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1.1 Background of the study
1.1.1 The state and the implementation of international law
It is a truism that the international legal system is, especially when 
compared to national legal systems, a largely horizontal and decentralised 
legal order. This nature of the international legal order, which is ultimately 
the result of the sovereignty and equality of its original and primary legal 
subjects, states, becomes visible both in the development of international 
law and in its realisation.1 In the absence of a central legislative authority 
which has the power to impose binding rules upon the system’s legal 
subjects, legal norms have been developed by the primary subjects them-
selves.2 As soon as the norms have emerged, most notably through treaties 
or custom, states themselves are entrusted with the task of enforcing the 
imposed rules by what has been called ‘self-help’.3 Although the imposition 
of enforcement measures or sanctions for alleged violations of international 
law by states may have some supra-national aspects, these procedures 
depend, directly or in directly, on the consent of states. The prominent 
position of states is, however, not confined to inter-state matters; the state 
may also contribute to the realisation of international law in matters that 
are subject to regulation by international law and that possess a more intra-
state character, such as an individual seeking access to justice for an alleged 
violation of applicable human rights standards by the state’s security 
services.
In general, international law relies to a large extent on the machinery 
of the state for the realisation of its policy aims and values on the domestic 
level. This is the result of the importance of state organs for the realisa-
tion of international law: decisions rendered by national courts may refer 
to applicable international law, a state’s executive may be involved in the 
education of its military personnel in accordance with obligations deriving 
from the law of armed conflict, or the national legislature may provide for 
the establishment of jurisdiction for the punishment of certain terrorist acts. 
Although the implementation of international law could be entrusted to 
1 Cassese distinguishes between three functions: law making, law determination and law 
enforcement. Law determination and law enforcement may be considered to fall under 
the header ‘realisation’. A. Cassese, International law (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2005) 5-6. See 
also M.N. Shaw, International law (6th edn CUP, Cambridge 2008) 6. 
2 Lauterpacht, E. (ed), International law, being the collected papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, vol I, 





multiple organs of the state, the interest of scholars has been selective and 
primarily focused on the activities of national courts, in particular in the 
way they apply international law.4
Although courts indeed play an important role in the application and 
implementation of international law on the domestic level, this almost 
exclusive emphasis on the contribution of judges is too narrow. The present 
study departs from the observation that under current international law, 
national legislatures, similar to the state’s judiciary or executive, are also 
endowed with the task of implementing international law in the domestic 
legal order. It seeks to establish whether the current international regula-
tion of implementing legislation is adequate for this task to be completed 
successfully.
1.1.2 The national legislature under international law: position
The term ‘national legislature’ used in this study must be understood as 
an autonomous concept, independent from the meaning attributed to it in 
the various domestic legal systems. Across the globe state legislatures have 
been given various names, including ‘Parliament’ in the United Kingdom 
and France, ‘Congress’ in the United States, ‘National People’s Congress’ 
in China, ‘States-General’ in the Netherlands, ‘Diet’ in Japan, ‘National 
Assembly for the Federation’ in Nigeria, ‘Federal Assembly’ in Russia, 
‘National Assembly of People’s Power’ in Cuba. The legislature is one of 
the three branches of government, or trias politica, an idea often associated 
with the French thinker Montesquieu. In his De l’esprit des lois, published 
in 1748, he observed that in each state there were three sorts of powers: the 
legislative power, the executive power and the power of judging. ‘By the 
first’, Montesquieu writes, ‘the prince or magistrate makes laws for a time 
or for always and corrects or abrogates those that have been made’.5
While organs with legislative powers nowadays often reflect the will 
of the population, or at least pretend to reflect that will, the (alleged) legiti-
macy of the organ is by no means a defining element. What counts, is the 
attribution of legislative powers. The term ‘national legislature’ will there-
fore be used to refer to a common denominator which can be found in any 
political community which constitutes a state and may be defined as ‘the 
part of government which exerts a legislative power, i.e. which is concerned 
with making and changing the law’.6 Although this seems to be a simple, 
adequate and useful definition, an international legal perspective, adopted 
in this study, may require some modification with the use of legal concepts 
4 This will be further discussed in section 1.4 on the relevance of the research.
5 C. de Montesquieu, The spirit of the laws, A. M. Cohler et al. (eds), (Cambridge texts in the 
history of political thought, CUP, Cambridge 1989) 156-157.
6 R. Scruton (ed), The Palgrave MacMillan dictionary of political thought (3rd edn Palgrave 




that are more common in international legal practice. For the purpose of this 
book, we therefore propose the following definition of ‘national legislature’:
A state organ which under national law has been entrusted with the 
power to adopt legislation.
Four elements of this definition deserve some clarification. First, the 
adjective ‘national’ in the title of this section is a reference to the state, the 
primary legal subject of the international legal order. The phrase ‘national 
legislature’ therefore must be understood as the legislature of the state; 
legislatures that are not part of a state, most notably legislative bodies of 
international organisations7, fall outside the scope of the present study, 
with the exception of the legislative quality standards developed in the 
framework of the European Union. Similarly, an extensive elaboration of the 
significance of the term ‘state’ will not be part of this book. It suffices to say 
that a state should possess all of the following qualifications: a permanent 
population, a defined territory, government and the capacity to enter into 
relations with other states.8 Once an entity meets these criteria, it is believed 
to acquire international legal personality and, as a consequence, the capacity 
to have rights and duties under international law. Contrary to the state, the 
national legislature does not possess international legal personality; as will 
be discussed below, the national legislature is merely an organ of an inter-
national legal person: the state.
Second, law-making authority usually is attributed to several organs 
of the state. As a result, the legislature will in practice often be composed 
of two or more state organs which draft and adopt laws in a joint effort. 
For example, article 42, first paragraph, of the Constitution of South 
Africa provides that Parliament consists of the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces. After a bill is adopted by Parliament, the 
assent (and signature) of the president is required before the bill becomes 
law. All three institutions participate in the legislative process.9 Similarly, 
the adoption of federal laws in Germany often require the involvement of 
the federal government, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat.10 Furthermore, 
the composition of the various national entities involved in the legislative 
process may be dependent upon a particular policy field. Under the South 
7 A case in point is the European Parliament, the (co-)legislative body of the European 
Union. Pursuant to article 14, fi rst paragraph, of the Treaty on European Union, ‘the 
European Parliament shall, jointly with the Council, exercise legislative and budgetary 
functions […]’. Treaty on European Union (consolidated version) OJ 2012, C 326, 1.
8 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (adopted 26 December 1933, entered into 
force 26 December 1936) 3802 LNTS 165 (Montevideo Convention) art 1.
9 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 art 42, second paragraph, and 79 
<https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996> (accessed 
29 March 2018).






African Constitution, legislative authority of the ‘national sphere of govern-
ment’ is attributed to Parliament, whereas the provincial legislatures and 
municipal councils possess legislative powers in the ‘provincial and local 
spheres of government’ respectively.11 The Basic Law of Germany, on the 
other hand, expressly stipulates what policy fields fall within the legislative 
competence of the Federation or of the states and hence whether the federal 
Bundestag or the legislatures of the states will have legislative authority.12
In short, even when taking into account the differences between states 
and the various political systems they embody, the term ‘legislature’ is not 
static; much depends on the division of competence between the national 
government and the regional or local governments, or between multiple 
organs on the national level. Given this state of affairs, Karpen rightly 
asserts, it is legitimate to speak of a ‘network of decision-making processes 
in legislation’.13
Third, not all stakeholders de facto involved in the legislative process 
are part of the national legislature. In this study, as already stated above, 
the scope of the term ‘national legislature’ will be limited to encompass 
only those actors that have been endowed with legislative powers under 
domestic law. Interest groups, whether they represent business interests or 
‘public’ interests, thus cannot be considered part of the national legislature.
Fourth, how should the term ‘legislation’ be understood? Laws that 
have been adopted by the national legislature are commonly referred to as 
legislation. Legislation contains general and abstract norms which can (and 
should) be applied or observed repeatedly in a infinite number of cases. 
In this respect they can be clearly distinguished from judicial law-making, 
which in principle is limited to the circumstances of a particular case. Legis-
lation must be understood as to encompass primary legislation adopted by 
parliaments and secondary laws, regulations and decrees.14
From an international legal perspective, the national legislature is a de 
iure organ of the state of which it is part.15 This legal bond could be derived 
from the international law of state responsibility, as codified in the Interna-
tional Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, article 4 of which provides:
11 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (n 9) art 43, sub a and b.
12 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (n 10) art 70-74.
13 U. Karpen, ‘Introduction’ in: U. Karpen and H. Xanthaki (eds), Legislation in Europe. 
A comprehensive guide for scholars and practitioners (Hart Publishing; Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon, 2017) 1-16, 5-6.
14 Cf. ibid, 2.
15 As opposed to de facto organs of the state, which include, for example, persons or entities, 
not being state organs, that are empowered by the law of that state to exercise elements 
of governmental authority and whose conduct, for purposes of responsibility, will 
be attributed to the state. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts art 5. ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 




‘1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under interna-
tional law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other func-
tions, whatever position it holds in the organisation of the State, and whatever its character 
as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State.
2.  An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the 
internal law of the State.’16
In other words, the national legislature must be considered an agent 
through which the state, itself nothing more than an abstraction, acts on 
the international legal stage. The obvious fact that any state is composed 
of several state organs, each with its own tasks and position within that 
state, is deliberately pushed aside in the text of article 4; the fragmenta-
tion or separation of power within the state is irrelevant, at least from the 
perspective of the international law of state responsibility.17 This idea is 
often referred to as the ‘unity of the state’ principle.18 As a consequence, its 
conduct will be attributed to the state of which it is part from the moment 
any domestic entity qualifies as state organ.19 If the conduct constitutes a 
breach of the state’s international obligations, it will amount to an inter-
nationally wrongful act for which the state bears responsibility.20 In the 
view of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), this is a ‘well-settled rule of 
international law, which also is of a customary character’.21
As emphasised by the ILC in article 4, first paragraph, cited above, the 
nature of the body’s functions (whether legislative, executive or judicial, 
or ‘any other’) is not relevant for the determination whether a particular 
body may be labelled ‘state organ’. The question arises how it could 
be determined whether an entity is a state organ. The second paragraph 
provides a clear answer to this question: entities which have the status of 
state organ under the domestic law of the state must be considered as such 
under international law. Nevertheless, entities which derive their status as a 
state organ from national practice instead of national law, may also qualify 
as state organ in accordance with article 4; state organs include, but are not 
16 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (n 15) art 4.
17 D. Momtaz, ‘Attribution of conduct to the state. State organs and entities empowered 
to exercise elements of governmental authority’ in: J. Crawford, A. Pellet and S. Olleson 
(eds), The law of international responsibility (OUP, Oxford 2010) 237-246, 239. 
18 ILC (n 15) 40. Or, phrased differently, ‘the agents of the State used to be treated as iden-
tical with it’. Momtaz (n 17) 237.
19 As a consequence, the state organ itself does not bear international responsibility for its 
conduct (whether wrongful or not); since the national legislature itself does not have 
international legal personality, its actions must be attributed to the legal person of which 
the legislature is an organ: the state.
20 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (n 15) art 2 jo. 
art 1.
21 Difference relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 




limited to, entities which are part of the state machinery in accordance with 
the law of that state.22
On the basis of the reasoning presented above, acts committed by a 
state’s armed forces and judgments passed by its courts must be attributed 
to the state of which they are part.23 Similarly, the national legislature 
must be considered a state organ, since its position and functions will be 
enshrined in many, if not all, modern constitutions.24 Indeed, it seems 
impossible to think of an entity that on the one hand meets our definition 
of ‘national legislature’, while on the other hand could not be qualified as 
‘state organ’. Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Constitution of the United States 
stipulates that ‘all legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of 
Representatives’.25 Pursuant to article 79, first paragraph of the 1995 Consti-
tution of the Republic of Uganda, ‘[…] Parliament shall have power to make 
laws on any matter for the peace, order, development and good governance 
of Uganda’.26 Another example is the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar, article 
96 of which provides that ‘the [bicameral parliament] Pyidaungsu Hluttaw 
shall have the right to enact laws for the entire or any part of the Union 
[of Myanmar] […]’.27 Therefore, the legislative organs mentioned in these 
respective constitutional provisions can be labelled as ‘state organs’.
1.1.3 National legislation under international law
Closely related to the position of the national legislature in the international 
legal sphere is the question how domestic legislative acts (legislation) should 
be viewed from an international legal perspective. An answer has been 
provided by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in 1926 in 
22 This view, that has been advanced by the ILC, has been supported by, and is based on, 
case law produced by the ICJ in the Armed Activities Case, in which the Court held that the 
conduct of soldiers of the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) in the territory of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo was attributable to Uganda ‘by virtue of the military status 
and function of Ugandan soldiers […]’. Case concerning Armed activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) (Judgment) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, par. 213.
23 ‘[…] the courts are regarded in the same way as any other organ of the state, the acts 
of which, if they breach the state’s international obligations, will entail its responsi-
bility’. S. Olleson, ‘Internationally wrongful acts in domestic courts. The contribution 
of domestic courts to the development of customary international law relating to the 
engagement of international responsibility’, 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 3 
(2013) 615-642, 618-619. See also: Difference relating to immunity from legal process of a 
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights (n 21) par. 63.
24 Momtaz (n 17) 239.
25 Constitution of the United States 1787 <https://www.senate.gov/civics/constitu-
tion_item/constitution.htm> (accessed 29 March 2018).
26 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 <http://www.statehouse.go.ug/govern-
ment/constitution> (accessed 29 March 2018). 
27 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar 2008 (Ministry of Information, 
2008) <http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf> 




Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia. This case centered on the expro-
priation of ‘certain German interests’ in Polish Upper Silesia by the Polish 
authorities, about which the German Empire complained before the PCIJ. 
The German Empire submitted that the Polish expropriation laws consti-
tuted a breach of several provisions of the Versailles Treaty and that several 
expropriation measures regarding specified properties contravened a treaty 
concluded between Poland and Germany. The PCIJ famously considered:
‘It might be asked whether a difficulty does not arise from the fact that the Court would 
have to deal with the Polish law of July 14th, 1920. This, however, does not appear to be the 
case. From the standpoint of International Law and of the Court which is its organ, munici-
pal laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of States, in the 
same manner as do legal decisions or administrative measures. The Court is certainly not 
called upon to interpret the Polish law as such; but there is nothing to prevent the Court’s 
giving judgment on the question whether or not, in applying that law, Poland is acting in 
conformity with its obligations towards Germany under the Geneva Convention.’28
The Court thus viewed domestic legislative acts as ‘mere facts’ under 
international law. This means that the acts do not constitute a source of 
international law and thus do not have intrinsic legal value in the interna-
tional legal order, contrary to its legal value in the domestic legal order. On 
the other hand, they are not legally irrelevant on the international plane; as 
the PCIJ noted, an investigation of the application of those domestic laws 
may be required to determine whether the state has respected its obliga-
tions under international law. This legal significance thus consists of an 
indication or evidence of an answer to the question whether a particular 
state has acted in accordance with its obligations under international law.29
More recently, the same approach was taken by the ICJ in 2005 when it 
discussed the possible value of domestic law in the settlement of a border 
dispute between Benin and Niger. The ICJ had to determine the course of 
the boundary between the two states on a particular date in the past. To 
this end, it had to examine the French colonial law which had applied prior 
to the specified date as this law might contain an indication of the existing 
legal titles. The ICJ referred to an earlier case in which it stated:
‘When reference is made to domestic law in such a context, that law is applicable “not in 
itself (as if there were a sort of continuum juris, a legal relay between such law and interna-
tional law), but only as one factual element among others, or as evidence indicative of […] 
the colonial heritage”’.30
28 Case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Merits) [1926] PCIJ Rep 
Series A No 7, 19. Also M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea) 
(Judgment of 1 July 1999) ITLOS Reports 1999, par. 120.
29 G. Arangio-Ruiz, ´International law and interindividual law’ in: J. Nijman and 
A. Nollkaemper (eds), New perspectives on the divide between national and international law 
(OUP, Oxford 2007) 15-52, 20.
30 Frontier Dispute (Benin v Niger) (Judgment) [2005] ICJ Rep 90, par. 28; Frontier Dispute 




In the international legal perspective taken in Certain German Interests 
and Frontier Dispute, legislative acts are not fundamentally different from 
legal decisions or administrative measures taken by other state bodies; the 
qualification of the national legislature as a state organ puts it on the same 
footing as any other state organ. As a result, conduct of other state organs 
must be treated in the same manner as legislative acts. In the Avena case, the 
ICJ expressed the opinion that in order to determine whether the United 
States had acted in accordance with its treaty obligations, the ICJ was 
entitled to assess decisions of domestic courts. Just as in the LaGrand Case, 
the Avena Case concerned a dispute about the 1963 Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations (VCCR). The claims submitted by Mexico were, among 
others, that the United States, by arresting, detaining, trying, convicting and 
sentencing 54 Mexican nationals on death row, had violated the VCCR; and 
that the United States was under the obligation not to apply its national 
‘procedural default’ rule31, or any other doctrine of municipal law, to 
preclude the exercise of the rights afforded by article 36 VCCR. In its first 
objection against the ICJ’s jurisdiction, the United States complained that the 
suggested findings about the United States criminal justice system would 
constitute an illegitimate interference with that system and as such would 
amount to the abuse of its jurisdiction by the ICJ. In response, the ICJ held:
‘The Court would recall that its jurisdiction in the present case has been invoked under the 
Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol to determine the nature and extent of the obliga-
tions undertaken by the United States towards Mexico by becoming party to that Conven-
tion. If and so far as the Court may find that the obligations accepted by the parties to the 
Vienna Convention included commitments as to the conduct of their municipal courts in 
relation to the nationals of other parties, then in order to ascertain whether there have been 
breaches of the Convention, the Court must be able to examine the actions of those courts 
in the light of international law. The Court is unable to uphold the contention of the United 
States that, as a matter of jurisdiction, it is debarred from enquiring into the conduct of 
criminal proceedings in United States courts.’32
The above suggests an approach taken by the PCIJ and ICJ in which they 
maintained a clear distinction between international law and national law. 
This means that legislative acts in the domestic legal sphere do not possess 
the quality of law in the international legal sphere. However, they can have 
legal significance under international law, as we have seen.
31 This rule has been described as ‘a federal rule that, before a state criminal defendant can 
obtain relief in federal court, the claim must be presented to a state court. If a state defen-
dant attempts to raise a new issue in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the defendant 
can only do so by showing cause and prejudice. Cause is an external impediment that 
prevents a defendant from raising a claim and prejudice must be obvious on its face. One 
important purpose of this rule is to ensure that the state courts have an opportunity to 
address issues going to the validity of state convictions before the federal courts inter-
vene.’ LaGrand Case (Germany v United States of America) (Judgment) [2001] ICJ Rep 466, 
par. 23.




1.1.4 The national legislature under international law: four roles
To complete our exploration of preliminary matters, it is useful to further 
contemplate the roles that can be attributed to national legislatures under 
international law. Or, to be more precise, national legislation may be 
relevant from an international legal perspective in four respects.
First, the national legislature’s conduct may constitute evidence for the 
emergence of a new rule of customary international law. Since customary 
international law will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 3, for 
now it may suffice to note that legislation has been analysed in order to 
establish the possible existence of state practice.33 As regards the second 
constituent element of customary international law, opinio iuris, it may 
come as a surprise that national legislative acts have not been mentioned 
explicitly as a source of opinio iuris in international case law. Whereas the 
extreme view that national legislation cannot be a source of opinio iuris 
probably goes too far34, the question remains why national laws have not 
been referred to for the purpose of demonstrating opinio iuris. The method 
which the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) has used for the determination of the (possible) existence of a rule of 
customary international law, suggests a blurring of the distinction between 
both its constituent elements: state practice and opinio iuris. In other words, 
the tribunal may treat state practice itself (consisting of the enactment of 
national legislation), as a reflection of a sense of legal obligation (opinio 
33 Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) (Judgment) [1951] ICJ Rep 116, p. 131. Nottebohm
Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatamala) (Second phase) [1955] ICJ Rep 4, p. 22. Arrest Warrant of 
11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (Judgment) [2002] ICJ Rep 3, par. 
58. Prosecutor v Stanislav Galić (Appeals Chamber judgment) IT-98-29-A (30 November 
2006) par. 94-98. Also Prosecutor vs. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez (Appeals Chamber judg-
ment) IT-95-14/2-A (17 December 2004) par. 65-66.
34 The topic was touched upon in the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert 
accompanying the Arrest Warrant judgment, in which she assessed the claim that a 
state may only establish universal jurisdiction of certain crimes if the alleged offender 
is present on its territory. She stated: ‘There is no customary international law to [the 
effect that universal jurisdiction in absentia is prohibited] either. The Congo submits there 
is a state practice, evidencing an opinio juris asserting that universal jurisdiction, per se, 
requires the presence of the offender on the territory of the prosecuting State. Many 
national systems giving effect to the obligation aut dedere aut judicare and/or the Rome 
Statute for an International Criminal Court indeed require the presence of the  offender. 
This appears from legislation and from a number of national decisions including the 
Danish Saric case , the French Javor case and the German Jorgic case . However, there are 
also examples of national systems that do not require the presence of the offender on the 
territory of the prosecuting State . Governments and national courts in the same State 
may hold different opinions on the same question, which makes it even more diffi cult to 
identify the opinio juris in that State . And even where national law requires the presence 
of the offender, this is not necessarily the expression of an opinio juris to the effect that this 
is a requirement under international law. National decisions should be read  with much 
caution.’ Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (Judg-




iuris) on behalf of that state. Under those circumstances, a separate discus-
sion of opinio iuris can be considered redundant. This approach was taken 
by the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić. In this case, the 
Appeals Chamber investigated the existence of a customary international 
norm establishing individual criminal responsibility for violations of the 
prohibition to spread terror among the civilian population. The Appeals 
Chamber stated that ‘individual criminal responsibility […] can be inferred 
from, inter alia, state practice indicating an intention to criminalise the 
prohibition, including statements by government officials and international 
organisations, as well as punishment of violations by national courts and 
military tribunals’. After brief remarks concerning a report of a commission 
established by an international conference and the conviction of a person 
for similar conduct by a Croatian municipal court, it proceeded to discuss 
national legislation on this topic. Following the discussion of the relevant 
domestic legislation, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility for the crime of spreading terror was of a 
customary nature.35 Apparently, it deemed a separate discussion of relevant 
opinio iuris unnecessary.
Second, domestic legislation may be a useful instrument for the 
interpretation of treaty provisions. In order to determine the content of an 
international legal obligation which has been laid down in a treaty, recourse 
may be had to national legislation. The legal basis of this practice can be 
found in article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 
which provides, as a general rule, that a treaty should be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.36
Moreover, there shall be taken into account, together with the context ‘any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’.37 Taking into account 
the subsequent practice of the parties to the treaty is a manner to identify 
the intention of the parties after the conclusion of a treaty, when this inten-
tion of the parties cannot be derived from the text of the treaty itself.38 The 
agreement would lead to an authoritative interpretation which must be read 
in the relevant treaty, thereby potentially achieving the same result as an 
amendment of the treaty provisions. For the sake of legal certainty, interna-
tional courts tend to maintain high, but diverging, thresholds for accepting 
35 Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić (n 33).
36 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT) art 31, fi rst paragraph.
37 VCLT art 31, third paragraph, sub b.
38 J.-M. Sorel and V. Boré Eveno, ‘Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention’ in: O. Corten 
and P. Klein (eds), The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A Commentary, vol I (Oxford 




subsequent practice.39 The question arises whether national legislation can 
amount to ‘subsequent practice’ in the sense of article 31, third paragraph, 
sub b, VCLT and, if so, under what conditions.40 As a point of departure, 
the formulation of ‘subsequent practice’ is such that it may be considered 
a ‘catch-all’ supplement to the rather restrictive requirement of (formal) 
‘subsequent agreement’ in accordance with article 31, third paragraph, 
sub a.41 With the broad scope of the term ‘practice’ in mind, there seems 
to be no ground for a a priori preclusion of national legislation as a means 
of interpretation of treaty provisions.42 As the national legislature can be 
considered an organ of the state [party to a treaty], its conduct could in 
principle amount to relevant ‘subsequent practice’.43 This point came to the 
fore in Case Concerning the Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, 
in which the ICJ had to decide whether a provision of the Treaty of Limits, 
concluded by Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1858, transferred upon Costa 
Rica a right of free navigation on the San Juan river. Article VI of the treaty 
granted to Costa Rica a perpetual right of free navigation ‘con objetos de 
comercio’.44 Costa Rica propagated a broad interpretation of this provision 
and argued that it encompassed both the transport of goods and the trans-
port of passengers.45 The Court agreed and based its finding on an evolutive 
interpretation of the term ‘commerce’.46 In his Separate Opinion, however, 
Judge Skotnikov pointed to the fact that Nicaragua had applied national 
regulations to the transport of passengers by Costa Rican companies:
39 A. Orakhelashvili, The interpretation of acts and rules in public international law (Oxford 
Monographs in International Law, OUP, Oxford 2008) 358-365; G. Nolte, ‘Subsequent 
practice as a means of interpretation in the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body’, 
in: E. Cannizzaro (ed), The law of treaties beyond the Vienna Convention (OUP, Oxford 2011) 
138-144, 141-143; Sorel and Boré Eveno (n 38) 826-829.
40 I. Würth, ‘Treaty interpretation, subsequent agreements and practice, and domestic 
constitutions’ in: G. Nolte (ed) Treaties and subsequent practice (OUP, Oxford 2013) 154-159, 
155-158.
41 R. Moloo, ‘When actions speak louder than words. The relevance of subsequent party 
conduct to treaty interpretation’, 31 Berkeley Journal of International Law (2013) 39-88, 64.
42 As Hafner points out, ‘in any case, the author [of subsequent practice] must be an indi-
vidual or entity whose acts are attributable to the state in question, provided that its act 
evidences a certain constant pattern of state conduct’. G. Hafner, ‘Subsequent agreements 
and practice. Between interpretation, informal modifi cation and formal amendment’ in: 
G. Nolte (ed), Treaties and subsequent practice (OUP, Oxford 2013) 105-122, 113.
43 G. Nolte, ‘Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice of states outside of judicial or 
quasi-judicial proceedings. Third report for the ILC Study Group on Treaties over time’ 
in: Idem (ed), Treaties and subsequent practice (OUP, Oxford 2013) 307-386, 310.
44 Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (Judgment) 
[2009] ICJ Rep 213, par. 37 and 42. Also Moloo (n 41) 65-66.
45 Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (n 44) par. 45 and 59.
46 The Court held: ‘[E]ven assuming that the notion of “commerce” does not have the same 
meaning today as it did in the mid-nineteenth century, it is the present meaning which 
must be accepted for purposes of applying the Treaty.’ Dispute Regarding Navigational and 
Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (n 44) par. 70. Also M. Kohen, ‘Keeping subsequent 
agreements and practice in their right limits’ in: G. Nolte (ed), Treaties and subsequent 




‘Nicaragua submits evidence that at the time the Treaty of Limits was concluded and for 
more than 100 years thereafter, it alone controlled the commercial transport of passengers. 
Be that as it may, it is clear that Costa Rican-operated tourism on the San Juan River has 
been present for at least a decade, and to a substantial degree. Nicaragua has never pro-
tested. This is in contrast to Nicaragua’s treatment of police vessels, which it has repeated-
ly asserted have no right whatsoever to travel on the San Juan. Nicaragua has not only 
engaged in a consistent practice of allowing tourist navigation by Costa Rican operators, 
but has also subjected it to its regulations. This can be seen as recognition by Nicaragua 
that Costa Rica acted as of right. […] In my view, the subsequent practice in the application 
of the Treaty suggests that the Parties have established an agreement regarding its interpre-
tation: Costa Rica has a right under the 1858 Treaty to transport tourists.’47
Thus, in Judge Skotnikov’s Separate Opinion, regulation by the Nicaraguan 
national authorities was an element which he interpreted as a permission 
expressed by Nicaragua to the practice of the Costa Rican tourist operators. 
Nevertheless, it will often be hard to derive from, or in response to, a piece 
of national legislation an ‘agreement of the parties’. Agreement presupposes 
some level of awareness. National legislation is, however, first and foremost 
a domestic affair; states do not have an obligation to keep themselves 
informed about the enactment of legislation within other states’ national 
jurisdictions.48 The criterion of awareness will thus not easily be met. On the 
other hand, if a state adheres, as would become visible from a national law, 
to a certain interpretation of a treaty provision to which it is bound and this 
interpretation is brought officially to the attention of the other state parties, 
this may be accepted as subsequent practice modifying the interpretation 
of that treaty provision; provided, of course, that the other states’ actions 
demonstrate ‘agreement’ to this interpretation. There are many ways in 
which states can demonstrate agreement, including through inaction, the 
validity of which may vary from case to case.49
Similarly, in its case law the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) 
frequently investigates the possible existence of ‘international and Euro-
pean consensus’ in the interpretation of the obligations laid down in the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR).50 In the view of the ECtHR, the ECHR should be consid-
47 Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (Judgment) 
(Separate Opinion of Judge Skotnikov) [2009] ICJ Rep 283, par. 9.
48 Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon 
v Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea intervening) (Judgment) [2002] ICJ Rep 303, par. 266. As was 
noted in the Third report for the ILC Study Group on Treaties over time, ‘[t]he mere fact 
that a document is publicly accessible does not, however mean that it can be assumed 
that another state has knowledge of it, or that another state has even adopted a position 
with respect to it’. Nolte (n 43) 318.
49 Moloo (n 41) 66-68.
50 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 
November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) 213 UNTS 211 (ECHR). For example, Marckx v Belgium (App no 




ered a ‘living instrument’, which requires an interpretation of its provisions 
‘in the light of present-day conditions’.51 These conditions can be derived 
from, among other sources, domestic legislation. Contrary to the regime of 
the VCLT applicable to ‘subsequent practice’, the evolutive interpretation 
of the ECHR must be based on the doctrine which prescribes interpreta-
tion of the convention in accordance with the ‘object and purpose of the 
convention’.52
Third, an act by the national legislature may constitute a breach of an 
international obligation. This breach may result from the adoption of a legis-
lative act which contravenes a binding norm of international origin, or from 
the failure to adopt legislation despite an obligation thereto.53 Arguably, in 
relation to the former category a distinction should be made between the 
adoption of a law by the national legislature, and the application of that 
law in a specific case. The mere adoption of a law in contravention of a 
state’s legal obligations would not amount to an internationally wrongful 
act, so the argument goes; only when that law is applied in one or more 
specific cases, the conduct gives rise to international responsibility.54 This 
will often be true, as legal consequences only arise when the law is applied 
to factual conduct of a legal subject. This notwithstanding, in some cases, 
international law may prescribe criteria that the formulation of the national 
piece of legislation should meet. In the 1923 Advisory Opinion German 
Settlers in Poland, the PCIJ made exactly this distinction between ‘fact’ and 
‘law’. Article 8 of the Polish Minority Treaty, concluded at the end of the 
First World War in order to provide for the protection of the interests of 
minorities of non-Polish origin residing on the newly established Polish 
territory, stipulated that ‘Polish nationals who belong to racial, religious 
or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law 
51 Demir & Baykara v Turkey (App no 34503/97) ECHR 2008-V 395, par. 68; Tyrer v the United 
Kingdom (App no 5856/72 (1978) Series A no 26, par. 31; Christine Goodwin v the United 
Kingdom (App no 28957/95) ECHR 2002-VI 1, par. 74.
52 Which in turn could be based on article 31, fi rst paragraph, of the VCLT. K. Dzehtsiarou, 
‘European consensus and the evolutive interpretation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ 12 German Law Journal (2011) 1730-1745, 1739. Also J. H. Gerards, ‘Judi-
cial deliberations in the European Court of Human Rights’ in: N. Huls, M. Adams and 
J. Bomhoff (eds), The legitimacy of highest courts’ rulings. Judicial deliberations and beyond 
(TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2009) 407-436, 423.
53 Also Momtaz (n 17) 240. 
54 As the ICTY put it in Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija: ‘Normally, the maintenance or passage 
of national legislation inconsistent with international rules generates State responsibility 
and consequently gives rise to a corresponding claim for cessation and reparation (lato 
sensu) only when such legislation is concretely applied.’ Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija
(Trial Chamber judgment) IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) par. 150. Also German Settlers 




and in fact as the other Polish nationals’.55 In this case the PCIJ found that 
‘there must equality in fact as well as ostensible legal equality in the sense of 
the absence of discrimination in the words of the law’.56 This may indicate 
that whenever a rule of international law not only prescribes certain factual 
conduct by a state, but also formulates requirements the text of national 
laws should meet, the mere enactment of legislation without its application, 
may amount to an internationally wrongful act.57
Fourth, the national legislature may be involved in the implementation 
of international legal obligations in the domestic legal order. According to 
the PCIJ, this role is based on:
‘[…] a principle which is self-evident, according to which a State which has contracted 
valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislation such modifications as 
may be necessary to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken’.58
Arguably, this is a general principle of law, or a manifestation of the prin-
ciple of pacta sunt servanda or of the principle of good faith, without which 
the international legal order would be largely dysfunctional. In addition, 
these basic principles have been codified in several instruments, the most 
important being article 2, second paragraph, of the Charter of the United 
Nations (ChUN). It provides that ‘[a]ll Members, in order to ensure to all of 
them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good 
faith the obligations assumed by them in the present Charter’.59
The task to which the PCIJ referred in the statement cited above, is cen-
 tral to the present study.
55 Minorities treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (the British 
Empire, France, Italy, Japan and the United States) and Poland (adopted 28 June 1919) 225 
CTS 412.
56 German Settlers in Poland (n 54) p. 24.
57 A closely related discussion can be discerned in the case law of the ECtHR, which has 
been confronted with the question whether states party to the ECHR are under the 
obligation to repeal domestic legislation which contravenes the provisions of that treaty, 
even if the relevant domestic law is not applied in practice. In Modinos v Cyprus, the 
Court suggested that the mere existence of such laws may, in absence of application in 
practice, amount to a breach of the ECHR. Modinos v Cyprus (App no 15070/89) (1993) 
Series A no 259, par. 22-24. This position seems to be confi rmed in more recent case law, 
such as A.D.T. v the United Kindom (App no 35765/97) ECHR 2000-IX 295, par. 23 and 38 
and S.A.S. v France (43835/11) ECHR 2014-III 341, par. 57. Also R.A. Lawson, ‘Positieve 
verplichtingen onder het EVRM. Opkomst en ondergang van de Fair Balance-test’ 20 
NJCM Bulletin 5 (1995) 558-573, 561-562.
58 Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations (Advisory Opinion) [1925] PCIJ Rep Series B No 
10, p. 20.
59 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 




1.2 Implementation of international law in the national 
legal order: a working definition
What exactly do the terms ‘implementation’ and ‘implementing legislation’ 
mean in the context of the fourth role of the national legislature, identified 
above, and in the context of the present study? The term ‘implementation’ 
originates from the Latin verb ‘implēre’, which means ‘to fill’ or ‘to fulfill’. 
In a general, non-legal context, ‘implementation’ may be defined as ‘the 
process of putting a decision or plan into effect’.60 The Oxford Dictionary of 
Law refers to ‘implementation’ as ‘the process of bringing any piece of legis-
lation into force’.61 According to Raustiala and Slaughter, implementation is 
‘the process of putting international commitments into practice’.62 Although 
these descriptions contain useful elements, they ignore one important aspect 
which has been emphasised in the present study up to this point: the distinc-
tion between the international and domestic legal spheres, as discussed in 
the previous section. A definition of implementation which is, therefore, 
more suitable for the purpose of the present study of a legal character is:
the act of putting into effect a norm of international law within the legal order of the state.63
The phrase ‘legal order of the state’ will be elaborated upon in Chapter 2,
and the notion of ‘norm of international law’ will be further discussed in 
Chapter 3. Therefore, only two elements will be briefly explained here. 
First, implementation is an act, which will be performed by the competent 
organ(s) on the domestic level. These organs may be part of the executive, 
legislative or judicial branch of government; as we have seen, the attribu-
tion of powers by national law is decisive. Although implementation could 
be viewed as a single act, as it is in the definition provided above, in prac-
tice it will often encompass several, or indeed many, subsequent acts which 
together amount to ‘implementation’. For that reason, the act of implemen-
tation may be a time-consuming endeavour. In general, implementing acts 
performed by the executive may require less time than implementation 
through legislation, although whether this is true in a particular case will 
probably depend upon many factors, among them the complexity of the 
implementation and the number of actors involved.
60 A. Stevenson (ed), Oxford Dictionary of English (3rd edn OUP, Oxford 2010).
61 J. Law and E.A. Martin (eds), Oxford Dictionary of Law (7th edn OUP, Oxford 2009).
62 K. Raustiala, and A.-M. Slaughter, ‘International law, international relations and compli-
ance’, in: W. Carlsnaes, Th. Risse and B.A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of international 
relations (Sage Publications, London 2002) 538-558, 539.
63 Cf. Jacobson and Brown Weiss, in whose opinion ‘implementation refers to measures 
that states take to make international accords in their domestic law’. H.K. Jacobson and 
E. Brown Weiss, ‘A framework for analysis’ in: Idem (eds), Engaging countries. Strengthe-





An implementing act performed by the national legislature will in 
principle start with the drafting of a legislative proposal and will not end 
until the enacted piece of legislation enters into force. This entire process 
will be governed by national (constitutional) law.64 The content of such 
implementing legislation could be diverse and will, of course, depend on 
the substance of the contracted international legal obligation. As we will 
see in Chapter 3, this may include legislative measures in order to establish 
jurisdiction over certain (criminal) acts, to impose adequate punishment 
on perpetrators, the appointment of a national authority which will be 
entrusted with the task to carry out the prescriptions set forth in the interna-
tional instrument, or the provision of some form of legal protection on the 
domestic level.
This brings us to the second element of the working definition 
presented above that deserves some clarification: the phrase ‘into effect’. 
This term is closely linked to questions of compliance and implementation, 
and is often referred to as the element of effectiveness: the extent to which 
a norm induces changes in behavior or achieves its policy objectives.65
Since the criterion of effectiveness is part of the normative framework that 
will be presented and discussed in Parts II and III, some general remarks 
on effectiveness suffice at this point. ‘Effective implementation’ must be 
distinguished from an ‘effective (international) norm’. Although the effec-
tive implementation of an international legal norm in domestic legal orders 
is a sine qua non for the effectiveness of that norm, effective implementa-
tion will not in all cases suffice for an international norm to be labelled 
as ‘effective’.66 ‘Effectiveness’ in relation to implementation refers to the 
rationale behind (or: content of) the act performed by the competent actor. 
64 Under European secondary legislation, however, the national legislative process has to be 
complemented by an additional action called ‘notifi cation’, through which states inform 
the European Commission about the completion of the implementing process. To this 
end, directives often contain the following provision: ‘Member States shall communicate 
to the Commission the text of the provisions of national law which they adopt in the fi eld 
governed by this Directive.’
65 Raustiala and Slaughter (n 62) 539. Also M.E. Footer, ‘Some theoretical and legal perspec-
tives on WTO compliance’ 38 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (2007) 61-112, 67. 
66 With regard to effective norms and their relation to the concept of ‘compliance’, Raustiala 
and Slaughter note that ‘the connection between compliance and effectiveness is also 
neither necessary nor suffi cient. Rules or regimes can be effective in any of these senses 
even if compliance is low. And while high levels of compliance can indicate high levels 
of effectiveness, they can also indicate low, readily met and ineffective standards. Many 
international agreements refl ect a lowest common denominator dynamic that makes 
compliance easy but results in a negligible infl uence on behavior. Here is the source of 
the vexing question of the signifi cance of high observed levels of compliances. From 
an effectiveness perspective more compliance is better, ceteris paribus. But regimes with 
signifi cant non-compliance can still be effective if they induce changes in behavior’. 




It thus becomes clear that the criterion of effectiveness is inherent to the 
concept of implementation. In this view, there is no such thing as implemen-
tation which is not effective; the expression ‘effective implementation’ is a 
pleonasm. This notwithstanding, the central place of the criterion of effec-
tiveness raises the question how the term ‘effective’ has to be understood 
in the context of the implementation of international law by the national 
legislature, whether as part and parcel of the notion of implementation or 
as a separate qualification. Since the national legislature acts through the 
adoption of legislation, it seems justified to assume that implementation 
of an international norm which solely requires the adoption of legislation, 
has succeeded when the national legislature enacts ‘effective’ implementing 
legislation. Put differently, in order to determine whether implementation 
was completed successfully we should at least make an assessment of the 
effectiveness of relevant piece of implementing legislation.
1.3 Research subject and research questions
The execution of the fourth task, the implementation of international legal 
obligations binding on the state of which the legislature is part, illustrates, 
more than the other roles mentioned above, the national legislature’s contri-
bution to the realisation of international law. It is topic of this study, the 
main research question of which is:
To what is extent is domestic implementing legislation regulated by international law and 
to what extent is this regulation adequate?
This research question has two essential components: a descriptive analysis 
of international legal practice with regard to the regulation of implementing 
legislation and a normative assessment of this practice. This assessment 
seeks to establish the adequacy of international legal practice. In order to 
operationalise the notion of adequacy, the present study borrows from the 
field of legisprudence. Legisprudence is the theoretical study of legislative 
problems from the perspective of legal theory. As Wintgens notes:
‘Legisprudence has as its object legislation and regulation, making use of the theoretical 
tools and insights of legal theory. The latter predominantly deals with the question of appli-
cation of law by the judge. Legisprudence enlarges the field of study to include the creation 
of law by the legislator.’67
67 L. Wintgens, ‘Rationality in legislation – Legal theory as legisprudence: an introduction’ 
in: Idem (ed), Legisprudence: a new theoretical approach to legislation. Proceedings of the Fourth 
Benelux-Scandinavian Symposium on Legal Theory (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon, 2002) 1-7, 2. Also L. Wintgens and Ph. Thion, ‘Introduction’ in: Idem (eds), Legis-




More specifically, Karpen explains, legisprudence is an interdisciplinary 
science, which encompasses the analysis of norms, research and practice 
of organisation and procedure, the setting of policies and adequate goals 
and the choice of effective and efficient means of regulation. It has both a 
theoretical and practical character. This means that it not only describes and 
analyses legislative practice, but also aims to apply its findings in practice.68
Under this heading various aspects of legislation are discussed, including 
its ‘quality’. In the present study, the question to what extent the regulation 
of implementing legislation can be considered adequate, coincides with the 
question to what extent this regulation ensures legislative quality. In other 
words, legislative quality is the yardstick through which the adequacy of 
international practice will be assessed.
In order to formulate an adequate answer to the main research question, 
several topics have to be addressed. These include the following questions: 
how must the relationship between international law and national law be 
understood?; why are national implementing measures indispensable?; 
from what sources do obligations to implement international law originate?; 
to what extent do international and European law impose legal constraints 
on the national legislature engaged in the act of implementation?; and to 
what extent do the international legal constraints on the national legislature 
that are currently in place correspond to quality standards applicable to 
legislation?
1.4 Aims and relevance of the study
The present study explores the extent to which domestic implementing 
legislation is governed by international law and makes an assessment of the 
question whether this regulation is adequate. In doing so, it intends to make 
a contribution to the academic debate in two ways.
First, scholarly research into the implementation of international law in 
the domestic legal order tends to adopt three distinct, sometimes overlap-
ping, approaches. Some publications specifically focus on national courts 




as institutions which apply and develop international law in general69, 
or certain branches of international law in particular.70 This perspective 
may be termed the institution-oriented approach. Other publications 
have a particular focus on a specified international legal instrument: the 
instrument-oriented approach. Often they seek to provide an answer to the 
question how a specified legal instrument is or should be implemented on 
the national level.71 A third approach can be found in publications which 
69 Examples include: A. Nollkaemper, ‘The role of domestic courts in the case law of the 
International Court of Justice’ 5 Chinese Journal of International Law 2 (2006) 301-322; E. 
Benvenisti, ‘Reclaiming democracy: the strategic uses of foreign and international law by 
national courts’ 102 American Journal of International Law (2008) 241-274; E. Benvenisti and 
G. Downs, ‘National courts, domestic democracy and the evolution of international law’ 
20 European Journal of International Law 1 (2009) 59-72; A. Roberts, ‘Comparative inter-
national law? The role of national courts in creating and enforcing international law’ 60 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2011) 57-92; A. Nollkaemper, National courts 
and the international rule of law (OUP, Oxford 2011); A. Tzanakopoulos, ‘Domestic courts 
in international law: the international judicial function of national courts’ 34 Loyola of 
Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 1 (2011) 133-168; O. Fauchald, and 
A. Nollkaemper (eds), The practice of international and national courts and the (de-)fragmen-
tation of international law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2012); A. Tzanakopoulos and Ch. J. 
Tams, ‘Introduction: domestic courts as agents of the development of international law’ 
26 Leiden Journal of International Law (2013) 531-540; W. Sandholtz, ‘How domestic courts 
use international law’ 38 Fordham International Law Journal (2015) 596-637; O. Grady 
Schwartz, ‘International law and national courts: between mutual empowerment and 
mutual weakening’ 23 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law (2015) 587-626. 
70 Examples include: I. Würth, ‘International law in domestic courts and the Jurisdictional 
immunities of the state case’ 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law 2 (2012) 819-837; 
R. O’Keefe, ‘Domestic courts as agents of the development of the international law of 
jurisdiction’ 26 Leiden Journal of International Law (2013) 541-558; S. Olleson, ‘Interna-
tionally wrongful acts in domestic courts. The contribution of domestic courts to the 
development of customary international law relating to the engagement of international 
responsibility’ 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 3 (2013) 615-642; S. Weill, The role of 
national courts in applying international humanitarian law (International Law in Domestic 
Legal Orders, OUP, Oxford 2014).
71 Examples include: M. Bothe, ‘National implementation of the CWC: some legal consider-
ations’ in: M. Bothe, N. Ronzitti and A. Rosas (eds), The New Chemical Weapons Convention: 
implementation and prospects (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1998) 543-568; J.A. 
Herrera, Mexico’s implementation of the Biodiversity Convention and the Cartagena Protocol in 
the GMO era: challenges in principles, policies and practices (DSL thesis, Dalhousie University 
2007); M. Lewis, ‘China’s implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime’ 2 Asian Journal of Criminology 2 (2007) 179-196; V. Prahalad 
and L. Kriwoken, ‘Implementation of the Ramsar Convention on wetlands in Tasmania, 
Australia’ 13 Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy (2010) 205-239; H. Sono, 
‘Japan’s accession to and implementation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)’ 53 Japanese Yearbook of International Law (2010) 
410-437; A. Chandra and A. Idrisova, ‘Convention on Biological Diversity: a review of 
national challenges and opportunities for implementation’ 20 Biodiversity and Conservation 
14 (2011) 3295-3316; C. Rose, ‘The UK Bribery Act and accompanying guidance: Belated 
implementation of the OECD Anti-bribery Convention’ 61 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly (2012) 485-499; W. Gullett, ‘Legislative implementation of the Law of 




are concerned with the (comparative) analysis of domestic constitutional 
systems, in particular the way international law is received in a specific 
national legal order.72 This may be labelled the constitutional law-oriented 
approach. A particular insightful study in this regard is International law in 
domestic legal systems: Incorporation, transformation, and persuasion, edited by 
Dinah Shelton, which covers 27 national legal orders.73
Contrary to the role of domestic courts, the position of the national 
legislature has attracted only modest attention. In particular, publications 
with an institution-oriented approach are scarce. More research has been 
conducted on the implementation of international law by legislative means 
with an instrument-oriented approach. However, these publications are 
often limited to implementation in a specific country. Even more literature 
is available on the role of the national legislature, similar to the national 
courts, in the implementation of international law with a constitutional 
law-oriented approach. Nevertheless, these publications are limited to an 
analysis of the ways in which international legal instruments are given 
the quality of law in various national legal orders by legislative acts of 
incorporation. They must be distinguished from implementing legislation, 
as will be further explained in Chapter 2. In sum, despite the national legis-
lature’s prominent role in the implementation of international law, existing 
academic scholarship reveals some lacunae. Against this backdrop, a study 
which primarily concerns the role of the national legislature may enhance 
our understanding of the relation between international and national law 
and of the implementation of international law in the national legal order.
Second, and perhaps most important, the present study seeks to connect 
the study of public international law with academic discussions on legisla-
tive quality. It may thus bring the requirements of good legislation to the 
attention of international policy makers and international legal scholars. 
72 Examples include: S. Fatima, Using international law in domestic courts (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2005) which focuses on the English legal order; S. Marochkin, ‘International law 
in the courts of the Russian Federation: Application of practice’ 6 Chinese Journal of Inter-
national Law 2 (2007) 329-344; V.G. Hegde, ‘Indian courts and international law’ 23 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 1 (2010) 53-77; J. Fleuren, ‘The application of public interna-
tional law by Dutch courts’ 57 Netherlands International Law Review (2010) 245-266; O.A. 
Hathaway, S. McElroy and S. Aronchick Solow, ‘International law at home: enforcing 
treaties in U.S. courts’ 37 Yale Journal of International Law (2012) 51-106; A. Paulus, ‘The 
judge and international custom’ 12 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribu-
nals (2013) 253-265 which focuses on the German legal order; V. Fikfak, ‘International law 
before English and Asian courts: fi nding the judicial role in the separation of powers’ 3 
Asian Journal of International Law 2 (2013) 271-304; G. de Búrca, ‘International law before 
the courts: the EU and the US compared’ 55 Virginia Journal of International Law 3 (2015) 
685-728; Ch. Okeke, ‘The use of international law in the domestic courts of Ghana and 
Nigeria’ 32 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 2 (2015) 371-430; C. Cai, 
‘International law in Chinese courts during the rise of China’ 110 American Journal of 
International Law 2 (2016) 269-288.
73 D. Shelton (ed), International law in domestic legal systems: Incorporation, transformation, and 




Simultaneously, it may inspire scholars of legisprudence to explore the 
phenomenon of legislation based on international legal instruments, 
thereby contributing to the quality of implementing legislation.
1.5 Outline, scope and methodology of the study
The present study is divided into three parts, each of which consists of at 
least two chapters. Part I is dedicated to a general introduction to the topic 
of implementation of international law. To this end, three separate subjects 
will be explored in this part: the context of implementation, which encom-
passes inter alia the concept of implementation and the relationship between 
international law and national law (Chapter 2) and the sources of law from 
which an obligation to adopt domestic implementing legislation may derive 
(Chapter 3).
In Part II, the general perspective will be abandoned. Instead, we will 
zoom in on the regulation of national implementing legislation under 
various special international legal regimes, such as the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT) and 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). ‘Regulation’ in this 
respect is to be understood as comprising the requirements or standards 
pertaining to domestic implementing legislation under each international 
legal regime. Part II contains a descriptive analysis of international legal 
practice with regard to the regulation of implementing legislation.
Generally speaking, Parts I and II of the study reflect an international 
legal perspective on domestic implementing legislation. As a result, the 
objects of analysis are general international law and particular international 
legal regimes. The latter category must also be considered to encompass 
the law of the European Union applicable to the implementation of its 
legal instruments. The inclusion of EU law in this study is justified, as it 
contains an extensive body of case law from which standards applicable 
to implementing legislation may be derived. This will be further explained 
in Part II. Other international legal regimes that will be explored originate 
from human rights law, international criminal law, international health law, 
international environmental law and international labour law. The inter-
national legal approach is also visible in the selection of sources; they will 
mainly include sources of an international character. Examples are the case 
law of international courts, most notably the ICJ, treaties and relevant docu-
ments drafted in the framework of international organisations. Thus, it will 
address neither specific national legislative acts which serve to implement 
international law, nor relevant case law produced by national courts.
In Part III, the findings of Part II will be assessed. This assessment 
encompasses a discussion of the common features of both the standards 
applicable to implementing legislation under the selected international legal 
regimes (Chapter 10). This will provide us with a comprehensive under-




the question to what extent the established practice is adequate (Chapters 11 
and 12) and whether there is a gap to bridge between current international 
legal practice and theories and practices with regard to the quality of imple-
menting legislation. As stated above, in the present study the adequacy 
question coincides with the question to what extent this practice ensures 
legislative quality. Part III thus possesses a clear normative aspect.
As we will see, the notion of legislative quality is not uncontroversial; 
there seems to be no perfect agreement as to what it entails. In order to oper-
ationalise this concept, we turn to international and national approaches to 
legislative quality. They encompass the legislative quality policies devel-
oped in the framework of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom. In contrast to Parts I and II, Part III thus combines an 
international and a national perspective. The sources on which the findings 
presented in Part III are based, mainly consist of international and national 
policy and legal documents. In addition, we rely on academic literature on 
legislative quality, which is mainly derived from legisprudence. As we will 
see, the quest for legislative quality is firmly engrained in the legispruden-
tial scholarship. It is an essential component of the present study’s legisla-





The implementation of 
international law in the 
national legal order
Introduction to Part I
In the present part we explore two important aspects of the implementa-
tion of international law in the national legal order. First, in Chapter 2 the 
context in which the implementation of international law in the national 
legal order takes place will be discussed. It encompasses the question how 
the relation between international law and national law must be under-
stood. Furthermore, we provide an answer to the question why national 
implementing measures are an indispensable element of the realisation of 
international law. Second, we discuss the sources of law, in particular treaty 
law, custom and binding decisions of international organisations, from 
which international obligations to adopt national implementing legislation 
derive (in Chapter 3). As will become clear, international legal practice 
contains a broad variety of such obligations. In order to come to grips with 
this diversity, we present a categorisation of international legal obligations 
which address the legislature of the state.
These two aspects provide us with a general and coherent overview 
of the concept of implementation of international law in the national legal 
order and paves the way for a more detailed discussion of the national 






2 The relation between international law 
and national law
2.1 Introduction
Aside from the reference to the principle pacta sunt servanda, which was 
touched upon in section 1.1, the notion of implementation, which in section 
1.2 we have defined as ‘the act of putting into effect a norm of international 
law within the legal order of the state’, could be approached from a more 
fundamental perspective. Such an approach raises the question why it is a 
matter of importance that state organs, among them the national legislature, 
engage in implementing measures in order to give effect to international 
legal norms to which a state is bound. It points to one of the classical topics 
in international legal discourse: the relation between international law and 
national law.
The purpose of this chapter is to further explore the notion of imple-
mentation of international law in the national legal order. To this end, it 
intends to formulate an answer to two separate, but related, questions: how 
must the relationship between international law and national law be under-
stood and why do we need national implementing measures? The answers 
to these questions provide us with theoretical insights that are indispens-
able for explaining the legal aspects of implementation, which will be the 
object of analysis in Chapter 3 and in Part II.
In the present chapter, it is argued that implementing measures by 
states’ legislative, executive and judicial organs serve as a connection 
between the international legal order and the national legal orders. Without 
such a connection, policies entrenched in international law have no chance 
of fulfilling their aspirations.
2.2 Understanding the relation between international 
and national law
The term ‘connection’ presupposes the existence of separate legal orders, a 
topic which has been a matter of controversy in academic literature for more 
than a century. The debate centers around the theoretical question whether 
the body of international law and the body of national law are part of the 
same, overarching legal order and whether, as a consequence, a norm of 
international law possesses the quality of law in the domestic legal system, 
and vice versa. Two theoretical approaches have been proposed to provide 
an answer to this question: dualism and monism.74
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According to the dualist position, the international legal order and the 
domestic legal orders must be viewed as distinct legal orders. They are 
often labelled ‘self-contained’, a qualification that refers to the premise that 
only rules that exist within that system are valid legal rules.75 As a result 
of this divide, a rule of international law can never a priori become part of 
national law; it must be made so by the express or implied authority of the 
state.76 Famous proponents of the dualist conception of the relation between 
international law and national law are the Italian Dionisio Anzilotti (1867-
1950) and the German Heinrich Triepel (1868-1946). The former served as a 
judge on the PCIJ at the time it decided the case of Certain German Interests 
in Polish Upper Silesia (as was discussed in section 1.1.3).77
Both jurists have asserted that there are two fundamental differences 
between international law and national law.78 First, in their view, both legal 
systems are based on different foundations. Departing from the statement 
that law is a ‘product of the will’, Triepel in his Völkerrecht und Landesrecht 
(1899) argued that while national law flows from the will of a particular 
state, the source of international law can be found in the common will of 
multiple or many states.79 Anzilotti has made a similar argument, but locates 
the source of international law in the principle of pacta sunt servanda.80
75 G. Gaja, ‘Dualism. A review’ in: J. Nijman and A. Nollkaemper (eds), New perspectives on 
the divide between national and international law (OUP, Oxford 2007) 52-62, 52-53.
76 Lauterpacht, General Works (n 2) 216.
77 Gaja suggests that it may very well have been Anzilotti who wrote the famous quote 
‘from the standpoint of international law and of the Court which is its organ, municipal 
laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of states […]’. 
G. Gaja, ‘Positivism and dualism in Dionisio Anzilotti’ 3 European Journal of International 
Law (1992) 123-138, 137.
78 Also J.H.W. Verzijl, International law in historical perspective, vol I, General subjects (A.W. 
Sijthoff, Leiden 1968) 91. Some authors consider that the second distinguishing charac-
teristic (different subject matter) also encompasses a third feature: a difference in legal 
subjects between the international and national legal orders. See, for example, Lauter-
pacht, General Works (n 2) 152-153, and H. Lauterpacht (ed), Oppenheim’s International law
(8th edn Longman, Greens & Co, London 1955) 37.
79 ‘Nur ein zu einer Willenseinheit durch Willenseinigung zusammengefl ossener Gemein-
wille mehrerer oder vieler Staaten kann die Quelle von Völkerrecht sein.’ H.Triepel, 
Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (Unveränderter Nachdruck 1958 Verlag von C.L. Hirschfeld, 
Leipzig 1899) 30-32.
80 As Anzilotti put it, ‘[les normes internationales] obligent en vertu du principe pacta sunt 
servanda et ne peuvent pas être abrogées sinon suivant les modes établis par le droit 
international; [les normes internes], au contraire, obligent, en vertu de la règle qui impose 
d’obéir aux commandements du législateur et elles peuvent être abrogées suivant les 
modes établis par le droit public interne de la communauté dont il s’agit’. D. Anzilotti, 
Cours de droit international, vol I, Introduction et théories générales (traduction Française 
d’après la troisième édition Italienne, Paris 1929) 53. Also A. Wasilkowski, ‘Monism and 
dualism at present’ in: J. Makarczyk (ed), Theory of international law at the threshold of the 
21st century. Essays in honour of Krzysztof Skubiszewski (Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague 1996) 323-336, 324-325.
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Second, international law and national law regulate different subject matter. 
National law contains norms that apply to (horizontal) legal relations 
among individuals or (private) legal entities within a single state, or to 
(vertical) legal relations between individuals and the state.81 International 
law, on the other hand, governs relations between states.82 These legal 
bonds are characterised by equality of the subjects involved, since one state 
is not hierarchically subordinate to the other. Therefore, Triepel argued, 
international legal relations can be said to possess a certain private legal 
nature.83 Closely related to this distinguishing feature of international law is 
Triepel’s observation that individuals cannot be subjects of the international 
legal order, but only objects. It follows that, if individuals acquire rights or 
obligations, these are of strict domestic legal nature.84
As a result of these distinct features, international law does not qualify 
as law in the national legal order,85 unless international law has been incor-
porated as part of national law by custom or statute.86 Without such an act 
of incorporation, it would be impossible for national courts to apply inter-
national law in a dispute before it, just as it would be logically impossible 
for the national legislature to adopt domestic legislation which contains a 
reference to a treaty, or to speak of a conflict between an international norm 
and a national norm.87
Supporters of monism, on the other hand, hold the opinion that inter-
national law and national law are part of one, integrated, legal order.88 In 
principle, therefore, international and national law are both automatically 
81 Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (n 79) 12-13.
82 Also Gaja, ‘Dualism’ (n 75) 54-56.
83 Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (n 79) 18-19; Gaja, ‘Positivism and dualism’ (n 77) 
134-135.
84 Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (n 79) 19-20.
85 In Anzilotti’s words, ‘[d]u principe que toute norme n’a de caractère juridique que dans 
l’ordre dont elle fait partie, dérive la séparation nette entre le droit international et le droit 
interne en ce qui concerne la caractère obligatoire de leurs normes respectives: les normes 
internationales n’ont d’effi cacité que dans les rapports entre les sujets de l’ordre inter -
national ; les normes internes n’ont d’effi cacité que dans l’ordre étatique auquel elles 
appartiennent.’ Anzilotti, Cours (n 80) 55-56. Also Gaja, ‘Positivism and dualism’ (n 77) 137.
86 Lauterpacht, General Works (n 2) 153.
87 Gaja, ‘Positivism and dualism’ (n 77) 134-135. According to Anzilotti, ‘[i]l n’y a pas là 
confl it de normes, mais simplement diversité d’appréciation du même fait dans des 
ordres juridiques différents.’ Anzilotti, Cours (n 80) 57 and 59.
88 ‘The monist assertion that international law and municipal law are part of one and the 
same legal system fi nds its origin, presumably, in the consideration that whenever such 
an interaction occurs in practice between international and domestic norms, it manifests 
itself, at the international or the national level, in terms of a simultaneous impact of 
international and domestic norms – or, more concretely, in terms of simultaneous impact, 
upon the parties in a given legal relationship, of international or national legal rights 
or obligations. The prima facie impression is thus one of coexistence of the two sets of 
norms (or the two sets of legal rights and obligations within a single normative context 
addressing itself directly to individuals as well as States’. Arangio-Ruiz, ‘International 
law and interindividual law’ (n 29) 16.
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valid. Within that unitary legal order, national law and international law 
are connected by delegation: national law exists as a result of delegation by 
international law, or vice versa. Accordingly, there have been two branches 
of monism: monism which deems international law superior to national 
law, and monism which maintains that national law is of a higher rank than 
international law.89 The former view has proved the most influential. It is 
based on the idea that the demarcation of a state’s sovereignty vis-à-vis other 
states, and thus their mutual existence, is derived from international law.90
This version of the monist standpoint has been articulated by the Austrian 
Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), who asserted that, even though both systems are 
part of one single overarching legal order, national law is subordinate to 
international law, as its validity is derived from international law.91 Interna-
tional legal norms are often ‘incomplete’ norms which require elaboration 
within the national legal sphere. ‘In this sense,’ Kelsen argued, ‘the interna-
tional legal order delegates to the national legal orders the completion of its 
own norms’.92
He did not ignore the differences between national law and interna-
tional law; these differences are, in his view, however, of a relative nature. In 
response to the dualist claim that international and national law are based 
on different foundations and, therefore, must be considered distinct legal 
orders, Kelsen acknowledged that international law flows from different 
sources than national law: while the primary methods of law-making in the 
international legal order are custom and treaty, national law is primarily a 
product of custom and legislation. Nevertheless, in his view, the difference 
in methods of law-making is not of a principal nature; nothing prevents 
states, for example, from creating by treaty international legislative organs 
that adopt binding norms similar to national legislation.93 In addition to 
the ‘sources of law’, i.e. the procedures of law-making, Kelsen has made an 
attempt to pinpoint the source of validity of international law, or the ‘basic 
norm’ (Grundnorm) of the international legal order, which he described as a 
‘hypothesis of juristic thinking, the fundamental condition under which our 
juristic propositions are possible’.94 Ultimately the basic norm (in a relative 
sense) of national legal orders, namely the principle of effectiveness95, leads 
back to this basic norm of international law:
89 Anzilotti, Cours (n 80) 50-51.
90 Lauterpacht, General Works (n 2) 152.
91 H. Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts. Beitrag zu einer 
reinen Rechtslehre (Verlag von J.B.C. Mohr, Tübingen 1920) 111-112.
92 H. Kelsen, Principles of international law (2nd edn revised and edited by Robert W. Tucker, 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., New York 1966) 305.
93 Ibid, 555-556.
94 Ibid, 559.
95 The principle of effectiveness is described as follows: ‘An actually established authority 
is the legitimate government, the coercive order enacted by this government is the legal 
order, a valid legal order, and the community constituted by this order is a state in the 
sense of international law, insofar as this order is, by and large, effective.’ Ibid, 561-562.
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‘It is this general principle of effectiveness, a positive norm of international law, which, 
applied to an individual national legal order, provides the basic norm of that national legal 
order. The basic norms of the different national legal orders are, in other words, themselves 
based on a general norm of the international legal order.’96
Thus, the unity of the international and national legal orders, so the argu-
ment goes, follows from the assumption that they go back the same basic 
norm, which he formulated as follows: states ought to behave as they have 
customarily behaved.97
Kelsen dismissed the argument that from the alleged difference in 
sources, one must infer a difference in subject matter that could be regulated 
by international or national law.98 According to Kelsen, there is no funda-
mental difference between the subject matter regulated by international 
and national law; every matter that is, or can be, regulated by national law 
is open to regulation by international law as well.99 While dualists have 
defended the thesis that international law is confined to the regulation of 
inter-state relations, Kelsen argued that the spheres of validity of interna-
tional law are, in principle, unlimited.100 As regards the legal subjects of the 
respective legal orders, Kelsen noted:
‘There is no difference between international and national law with respect to the subjects 
of the obligations and rights established by the two legal orders. The subjects are in both 
cases individual human beings. But, whereas the national legal order determines directly 
the individuals who, by their behaviour, have to fulfil the obligations or may exercise the 
rights, the international legal order leaves to the national legal order the determination of 
the individuals whose behaviour forms the content of the international obligations and 
rights. The obligations and rights which the state has under international law are the obli-
gations and rights which individuals have in their capacity as organs of the state; and these 
individuals are determined by national law, the law of the state. […] Again, the two legal 
orders differ only in degree and not in essence.’101
These are the lines of argumentation along which both dualists and monists, 
in their own manner, have attempted to explain the relation between inter-
national law and national law. They are relevant for the present study, since 
they help explain why states adopt implementing measures in order to give 
effect to their international legal obligations.
96 Ibid, 562. As Alfred Rub puts it: ‘Gehe man dagegen vom Völkerrechtsprimat aus, so 
könne die Völkerrechtsnorm, derzufolge ein Staat als entstanden gelte, wenn sich die 
Rechtsordnung, die ihn ausmache, effektiv durchsetze, als delegierendes Bindeglied 
zwischen Völkerrecht und den staatlichen Rechten betrachtet werden.’ A. Rub, Hans 
Kelsens Völkerrechtslehre. Versuch einer Würdigung (Schweizer Studien zum internationalen 
Recht 93, Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag, Zürich 1995) 422-423.
97 Kelsen, Principles (n 92) 564.
98 Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität (n 91) 123-124.
99 Kelsen, Principles (n 92) 554-555.
100 Ibid, 551-552.
101 Ibid. Also Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität (n 91) 124-130.
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2.3 Monism and dualism in contemporary international law
The depiction of the doctrinal positions held by supporters of dualism and 
monism raises the question to what extent contemporary international law 
reflects their views. As will become clear, despite the emergence of some 
phenomena that have been associated with monism, international law as 
it stands today bears more resemblance with the dualist proposition that 
the international and national legal orders must be considered as distinct 
legal systems.102 Wasilkowski points out that the differences between inter-
national law and national law, as advanced by Triepel in Völkerrecht und 
Landesrecht, are still accurate to a large extent when it comes to the sources 
and subjects of the respective legal orders. Only as regards the subject 
matters regulated by the law, Triepel’s observations are outdated, since 
international law and national law nowadays regulate the same subject 
matter to a considerable extent.103 Arangio-Ruiz correctly notes that ‘it 
would be superficial, however, to infer, from such a concrete “piling-up” 
of international and national norms (or international and national rights or 
obligations) in regulating the matter, that the concurrent rules must belong 
to one and the same system’.104 In other words, the increasing concurrence 
between international and national law, still flowing from different sources 
of law, does not necessarily provide support for the monist doctrine at the 
expense of dualism.
To what extent can Wasilkowski’s and Arangio-Ruiz’ statements be 
corroborated with evidence? As regards the sources of law, there is no indi-
cation that the sources of international law and national law respectively 
are converging. The treatment of domestic legislation by the PCIJ in 1926 
in Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia as ‘mere facts’ from the 
standpoint of international law, as was discussed in section 1.1.3, is still 
dominant and is a clear indication of a dualist stance; whereas domestic 
legislation may be ‘law’ in the domestic legal order, this cannot be said of its 
status in the international legal order.105 Similarly, while treaty norms will 
be valid law in the international legal order, they do not a priori possess that 
quality in the national legal order. Of course, some national constitutional 
102 Arangio-Ruiz, ‘International law and interindividual law’ (n 29) 17. Nevertheless, it 
would go too far to conclude from this that the monists were wrong and the dualists 
were right, for two reasons. First, as we have seen above, monism, at least in the version 
defended by Kelsen, does not deny that international and national law are two norma-
tive systems. According to the monist conception, however, they are unifi ed in one legal 
order. Second, Kelsen does not deny the differences between international and national 
law. In his view, these differences are, however, not of a fundamental nature. In other 
words, the fact that international law appears different than national law, this does not 
suffi ce to falsify Kelsen’s conception of the unity of international and national law.
103 Wasilkowski, ‘Monism and dualism at present’ (n 80) 326-328.
104 Arangio-Ruiz, ‘International law and interindividual law’ (n 29) 16-17.
105 M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea) (n 28) par. 120 ff . Frontier 
Dispute (Benin v Niger) (n 30) par. 28; Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali)
(n 30) par. 30.
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systems do accept international law as law in the national legal order. But 
they do so because they are willing to, not because international law forces 
them to adhere to such a monist approach. Furthermore, an international 
legal perspective places international law above national law. With regard 
to treaties, for example, a state may not invoke the provisions of its internal 
law as a justification for its failure to perform a treaty.106 Neither may a state 
invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed 
in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to 
conclude treaties, as invalidating its consent unless that violation was mani-
fest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance. If 
the authority of a representative to express the state’s consent to be bound 
by a particular treaty has been made subject to a specific restriction, his 
omission to observe that restriction may not be invoked as invalidating the 
consent expressed by him unless the restriction was notified to the other 
negotiating states prior to his expressing such consent.107 Outside the law of 
treaties and the law of international responsibility, the ICJ has confirmed the 
‘fundamental principle of international law that international law prevails 
over domestic law’.108 The aforementioned examples clearly demonstrate 
that international law and national law are distinct.
On the other hand, the post-1945 world has witnessed new develop-
ments relating to the sources of international law. An important example 
can be found in the law-making activities of international organisations, 
such as the adoption by two third’s majorities of technical standards by the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) that are binding upon 
member states, or the enactment of legislation in the framework of the EU 
that is directly applicable in the national legal orders of its member states.109
Although it could be argued that the adoption of such legislation in the 
framework of these international organisations is based on treaties, a source 
reserved for the domain of international law, it indicates that the clear-cut 
distinction between the sources of the international and national legal 
orders has become more complicated.110 Despite these relatively exceptional 
106 VCLT art 27; Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States art 13. ILC, ‘Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its First Session’ (12 April-9 June 1949) 
UN Doc A/CN.4/13 and Corr. 1-3, 286; Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (n 15) art 32. Also Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public 
International Law (n 74) 51-52. 
107 VCLT artt 46 and 47. It becomes clear from the exceptions embedded in these provisions 
that international law is not entirely blind to national law. This may be explained by the 
fact that ‘it is the same government – in a wide sense- that operates in the municipal 
society and as a member of the international society’. Gaja, ‘Dualism’ (n 75) 56.
108 Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters 
Agreement of 26 June 1947 (Advisory Opinion) [1988] ICJ Rep 12, par. 57. Also Crawford, 
Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (n 74) 51-52.
109 Convention on International Civil Aviation (adopted 7 December 1944, entered into force 
4 April 1947) 15 UNTS 295 (Chicago Convention) artt. 37, 54, sub 1, 90, sub a; Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (consolidated version) OJ 2012, C 326, p. 47, art 288.
110 Wasilkowski, ‘Monism and dualism at present’ (n 80) 326-328.
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phenomena, nevertheless, it may be concluded that in the first decades of 
21st century international and national law still largely flow from their own, 
exclusive sources.
In relation to the objects it is evident that there has been an impressive 
expansion of the objects that are regulated by international law. The advance 
of globalisation has altered the conception of a clear divide between a 
state’s jurisdiction based on its sovereignty, and everything beyond; to 
an increasing extent international relations can be characterised by an 
interaction and structural interdependence between states.111 As a result, 
international law is no longer limited to inter-state relations concerning 
topics such as territory and war and peace; it also governs legal relations 
and behaviour that until recently have been considered to fall within the 
exclusive field of competence of states and their legal orders: issues relating 
to health, economics, labour standards, protection of the environment and 
space exploration.112
Similarly, the development of international law has led to the inclusion, 
to some extent at least, of individuals and legal persons as having legal 
personality in the international legal order.113 Individuals are thus no longer 
exclusive legal subjects of the domestic legal order.114 Obvious examples 
include individuals who enjoy rights enshrined in international human 
rights instruments, in particular those instruments that expressly address 
natural persons as bearers of rights. Pursuant to articles 6, first paragraph, 
and 7, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
for instance, ‘every human being has the inherent right to life’ and ‘no one 
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment’.115 In addition, there is some evidence that business enter-
prises have a responsibility to respect human rights.116 Moreover, since the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, international criminal tribunals have exer-
cised jurisdiction over, and acknowledged the individual criminal responsi-
bility of, individuals for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. 
Article 1 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) provides 
that it ‘shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the 
most serious crimes of international concern’.117 In Prosecutor v. Stanislav 
111 H. Keller, Rezeption des Völkerrechts. Eine rechtsvergleichende Studie zur Praxis des U.S. 
Supreme Court, des Gerichtshofes der Europäischen Gemeinschaften und des schweizerischen 
Bundesgerichts in ausgewählten Bereichen (Springer Verlag, Berlin 2003) 6.
112 Shaw, International law (n 1) 48.
113 Wasilkowski, ‘Monism and dualism at present’ (n 80) 328-329.
114 D. Shelton, ‘Introduction’ in: Idem (ed), International law in domestic legal systems: Incorpo-
ration, transformation, and persuasion (OUP, Oxford 2011) 1-22, 3.
115 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR).
116 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
John Ruggie’ (21 March 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/31. 
117 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into 
force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90 (Rome Statute) art 1.
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Galić, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY found that ‘customary international 
law imposed individual criminal liability for violations of the prohibition 
of terror against the civilian population.’118 Despite the emergence of 
individuals and businesses as legal subjects, however, the most prominent 
subjects of the international legal order still are states and, to a lesser extent, 
international organisations.
It may be concluded that, as Arangio-Ruiz puts it, ‘frequently misunder-
stood or ignored but never seriously challenged, these fundamental tenets 
of dualism have been confirmed by the practice of States throughout the 
20th century and up to the present time.’119 While this statement may be 
correct in relation to the fundamental tenets of dualism, some indications 
can be found in support of the statement that international law has, in the 
words of Cassese, ‘pierced the armour’ of domestic legal systems.120
2.4 Why are national implementing measures indispensable?
The picture presented above begs the question what its implications are for 
our main topic: the implementation of international law by state organs. 
In the present section it is argued that, given the current state of the law, 
as discussed in the previous section, domestic implementing acts (whether 
legislative, executive or judicial) remain of great importance in the realisa-
tion of international law. This statement can be based on both international 
legal and national legal considerations, which are closely related.
Sometimes national implementing measures are an essential element in 
the realisation of international law; without those measures, international 
legal instruments will not be able to produce legal and practical effects in 
domestic jurisdictions. A norm of this category may be found in a treaty 
provision which contains the obligation to take a specified action, of a 
legislative or other nature, in the legal order of a state party with the object 
of implementing the treaty’s provisions.121 As an example, we could refer 
to article 8, second paragraph, FCTC, which provides that ‘each Party shall 
adopt […] effective legislative, executive, administrative and/or other 
measures, providing for protection from exposure to tobacco smoke in 
indoor workplaces, public transport, indoor public places and, as appro-
priate, other public places’.122 The formulation of the obligation almost 
certainly requires the adoption of measures that serve to attain the objective 
set out in the provision: to provide protection against tobacco smoke etc. 
In general, the refusal or failure of the state authorities to adopt the said 
118 Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić (n 33). Also Prosecutor vs. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez (n 33).
119 Arangio-Ruiz, ‘International law and interindividual law’ (n 29) 20.
120 Cassese, International law (n 1) 165-166.
121 Verzijl, International law in historical perspective (n 78) 92.
122 WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (adopted 21 May 2003, entered into 
force 27 February 2005) 2302 UNTS 166 (FCTC) art 8.
519024-L-sub01-bw-Beenakker
Processed on: 18-4-2018
34 Part I The implementation of international law in the national legal order
measures will entail the international responsibility of that state which after 
all has violated the treaty norm. In this case, the adoption of measures is 
required by international law. In this regard, the traditional and dominant 
position is that only the final result counts; the means that have brought 
about the result are irrelevant from the perspective of international law.123
Dualism, in this view, implies a clear division of labour between interna-
tional law and national law: states are responsible for the implementation 
of the contracted international legal obligations within their domestic legal 
orders; they may choose the most appropriate means, taking into account 
the attribution of competence to the various organs on the national level. In 
other words: a state is free to let the executive, the legislative or the judiciary 
apply or implement the relevant rule of international law, as long as these 
national arrangements do not contravene the boundaries of the relevant 
international obligation.
In other areas of international law, policies laid down in international 
legal instruments have, as Verzijl has put it, an ‘immediate legislative 
purpose’ by which the contracting parties intend to lay down rules which 
lend themselves to direct and repeated application by their administrative 
organs and their courts and are therefore intended to be ‘self-executing’.124
As a consequence, national implementing measures may not be required 
for the attainment of the formulated policy objectives. An example of this 
category, borrowed from the law of armed conflict, can be found in article 
15 of the 1977 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of non-international 
armed conflict, which stipulates that ‘works or installations containing 
dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating 
stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are 
military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces 
and consequent severe losses among the civilian population’.125 Indeed, 
many international human rights obligations fall within this category as 
well, as we have seen in the previous section, in which we signalled the 
emergence of individuals as legal subjects of the international legal order. 
Contrary to the implementing measures described above, international 
legal instruments with an immediate legislative purpose do not, from an 
international law point of view, require national implementing legislation, 
provided that the international legal instrument can be relied on in the 
national legal order.
123 Cassese, International law (n 1) 167; Shelton, ‘Introduction’ (n 114) 3; E. Denza, ‘The rela-
tionship between international and national law’ in: M. D. Evans (ed), International law 
(3rd edn OUP, Oxford 2010) 411-438, 415.
124 Verzijl, International law in historical perspective (n 78) 92.
125 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Confl icts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered 
into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609 (Additional Protocol II) art 15.
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Whether the latter condition is fulfilled, depends on the state’s approach 
to international law. International law tolerates and accommodates the 
diversity in the way states receive international law in their respective 
domestic legal systems. Somewhat confusingly, these different ways have 
also been characterised with the use of the terms dualism and monism. 
The diversity of existing systems in place reflects the absence of a global or 
regional consensus on the relation between international law and domestic 
law from a national point of view: states have opened up their domestic juris-
dictions to international law to a varying extent. It means that the reference 
to ‘the’ national legal order in the title of the present study, is not entirely 
accurate: it only exists as an ideal type. The various modalities of the 
reception of international law in the domestic legal order range from pure 
monism to pure dualism, and everything in between. In this broad spectre, 
three concepts are of crucial importance: validity, rank and direct effect.126
The criterion of validity concerns the question whether international 
law is valid in the domestic legal order, or, in other words, whether it quali-
fies as law (as opposed to ‘fact’). States which adhere to a strong dualist 
view will deny validity to international legal norms in the domestic legal 
order, unless a domestic (legislative) act of transformation or incorpora-
tion has attributed the quality of law to the norm at hand.127 As stated 
above, while an international legal instrument may be suitable for direct 
application within national jurisdictions, international law does not possess 
the quality of law in the national legal order a priori; whether it is the case 
depends on applicable national law.128 National law may require an express 
act of incorporation. This is the case in the United Kingdom where a treaty 
cannot be applied by national courts unless it has been expressly incorpo-
rated by an act of Parliament.129 This practice is commonly referred to as 
ad hoc statutory incorporation, as it requires every treaty to be expressly 
126 National constitutional provisions or doctrines relating to the reception of international 
law may, and often do, distinguish between the formal sources of international law, to 
which separate regimes may apply. Also Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public Interna-
tional Law (n 74) 55-59.
127 Keller, Rezeption des Völkerrechts (n 111) 7; Lauterpacht, Oppenheim’s International Law (n 
78) 37. 
128 Keller, Rezeption des Völkerrechts (n 111) 7. This is a crucial difference between European 
law and ‘other’ forms of international law. 
129 Lauterpacht, General Works (n 2)158-161. In the United Kingdom the conclusion of treaties 
is a prerogative of the executive power. The requirement that treaties must be expressly 
incorporated before they can be applied domestically thus ensures that the executive 
cannot conclude treaties that contravene pieces of legislation adopted by parliament. 
An exception to this general rule consists of treaties concluded by the institutions of the 
European Union. They are directly applicable in the legal order of the United Kingdom as 
a matter of European law. S. Neff, ‘United Kingdom’ in: D. Shelton (ed), International law 
in domestic legal systems: Incorporation, transformation, and persuasion (OUP, Oxford 2011) 
620-630, 622. Also Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (n 74) 63-65.
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and separately incorporated in the domestic legal order.130 Usually this act 
of incorporation states that it gives effect to a particular treaty, the text of 
which is annexed to the act. After its incorporation, the provisions of the 
implementing act, not the treaty provisions itself, will be applied.131 In 
contrast to treaties, customary international law is automatically incorpo-
rated into British law.132 In states that maintain a monist approach to the 
reception of international law in the domestic legal order, on the contrary, 
a treaty itself can be considered to have the quality of law. The Supreme 
Court of the Netherlands, for instance, has accepted the validity of binding 
international treaties in the Dutch domestic legal order.133 The argument 
advanced by the Court provides for the incorporation of all present and 
future binding international legal obligations and, therefore, is an example 
of what is usually termed ‘automatic standing incorporation’. A similar 
(monist) stance is implied in article 25, first sentence, of the German Basic 
law, which provides that ‘the general rules of international law shall 
be integral part of federal law’.134 In accordance with the case law of the 
Federal Constitutional Court, this sentence must be understood as to refer 
to customary international law.135
‘Rank’ refers to the place international law occupies in the domestic 
hierarchy of norms, i.e. whether it is superior or inferior to norms of 
domestic origin. Other than one might expect, dualist jurisdictions do not 
necessarily express a preference for the prevalence of international law over 
national law (or vice versa); this is for the national state to decide.136 In the 
United Kingdom, for example, the statutory act by which the treaty has 
been incorporated has the same status as any other statutory act, but will 
prevail over prior legislation on the basis of the principle lex posterior derogat 
legi priori.137 In the Netherlands primacy is granted to those provisions of 
treaties that have the capacity to ‘bind any person’, a phrase which refers to 
130 Dixon uses the term ‘transformation’ for the express domestic (legislative) act which 
draws a particular treaty into the body of national law. In his Textbook on international 
law the term ‘incorporation’ is reserved for what has been labelled ‘automatic standing 
incorporation’ above. M. Dixon, Textbook on international law (7th edn OUP, Oxford 2013) 
98-100.
131 Neff, ‘United Kingdom’ (n 129) 622-623.
132 Ibid, 626-628.
133 C.W. van der Pot, Handboek van het Nederlandse Staatsrecht (16th edn Kluwer; Deventer 
2014) 712.
134 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (n 10) art 25, fi rst sentence. 
135 H.-P. Folz, ‘Germany’ in: D. Shelton (ed), International law in domestic legal systems: Incorpo-
ration, transformation, and persuasion (OUP, Oxford 2011) 240-248, 240 and 244-245. 
136 Arangio-Ruiz, ‘International law and interindividual law’ (n 29) 19; Gaja, ‘Dualism’ (n 
75) 61-62.
137 S Neff, ‘United Kingdom’ (n 129) 629. Also Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public Inter-
national Law (n 74) 64.
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the self-executing character or content of the provision.138 These provisions 
must be considered superior to statutory law and even to the constitution 
itself. In Germany, treaties have the same rank as ordinary statutes, but 
customary international law ranks higher than statutes.139 Pursuant to 
article 55 of the French Constitution, treaty provisions prevail over French 
statutory acts.140
International law possesses ‘direct effect’ when individuals can invoke 
a norm of international law before national courts.141 Again, it is the compe-
tent national authority, applying standards of national origin, which decides 
whether national implementing measures will be required or whether the 
international instrument may be directly applied. In a dualist state such as 
the United Kingdom, this problem may not exist; as we have seen above, 
the treaty itself is not valid in the domestic legal order; it thus cannot be 
invoked by individuals before national courts.142 In order to determine 
whether a treaty provision may have direct effect, judges in the Netherlands 
will again have to investigate whether the particular provision could be 
considered to ‘bind any person’. If answered in the affirmative, this will 
thus have a double effect: it may not only be invoked before national 
courts by individuals, but also be of superior rank compared to legislation 
of domestic origin, as stated in articles 93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitu-
tion. Under Dutch law, customary international law cannot possess direct 
effect.143 In France, similar conditions relating to the substance of the norm 
have to be fulfilled in order to be relied upon before by individuals national 
courts.144
The foregoing could be summarised as follows. International legal 
obligations will often give rise to the adoption of measures on the national 
level. Whether this is the case, first and foremost depends on the substance 
of the international legal obligation. While some international obliga-
tions may impose a duty on state parties to adopt domestic measures in 
order to achieve a specified policy aim, other norms may be interpreted 
as having ‘immediate legislative effect’. The former will often require the 
adoption of an act of implementation. Second, the persisting dominance of 
dualism has enabled states to develop and maintain various ways to receive 
138 Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 2008 (Ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations, Constitutional Affairs and Legislation Division 2008) art 94 <https://
www.government.nl/binaries/government/documents/regulations/2012/10/18/the-
constitution-of-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-2008/the-constitution-of-the-kingdom-
of-the-netherlands-2008.pdf> (accessed 29 March 2018); Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) 30 
May 1986, NJ 1986, 688 (Spoorwegstaking).
139 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (n 10) art 25, second sentence; Folz, 
‘Germany’ (n 135) 245.
140 Deccaux, E., ‘France’ in: D. Shelton (ed), International law in domestic legal systems: Incorpo-
ration, transformation, and persuasion (OUP, Oxford 2011) 207-239, 216. 
141 Keller, Rezeption des Völkerrechts (n 111) 11-16.
142 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (n 74) 64.
143 Van der Pot, Handboek van het Nederlandse Staatsrecht (n 133) 716.
144 Deccaux, ‘France’ (n 140) 228-230.
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international law in their national legal orders. As a consequence, an act of 
incorporation may be required before the international instrument could be 
applied directly.
Acts of implementation and acts of incorporation differ in at least two 
respects. First, whereas implementing acts may be required to elaborate or 
complement an international legal norm binding upon the state in order 
to ensure the realisation of the policy aims (usually defined in the interna-
tional instrument), acts of incorporation do not constitute such elaboration. 
Instead of elaborating or complementing international legal obligations, 
they serve the sole purpose of attributing the quality of law to existing 
provisions of international origin in the domestic legal order. Second, 
the legal obligation to adopt an implementing act solely originates from 
an international legal instrument. An act of incorporation, by contrast, is 
primarily required by the national constitutional law of a state that does not 
accept the validity of international law in the domestic legal order without 
a domestic (legislative) act to that effect. Thus acts of implementation and 
acts of incorporation can be clearly distinguished from a theoretical point 
of view. From a practical point of view, however, it is perfectly conceivable 
that a national piece of legislation performs both an international legal 
instrument’s implementation and incorporation; in the end, much depends on 
each national legal order’s specific features.
2.5 Conclusion
If we return to the question that appears in the title of section 2.4, the 
foregoing has made clear that the need for implementing measures in a 
broad sense (thus also encompassing acts of incorporation) by state organs 
can be explained partly by reference to international law, and partly by 
reference to national law. First, the current state of international law to a 
large extent presumes the existence of a divide between international and 
national law. Despite the appearance of ‘monist’ elements in contemporary 
international law, it still heavily relies upon state organs for the fulfilment of 
its policy objectives. This dependence comes with a significant freedom in 
the implementation of international law in the national legal order. Second, 
states can make arrangements for the reception of international law in their 
domestic jurisdictions as they see fit. Some states do not accept the validity 
of international law in the domestic legal order, unless their authorities have 
adopted an act of incorporation to that effect. Therefore, incorporation is 
indispensable as it may be the only way for international law to become 
law within the national legal order. Either way, national measures aimed at 
the implementation or incorporation of international law remain of utmost 
importance for the realisation of its objectives.
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3 Sources of obligations to adopt 
implementing legislation
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we clarified the relation between the international 
legal order and domestic legal systems in abstract terms. Moreover, we 
established that the motives for the adoption of national implementing 
measures in a broad sense may find its origins in international law and 
national law. The present chapter provides an answer to the question 
which international legal norms could possibly give rise to the adoption of 
implementing measures by the national legislature. Its aim is to complete 
the general discussion of the concept of international law’s implementation 
in the national legal order.
The present chapter focuses on implementing measures that involve 
action by the national legislature; implementing measures taken by state 
organs attributed with powers other than legislative, such as the executive 
or judicial branch of government, will fall beyond its scope. It is important 
to note that it is often difficult to conclude on the basis of an international 
legal instrument alone whether implementing measures are required in a 
specific national legal order and, if so, which state organ comes into play. 
In the previous chapter we have already seen that much depends on each 
national legal order’s specific features, in particular its written or unwritten 
constitutional law. This means that the overview provided in the present 
chapter cannot serve as a sufficient justification for the conclusion that a 
particular state is under the obligation to adopt national implementing 
legislation in order to observe the international legal instrument at hand 
or, conversely, that the adopted legislative measures should be limited to 
matters expressly addressed in the international legal instrument.145 In 
sum, even though this chapter primarily concerns national implementing 
measures of a legislative nature, national implementing practice will often 
be less clear-cut than the international legal instrument at hand suggests.
Another remark concerns the choice of sources in this chapter. The inter-
national legal provisions will be discussed separately on the basis of the 
formal source of international law from which the obligation flows: treaties, 
customary law and binding decisions of international organisations. There 
145 For instance, section 4 (5) of the Human Rights Act 1998 specifi es which judicial authori-
ties of the United Kingdom can make a so-called ‘declaration of incompatibility’ if they 
are satisfi ed that British subordinate legislation is incompatible with the rights embedded 
in the ECHR. The need for such specifi cation cannot be derived from the text of the ECHR 
itself; this national implementing provision must therefore be considered the product of 
national (legal) considerations. Human Rights Act 1998 <https://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents> (accessed 29 March 2018).
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is no fundamental reason why other sources of international law, most 
notably soft law instruments, should be excluded from the present study. 
Nonetheless, for reasons of space, this chapter is limited to the sources of 
international law which possess an unquestionably binding character, thus 
excluding soft law instruments. Furthermore, the sources which, due to 
their function, are unlikely to contain legal obligations to adopt national 
implementing measures from the outset, such as general principles of law, 
have been left out of the analysis.146 As a result, this chapter is limited to the 
binding sources of international law which, as appears from international 
practice, provide for the lion’s share of international legal obligations to 
adopt national implementing legislation.147
3.2 Treaties
3.2.1 Treaties as a source of law
Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, which contains the most authoritative 
enumeration of the sources of law of the international legal order, refers 
to treaties as ‘international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognised by […] states’.148 Pursuant to article 
2, first paragraph, sub a, VCLT, a treaty is an ‘international agreement 
concluded between States in written form and governed by international 
law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation’.149 This definition 
is believed to be part of customary law.150 Nowadays it is no longer only 
states which conclude treaties; also international organisations can be party 
to treaties, either with states or with other international organisations.151
Treaties may be considered the most important source of international law, 
since they reflect the express consent of the parties to the treaty.152
146 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 
October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI (ICJ Statute) art 38, fi rst paragraph, sub c. 
147 Article 38, fi rst paragraph, sub d, of the ICJ Statute refers to ‘judicial decisions’ as a 
‘subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law’. In other words, case-law can 
be relied on as evidence for the existence of law; it cannot, however, be considered to 
constitute ‘law’ similar to treaty law, customary law or binding decisions of international 
organisations. In the present section, therefore, case-law will not be discussed sepa-
rately, but will be referred to subsidiarily in the context of the discussion of treaty law, 
customary law and binding decisions of international organisations.
148 ICJ Statute art 38, fi rst paragraph.
149 VCLT art 2, fi rst paragraph, sub a.
150 Aust, A., Modern treaty law and practice (CUP, Cambridge 2000) 14.
151 The applicable law of treaties is codifi ed in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
between States and International Organisations or between International Organisations 
(VCLTIO) (adopted 21 March 1986, not yet in force) UN Doc A/CONF.129/15.
152 Shaw, International law (n 1) 94.
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As the PCIJ put it in Certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia, ‘a 
treaty only creates law as between the States which are parties to it’.153
In this respect, treaties that have been concluded between states may be 
considered ‘analogous in nature to contracts between private individu-
als’.154 Similar to agreements between private individuals, a treaty which 
has come into force is binding upon the parties and must be performed by 
them in good faith: pacta sunt servanda.155
A common division distinguishes law-making treaties from other 
treaties. Law-making treaties differ from other treaties because the former 
contain rules that are suitable for general and repeated application.156 They 
resemble the concept of legislation as it is commonly understood in the 
national legal domain.157 In the previous chapter we have already described 
this category as having, as Verzijl put it, ‘immediate legislative purpose’.158
Treaties which lack this law-making nature often possess a content of a more 
contractual nature and could therefore be referred to as ‘treaty-contracts’.159
Law-making treaties tend to have a large number of parties, whereas 
treaty-contracts usually have only a small number of parties.160 Examples 
of law-making treaties are the VCLT, which contains a general legal regime 
applicable to the conclusion, validity and interpretation of treaties, and the 
four 1949 Geneva Conventions which regulate the conduct of hostilities 
during armed conflict (ius in bello).161
For the present study, law-making treaties are of lesser importance than 
‘treaty-contracts’. The ‘legislative’ nature of the former makes it suitable for 
general and repeated application.162 Their norms can be applied directly; 
it does not require implementation of its rules through legislation on the 
domestic level.163 On the other hand, ‘treaty contracts’ do not always contain 
obligations for the state parties, either expressly of implicitly, to engage in 
153 Case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (n 28) 29.
154 Lauterpacht, General Works (n 2) 58. 
155 VCLT art 26 and VCLTIO art 26.
156 Also Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (n 74) 95.
157 Also Lauterpacht, General Works (n 2) 59.
158 Verzijl, International law in historical perspective (n 78) 92.
159 Shaw, International law (n 1) 94.
160 Ibid, 95. The number of state parties is, however, not a distinctive element. Lauterpacht 
distinguishes between law-making treaties which contain particular international law due 
to a small number of parties, and law-making treaties which contain general international 
law due to a large number of parties. Lauterpacht, Oppenheim’s International Law (n 78) 28. 
161 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 
75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949, entered 
into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 
135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287.
162 Section 2.4.
163 Except for, as was discussed in section 2.4, acts of incorporation in dualist states.
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implementing measures in order to comply with the contracted obligations. 
A case in point may be an alliance treaty such as the North Atlantic Treaty, 
which stipulates that ‘the Parties will consult together whenever, in the 
opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or 
security of any of the Parties is threatened’.164 In other words, a treaty may 
not require implementing measures if it does not intend to regulate subject 
matter within the jurisdiction of a state.165 In short, not all treaties require 
implementation on the domestic level. Even less require implementation by 
legislative means. Whether it does, depends on its text and the substance of 
the norms at hand. These norms, to the extent that they are part of an inter-
national convention or treaty, will be the subject of the following section.
3.2.2 Treaties as a source of obligation to adopt implementing measures
Treaties include, more often than any other source of international law, obli-
gations to adopt implementing legislation on the domestic level. They come 
in various shapes and can only be discussed indicatively here. By far the 
largest category of norms which is of relevance to the present study consists 
of treaty provisions that require or suggest the adoption of domestic legisla-
tion or other measures in order to achieve an expressly defined policy aim. 
A few examples may suffice to prove this point:
‘States Parties shall enact laws and adopt strategies to fight corruption through the estab-
lishment of independent anti-corruption institutions’;166
‘Each Contracting State agrees to adopt all practicable measures, through the issuance of 
special regulations or otherwise, to facilitate and expedite waterborne transportation 
between the territories of the Contracting States, and to prevent unnecessary delays to ves-
sels, passengers, crews, cargo and baggage in the administration of the laws relating to 
immigration, public health, customs, and other provisions relative to arrivals and depar-
tures of vessels’;167
‘Each Party shall undertake measures to prevent and control activities related to land and/ 
or forest fires that may lead to transboundary haze pollution, which include […] [d]evelop-
ing and implementing legislative and other regulatory measures, as well as programmes 
and strategies to promote zero burning policy to deal with land and/ or forest fires result-
ing in transboundary haze pollution’;168
164 North Atlantic Treaty (adopted 4 April 1949, entered into force 24 August 1949) 34 UNTS 
243, art 4.
165 A. Aust, Modern treaty law and practice (3rd edn CUP, Cambridge 2013) 181.
166 African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration (adopted 
31 January 2011, entered into force 23 July 2016) art. 12, fi rst paragraph. <https://au.int/
en/treaties> (accessed 29 March 2018).
167 Inter-American Convention on Facilitation of International Waterborne Transportation 
(adopted 7 June 1963, entered into force 11 January 1981) 1438 UNTS 169 (Convention of 
Mar del Plata) art 1.
168 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (adopted 10 June 2002, entered 
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‘The Parties shall adopt where appropriate legislation, regulations or administrative mea-
sures to restrict the availability (including provisions to control movement, possession, 
importation, distribution and sale) as well as the use in sport of banned doping agents and 
doping methods and in particular anabolic steroids’;169
‘Each Party shall adopt and implement […] effective legislative, executive, administrative 
and/or other measures, providing for protection from exposure to tobacco smoke in 
indoor workplaces, public transport, indoor public places and, as appropriate, other public 
places’;170
‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures’.171
The treaty provisions referred to above expressly refer to the adoption of 
‘legislation’, ‘regulations’, ‘laws’ etc. However, it must be kept in mind 
that many international conventions resort to more broader terms, such as 
‘measures’. For instance, article VI, first paragraph, of the African Conven-
tion on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, provides:
‘The Parties shall take effective measures to prevent land degradation, and to that effect 
shall develop long-term integrated strategies for the conservation and sustainable manage-
ment of land resources, including soil, vegetation and related hydrological processes’.172
In addition to treaty provisions that contain an express obligation to 
adopt implementing measures, either through legislation or other means, 
international conventions may impose obligations to adopt implementing 
measures in an implicit manner as well. In this context we could refer to the 
so-called positive obligations under the ECHR. Pursuant to article 1 ECHR, 
‘the High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their juris-
diction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention’.173
While this general provision may be seen as the source of the positive obli-
gations arising out of the ECHR, it has only legal value in a particular case 
when it is read in conjunction with one or more of the document’s substan-
tive rights. For instance, the ECtHR has held that the obligation to protect 
the right to life, laid down in article 2 ECHR, requires ‘by implication that 
there should be some form of effective official investigation when individ-
169 Anti-Doping Convention (adopted 16 November 1989, entered into force 1 March 1990) 
ETS no 135, art 4, fi rst paragraph.
170 FCTC art 8.
171 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (CESCR) art 2, fi rst paragraph.
172 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (adopted 11 
July 2003) art VI, fi rst paragraph. <https://au.int/en/treaties> (accessed 29 March 2018).
173 Similar provisions can be found in article 2 ICCPR, and article 2 of the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 
UNTS 123 (Pact of San José, Costa Rica).
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uals have been killed as a result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of 
the state’.174 In a number of cases, the ECtHR has established, either implic-
itly or expressly, the existence of a positive obligation to enact national 
legislation in order to comply with the obligation set forth in article 1
ECHR. This particular regime will be further discussed in Chapter 4.
The use of both the broad notion of ‘measures’ and the more specific 
‘domestic legislation’ or similar terms, raises the question how the prefer-
ence for one approach could be justified. The Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the treaty body that has been estab-
lished to monitor the implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), maintains the view that 
in order to fulfil the above-cited obligation embodied in article 2, first 
paragraph, ICESCR, the adoption of legislation is often ‘highly desirable’ 
and in some cases even ‘indispensable’, for instance with regard to discrimi-
nation.175 This statement is largely based on the presumption that it ‘may 
be difficult to combat discrimination effectively in the absence of a sound 
legislative foundation for the necessary measures’.176 Although this may 
be true, the argument does not explain why the requirement of ‘legislative 
measures’ is expressly included in the treaty provision; the drafters could 
have considered that it is for the state parties to choose the necessary means, 
legislative or other, to achieve the aims laid down in the ICESCR.
The view expressed in relation to article 8, second paragraph, FCTC, 
cited above, may be more convincing. According to the ‘guiding principles’ 
for the implementation of this provision, legislation has a distinct and 
significant advantage compared to non-legislative implementing measures:
‘Legislation is necessary to protect people from exposure to tobacco smoke. Voluntary 
smoke free policies have repeatedly been shown to be ineffective and do not provide ade-
quate protection. In order to be effective, legislation should be simple, clear and 
enforceable.’177
In other words, the requirement to adopt legislation in order to provide the 
necessary protection against tobacco smoke is justified by the argument that 
this objective cannot be achieved through the adoption of non-mandatory
smoke free policies. Hence, in this particular context, the means and the aim 
of implementation seem to merge; the adoption of legislation has become 
part and parcel of compliance with the treaty provision.
174 McCann and others v the United Kingdom (App no 18984/91) (1995) Series A no 324, par. 
161.
175 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 3: the nature of states parties’ obligations (art. 2, Par.1, of 
the Covenant)’ (14 December 1990) UN Doc E/1991/3, par.3.
176 Ibid.
177 WHO, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Guidelines for implementation 
(World Health Organisation, Geneva 2013) 21 <http://apps.who.int/iris/bitst
ream/10665/80510/1/9789241505185_eng.pdf> (accessed 29 March 2018).
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The opposite view was taken by the drafters of the Anti-Doping Conven-
tion, which was already referred to above. The explanatory report to the 
Convention does not contain any indication why article 4, first paragraph, 
expressly refers to ‘legislation’ and ‘regulations’. On the contrary, it empha-
sises the primary role for states to make an assessment of the nature of the 
required measures:
‘Because of the wide variety of constitutional arrangements within the states which have 
participated in the elaboration of the Convention […] the Convention tries to avoid setting 
out a rigid model for legislation or implementation. The Convention recognizes that many 
actors will be involved and that Parties will use the structures and bodies which are most 
appropriate to it’.178
Nevertheless, there are treaties in the context of which the adoption of legis-
lation, as opposed to the adoption of other measures, may be considered 
important for the fulfilment of the applicable treaty obligation. These trea-
ties may be found in the field of criminal law, or closely related thereto. In 
contrast to the treaty provisions discussed above, in the field of criminal law 
and international humanitarian law, states have accepted more narrowly 
circumscribed obligations that will often address national legislatures. 
Examples include treaty provisions that serve to penalise certain conduct. 
Article 146 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War stipulates that:
‘[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide 
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the 
grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article’.179
The so-called ‘grave breaches’ that is referred to include, among others, the 
following acts against a person who is entitled to protection in accordance 
with the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including 
biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to 
body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of 
a protected person, or compelling a protected person to serve in the forces 
of a hostile Power.180 The objective of article 146, first paragraph, of the 
Convention is clear: the severity of the acts enumerated in article 147 makes 
it imperative to prevent this type of conduct. This must be done by the enact-
ment of domestic legislation that provides for the perpetrator’s punishment. 
178 Council of Europe, ‘Explanatory report to the Anti-Doping Convention’, par. 33 <https://
www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/135> (accessed 29 
March 2018).
179 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art 146, 
fi rst paragraph.
180 Ibid, art 147.
519024-L-sub01-bw-Beenakker
Processed on: 18-4-2018
46 Part I The implementation of international law in the national legal order
As was stated by the ICTY, the absence of such legislation could be incon-
sistent with the general obligation, codified in article 1 of the Convention, 
to ‘undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in 
all circumstances’.181
It is interesting that during the drafting of the Geneva Conventions the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had expressed the wish 
to draw up a law that would serve as a model for the domestic laws that 
state parties would have to enact in order to fulfil the obligation laid down 
in article 146. This would help to achieve some uniformity in the penali-
sation of grave breaches of the Convention. However, during the discus-
sions it became clear that the adoption of penal law was considered to be 
too closely tied to a state’s sovereignty; in the commentary to the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, which was drafted under the supervision of the ICRC, 
it is noted that ‘it is above all in the definition of breaches that uniformity 
must be sought; the fixing of the sentence and the procedure to be followed 
are thought to be matters for municipal law in each country’.182
The obligation to criminalise certain acts in domestic legislation and to 
provide for appropriate penalties can be found in other international legal 
instruments as well. Article 4 ICSFT, for instance, provides:
‘Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary:
(a) To establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the offences set forth in article 2; 
(b) To make those offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account 
the grave nature of the offences […].’183
Many of the conventions that have been adopted in order to combat acts 
of terrorism also contain provisions that serve to establish jurisdiction over 
certain terrorist crimes. One example can be found in article 7, first para-
graph, ICSFT, which provides:
181 Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka “Pavo”), Hazim Delic and Esad Landž (aka 
“Zenga”) (Appeals Chamber judgment) IT-96-21-A (20 February 2001) par. 167. 
182 J. Pictet, (ed), Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, vol IV, Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva 1958) 591. 
183 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (adopted 9 
December 1999, entered into force 10 April 2002) 2178 UNTS 197 (ICSFT) art 4. Other 
examples with (almost) identical provisions can be found in article 4 of the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (adopted 15 December 1997, 
entered into force 23 May 2001) 2149 UNTS 256; article 2 of the International Convention 
against the Taking of Hostages (adopted 17 December 1979, entered into force 3 June 
1983) 1316 UNTS 205; article 2, second paragraph, of Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic 
Agents (adopted 14 December 1973, entered into force 20 February 1977) 1035 UNTS 167; 
article 5 of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 
(adopted 13 April 2005, entered into force 7 July 2007) 2445 UNTS 89.
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‘[e]ach State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction 
over the offences set forth in article 2 when [the] offence is committed in the territory of 
that State […].’184
In its Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism: a Handbook for Legislative Drafting, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has provided some guidance as to 
how the provisions of the ICSFT should be implemented.185 Although the 
choice for implementation through legislative means seems to be presup-
posed in the document, the handbook recommends that states should make 
an assessment whether elements of the convention could be implemented 
without resort to legislation. Whether this is the case, it is stated, depends 
on the monist or dualist characteristics of the legal system involved; the 
handbook suggests that domestic implementing legislation may not be 
required in countries where ratified international treaties have the force of 
law.186
In the same vein, in the Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
Protocol Thereto, it is argued that the implementation of the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (CTOC) may vary 
from state to state: whereas in ‘monist’ states ratification and subsequently 
official publication may suffice for the fulfilment of the Convention’s provi-
sions, in ‘dualist’ states the enactment of domestic implementing legislation 
would be required.187 Although this may be evident on an abstract level, 
as we have discussed in the previous chapter, it does not explain why the 
CTOC contains an obligation to adopt ‘such legislative and other measures 
as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed 
intentionally’ the participation in an organised criminal group (article 5, 
first paragraph).188 Again, the reference to ‘legislation’ in the treaty text 
184 ICSFT art 7, fi rst paragraph, sub a. Other examples with (almost) identical provisions can 
be found in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Inter-
nationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents art 3; International Conven-
tion for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism art 9, fi rst paragraph; International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings art 6, fi rst paragraph; International 
Convention against the Taking of Hostages art 5, fi rst paragraph.
185 International Monetary Fund, Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism. A handbook for legis-
lative drafting (International Monetary Fund, Washington 2003) <https://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/nft/2003/SFTH/pdf/SFTH.pdf> (accessed 29 March 2018). 
186 Ibid, 39-40.
187 UNGA ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime on the work of its fi rst to eleventh sessions, Addendum, 
Interpretative notes for the offi cial records (travaux préparatoires) of the negotiation of 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Proto-
cols thereto’ (3 November 2000) UN Doc A/55/383/Add1, 6.
188 Furthermore, article 34, first paragraph, of the Convention, stipulates that ‘[e]ach 
State Party shall take the necessary measures, including legislative and administrative 
measures, in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, to ensure the 
implementation of its obligations under this Convention’.
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seems to be the consequence of the drafters’ estimation that the treaty could 
only be successfully complied with after the enactment of domestic legis-
lation. It cannot, however, be unambiguously verified on the basis of the 
travaux préparatoires of the CTOC.189
Perhaps we should not attribute too much weight to the reference to 
domestic ‘legislation’ as a method of implementation of a treaty. Its inclu-
sion in the text of the treaty may be inspired by an assessment made by 
the drafters that states cannot successfully implement the treaty provisions 
in their domestic legal orders with administrative measures alone; the 
adoption of legislation is considered inevitable. Similarly, international 
conventions pertaining to criminal law will often require the adoption of 
domestic legislation, since the drafters may realise that the entrenchment 
of the nulla poena sine lege and nullum crimen sine lege principles will render 
the implementation of the convention impossible without the enactment 
of legislation. Only in legal orders that possess strong monist features, the 
treaty itself may satisfy the condition of legality. In other words, there is 
little evidence that the specific obligation to adopt legislation, in contrast 
to other implementing measures, is considered to be an important aspect 
of the more general obligation to adopt implementing measures; the attain-
ment of a treaty’s policy objectives remains the primary concern.
3.3 Customary law
3.3.1 Custom as a source of law
Article 38, first paragraph, of the Statute of the ICJ, refers to customary 
international law as ‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law’.190 Customary law is an important source of international 
law, even though some argue its value has diminished considerably during 
the past decades.191 As can be derived from article 38 of the Statute of the 
ICJ, two conditions have to be fulfilled for a norm to acquire customary 
189 As appears from the history of the drafting process of the Convention, the reference to 
‘legislative and other measures’, which eventually has become part of article 5, fi rst para-
graph, cited above, was inserted in the fi nal stage of the negotiation process, probably 
for reasons of consistency. See UNGA ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elabora-
tion of a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on its Tenth Session, held 
in Vienna from 17 to 28 July 2000 (11 September 2000) UN Doc A/AC.254/34, par.14. 
Early proposals for provisions that are similar to article 5, fi rst paragraph, such as the 
obligation to criminalise corruption (article 8, fi rst paragraph), expressly made reference 
to ‘legislative and other measures’. This formulation has not been disputed, however. UN 
Offi ce on Drugs and Crime, Travaux préparatoires of the negotiations for the elaboration of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and the Protocols thereto 
(United Nations, New York 2006) 75-86.
190 ICJ Statute art 38, fi rst paragraph, sub b. 
191 Shaw, International law (n 1) 73-74; Cassese, International law (n 1) 165-166.
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status.192 These two conditions are often called the ‘objective’ and ‘subjec-
tive’ (or: ‘psychological’) elements. The objective element consists of a 
general practice adhered to by states, whereas the subjective element refers 
to the conviction of states that the practice is required by law: opinio iuris 
sive necessitatis.193 While at first sight the distinction between state practice 
and opinio iuris has been consistently upheld by the ICJ, a closer look raises 
various questions. According to some authors, the distinction between the 
objective and subjective element is difficult to maintain as we can only learn 
about the ‘conviction’ of states (opinio iuris) through their actions.194 In a 
number of cases the ICJ has indeed derived the existence of opinio iuris from 
a general practice.195
As regards the objective element, the state practice will have to meet 
certain criteria in order to be able to contribute to the emergence of a new 
rule of customary international law. In the Asylum Case, the ICJ stated that 
‘a customary rule must be in accordance with a constant and uniform 
usage practiced by the State in question’.196 This criterion was further 
specified North Sea Continental Shelf in 1969, when it held that ‘state practice, 
including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have 
been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision 
invoked’.197 This threshold was somewhat lowered in Military and Paramili-
tary Activities in and against Nicaragua, when the ICJ considered that:
‘[…] for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must [not] be in 
absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of custom-
ary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be 
consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given 
rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the 
recognition of a new rule.’198
192 As the ICJ put it: ‘It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international 
law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of states […]’. Case 
concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta) (Judgment) [1985] ICJ Rep 
13, par. 27. Also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] 
ICJ Rep 226, par. 64. 
193 C. Dahlman, ‘The function of opinio iuris in customary international law’ 81 Nordic Journal 
of International Law 3 (2012) 327-339, 329-330.
194 For an overview of this debate, see J. Kammerhofer, ‘Uncertainty in the formal sources 
of international law: Customary international law and some of its problems’ 15 European 
Journal of International Law 3 (2004) 523-553, 525-532. Also M. Byers, Custom, power and the 
power of rules: International relations and customary international law (CUP, Cambridge 1999) 
136-141.
195 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (n 74) 8.
196 Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) (Judgment) [1950] ICJ Rep 266, p. 14.
197 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany v Netherlands) (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, par. 74.
198 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, par. 186.
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Another issue concerns the actors involved. What forms of state behaviour 
could possibly amount to ‘state practice’? As a general rule, the conduct of 
all organs of officials competent to act on behalf of the state on the interna-
tional plane could be relevant for the emergence of customary international 
law.199 Arguably, the rules of the law of international responsibility relating 
to the attribution of conduct to states, as was discussed in Chapter 1, may 
provide some guidance for the determination whether the organ’s conduct 
amounts to state practice. The ICTY has noted that for the development 
of customary international law pertaining to armed conflict, state practice 
should primarily be sought in such elements as official pronouncements 
of states, military manuals and judicial decisions.200 The ICJ has accepted 
administrative acts or attitudes, acts of the judiciary and treaties as exam-
ples of state practice. Furthermore, it may also include national legislative 
acts.201
The subjective element, or opinio iuris, will be fulfilled if states behave 
in conformity with the rule because they believe the law requires them to 
do so. This element thus distinguishes customary law from mere usages or 
habits. In North Sea Continental Shelf, the ICJ held:
‘Not only must the acts concerned  amount to a  settled practice, but they must also be such, 
or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered 
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the 
existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive neces-
sitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts 
to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself 
enough.’202
It thus becomes apparent that the concept of opinio iuris contains some 
problematic aspects, as it presupposes the existence of a norm of (customary) 
international law. In absence of such a norm, how could states hold the 
199 J. Wouters, ‘Bronnen van het internationaal recht’ in: N. Horbach, R. Lefeber and O. 
Ribbelink (eds), Handboek Internationaal recht. (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2007) 81-122, 
86; P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, Droit international public (8th edn LGDJ, Paris 
2009) 355-356. Brownlie mentions ‘diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press 
releases, the opinions of offi cial legal advisers, offi cial manuals on legal questions, e.g. 
manuals of military law, executive decision and practices, orders to naval forces etc., 
comments by governments on drafts produced by the International Law Commission, 
state legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other 
international instruments, pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of interna-
tional organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the United Nations General 
Assembly’ as possibly relevant sources. I. Brownlie, Principles of public international law 
(6th edn OUP, Oxford 2003) 6.
200 Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić aka ‘Dule’ (Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory 
appeal on jurisdiction) IT-94-1 (2 October 1995) par. 99. 
201 A. Pellet, ‘Article 38’ in: A. Zimmermann et al. (eds), The Statute of the International Court 
of Justice. A commentary (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2012) 731-870, 815-816. Also Shaw, Interna-
tional law (n 1) 82.
202 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (n 197) par. 77.
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opinion that international law requires them to behave as they do?203 Be 
that as it may, for the purpose of this study, a more urgent question than 
this ‘chronological paradox’204 seems to be in what ways states can express 
opinio iuris. In general, it has to be deduced from a state’s actions or state-
ments, expressed by the same organs and officials that are also able to 
perform state practice. Important elements include the voting behaviour 
of states in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)205, military 
manuals and the adoption of conventions206, resolutions adopted by the 
Institute of International Law207, proposals of states submitted during the 
drafting of international conventions and adopted recommendations of 
drafting committees208, agreements between states and non-governmental 
203 Lauterpacht, General Works (n 2) 63; H. Thirlway, ‘The sources of international law’ in: 
M.D. Evans, International law (3rd edn OUP, Oxford 2010) 91-117, 98-99; Kammerhofer, 
‘Uncertainty in the formal sources of international law’ (n 194) 534; Dahlman, ‘The func-
tion of opinio iuris’(n 193) 330-335. 
204 Byers, Custom, power and the power of rules (n 194) 130-133.
205 In Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, for example, 
the ICJ concluded that the prohibition on the use of force, enshrined in the UN Charter, 
was also part of customary international law. It looked into the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (UNGA Res 25/2625 (XXV) (25 
October 1970)). Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(n 198) par. 188. Also Prosecutor v Thomir Blaskic, (Appeals Chamber judgment) IT-95-
14-A (29 July 2004) par. 158; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 192) par. 70; 
Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) (Separate Opinion of Judge Dillard) [1975] ICJ Rep 
116, p. 121.
206 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada) (Jurisdiction) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Torres 
Bernárdez) [1998] ICJ Rep 582, par. 272; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Separate Opinion of Judge Khasawneh) [2004] ICJ Rep 
235, par. 3; Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organisation (Advisory Opinion) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Moreno 
Quintana) [1960] ICJ Rep 150, p. 177; Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreškić, Mirjan Kupreškić, 
Vlatko Kupreškić, Drago Josipović, Dragan Papić, Vladimir Šantić, also known as “Vlado” (Trial 
Chamber judgment) IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000) paras 531-533; Prosecutor v Blagoje Simić, 
Miroslav Tadić and Simo Zarić (Trial Chamber judgment) IT-95-9-T (17 October 2003) par. 
121 and 153; Prosecutor v Duško Tadić (Appeals Chamber judgment), IT-94-1-A (15 July 
1999) par.223; Prosecutor v Milorad Knrojelac (Appeals Chamber judgement) IT-97-25-A 
(17 September 2003) par. 221; Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran 
Vuković (Trial Chamber judgment) IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (22 February 2001) par. 495; 
Prosecutor v Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan Todorović and Simo Zarić (Trial 
Chamber ex parte confi dential decision on the prosecution motion under Rule 73 for a 
ruling concerning the testimony of a witness) IT-95-9 (27 July 1999) par. 74; Prosecutor v. 
Anto Furundžija (n 54) par. 227. 
207 Prosecutor v Stanislav Galić (Trial Chamber judgment) IT-98-29-T (5 December 2003) par. 45.
208 Also Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Iceland)
(Merits) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Rep 3, par.13; Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of 
Germany v Iceland) (Merits) [1974] ICJ Rep 175, par. 13; Prosecutor v Pavle Strugar, Miodrag 
Jokic and others (Trial Chamber decision on defence preliminary motion challenging juris-
diction) IT-01-42-PT (7 June 2002) par. 19; Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač
and Zoran Vuković (n 205) par. 503 and 541. Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić (Trial Chamber 
judgment) IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) par. 541.
519024-L-sub01-bw-Beenakker
Processed on: 18-4-2018
52 Part I The implementation of international law in the national legal order
organisations209, amicus curiae letters submitted by states210, resolutions 
adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)211 and official 
proclamations issued by states.212
3.3.2 Custom as a source of obligation to adopt implementing measures
Norms of customary international law usually do not require implemen-
tation on the domestic level. There may, however, be exceptions: interna-
tional crimes such as torture and genocide. These exceptions are believed 
to be part of a special branch of customary law, a category which is often 
referred to as ius cogens. Ius cogens has been authoritatively defined as ‘a 
norm accepted and recognised by the international community of states as 
a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character’.213 Candidates which have been mentioned often include 
the prohibition of genocide, the prohibition of slavery, the prohibition of 
torture, the prohibition of racial discrimination, the prohibition of the use of 
force in violation of the UN Charter and the right to self-determination of 
peoples. In the context of the law of treaties, a violation of such a peremp-
tory norm of general international law will render the conflicting treaty 
void, either ab initio or from the moment the ius cogens norm has emerged.214
Outside the context of the law of treaties, however, ius cogens norms may 
also have considerable influence.
In the field of international criminal law the ICTY in Furundžija explored 
the substance of the prohibition of torture under international law. After 
establishing its customary status under the international law of armed 
conflict and international human rights law, and its ius cogens character,215
the Trial Chamber held:
209 Prosecutor v Blagoje Simić, Milan Simić, Miroslav Tadić, Stevan Todorović and Simo Zarić
(Trial Chamber ex parte and confi dential separate opinion of Judge David Hunt on 
prosecutor’s motion for a ruling concerning the testimony of a witness) IT-95-9 (27 July 
1999) par. 23.
210 Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić aka ‘Dule’ (Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory 
appeal on jurisdiction) (n 200) par. 83.
211 Armed activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) 
(Judgment) (Separate Opinion of Judge Simma) [2005] ICJ Rep 334, par. 11; Prosecutor 
v. Duško Tadić aka ‘Dule’ (Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on 
jurisdiction) (n 200) par. 133.
212 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany v Netherlands) (Judgment) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lachs) [1969] ICJ Rep 
218, p. 235.
213 VCLT art 53.
214 Ibid, art 64.
215 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija (n 54) par. 134-146. Also Al-Adsani v the United Kingdom (App 
no 35763/97) ECHR 2001-XI 79, par. 61.
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‘[I]n the case of torture, the requirement that States expeditiously institute national imple-
menting measures is an integral part of the international obligation to prohibit this prac-
tice. Consequently, States must immediately set in motion all those procedures and mea-
sures that may make it possible, within their municipal legal system, to forestall any act of 
torture or expeditiously put an end to any torture that is occurring.’216
The Trial Chamber thus advanced the view that the prohibition of torture 
must be interpreted in a manner as to encompass an accompanying obli-
gation to adopt national implementing measures. The motivation for this 
particular interpretation remains somewhat unclear, although the Trial 
Chamber referred to the ECtHR’s judgment in Soering.217 The ECtHR did 
not, however, discuss the possible existence of an obligation to adopt imple-
menting legislation; it was requested to determine whether a violation of 
article 3 ECHR could be established ‘where substantial grounds have been 
shown for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real 
risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment in the requesting country’.218 The question hence remains 
whether it could be deduced from the Furundžija decision that any obliga-
tion which has acquired the status of ius cogens under international law, 
automatically includes an obligation to adopt legislation on the domestic 
level. There seems to be no evidence for such a claim.219
Arguably the Trial Chamber in Furundžija implicitly referred to the 
Convention against Torture (CAT), the provisions of which include obliga-
tions to take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures 
to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction, to ensure 
that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law, and to make these 
offences punishable by appropriate penalties.220 In other words, the Trial 
Chamber in the Furundžija decision may have established the elevation 
of treaty norms, codified in the CAT, into rules of customary law with a 
ius cogens character. Nevertheless, the qualification of a rule as a peremp-
tory norm of general international law as such does not suffice to accept 
the existence of an accessory obligation to adopt domestic legislation. This 
interpretation may be supported, albeit not in a conclusive manner, by the 
reasoning followed by the Trial Chamber. It stated:
216 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija (n 54) par. 149.
217 Ibid, par. 148.
218 Soering v the United Kingdom (App no 14038/88) Series A no 161, par. 86.
219 Moreover, it is hard to see why states should enact legislation in order to implement 
international obligations which have an inter-state, instead of an intra-state, character, 
such as the universally recognised prohibition of the acquisition of territory by the use of 
force.
220 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85, 
artt 2, fi rst paragraph, and 4, fi rst and second paragraph.
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‘[this universal revulsion against torture], as well as the importance States attach to the 
eradication of torture, has led to the cluster of treaty and customary rules on torture acquir-
ing a particularly high status in the international normative system, a status similar to that 
of principles such as those prohibiting genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, aggression, 
the acquisition of territory by force and the forcible suppression of the right of peoples to 
self-determination. The prohibition against torture exhibits three important features, 
which are probably held in common with the other general principles protecting funda-
mental human rights.’221
The three elements to which the Trial Chamber referred, were ‘the prohibi-
tion even covers potential breaches’, ‘the prohibition imposes obligations 
erga omnes’, and ‘the prohibition has acquired the status of ius cogens’.222 The 
Trial Chamber then proceeded to discuss these three elements separately. In 
relation to the first element, it indeed found that the prohibition of torture 
comprises the obligation of states, as cited above, to ‘expeditiously institute 
implementing measures’. Therefore, the reasoning advanced by the Trial 
Chamber seems to suggest that the ius cogens character of the prohibition of 
torture as such is not decisive when confronted with the question whether 
an accompanying obligation to adopt domestic implementing measures 
exists; more important is the interpretation of the substance and scope of 
the treaty and customary norm.
Similar reasoning may apply to the obligation to prevent genocide, 
which must be distinguished from the prohibition to commit genocide.223
As part of this obligation, article V of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) provides:
‘The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitu-
tions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention 
and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the 
other acts enumerated in Article 3.’224
Could this obligation be considered to be part of customary international 
law? The duty to prevent genocide, codified in article I CPPCG, may indeed 
be part of customary law.225 In its advisory opinion on Reservations to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide the ICJ 
stated that ‘the principles underlying the Convention are principles which 
are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any 
221 Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija (n 54) par. 148.
222 Ibid, par. 148-157.
223 The latter norm, the prohibition to commit genocide, has been recognised as a norm of 
ius cogens. See J. Wouters and S. Verhoeven, ‘The prohibition of genocide as a norm of ius 
cogens’ 5 International Criminal Law Review (2005) 401-416, 404-405.
224 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 
December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277 (Genocide Convention) 
art V.
225 W. Schabas, Genocide in international law: The crime of crimes (2nd edn CUP, Cambridge 
2009) 524 and 526.
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conventional obligation’.226 This may be understood as a finding by the 
court that the provisions of the CPPCG, including article V, have emerged 
as rules of customary law.227 In a separate opinion to the Case concerning the 
Application of the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, judge ad hoc Vukas stated that ‘in any event, it is necessary to stress 
that, even in the period before the establishment of the [Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia], Serbia was obliged to prevent and punish the crime of 
genocide, as the provisions of the Genocide Convention had for a long 
time before the 1990s formed a part of general customary international law 
of a peremptory nature (jus  cogens).’228 This conclusion with regard to the 
customary nature of the obligations set out in the CPPCG seems convincing, 
given the fact that a similar accompanying obligation has been read into the 
prohibition of torture as well. On the other hand, ‘principles underlying 
the Convention’ and the provisions of the Convention itself may not be 
identical.229 In the absence of an unequivocal and authoritative opinion on 
the subject, this customary status of the obligation to adopt domestic imple-
menting measures may continue to be surrounded with some controversy.
In sum, although not uncontroversial, the prohibition of torture and 
genocide and its implied obligations to adopt domestic implementing 
measures providing for, as an example, the criminality and punishment 
by adequate penalties of these crimes on the domestic level, may be scarce 
examples of customary international law as a source of obligation to adopt 
national (legislative) implementing measures. Both cases concern treaty 
obligations which have been elevated to customary status (and perhaps 
even possess the character of ius cogens). Given the fact that acts of genocide 
and torture constitute the most heinous crimes in the international commu-
nity, the overall image is that only in exceptional circumstances customary 
international law may give rise to the obligation to adopt (legislative) 
implementing measures on the national level.
226 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Advisory Opinion [1951] ICJ Rep 15, p. 12. Also Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (New Application 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda) (Jurisdiction of 
the Court and Admissibility of the Application) (Judgment) [2006] ICJ Rep 6, par. 64; Case 
Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 43, 
par. 161.
227 Also Schabas, Genocide in international law (n 225) 58.
228 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Croatia v Serbia) (Preliminary Objections) (Separate Opinion of Judge ad 
hoc Vukas) [2008] ICJ Rep 549, par. 17.
229 Cf. H. de Pooter, ‘The obligation to prevent genocide. A large shell yet to be fi lled’, 17 
African Yearbook of International Law (2011) 285-320, 294. De Pooter holds the opinion that 
‘the interpretation unanimously given to this statement is that the obligations contained 
in the Genocide Convention are part of customary international law’.
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3.4 Binding decisions of international organisations
3.4.1 Binding decisions of international organisations as a source of law
Since the 19th century international law has witnessed the emergence 
of international organisations as legal subjects in the international legal 
domain. Well-known examples include the United Nations (1945), the 
Council of Europe (1949), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (1949), 
the Organisation of American States (1951), the European Coal and Steel 
Community (1952), the European Economic Community (1958), the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1961), the 
Organisation of African Unity (1963), the European Union (1992), the World 
Trade Organisation (1995) and the African Union (2001).230 International 
organisations have been established for a wide range of purposes and, as a 
result, have been attributed with varying powers and functions. They share, 
however, some characteristics. First, international organisations tend to be 
products of cooperation between states.231 Second, the existence of inter-
national organisations often derives from treaties.232 Third, and arguably 
most importantly, the newly created organisation must, at least to a certain 
extent, possess a will distinct of the will of its member states, in order to 
distinguish the organisation from other entities that are merely agents of, or 
instruments at the hands of, states.233
Three elements may provide an indication as to whether a particular 
organisation can be considered an international organisation in the sense 
of possessing international legal personality: whether the entity possesses 
treaty-making capacity, whether it has the right to send and receive 
legations and whether it can bring international claims.234 There is some 
measure of circularity in these criteria; a similar blurring of fact and law 
may be discovered in Reparation for Injuries, in which the ICJ had to deter-
mine whether the United Nations (UN) had the capacity to bring a claim 
against the state in which one of its officials had been murdered. To this 
230 The years mentioned refer to the dates of entry into force of the constituent documents.
231 Nevertheless, there are examples of international organisations which, in cooperation 
with states, participate in the establishment of other international organisations. The 
European Communities, one of the European Union’s predecessors, was a founding 
member of the World Trade Organisation (Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World 
Trade Organisation (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1867 UNTS 
3, art XI, fi rst paragraph).
232 For instance, article 1 TEU provides that ‘[b]y this treaty, the High Contracting Parties 
establish among themselves a European Union […]’. An exception to the general rule that 
international organisations are established by treaty may be found in the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) which was established by a resolution of the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA res 57 (11 December 1946)).
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end, the ICJ had to investigate whether the UN possessed international legal 
personality. It held that ‘the [UN] was intended to exercise and enjoy, and 
is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be 
explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of international 
personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane’.235
If it is established (or assumed) that an entity is an international legal 
subject and, as a consequence, is capable of bearing rights and obligations 
under international law, the question arises how an international organisa-
tion receives its powers. This conferral of powers will often be based on an 
express attribution of powers of the founding entities to the organisation.236
This principle may be derived from Jurisdiction of the European Commission of 
the Danube between Galatz and Braila, in which the PCIJ held:
‘As the European Commission is not a State, but an international institution with a special 
purpose, it only has the functions bestowed upon it by the Definitive Statute with a view to 
the fulfilment of that purpose, but it has the power to exercise these functions to their full 
extent, in so far as the Statute does not impose restrictions upon it’.237
In addition to attribution, powers may also be ‘implied’.238 The doctrine of 
implied powers provides for an expansion of an international organisation’s 
powers and has been accepted by the ICJ in Reparation for Injuries in relation 
to the UN, about which the court noted that ‘under international law, the 
[UN] must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly 
provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as 
being essential to the performance of its duties’.239 Similar argumentation 
applies to the EU.240
Thus, whether expressly attributed or implied, the organisation’s 
founding fathers have delegated powers to the newly created organ-
isation.241 The nature of these powers could be diverse, among them the 
competence to adopt ‘internal’ norms which regulate organisation matters. 
235 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisor Opinion) [1949] 
ICJ Rep 174, p. 179.
236 In general on this topic, J. Erne, ‘Conferral of powers by states as a basis of obligation of 
international organisations’ 78 Nordic Journal of International Law 2 (2009) 177-199.
237 Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube between Galatz and Braila (Advisory 
Opinion) [1927] PCIJ Rep Series B no. 14, p. 64. In addition to this general rule, the prin-
ciple of attribution may be codifi ed in the constituent treaty of an organisation. Article 
5, fi rst and second paragraph, TEU, provides that ‘the limits of Union competences are 
governed by the principle of conferral. […] Under the principle of conferral, the Union 
shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member 
States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred 
upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States’. 
238 Klabbers, International institutional law (n 233) 59-64.
239 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (n 235) p. 182.
240 CJEU, ERTA, case 22/70, judgment of 31 March 1971, ECLI:EU:C:1971:32, par. 17-19 and 27.
241 Klabbers, International institutional law (n 233) 185-186.
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Examples in the sphere of the UN may be found in decisions of the UNGA 
pertaining to the admission of new member states, voting procedures or 
the apportionment of the budget.242 They should be distinguished from the 
power to produce legal rules which address other entities, most notably 
states, beyond the structure of the organisation itself. It would seem obvious 
that such ‘external’ law-making competence of an international organisa-
tion cannot be based on implied powers; such a power will require an 
express act of attribution since ‘it cannot be assumed that states have ceded 
sovereign prerogatives to make law’.243 Therefore, law-making powers will 
be enshrined in the constituent treaty of the organisation, which has been 
labelled a ‘general rule of modern international institutional law’.244 From 
the principle that a treaty does not contain obligations for third parties 
without its consent, as codified in article 34 VCLT, it may be induced that 
‘law’ produced by an international organisation is only binding upon its 
member states.245
A closer look at the products of external law-making powers of interna-
tional organisations makes clear that a distinction should be made between 
binding and non-binding decisions of international organisations, although 
this strict dichotomy may be difficult to consistently uphold in practice.246
The non-binding category is often referred to as ‘recommendations’. In 
contrast to binding decisions of international organisations, recommenda-
tions do not have the capacity to create obligations for its addressee(s).247
Resolutions adopted by the UNGA (which are not of an ‘internal’ nature) 
are generally considered to possess such character. Article 10 ChUN, for 
instance, endows the UNGA with the power to ‘discuss any questions or 
any matters within the scope of the present charter […] and […] [to] make 
recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security 
Council or to both on any such questions or matters’.248 Despite its non-
binding character, however, resolutions adopted by the UNGA, and soft 
law in general, may reflect the emergence of a new rule of customary law, 
242 M. Divac Öberg, ‘The legal effects of resolutions of the UN Security Council and General 
Assembly in the jurisprudence of the ICJ’ 16 European Journal of International Law 5 (2006) 
879-906, 883.
243 J. Alvarez, International organisations as law-makers (OUP, Oxford 2005) 120. Also N. 
Buchowska, ‘The issue of nullity of law-making resolutions of international organisa-
tions’ 28 Polish Yearbook of International Law 9 (2006-2008) 9-23, 13-14.
244 H. Schermers and N. Blokker, International institutional law (5th edn Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden & Boston 2011) 825.
245 Alvarez, International organisations as law-makers (n 243) 120-121.
246 N. Blokker, ‘Decisions of international organisations: the case of the European Union’ 30
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (1999) 3-44, 6-8.
247 Divac Öberg, ‘The legal effects’ (n 242) 880.
248 ChUN art 10. Other provisions containing the powers of the General Assembly to make 
‘recommendations’ include articles 11, fi rst and second paragraph, 12, fi rst paragraph, 13, 
fi rst paragraph, and 14, of the UN Charter.
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a process which has been referred to as the ‘hardening of soft law’.249 The 
legal basis of other examples of non-binding decisions made by organs of 
international organisations may be found in article 23 of the Constitution of 
the WHO, which provides that ‘the Health Assembly shall have authority to 
make recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the 
competence of the Organisation’, or article 5, sub b, of the Convention on 
the OECD, according to which ‘the Organisation may make recommenda-
tions to Members’ in order to achieve its aims.250
Perhaps the most prominent example of binding decisions made by 
international organisations consists of decisions of the UNSC. In general, 
whether a specific UNSC resolution will be binding upon its addressees, 
depends on the intent of the UNSC, which may be derived from the 
language used, the background of its drafting and the Charter provisions 
invoked.251 In case of the so-called enforcement actions of the UNSC under 
Chapter VII ChUN in response to any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace or act of aggression, such intent may be established.252 The binding 
character of these measures flows from articles 25 and 48, first paragraph, 
ChUN, which stipulate that ‘the Members of the United Nations agree to 
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance 
with the present Charter’, and that ‘the action required to carry out deci-
sions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and 
security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations, or by some 
of them, as the Security Council may determine’.253 Several other interna-
tional organisations have been endowed with the task of producing legal 
rules which are more or less binding upon the member states, including 
the EU, the ICAO, the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the 
WHO.254
249 C. Chinkin, ‘Normative development in the international legal system’ in: D. Shelton 
(ed), Commitment and compliance. The role of non-binding norms in the international legal 
system (OUP, Oxford 2000) 21-42. In its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ noted ‘that General Assembly resolutions, even if they are 
not binding, may sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, 
provide evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an 
opinio juris’. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 192) par. 70.
250 Constitution of the World Health Organisation (adopted 22 July 1946, entered into force 
7 April 1948) 14 UNTS 185 (Constitution of the WHO); Convention on the Organisation 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (adopted 14 December 1960, entered into 
force 30 September 1961) 888 UNTS 179 (Convention on the OECD).
251 Legal consequences for states of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ 
Rep 16, p. 53. Also Divac Öberg, ‘The legal effects’ (n 242) 885.
252 ChUN art 39.
253 Also Divac Öberg, ‘The legal effects’ (n 242) 884-885.
254 See references in (n 109). Also Convention of the World Meteorological Organisation 
(adopted 11 October 1947, entered into force 23 March 1950, as amended) 77 UNTS 143 
(WMO Convention) artt 8, sub d, and 9; Constitution of the WHO artt 21 and 22.
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It has been argued that decisions of international organisations, whether 
binding or not, cannot be regarded as a formal source of law. In absence 
of a criterion for distinguishing non-law from law in the international 
community, as noted by Klabbers, this debate may however of interest more 
to scholars than to legal practitioners.255 Supporters of this view point to 
article 38, first paragraph, of the Statute of the ICJ. The exclusion of deci-
sions of international organisations from the enumeration of the sources of 
law primarily reflects international legal practice at the time the Statute was 
drafted. As will be demonstrated in the next section, examples of binding 
decisions of international organisations, without exceptions, date back 
to the post-1945 era, or, more specifically, to the period of time following 
the drafting of the Statute of the ICJ. Malanczuk has argued that acts of 
international organisations may not be a separate source of law, since inter-
national organisations possess legislating power on the basis of a treaty. It 
is the constituent treaty of the organisation, he suggests, which grants the 
organisation’s decisions their legal character.256 Although it is true, as we 
have seen, that law-making powers of an international organisation require 
a legal basis in the constituent treaty of the organisation, it may go too far 
to conclude from this that the treaty constitutes the ultimate and exclu-
sive source of law from which a decision of an international organisation 
derives its character as law. At some point, it seems, such an instrument 
may possess an autonomous legal character which is no longer a mere 
derivate from the constituent treaty. Contemporary international law has 
demonstrated that legal obligations could very well spring from decisions 
of international organisations. Therefore, some authors acknowledge the 
status of decisions of international organisations as a source of law.257 As 
a result, the more practical view, for the present study at least, would be 
that decisions of international organisations must be considered a source of 
obligation to the extent that they are binding on the addressee.258
3.4.2 Binding decisions of international organisations as a source of 
obligation to adopt implementing measures
Some (binding) law produced by the aforementioned organisations may 
entail the obligation of member states to adopt legislative measures on the 
domestic level. Examples include UNSC resolutions 1373 and 1540, adopted 
in 2001 and 2004 respectively, as part of the global effort to combat terrorism 
255 J. Klabbers, International law (CUP, Cambridge 2013) 38.
256 P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern introduction to international law (7th edn Routledge, New 
York 1997) 53.
257 R. Wessel, ‘Informal international law-making as a new form of world legislation?’ Inter-
national Organisations Review 8 (2011) 253-265.
258 Also H. Thirlway, The sources of international law (OUP, Oxford 2014) 21-23, and Alvarez, 
International organisations as law-makers (n 243) 588-601.
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and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.259 Prior to 2001, the ‘legis-
lative’ capacity, in the sense of the power to lay down legal norms which 
are suitable for general and repeated application, of the UNSC was largely 
rejected.260 In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, however, the 
UNSC resorted to legislative measures, acting under Chapter VII ChUN, 
to attain its policy aims.261 These measures will often require the adoption 
of domestic legislation in order to comply with the obligation, imposed 
by resolution 1373, to ‘ensure that […] terrorist acts are established as 
serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations’.262 In relation 
to weapons of mass destruction, the UNSC in resolution 1540 decided that 
all states ‘in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and 
enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-state actor to 
manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, 
chemical or biological weapons […]’.263 Talmon has noted that the phrase 
‘in accordance with their national procedures’ was added to meet the 
concerns of several states that resolution 1540 would involve action by their 
legislators. Therefore, he has pointed out, ‘a legislative resolution cannot 
provide more than a framework to be filled in by national legislatures’.264 In 
order to ensure and monitor the implementation process of the resolutions 
1373 and 1540, the UNSC also provided for the establishment of so-called 
‘compliance committees’, which monitor the implementation progress of 
the member states.265
It has been a matter of debate whether the UNSC is legally entitled 
to impose such obligations on states; it is not evident that the UNSC has 
the competence thereto. Some commentators point to the broad powers 
attributed to the UNSC under the ChUN and infer from this the competence 
to impose upon the member states of the United Nations the obligations 
cited above (although in practice, they argue, this power may be subject 
259 UNSC Res 1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373 and UNSC Res 1540 (28 April 
2004) UN Doc S/RES/1540.
260 M. Fremuth and J. Griebel, ‘On the Security Council as a legislator: a blessing or a curse 
for the international community?’ 76 Nordic Journal of International Law (2007) 339-361, 
339-340.
261 The revolutionary nature of resolution 1373 was recognised in an early stage by Szasz. P. 
Szasz, ‘The Security Council starts legislating’ 96 American Journal of International Law 4 
(2002) 901-905.
262 UNSC Res 1373 (n 259) par. 2, sub e.
263 UNSC Res 1540 (n 259) par. 2.
264 S. Talmon, ‘The Security Council as world legislature’, 99 American Journal of International 
Law (2005) 175-193, 188-189. In relation to resolution 1540, see P. Crail, ‘Implementing 
UN Security Council resolution 1540. A risk-based approach’ 13 Nonproliferation review 2 
(2006) 355-399. 
265 UNSC Res 1373 (n 259) par. 6 and UNSC Res 1540 (n 259) par. 4.
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to important limitations).266 Others hold the opposite view that the UNSC 
exceeded its powers when it adopted the resolutions 1373 and 1540, as valid 
enforcement measures ‘have to be of a concrete character responding to a 
concrete threat’. In their opinion, the regime laid down in the resolutions 
is intended to apply generally and repeatedly, and thus does not meet this 
criterion.267 This problem will not be solved until the resolutions have come 
under review by the ICJ, which is unlikely to occur.268
In addition to the obligations laid down in the resolutions discussed 
above, domestic implementing legislation may also be required in order to 
execute sanctions which have been enacted by the UNSC. In this particular 
context, sanctions may be understood as coercive measures taken against 
a target state or entity in application of a decision of the UNSC.269 The 
competence to adopt sanctions is based, similar to the power to adopt reso-
lutions such as 1373 and 1540, on article 41 ChUN, which provides that ‘the 
Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon 
the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures […]’. Sanctions 
are often of an economic, diplomatic or financial nature and include prohi-
bitions of export and import, prohibition of services, prohibition of move-
ment of funds, freezing of funds and assets, prohibition of air, sea and land 
communications, severance or reductions of diplomatic and other official 
relations, and restrictions on the movement of persons.270 In response to the 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces in 1990, for instance, the UNSC adopted 
resolutions 661 and 670 in which it imposed an embargo on the import and 
export of commodities and goods to and from Iraq and Kuwait, financial 
and economic sanctions, including the freezing of assets, and a ban on all 
means of transport to Iraq and Kuwait, including air traffic.271
Similar to the aforementioned provisions of the ‘legislative’ resolutions 
1373 and 1540, sanctions may give rise to the adoption of domestic legisla-
tion.272 UN member states are at liberty to treat sanctions as ‘self-executing’ 
provisions, in theory at least. Then the sanctions could be applied directly 
in the domestic legal order, as a result of which monist states would not 
266 For example Talmon, ‘The Security Council as world legislature’ (n 264) 192, and L.M.H. 
Martínez, ‘The legislative role of the Security Council in its fi ght against terrorism: legal 
political and practical limits’ 57 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 2 (2008) 
333-360.
267 Fremuth and Griebel, ‘On the Security Council as a legislator’ (n 260) 350.
268 Ibid, 357.
269 G. Abi-Saab, ‘The concept of sanction in international law’ in: V. Gowlland-Debbas (ed), 
United Nations sanctions and international law (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001) 
29-41, 39.
270 V. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Sanctions regimes under article 41 of the UN Charter’ in: Idem 
(ed), National implementation of United Nations sanctions. A comparative study (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 2004) 3-31, 6-7.
271 UNSC Res 670 (25 September 1990) UN Doc S/RES/670 and UNSC Res 661 (6 August 
1990) UN Doc S/RES/661. Also Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Sanctions regimes’ (n 270) 8-9.
272 Talmon, ‘The Security Council as world legislature’ (n 264) 176.
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require implementing legislation. Gowlland has pointed out, however, 
that sanctions adopted under article 41 ChUN often have been assimilated 
to non-self-executing treaty obligations.273 For this reason, and because of 
the importance of an expedient implementation of the sanctions by states 
and the fact that sanctions often constitute an infringement of constitution-
ally protected rights, such as the protection of property, some states have 
adopted ‘enabling legislation’: prior framework legislation through which 
the sanctions could be executed on the domestic level. The majority of 
states, nevertheless, has relied on other measures in order to fulfil their 
obligation to comply with the sanctions resolutions, such as legislation not 
necessarily linked to acts by the UNSC or through the adoption of ad hoc 
legislation in response to a particular sanctions resolution.274
Also in the framework of the WHO, the adoption of decisions by one of 
the organisation’s organs may give rise to the obligation to adopt national 
legislation. Pursuant to article 21 of the Constitution of the WHO, the Health 
Assembly, in which the member states are represented, shall have the 
authority to adopt regulations concerning sanitary and quarantine require-
ments and other procedures designed to prevent the international spread of 
disease. These regulations will be binding upon member states unless they 
choose to opt out in accordance with article 22 of the Constitution of the 
WHO. As Schermers and Blokker have noted, ‘[i]n view of this discretion 
accorded to the member states, these “regulations” more closely resemble 
conventions with a negative ratification procedure […] than binding acts of 
the organisation’.275 On the basis of these provisions, the WHO has facili-
tated the drafting of the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR), the 
history of which may be traced back to 1851, when European states present 
at the International Sanitary Conference in Paris acknowledged the need 
for international cooperation to combat the spread of infectious diseases, in 
particular cholera.276 The 2005 IHR entered into force in 2007.
The aim of the IHR is to prevent, protect against, control and provide 
a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that 
are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which 
avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade.277
273 V. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Implementing sanctions resolutions in domestic law’ in: Idem (ed), 
National implementation of United Nations sanctions. A comparative study (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Hague 2004) 33-73, 40.
274 Ibid, 41-45.
275 Schermers and Blokker, International institutional law (n 244) 794-795.
276 D. Fidler, ‘From international sanitary conventions to global health security: the new 
International Health Regulations’ 4 Chinese Journal of International Law 2 (2005) 325-392, 
329.
277 International Health Regulations (adopted 23 May 2005, entered into force 15 June 2007) 
2509 UNTS 79 (IHR) art 2. 
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Member states are called upon, it is stated, to implement fully the IHR 
in accordance with […] the principles embodied in article 3.278 The term 
‘implementation’ in article 3 does not necessarily refer to implementation 
through legislation; the diverse nature of the provisions contained in the 
IHR will often require other than legislative measures, such as the obliga-
tion for state authorities to communicate with the WHO in case of public 
health emergencies of international concern.279 In practice, however, the 
IHR seem to anticipate that states would resort to legislation in order to give 
effect to its norms. Strictly speaking, the IHR do not, however, prescribe the 
adoption of legislation; the modality of implementation, through legislation 
or other measures, is left for the domestic jurisdictions to decide. Against 
this background, article 59, third paragraph, speaks of full adjustment of 
‘domestic legislative and administrative arrangements’ with the IHR.280
Another category of binding decisions of international organisations as 
a source of obligation to enact domestic legislation consists of what may be 
called ‘technical standards’: instruments that have been adopted by, among 
others, the ICAO and the WMO.281
According to articles 37 and 54, sub l, of the Chicago Convention, the 
Council of the ICAO has the task to ‘adopt and amend, from time to time, as 
may be necessary, international standards and recommended practices and 
procedures […] concerned with the safety, regularity and efficiency of air 
navigation as may from time to time appear appropriate’. Standards have 
been defined as ‘any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, 
material, performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of 
which is recognized as necessary for the safety of international air naviga-
tion and to which Contracting States will conform in accordance with the 
Convention’. ICAO standards differ from ‘recommended practices’ in that 
the uniform application of the latter is recognised as merely ‘desirable’; the 
member states will ‘endeavour to conform’.282 Furthermore, the Chicago 
Convention stipulates that ‘[e]ach contracting State undertakes to collabo-
rate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, 
standards, procedures, and organisation in relation to aircraft, personnel, 
airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which such uniformity will 
facilitate and improve air navigation.283 A recent instrument adopted by the 
Council (‘Annex 19’) focuses on ‘safety management’ and includes provi-
sions on personnel licensing, operation of aircraft, airworthiness of aircraft, 
air traffic services, aircraft accidents and incident investigation and aero-
278 WHO (Resolution of the World Health Assembly) ‘Revision of the International Health 
Regulations’ (23 May 2005) WHA 58.3.
279 IHR art 6, fi rst paragraph. 
280 The IHR will be further discussed in Chapter 7.
281 Chicago Convention and WMO Convention. Also Alvarez, International organisations as 
law-makers (n 243) 111 and 223-224. 
282 R. Abeyratne, Convention on International Civil Aviation: A Commentary (Springer Interna-
tional Publishing, Cham 2014) 418.
283 Chicago Convention art 37. 
519024-L-sub01-bw-Beenakker
Processed on: 18-4-2018
Chapter 3 Sources of obligations to adopt implementing legislation 65
dromes. These standards and procedures require a two-third majority in 
the Council and become effective within three months after its submission 
to the member states, unless in the meantime a majority of states register 
their disapproval with the Council.284 If a state finds it ‘impracticable to 
comply in all respects with any such international standard or procedure, 
or to bring its own regulations or practices into full accord with any interna-
tional standard or procedure after amendment of the latter, or which deems 
it necessary to adopt regulations or practices differing in any particular 
respect from those established by an international standard’, the member 
state should notify ICAO.285
Similar competences have been bestowed upon the Congress of the 
WMO, which has the power to adopt regulations ‘prescribing the proce-
dures of the various bodies of the organisation, in particular the general, 
technical, financial and staff regulations’. The body of technical regulations 
is the product of WMO’s ‘external’ law-making power. States must do their 
utmost to implement the decisions of Congress. If, however, any member 
finds it impracticable to give effect to some requirement laid down in a 
technical regulation adopted by the congress, such member should inform 
the secretary-general of the WMO whether its inability to give effect to it 
is provisional or final, and state its reasons therefor.286 Technical regula-
tions encompass ‘standard practices and procedures’ and ‘recommended 
practices and procedures’. ‘Standard’ practices and procedures ‘shall be 
the practices and procedures which it is necessary the members follow or 
implement’. Similar to the instruments adopted by ICAO, this element 
distinguishes the ‘standards’ from the ‘recommended’ practices and proce-
dures; the latter is merely ‘desirable’ to be followed and implemented.287
In other words, the power of the WMO to take decisions which are binding 
upon the member states becomes visible through the adoption of the ‘stan-
dard practices and procedures’. They include various norms of a highly 
technical nature, such as norms on general meteorological standards, mete-
orological service for international air navigation, hydrology and quality 
management.288 Although the provisions cited above may give member 
states an opportunity to ‘opt-out’, and therefore justify the conclusion that 
the international standards and recommended practices adopted by the 
ICAO and the WMO, may not be, strictly speaking, binding decisions, in 
practice they are considered to have normative force for the member states 
who have not opted out, as a consequence of which they may be referred to 
as ‘legislation’.289
284 Ibid, art 90, sub a. 
285 Ibid, art 38.
286 WMO Convention artt 8, sub d, and 9. 
287 World Meteorological Organization, Technical regulations, I, General meteorological 
standards and recommended practices (WMO-no. 49, Geneva 2015) ix-x. 
288 WMO Technical regulations (WMO-no. 49) (4 vols). <http://www.wmo.int/pages/gover-
nance/policy/tech_regu_en.html> (accessed 29 March 2018).
289 In relation to ICAO, see Abeyratne, Convention on International Civil Aviation (n 282) 426.
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How is the implementation by member states of ‘technical standards’ 
that have been adopted by the ICAO and the WMO, to be executed? The 
aforementioned provisions of the Convention of the WMO and the Chicago 
Convention do not specify an obligation to adopt legislation as such. 
Whereas the WMO’s technical regulations are silent on the modality of 
implementation,290 the harmonisation efforts of ICAO seem to premise the 
adherence to its norms through the adoption of national legislation. Section 
2.1.6 of the ‘Safety Oversight Manual’ of ICAO provides:
‘It is the obligation of each State to approve and maintain regulations and the supporting 
procedures in order to implement the ICAO [standards and recommended practices] with-
in the State. The [Regional Safety Oversight Organisation, a regional organisation affiliated 
with ICAO,] may assist its member States by developing a generic set of civil aviation leg-
islation and regulations for member States to adapt and use to harmonize their own 
national legislation and regulations.’291
Arguably the most developed form of international norms that contain 
obligations for member states to adopt national implementing legislation 
may be found in the legal acts issued by the institutions of the EU. One of 
the pillars of European law can be traced back to the famous judgments of 
the Court of Justice (CJEU) of the (then) European Communities in the Van 
Gend en Loos and Costa Enel cases that were delivered in the early 1960’s. In 
Van Gend en Loos, the CJEU was asked whether the Treaty of the European 
Economic Community had direct application within the territory of its 
member states. The CJEU dismissed the argument advanced by the Belgian 
and Dutch Governments to the effect that it had no jurisdiction, since it 
concerned a matter of national constitutional law to be decided upon by 
the national courts. Instead, the CJEU held that ‘the [European Economic] 
Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit 
of which states have limited their sovereign rights. […] Independently of 
the legislation of the member states, Community law therefore not only 
imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them 
rights […]’.292
290 In relation to the ‘Global Atmosphere Watch’ it is provided that ‘all activities connected 
with its implementation in the territories of individual countries should be the respon-
sibility of the countries themselves and should, as far as possible, be met from national 
resources’. WMO, Technical regulations I (n 287) 12.
291 International Civil Aviation Organisation, Safety oversight manual part B: Establishment 
and management of a Regional Safety Oversight Organisation (2nd edn International Civil 
Aviation Organisation, Montréal 2011) par. 2.1.6. The fact that the adoption of legisla-
tion is merely one of several relevant elements which determine the level of compliance 
with ICAO norms, may also be derived from ICAO’s Universal Safety Oversight Audit 
Programme Continuous Monitoring Approach (USOAP CMA). This monitoring mecha-
nism quantifi es the level of ‘effective implementation’ on the basis of multiple factors, 
which include legislation, organisation, licensing, operations, airworthiness, accident 
investigation, air navigation services and aerodromes. Results available through http://
www.icao.int/safety/Pages/USOAP-Results.aspx (accessed 29 March 2018). 
292 CJEU, Van Gend en Loos, case 26/62, judgment of 5 February 1963, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, p. 12.
519024-L-sub01-bw-Beenakker
Processed on: 18-4-2018
Chapter 3 Sources of obligations to adopt implementing legislation 67
In Costa v. Enel, the CJEU elaborated the concept of the autonomous 
legal order and decided that ‘the law stemming from the Treaty, an indepen-
dent source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be 
overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being 
deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of 
the Community itself being called into question’.293 In other words, Euro-
pean law not only applies qua European law in the legal orders of member 
states, but also prevails over their domestic laws. As a result of these monist 
features, the European legal order relates to domestic legal orders in a 
fundamentally different manner compared to the ‘non-European’ interna-
tional legal order, as we have seen in Chapter 2. These features are relevant 
for the implementation of legislative instruments adopted in the framework 
of the EU, as they explain why member states are under the obligation to 
implement the adopted European laws: were this obligation absent, Euro-
pean law would be dependent upon the willingness of member states to 
maintain its supremacy over domestic laws.294
Implementation in relation to directives comprises three distinguishable 
activities: transposition, application and enforcement. ‘Transposition’ refers 
to the European directive’s translation into provisions of national law. After 
the adoption of these measures, the applicable domestic legal norms should 
be applied by the competent authorities in concrete cases. Were a breach of 
the implementing legislation to occur, member states have a duty to enforce 
compliance, for instance through the imposition of penalties.295
The legal basis of member states’ obligation to implement legislative 
instruments that have been adopted by the EU institutions, can be found in 
the treaties, the legislative instrument itself, and in the so-called principle of 
effectiveness.
First, article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), imposes the obligation on member states to ensure the fulfilment 
of directives’ aims. The application of article 291 TFEU may produce the 
same result as regards other binding instruments of EU law, as it prescribes 
that ‘Member States shall adopt all measures of national law necessary to 
implement legally binding Union acts’.296 Secondly, the adopted instrument 
itself usually contains a provision that calls upon the member states to 
293 CJEU, Costa v ENEL, case 6/64, judgment of 15 July 1964, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, p. 593-594.
294 This is not to say that in practice the implementation of European law is carried out 
without problems. See, for example, Mastenbroek, E., The politics of compliance. Explaining 
the transposition of EC directives in the Netherlands (PhD thesis Leiden University 2007), 
in particular sections 1.1-1.3. For a more recent discussion of problems (and efforts to 
overcome those problems) relating to compliance with EU law, see W.J.M Voermans, 
‘Implementation. The Achilles heel of European integration’ 2 The Theory and Practice of 
Legislation 3 (2015) 343-359.
295 Mastenbroek, The politics of compliance (n 294) 19.
296 Also M. Klamert, The principle of loyalty in EU law (OUP, Oxford 2014) 13 and 263.
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ensure the application of the directive or regulation concerned within the 
member states’ legal orders. In directives this provision is often phrased in 
the following terms:
‘Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
necessary to comply with this [legislative instrument] by [date]. They shall immediately 
inform the Commission thereof.’
Thirdly, in order to adhere to the aforementioned obligations, ‘[t]he 
measures taken by the Member States must be such as to ensure that a direc-
tive is fully effective, in accordance with the objective which it pursues’.297
Arguably, this reference to the principle of effectiveness must be viewed as 
having an autonomous legal character which flows from its recognition as 
a principle of EU law. However, as appears from the case law of the CJEU, 
it is closely related to the principle of sincere cooperation or the principle of 
loyalty as embodied in article 4, third paragraph, of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU).298 It stipulates that, ‘the Member States shall take any appro-
priate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations 
arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of 
the Union’.299 This norm may be labelled a ‘principle of Union law‘, the 
influence of which has increased considerably during the past decades. It 
applies across the whole range of European Union law, although its legal 
consequences may depend on the particular circumstances in which it is 
invoked.300 Given this state of affairs, in the context of implementation, the 
principle of effectiveness can be considered complementary to the principle 
of loyalty as codified in article 4, third paragraph, TEU.
297 CJEU, Von Colson, case C-14/83, judgment of 10 April 1984, ECLI:EU:C:1984:153, par. 15. 
See also CJEU, Royer, case C-48/75, judgment of 8 April 1976, ECLI:EU:C:1976:57, par. 73; 
CJEU, Adeneler and others, case C-212/04, judgment of 4 July 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:443, 
par. 93; CJEU, Boehringer Ingelheim, case C-348/04, judgment of 26 April 2007, 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:249, par. 58; CJEU, Gallotti, joined cases C-58/95, C-75/95, C-112/95, 
C-119/95, C-123/95, C-135/95, C-140/95, C-141/95, C-154/95 and C-157/95, judgment 
of 12 September 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:323, par 14; CJEU, Rosado Santana, case C-177/10, 
judgment of 8 September 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:557, par. 50; CJEU, Juuri, case C-396/07, 
judgment of 27 November 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:656, par. 26; CJEU, Impact, case 
C-268/06, judgment of 15 April 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:223, par. 40.
298 M. Accetto and S. Zleptnig, ‘The principle of effectiveness. Rethinking its role in Commu-
nity law’ 11 European Public Law 3 (2005) 375-403, 387, 390-391 and 402.
299 TEU art 4, third paragraph. Also TFEU art 197, fi rst paragraph, which provides that the 
‘effective implementation of Union law by the Member States, which is essential for the 
proper functioning of the Union, shall be regarded as a matter of common interest’.
300 Klamert, The principle of loyalty (n 296) 233 and 250-251.
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3.5 Categories of norms addressing the national legislature
The overview of legal norms which flow from the sources of international 
law and which may give rise to the adoption of domestic legislation, 
presented in the previous sections, could also be approached from the 
perspective of the norms themselves, instead of the sources from which 
they derive. This standpoint provides us with the opportunity to categorise 
the various norms which address the national legislature. In doing so, we 
can establish to what extent international legal norms address national 
legislatures.
International legal norms could be divided into two categories: norms 
that require implementation within domestic legal systems and norms that 
do not require implementation within domestic legal systems. If an interna-
tional instrument does not intend to regulate matters within jurisdictions 
of states, because the material scope of application is confined to purely 
inter-state matters, such as an alliance treaty, or when the international 
instrument is of such nature that it is suitable for direct application by state 
organs, such as ‘law-making treaties’, implementation on the domestic level 
may not be imperative.
Norms that do require implementation by states, on the other hand, 
could be (sub)divided into three groups: norms that will be implemented 
by the state’s executive, by its judiciary and by its legislature. It is the latter 
(sub)category that concerns us here, which in turn encompasses norms that 
expressly prescribe the implementation by the national legislature and norms 
which implicitly prescribe the implementation by the national legislature. 
An example of former may be found in resolution 1540 of the UNSC, which 
was discussed above, and which prescribes that all states:
‘in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effec-
tive laws which prohibit any non-state actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, 
transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons […]’.301
The crucial issue here is that in principle this obligation could only be 
complied with through the adoption of legislation. Put differently, in this 
case, it not only prescribes the objective to be achieved (the prohibition 
for non-state actors to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, 
transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons), but also the 
means that will lead to the achievement of the objectives (the adoption and 
enforcement of appropriate effective laws).
An implicit obligation to adopt domestic legislation, on the other hand, 
determines which objectives have to be achieved, but does not prescribe 
legislation as a means to achieve those objectives. In this case, the relevant 
international legal obligation could, at least in theory, be implemented 
301 UNSC Res 1540 (n 259) par. 2.
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without resort to legislative measures. The implementation of ‘technical 
standards’, discussed above in relation to the WMO and the ICAO, could 
fall within this category as they do not prescribe implementation by legis-
lative means. Another example may be found in article 5, first paragraph, 
FCTC, which provides that:
‘[e]ach Party shall develop, implement, periodically update and review comprehensive 
multisectoral national tobacco control strategies, plans and programmes in accordance 
with this Convention and the protocols to which it is a Party.’302
A less obvious example may be found in article 5, third paragraph, ICSFT, 
which states that:
‘[e]ach State Party shall ensure, in particular, that [liable] legal entities […] are subject to 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal, civil or administrative sanctions. Such 
sanctions may include monetary sanctions.’303
Furthermore, pursuant to article 13 ECHR,
‘[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall 
have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has 
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity’.304
Although it is hard to see how these provisions could be implemented by 
states that value the rule of law without the adoption of domestic legislation, 
the adoption of legislation is not de iure required by the international norm.
Another obligation that falls in this category, is article 5 of the Inter-
national Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, which 
stipulates that:
‘[e]ach State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, including, where appro-
priate, domestic legislation, to ensure that criminal acts within the scope of this Conven-
tion, in particular where they are intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the 
general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, are under no circumstances 
justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, reli-
gious or other similar nature and are punished by penalties consistent with their grave 
nature’.305
While express reference is made to the phrase ‘domestic legislation’, it 
appears from the formulation of the treaty provision that the choice for 
legislation is an optional one. Thus, again, the adoption of domestic legisla-
tion is not mandatory from an international legal point of view. But how 
could be determined whether an obligation to implement a particular 
302 FCTC art 5, fi rst paragraph.
303 ICSFT art 5, third paragraph.
304 ECHR art 13. 
305 Ibid, art 5.
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international legal obligation implies an obligation for the national legisla-
ture to initiate the enactment of implementing measures, as opposed to an 
obligation for the executive or the judiciary? As we have seen, an analysis 
of the international legal norm does not suffice, since the norm does not 
compulsory prescribe the entity the action of which is required. The answer 
must be found in domestic law. If the international norm tolerates imple-
mentation by other entities than the national legislature, it falls to the state 
to determine which one of its organs has the responsibility to adopt imple-
menting measures. In other words, the division of powers on the domestic 
level will be decisive.306
3.6 Conclusion
From the survey of international legal obligations referring expressly or 
implicitly to the adoption of domestic legislation, the following conclusions 
may be drawn.
First of all, national legislative measures which implement international 
law will often derive from treaty law. Treaty practice provides us with an 
extensive and varied range of obligations which address the national legis-
latures of state parties. Only in exceptional cases, as accepted by the ICTY 
in Furundžija, an obligation to adopt domestic legislative measures may be 
premised on the basis of customary international law. Similarly, there are, 
apart from the EU’s legislative instruments, no more than a few examples 
of binding decisions of international organisations which have given rise to 
the adoption of legislation on the domestic level. Overall, a distinction must 
be made between norms that require implementation within domestic legal 
systems and norms that do not require implementation within domestic 
legal systems. The former category could be (sub)divided into norms that 
require action by the state’s executive, legislative and judicial authorities 
respectively.
Second, international obligations which require the adoption of 
domestic implementing measures often leave a significant measure of 
freedom to the states which are bound. In general, international instruments 
calls upon states to take action. This action will, nevertheless, often be 
formulated in terms of policy objectives to be achieved, instead of means to
obtain those policy objectives. This may not come as a surprise, since it is of 
utmost importance, from the perspective of international policy makers at 
least, that no state party will be confronted with international legal impedi-
ments if they endeavour to ensure the application of the relevant instrument 
in their respective legal orders. In other words, the general formulation 
306 In some instances, other international legal provisions than the one which has to be 
implemented may infl uence the selection of the state organ. An example can be found in 
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commonly adhered to in international legal obligations to adopt domestic 
implementing measures, serves to accommodate the diversity in the world’s 
national legal orders. This leads us back to the important role played by 
national law, which may be said to ‘fill the gaps’ whenever an international 
legal instrument is inconclusive with regard to matters of implementation, 
as will often be the case. It underlines the fact that the implementation of 
international law in the national legal order, including implementation 





The regulation of implementing 
legislation under selected 
international legal regimes: 
legislative standards
Introduction to Part II
In the previous part, we have identified the international legal sources from 
which a state obligation to adopt implementing legislation may originate. In 
order to complete our analysis of current international legal practice in rela-
tion to implementing legislation, the following question must be answered: 
to what extent is domestic implementing legislation regulated by interna-
tional law? The purpose of Part II is to provide an answer to that question.
In this regard ‘regulation’ is understood as comprising the standards 
of an international origin which should be observed by the national legis-
lature which is engaged in the implementation of international law in the 
domestic legal order. In other words, it consists of prescribed features of 
domestic implementing legislation (encompassing both substantive and 
formal requirements) or legislative procedure. They will be referred to as 
‘legislative standards’. They may include, for instance, a duty to punish 
violations of the legal provisions in force, or a duty to periodically evaluate 
domestic measures. Legislative standards complement the original obligation 
to adopt domestic implementing legislation with specific guidance on how 
that obligation must be performed.
The concept of legislative standards originates from the field of legis-
prudence and is closely related to the notion of legislative quality. In this 
view, the quality of a domestic piece of implementing legislation depends 
on the measure of adherence to legislative standards: limited adherence 
leads to ‘poor’ quality and a large measure of adherence may result in ‘high’ 
quality. Of course, such legislative quality cannot be captured in quantita-
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tive terms; it requires an assessment of a qualitative nature. The statement 
that adherence to legislative standards enhances the quality of any piece of 
(implementing) legislation raises the question on the legitimacy of their use 
in legislative practice: to what extent could this statement be underpinned 
with evidence? This question will be left aside for the moment, but will 
be revisited in Part III. At this point, it is important to place not too much 
emphasis on the notion of legislative quality; in the present part we seek 
to identify legislative standards pertaining to implementing legislation 
in general, irrespective of whether they can be said to enhance legislative 
quality.
The survey included in this part will focus on legislative standards 
that have been codified. They primarily consist of legislative standards of 
a legally binding nature, such as norms included (or read) in the applicable 
treaty. Often, however, legislative standards cannot be derived from the text 
of the treaty alone. In those cases, other sources will be resorted to, such as 
‘legislative guides’, if available. The legal force of those documents may not 
be similar to the legal obligation to adopt implementing legislation, but they 
may contain legislative standards nonetheless. Although the distinction 
between mandatory and non-mandatory legislative standards is relevant to 
a certain extent, there does not seem to be a convincing argument why our 
inquiry should be limited to legislative standards of the former category. 
Furthermore, we seek to identify legislative standards that have been made 
part, through codification, of international law. This implies that domestic 
attitudes towards implementing legislation, which may consist of an elabo-
rate legislative policy or other means, remains outside the scope of this part; 
they will be addressed in Part III.
It is often and rightly asserted that legislative standards do not exist 
under general international law; in this view, it is entirely left to states to 
determine the means and methods of implementation within their jurisdic-
tions, as long as the choice of means and methods leads to conduct which 
is consistent with the relevant binding legal obligation. Cassese has pointed 
out that:
‘[a]part from the general rule barring States from adducing domestic legal problems for not 
complying with international law, and the treaty or customary rules […] that impose the 
obligation to enact implementing legislation, international law does not contain any regu-
lation of implementation. It thus leaves each country complete freedom with regard to how it 
fulfils, nationally, its international obligations’.307
Therefore, in the present part the focus shifts from general international law 
to special international legal regimes in order to provide an answer to the 
question to what extent international standards pertaining to implementing 
legislation can be inferred from those regimes. They include human rights 
law, EU law, criminal law, health law, environmental law and labour law. 
307 Cassese, International law (n 1) 219-220.
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As will become clear, the regimes included in this part provide for several 
standards applicable to domestic implementing legislation.
For the sake of brevity, in this part only a limited number of interna-
tional legal regimes will be discussed. As a result, of course, they do not 
perfectly coincide with current international practice in general. Neverthe-
less, the selection presented below is intended to give a fair impression of 
the variety of ways in which implementing legislation is regulated under 
international law. To this end, it is important to explicate the grounds that 
have led to the inclusion of a particular regime in this part. They include, 
first and foremost, the diversity of subject matter that is covered by a 
particular regime; in other words, the regimes included in this part repre-
sent a broad spectre of policy fields. Such a broad view is justified in order 
to avoid too much reliance on legislative standards that might be typical for 
a certain policy field. Second, it focuses on regimes that have a global scope, 
as opposed to regimes with a regional character which only address states 
of a certain region. Although there is no fundamental reason for the exclu-
sion of regional regimes, the lack of space may be a sufficient justification 
for a more narrow scope. Therefore, in principle, the examination contained 
in this part is limited to legal regimes that are truly international in scope. 
The third consideration is an exception to the second. In contrast to the truly 
global legal regimes, two regimes of a European nature will be discussed 
below as well: the law of the ECHR and the law of the EU. This exception 
can be justified by the fact that the courts which have jurisdiction to solve 
legal disputes arising from these instruments, namely the ECtHR and the 
CJEU, have produced a vast amount of case law pertaining to implementing 
legislation, which has remained unrivalled by any other international 
court.308 The authoritative legislative standards that have been formulated 
by these courts are not only unique in quantitative terms, but are also highly 
relevant for the present study, as they provide insight into the way in which 
courts have proceeded to assess domestic implementing legislation. In this 
regard, they differ from the other regimes included in this chapter, for 
which there are no international judicial decisions on their implementation. 
Fourth, the selection of international legal regimes that can be found in Part 
II is the product of a more practical consideration. A prerequisite for inclu-
sion in the present part is the simple availability of legislative standards 
in the legal instrument itself or in the relating documents. In other words, 
international legal regimes that do not at least slightly indicate the way in 
which its norms should be implemented on the domestic level, have been 
left aside. This constitutes an important limitation on the conclusions which 
could be drawn from the present part’s findings: whereas they shed light 
on the substance of the legislative standards applicable to the instrument’s 
308 Admittedly, the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights might also be 
provide authoritative interpretations relating to domestic legislation through which 
international law (the American Convention on Human Rights) is implemented. Unfor-
tunately, its case law is only partly accessible in English.
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implementation, they do not provide insight into the number of interna-
tional legal regimes which include such standards.
On the basis of the aforementioned considerations, the remainder of this 
part is dedicated to an overview of the regulation of implementing legisla-
tion under selected international legal regimes.
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human rights law
4.1 Implementation of positive obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights
4.1.1 General
The post-1945 era has witnessed the emergence of various human rights 
treaties, which depart from the premise that individuals, as humans, are 
inherently entitled to certain basic rights that should not be infringed upon 
by others, most notably by state authorities. A useful perspective that has 
been adopted in order to categorise the obligations flowing from human 
rights treaties, distinguishes between negative and positive obligations.309
Negative obligations, in short, are norms under which states are obliged to 
refrain from conduct that may constitute a violation of the rights to which 
their citizens are entitled. Positive obligations, in contrast, encompass 
norms that compel states to actively take measures in order to ensure the 
full application of the rights entrenched in the applicable treaty.310 This 
section focuses on the latter category and addresses the question what legal 
requirements apply to the legislative measures that have been taken by 
states in order to comply with their positive obligations.
The exact scope and content of the positive obligations depend on the 
applicable right and on the context in which it is relied on. As we have seen 
in section 3.2.2, they may include, but are not limited to, the duty to adopt 
legislative measures. In contrast to negative human rights obligations, the 
established positive obligations do not only provide protection to individ-
uals vis-à-vis the state, but are also intended as safeguards for individuals 
in relation to possible violations conducted by other private entities.311 Were 
309 J.-F. Akandji-Kombe, Positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
A guide to the implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Human Rights 
Handbooks no. 7, Council of Europe, Strasbourg 2007) 5.
310 Mowbray, in his book on positive obligations fl owing from the ECHR, argues that the 
key characteristic of positive obligations is ‘the duty upon states to undertake specifi c 
affi rmative tasks’. A.R. Mowbray, The development of positive obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2004) 2.
311 As the Human Rights Committee put it, ‘the positive obligations on States Parties […] 
will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against 
violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private 
persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they 
are amenable to application between private persons or entities’. UN Human Rights 
Committee, ‘General Comment no. 31: the nature of the legal general obligation imposed 
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such a violation to occur, the state, depending on the circumstances, may be 
under the obligation to investigate and punish the harm inflicted upon its 
citizen. Although positive obligations may be found under several interna-
tional human rights regimes, the ECtHR has developed the most elaborate 
case law relating to the doctrine of positive obligations. For this reason, this 
section focuses on the positive obligations flowing from the ECHR.
In section 3.2.2 it was argued that the source of any positive obligation 
to adopt implementing legislation can be found in article 1 ECHR, read in 
conjunction with its (other) substantive provisions. The question arises to 
what extent the ECtHR has formulated rules that govern the fulfilment of 
positive obligations by the authorities of the states party to the ECHR. In 
this regard, it must be pointed out that the ECtHR has consistently held that:
‘where the State is required to take positive measures, the choice of means is in principle a 
matter that falls within the Contracting State’s margin of appreciation. There are different 
avenues to ensure Convention rights, and even if the State has failed to apply one particu-
lar measure provided by domestic law, it may still fulfil its positive duty by other 
means’.312
This starting point applies to positive measures in general, which also 
include measures that comprise the enactment of legislation.313 However, 
as may be derived from the ECtHR’s case law, the freedom to choose the 
means necessary to comply with the positive obligations entrenched in 
the ECHR has been circumscribed in several ways. For the purpose of 
the present study, it is relevant to explore the circumstances in which the 
ECtHR has demanded the adoption of domestic legislation to comply with 
the positive obligation of the relevant provision of the ECHR. In addition, 
this section will examine whether the ECtHR indicates what elements such 
legislation should contain, and how it should be applied in practice. The 
scope and substance of the positive obligations depend on the right that 
is at stake; the duty to adopt implementing legislation may vary from one 
Convention right to the other. For reasons of space, the present section 
is limited to articles 2, 4, 5, 8 and 10 of the ECHR. As a result, it must be 
emphasised, relevant case law developed under other provisions of the 
ECHR, will not be discussed here. Therefore, we must be aware that the 
analysis contained in section 4.1 cannot an exhaustive discussion of all posi-
312 For example Budayeva and others v Russia (App no 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 
11673/02 and 15343/02) ECHR 20 March 2008, par. 134.
313 Arguably, the Court attaches greater importance to the result that is produced by a 
domestic measure than to the nature, either legislative or non-legislative, of the measure. 
In Brincat and others v Malta, which concerned the right to life, the Court expressed the 
view that ‘while there is a primary duty to put in place a legislative and administrative 
framework, it cannot rule out the possibility, a priori, that in certain specifi c circumstances, 
in the absence of the relevant legal provisions, positive obligations may nonetheless be 
fulfi lled in practice.’ Brincat and others v Malta (App no 60908/11, 62110/11, 62129/11, 
62312/11 and 62338/11) ECHR 24 July 2014, par. 112.
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tive obligations under the ECHR. However, this limitation will not prevent 
us from obtaining a fair impression of the subject matter.
4.1.2 Content of the Convention
4.1.2.1 Right to life
Article 2 ECHR embodies probably the most fundamental principle of the 
Convention: the right to life. The positive obligations that flow from this 
provision can be summarised by the responsibility of a state party to ‘take 
appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction’314, 
which was stated in Öneryildiz v. Turkey. This case concerned a methane 
explosion at the site of a rubbish tip at the outskirts of Istanbul, Turkey, 
which had resulted in the deaths of thirty-nine people living in the vicinity. 
Prior to the accident, experts had concluded that the rubbish tip posed 
an imminent danger to the health of the area’s inhabitants and to the 
surrounding environment. The question arose whether Turkey had failed to 
meet its obligations under article 2 ECHR. The ECtHR expressed the view 
that article 2 ‘entails above all a primary duty on the State to put in place 
a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide effective 
deterrence against threats to the right to life’.315 This framework should 
encompass ‘effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of 
offences against the person, backed up by lawenforcement machinery for 
the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provi-
sions’.316 In the particular context of dangerous activities, such as the collec-
tion of waste in Öneryildiz v. Turkey, it added that:
‘special emphasis must be placed on regulations geared to the special features of the activ-
ity in question, particularly with regard to the level of the potential risk to human lives. 
They must govern the licensing, setting up, operation, security and supervision of the 
activity and must make it compulsory for all those concerned to take practical measures to 
ensure the effective protection of citizens whose lives might be endangered by the inherent 
risks. […] In any event, the relevant regulations must also provide for appropriate proce-
dures, taking into account the technical aspects of the activity in question, for identifying 
shortcomings in the processes concerned and any errors committed by those responsible at 
different levels.’317
Instead of formulating the requirement that the legislative and adminis-
trative framework applicable to dangerous activities should guarantee 
‘effective protection’ to the rights involved, the Court chose to enumerate 
314 L.C.B. v the United Kingdom (App no 23413/94) ECHR 9 June 1998, par. 36.
315 Öneryildiz v Turkey (App no 48939/99) ECHR 2004-XII 79, par. 89.
316 Osmanoğlu v Turkey (App no 48804/99) ECHR 24 January 2008, par. 72. See also Ghimp and 
others v Moldova (App no 32520/09) ECHR 30 October 2012, par. 43, in which the Court 
held that ‘the domestic legal system [is required] to demonstrate its capacity to enforce 
criminal law against those who have unlawfully taken the life of another’.
317 Öneryildiz (n 315) par. 90 and Budayeva (n 312) par. 132.
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the different features that should be included in the framework. From the 
ECtHR’s perspective, this level of detail may be justified by the importance 
of the interests that were at stake: individuals’ lives.
In Opuz v. Turkey, the ECtHR reached a similar conclusion with regard 
to the obligation to adopt an ‘effective deterrent’ legislative framework. 
However, the subject matter was different. In this case, a woman, the 
applicant’s mother, had died as a result of domestic violence committed 
by the applicant’s husband. The applicant complained that the authorities 
had failed to provide sufficient protection to the applicant’s mother and 
herself. The ECtHR was confronted with the question whether the criminal 
law provisions pertaining to the punishment of domestic violence lived up 
to Turkey’s obligations under article 2 ECHR. These provisions contained 
inter alia the requirement that criminal investigations would not start until it 
was established that the acts had led to a minimum of ten days sickness for 
work. The Court considered that:
‘[…] the application of the above-mentioned provisions and the cumulative failure of the 
domestic authorities to pursue criminal proceedings against [the victim] deprived the 
applicant’s mother of the protection of her life and safety. In other words, the legislative 
framework then in force, particularly the minimum ten days’ sickness unfitness require-
ment, fell short of the requirements inherent in the State’s positive obligations to establish 
and apply effectively a system punishing all forms of domestic violence and providing 
sufficient safeguards for the victims.’318
Thus, similar to the Court’s reasoning in Öneryildiz, it placed the notion of 
‘effectiveness’ at the heart of its evaluation of domestic law in the light of 
article 2 ECHR. It did not, however, specifically enumerate the elements 
which should have been included in the domestic legislative framework.
In addition to the obligation to put in place a deterrent legislative and 
administrative framework, states have a duty to ensure that the framework 
is ‘properly implemented’ and that breaches of the right to life are repressed 
and punished.319 This entails the obligation to perform an independent and 
impartial official investigation into the circumstances of the breach of the 
right to life.320
In Vo v. France the ECtHR clarified what the obligation to ‘properly 
implement’ the domestic legal framework could entail in the field of public 
health. In this case, a woman’s pregnancy had to be terminated as a result of 
a doctor’s mistake.321 French criminal law did not offer an effective remedy 
against the unintentional destruction of a fetus, and the question thus arose 
whether this amounted to a breach of France’s positive obligations under 
318 Opuz v Turkey (App no 33401/02) ECHR 2009-III 107, par. 145.
319 Öneryildiz (n 315) par. 91. Also Guiliano and Gaggio v Italy (App no 23458/02) ECHR 
2011-II 275, par. 298 and Fanziyeva v Russia (App no 41675/08) ECHR 18 June 2015, par. 
51.
320 Fanziyeva (n 319) par. 51.
321 Vo v France (App no 53924/00) ECHR 2004-VIII 67, par. 89.
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article 2 ECHR. After it had pointed to the lack of consensus in Europe as to 
the question whether a fetus could be regarded as a ‘person’ that is entitled 
to the right to life, it decided, nonetheless, to consider the alleged failure of 
the French authorities under article 2 ECHR and held:
‘The positive obligations require States to make regulations compelling hospitals, whether 
private or public, to adopt appropriate measures for the protection of patients’ lives. They 
also require an effective independent judicial system to be set up so that the cause of death 
of patients in the care of the medical profession, whether in the public or the private sector, 
can be determined and those responsible made accountable’.322
In the present case, the ‘effective judicial system’ did not, in the view of 
the ECtHR, necessarily require a remedy of a criminal legal nature. In the 
sphere of medical negligence, the availability of civil redress or disciplinary 
measures would suffice to fulfil the positive obligations under article 2. 
Therefore, the ECtHR found no violation of the right to life.323 More gener-
ally, the ECtHR has held that where an infringement on the right to life has 
not been intentional, article 2 ECHR does not necessarily require recourse to 
criminal prosecution.324
In view of the above, it must be concluded that article 2 ECHR, as 
interpreted by the ECtHR, imposes some constraints on the national legis-
lature that takes appropriate measures to protect the lives of the citizens 
that it represents. These constraints cannot conceal, however, the significant 
amount of latitude that is allowed to states. As the ECtHR has eloquently 
summarised this state of affairs:
‘In principle, States should have the discretion to decide how a system for the implementa-
tion of a regulatory framework protecting the right to life must be designed and imple-
mented. What is important, however, is that whatever form the investigation takes, the 
available legal remedies, taken together, must amount to legal means capable of establish-
ing the facts, holding accountable those at fault and providing appropriate redress. Any 
deficiency in the investigation, undermining its ability to establish the cause of the death or 
those responsible for it, may lead to the finding that the Convention requirements have not 
been met […]’.325
4.1.2.2 Prohibition of slavery and forced labour
Pursuant to article 4 ECHR, no one shall be held in slavery or servitude and 
no one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour. From this 
322 Ibid, par. 89. Also Kudra v Croatia (App no 13904/07) ECHR 18 December 2012, par. 103 
and Bajić v Croatia (App no 41108/10) ECHR 13 November 2012, par. 89.
323 Vo (n 321) par. 90 and 95. 
324 Anna Todorova v Bulgaria (App no 23302/03) ECHR 24 May 2011, par. 73. Also, in relation 
to the protection of life from road traffi c accidents, Ciobanu v Moldova (App no 62578/09) 
ECHR 24 February 2015, par. 32.
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provision the ECtHR has derived various positive obligations, such as an 
obligation to investigate cases of potential human trafficking in an effective 
and independent manner.326
In addition, the ECtHR has identified a positive obligation to adopt 
domestic legislation of a criminal nature to penalise the acts referred to in 
article 4, and to enforce that legislation in practice.327 As a justification for 
this interpretation of article 4, it pointed inter alia to the fact that this provi-
sion, together with articles 2 and 3 ECHR, ‘enshrines one of the basic values 
of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe’ from which no 
derogation is permitted.328
In Siliadin v. France, the ECtHR investigated French criminal legal 
provisions applicable to the case of a Togolese woman who had come to 
France as a minor, and who was held in servitude and subjected to forced 
labour for several years. The applicant complained that French criminal 
law had not afforded her sufficient protection against the situation and 
had made it impossible to punish the offenders. The relevant provisions of 
the French Criminal Code did not expressly criminalise acts of servitude 
or forced labour; instead, it referred to acts of ‘exploitation through labour 
and subjection to working and living conditions that are incompatible with 
human dignity’. The ECtHR referred to its earlier case law and seems to 
have attached great importance to the required ‘effectively deterrent’ 
character of domestic legislation. In the present case, this effective deter-
rent character was not sufficiently present in the French penal provisions in 
force at the time, as had become clear from the different interpretations that 
had been adhered to by several French courts. Therefore, the French legisla-
tion in force did not afford the applicant ‘practical and effective protection 
against the actions of which she was a victim’.329 It thus found a breach of 
article 4 ECHR.330
The positive obligations under article 4 also include the more specific 
obligation of states to put in place a legislative and administrative frame-
work to prohibit and punish trafficking, as was established by the ECtHR 
in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia. Moreover, states are under the obligation to 
adopt adequate measures regulating businesses often used as a cover for 
human trafficking and a state’s immigration rules must ‘address relevant 
326 Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia (App no 25965/04) ECHR 2010-I 65, par. 288.
327 Siliadin v France (App no 73316/01) ECHR 2005-VII 333, par. 89 and 112. For a discussion 
of this case, see H. Cullen, ‘Siliadin v France. Positive obligations under article 4 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ 6 Human Rights Law Review 3 (2006) 585-592, 
587-589; A. Nicholson, ‘Refl ections on Siliadin v. France. Slavery and legal defi nition’ 14 
International Journal of Human Rights 5 (2010) 705-720, 707. 
328 Siliadin (n 327) par. 82 and 112.
329 As Nicholson puts it, ‘we see the court […] re-affi rming that the requirement that laws 
be effective requires more than the creation of relevant laws’. Nicholson, ‘Refl ections on 
Siliadin v. France’ (n 327) 707.
330 Siliadin (n 327) par. 142-149. Also C.N. and V. v France (App no 67724/09) ECHR 11 
October 2012, par. 105-108, in which the Court reached the same conclusion.
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concerns relating to encouragement, facilitation or tolerance of trafficking’.331
In this case, the ECtHR stated that, similar to the conclusion it had drawn 
in Siliadin v. France, ‘the spectrum of safeguards set out in national legisla-
tion must be adequate to ensure the practical and effective protection of the 
rights of victims or potential victims of trafficking’.332 The ECtHR had to 
determine whether the legislative and administrative framework currently 
in place in Cyprus could offer such ‘practical and effective protection’. 
Whereas the Cypriot legislation prohibiting trafficking and sexual exploi-
tation was considered to be in conformity with the demand imposed by 
article 4 ECHR, the ECtHR identified a number of weaknesses as regards the 
Cypriot immigration policy, in particular in relation to the regime of ‘artiste’ 
visas.333 Under this regime, visas were issued to foreign nationals who went 
to work in Cypriot cabarets, musical-dancing places or other forms of night 
entertainment. It was widely known, however, that the women to whom 
these visas were issued, would in practice become victims of human traf-
ficking.334 After the analysis of several aspects of this visa regime, the ECtHR 
concluded that the applicable immigration regulations did not meet the 
standard laid down in article 4. This case demonstrates that the criminalisa-
tion in domestic law of certain acts that fall within the scope of article 4, as 
was required by the Court in Siliadin, may not be sufficient to pass the test of 
practical and effective protection; other branches of domestic laws may also 
require modification.335
4.1.2.3 Right to liberty and security
Article 5 ECHR, according to which everyone is entitled to a right to liberty 
and security of person, encompasses a positive obligation upon states 
to ‘take measures providing effective protection of vulnerable persons, 
including reasonable steps to prevent a deprivation of liberty of which 
the authorities have or ought to have knowledge’.336 There is only scarce 
evidence in the case law of the ECtHR, however, that article 5 ECHR may 
require the enactment of measures of a legislative nature.337
331 Rantsev (n 326) par. 284-285.
332 Ibid, par. 284.
333 Ibid, par. 290-291.
334 For a more extensive discussion of the facts of the case, see J. Allain, ‘Rantsev v Cyprus and 
Russia’ 10 Human Rights Law Review 3 (2010) 546-557, 547-550.
335 See also R. Piotrowicz, ‘States’ obligations under human rights law towards victims of 
traffi cking in human beings. Positive developments in positive obligations’ 24 Internati-
onal Journal of Refugee Law 2 (2012) 181-201, 196.
336 Storck v Germany (App no 61603/00) ECHR 2005-V 111, par. 102 and Stanev v Bulgaria
(App no 36760/06) ECHR 2012-I 81, par. 120.
337 These measures may not, however, expand the grounds on the basis of which an indi-
vidual may be deprived of his personal liberty. See for example Ostendorf v Germany (App 
no 15598/08) ECHR 7 March 2013, par. 87.
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In Lobanov v. Russia, the applicant, a Russian national, had been 
convicted by a Kazakh court for the commission of drug-related offences. 
He had been sentenced to five years imprisonment. After having served 
more than one year of his prison term in Kazakhstan, the applicant was 
transferred to Russia, at his request. Meanwhile, however, the Kazakh court 
had conducted a supervisory review of Mr. Lobanov’s case, which led to a 
reclassification of the facts and a reduction of the sentence. It ordered the 
immediate release of the convict, who at the time was detained in a Russian 
prison to serve the remainder of his prison term. Mr. Lobanov, however, 
was not released until almost four months after this order. Subsequently he 
brought proceedings against the Russian authorities seeking compensation 
for damages he had incurred during the almost four months’-period of his 
illegitimate detention. His request was rejected. Before the ECtHR the issue 
was raised whether the delay in his release from prison could be reconciled 
with the provisions contained in article 5, which permits infringements 
upon an individual’s liberty only in case of lawful arrest or detention. While 
some delay in the execution of an order to release a prisoner is often inevi-
table, the ECtHR argued, especially when the order has to be carried out by 
the authorities of another state, as in the case of Mr. Lobanov, it held that:
‘the State must put in place a legislative and administrative framework which would 
ensure that each and every step required for a person’s release in such a situation is taken 
promptly and diligently.’338
In the present case, the ECtHR found that the delay in the execution of the 
order to release Mr. Lobanov was too long and clearly demonstrated neglect 
on the part of the Russian authorities. Therefore, it found it a violation of 
article 5.339
However, it remains unclear what standards the required ‘legislative 
and administrative framework’ should meet. Indeed, it seems that the 
ECtHR is indifferent with regard to the manner in which it will be imple-
mented, as long as it achieves the aim that is part of article 5 ECHR: to rule 
out unnecessary delay in the execution of an order to release a detainee.
4.1.2.4 Right to respect for family and private life
Under article 8 everyone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life, his home and his correspondence. Again, to observe this right, states 
may be required to adopt domestic legislation. In Sari and Çolak v. Turkey, the 
ECtHR held that the state’s failure to provide practical and effective protec-
tion against violations of the right of persons in police custody to commu-
nicate with family members, constituted a breach of article 8.340 Similarly, in 
338 Lobanov v Russia (App no 16159/03) ECHR 16 October 2008, par. 49.
339 Ibid, par. 47-50.
340 Sari and Çolak v Turkey (App no 42596/98) ECHR 2006-V 295, par. 37. Also Uçar v Turkey 
(App no 52392/99) ECHR 11 April 2006, par. 141.
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cases of medical negligence, states are under the obligation to ‘maintain and 
apply in practice an adequate legal framework enabling victims to establish 
any liability on the part of the physicians concerned and to obtain appro-
priate civil redress, such as an award of damages, in appropriate cases’.341
Another interesting case in this respect was A., B. & C. v. Ireland, which 
concerned the question whether the Irish policies in the field of abortion 
were in accordance with the ECHR. The Irish Constitution contained a 
provision which stipulated that the state ‘acknowledges the right to life of 
the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, 
guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to 
defend and vindicate that right’.342 This provision, laid down in article 40, 
third paragraph, sub 3, had been interpreted by the Irish Supreme Court 
as permitting abortion only in cases where it is established as a matter of 
probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct 
from the health of the mother, including a risk of self-harm, which can only 
be avoided by a termination of the pregnancy. One of the applicants, who 
had received chemotherapy as part of cancer treatment, had complained 
that due to the failure of the Irish legislature to provide an effective and 
accessible procedure, she had not been able to establish whether she quali-
fied for a lawful abortion in Ireland on the ground of a risk to her life or 
her pregnancy. The ECtHR was thus confronted with the question whether 
there was a positive obligation on the state to provide for such an effective 
and accessible procedure under article 8 ECHR.
The ECtHR noted that the constitutional provision, including its expla-
nation by the Supreme Court had been formulated in broad terms. This 
contributed to a sense of legal insecurity, as the applicant and her doctor ran 
the risk of criminal prosecution if they would decide to end her pregnancy 
in contravention of applicable provision. This uncertainty could have been 
removed if the Irish national legislature would have adopted legislation to 
implement the relevant provision of the Irish constitution, as the Irish courts 
had suggested on various occasions. Against this background, the ECtHR 
held that:
‘the authorities failed to comply with their positive obligation to secure to the […] appli-
cant effective respect for her private life by reason of the absence of any implementing leg-
islative or regulatory regime providing an accessible and effective procedure by which the 
third applicant could have established whether she qualified for a lawful abortion in Ire-
land in accordance with […] the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court finds that there has 
been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.’343
341 S.B. v Romania (App no 24453/04) ECHR 23 September 2014, par. 66 and 81.
342 Constitution of the Republic of Ireland 2015 art 40.3.3 (The Stationery Offi ce, Dublin 
2015) <https://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Historical_Information/The_Constitution/
February_2015_-_Constitution_of_Ireland_.pdf> (accessed 29 March 2018). 
343 A., B. & C. v Ireland (App no 25579/05) ECHR 2010-VI 185, par. 267-268.
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Thus, the ECtHR found that the sole absence of domestic legislation 
which would clarify the boundary between lawful and unlawful abor-
tions amounted to a breach of the right to respect for the private life of the 
applicant. The ECtHR seems to attribute considerable importance to the 
demand of legal certainty; arguably, the notions of legal certainty and effec-
tive protection under article 8 ECHR are closely connected. This may not be 
surprising given the fact that in the case before it, a violation of the domestic 
legislative framework could very well have resulted in the criminal pros-
ecution of the person. Nevertheless, it would go too far to infer from this 
the existence of a separate and general criterion of legal certainty that is 
applicable to domestic implementing legislation. Instead, it will depend on 
the circumstances, such as the threat of criminal prosecution, whether an 
effective protection of the right laid down in article 8 ECHR requires a clear 
legal framework.
4.1.2.5 Right to freedom of expression
Article 10, first paragraph, ECHR, stipulates that everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression. The ECtHR has accepted that, under circumstances, 
this provision, read in conjunction with article 1 ECHR, may impose the 
obligation upon states to adopt legislative measures in order to comply with 
their positive obligations under the ECHR. In Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di 
Stefano v. Italy, an Italian broadcasting company had obtained a license for 
nationwide television broadcasting. According to the license, the company 
was entitled to three frequencies covering 80% of national territory. 
However, the license also referred to the national frequency-allocation plan, 
which would provide for the allocation of the frequencies to the holders 
of a license. This plan was, nevertheless, not implemented by the Italian 
authorities. As a result, the company was not able to broadcast until ten 
years later, as it had not been given any frequencies to which it was entitled 
on the basis of the license.
Did the Italian state act in contravention of its obligations under the 
ECHR? The ECtHR emphasised the principal importance of pluralism and 
the right to freedom of expression for the proper functioning of democracy. 
In Italy, media pluralism had come under pressure, it was feared, as two 
companies commanded more than 90% of the television audience, thus 
creating a duopoly (both of which happened to lie in the hands of one man: 
business man and Italy’s then prime minister, Mr. Berlusconi). Against this 
backdrop, the ECtHR held that:
‘to ensure true pluralism, […] it is necessary […] to allow effective access to the market so 
as to guarantee diversity of overall programme content, reflecting as far as possible the 
variety of opinions encountered in the society at which the programmes are aimed’.344
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To this end, the Italian state was under the positive obligation to ‘put in 
place an appropriate legislative and administrative framework to guarantee 
effective pluralism’.345 While the applicant company had obtained a broad-
casting license, this license had remained without practical purpose as the 
Italian authorities had failed to allocate frequencies to the license-holder. 
This amounted to a ‘substantial obstacle’ to the applicant company’s right 
to impart information and ideas. The ECtHR thus found a violation of 
article 10 ECHR.346
In the present case, the ECtHR did not elaborate on the content of the 
‘appropriate legislative and administrative framework’ that it had perceived 
as necessary for the compliance with article 10 ECHR. It only referred to 




What legislative standards could be derived from the case law discussed 
above and from the ECHR? It has become clear that the ECtHR’s case law 
in relation to this kind of implementing legislation has provided some 
guidance as to the criteria that must be observed by national legislatures 
in order to respect their obligations under the ECHR. First and foremost, 
this is the criterion of effectiveness, which has led the ECtHR to investigate 
whether the laws adopted on the domestic level ensure the effective protec-
tion of the applicable ECHR rights. This has been eloquently phrased by 
the ECtHR itself, which on several occasions has stated that ‘[t]he Conven-
tion is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but 
rights that are practical and effective’.347 As has been noted by Xenos, ‘the 
principle of effectiveness is approached as an objective factor to guide the 
determination of the content of positive obligations’.348 Thus, what could 
be expected from a state in the case at hand in order to meet the require-
ments entrenched in the ECHR, is identical to the answer to the question 
what amounts to the effective protection of individuals under the applicable 
right. As we have seen in Lobanov, a legislative and administrative frame-
work will meet the standard of effective protection under article 5 ECHR if 
it ensures that ‘each and every step required for a person’s release in such 
a situation is taken promptly and diligently’.349 Similarly, under article 10 
ECHR, the effective protection of a person’s right to freedom of expression 
345 Ibid, par. 134 and 156.
346 Ibid, par. 138.
347 Airey v Ireland (App no 6289/73) ECHR 9 October 1979, par. 24.
348 D. Xenos, The positive obligations of the state under the European Convention of Human Rights
(Routledge, London 2012) 91. 
349 Lobanov (n 338) par. 49.
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may only be complied with if the applicable domestic legal framework 
guarantees ‘effective pluralism’.350
In addition to the aim that the domestic implementing legislation 
should achieve, the ECtHR on several occasions has indicated which mate-
rial elements it should consist of. In Öneryildiz, the ECtHR pointed out the 
elements that should be included in the domestic legal framework that is 
applicable to dangerous activities such as the collection of waste. In Rantsev, 
the ECtHR held that the states’ law-making activities must go beyond the 
mere prohibition and punishment of trafficking; domestic legislation should 
also include adequate measures regulating businesses often used as a cover 
for human trafficking and a state’s immigration rules must ‘address relevant 
concerns relating to encouragement, facilitation or tolerance of trafficking’. 
As we have seen above, in cases of medical negligence, states are under the 
obligation to put in place an ‘adequate legal framework enabling victims to 
establish any liability on the part of the physicians concerned and to obtain 
appropriate civil redress, such as an award of damages, in appropriate 
cases’. These stipulations of the content of the legislative measures cannot 
be considered an end in itself; rather they must be seen as a means to ensure 
‘effective protection’ of the individual in a specific case.
4.1.3.2 Non-discrimination
A legislative standard that has not been mentioned in the context of the 
discussion of the various ECHR rights above, consists of the prohibition of 
discrimination. Pursuant to article 14 ECHR,
‘the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, politi-
cal or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, proper-
ty, birth or other status’.
Non-discrimination, of course, is at the heart of the ECHR system. It must 
therefore also be considered to apply to domestic legislation that has been 
enacted by state parties in order to fulfil the positive obligations under the 
ECHR. From this point of view, the exclusion of certain minorities from the 
scope of a particular positive obligation to adopt domestic implementing 
legislation, will certainly amount to a breach of the ECHR on the part of the 
state.
Two examples from the ECtHR’s case law may support this view. 
The case Eremia v. Moldova concerned a woman who had been the victim 
of domestic violence by her husband. Before the ECtHR the question was 
raised whether the Moldovan state, which had not protected her from 
domestic violence and had not prevented the recurrence of such violence, 
had failed to discharge its obligations under article 3 ECHR. This article 
350 Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di Stefano (n 344) par. 134 and 156.
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embodies inter alia the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment.351
The ECtHR found, in accordance with its case law, that article 3 requires:
‘on the one hand, setting up a legislative framework aimed at preventing and punishing 
ill-treatment by private individuals and, on the other hand, when aware of an imminent 
risk of ill-treatment of an identified individual or when ill-treatment has already occurred, 
to apply the relevant laws in practice, thus affording protection to the victims and punish-
ing those responsible for ill-treatment’.352
With regard to the former obligation, the ECtHR established that a legisla-
tive framework to take measures against persons accused of family violence 
was indeed present in Moldova in accordance with article 3 ECHR.353 As 
regards the obligation to apply the laws in force, however, the ECtHR 
concluded that the Moldovan authorities had failed to comply with the 
positive obligation entrenched in article 3. In short, it based its finding on 
evidence that the authorities had refused to take action in order to prevent 
further domestic violence against the applicant, even though they had 
been well aware that the applicant was in jeopardy.354 For the purpose of 
the present section, the more interesting aspect of this case was that the 
applicant also complained of a breach of the prohibition of discrimination 
as covered by article 14 ECHR. The applicant argued that the domestic 
violence of which she was a victim, was gender-based. The failure of the 
state authorities to adequately respond to the imminent threats against 
the applicant, despite available information to this effect, thus amounts to 
discrimination on the basis of gender, she claimed.355 The ECtHR sided with 
the applicant and found a breach of article 14 in conjunction with article 3 
ECHR, as it concluded that:
‘the authorities’ actions were not a simple failure or delay in dealing with violence against 
the first applicant, but amounted to repeatedly condoning such violence and reflected a 
discriminatory attitude towards the first applicant as a woman’.356
While Eremia v. Moldova concerned the discriminatory nature of the applica-
tion in practice of the domestic laws in force, in contravention of the articles 
3 and 14, the ECtHR discussed the discriminatory nature of domestic laws 
itself in Marckx v Belgium. In this case the ECtHR was requested to assess 
the Belgian laws applicable to the establishment of maternal affiliation of 
a woman’s child which was ‘illegitimate’ in the sense that the mother was 
unmarried at the time of birth. Under Belgian law, no legal bond between 
an unmarried mother and her child arose from the mere fact of birth; 
351 Eremia v the Republic of Moldova (App no 3564/11) ECHR 28 May 2013, par. 40.
352 Ibid, par. 56.
353 Ibid, par. 57.
354 Ibid, par. 66.
355 Ibid, par. 82.
356 Ibid, par. 89.
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maternal affiliation was not established until after voluntary recognition by 
the mother or a court ruling. In this respect, the legal position of unmarried 
mothers differed from married mothers: whereas an unmarried mother had 
to take steps in order to ensure her recognition as the child’s mother before 
the law, the latter were recognised automatically as the child’s mother upon 
the presentation of a birth certificate.357 Did this distinction amount to 
discrimination as prohibited under article 14 of the Convention? The ECtHR 
answered in the affirmative as the distinction could not be ‘objectively and 
reasonably justified’.358
From the foregoing it may be concluded that the adoption of discrimi-
natory domestic laws in order to give effect to positive obligations under 
the ECHR, or their application in practice, may constitute a breach of the 
ECHR. Therefore, the ECtHR’s case law seems to support that the view that 
non-discrimination must be considered to apply as a legislative standard to 
domestic legislation that is adopted as part of the positive obligations under 
the ECHR.
4.1.3.3 Enforcement, remedies and ‘proper implementation’
Another element of the national legislative frameworks that states are 
required to adopt in order to fulfil their positive obligations under the 
ECHR, consists of enforcement. As we have seen above, the articles 2 and 
4 ECHR demand states to criminalise certain unlawful acts. States must 
ensure that the necessary criminal law provisions are in place to prosecute 
any person suspected of the intentional taking of human life. Similarly, 
under article 4, states have a duty to adopt domestic legal provisions which 
prohibit and punish human trafficking. In other situations, the enforcement 
of the applicable domestic legal framework can be secured through the 
presence of provisions of a non-criminal nature, such as legal procedures to 
obtain civil redress in case of damage as a result of medical negligence, as 
we have seen in the context of the discussion of article 8 ECHR.
At this point we should also refer to article 13 ECHR on effective 
remedies, which reads:
‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall 
have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has 
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity’.359
If a person enjoys a right under domestic implementing legislation on the 
basis of a positive obligation which originates from the ECHR, he should 
be able to have a remedy to enforce that right. The contours of the ‘effec-
tive remedy’ which is imperative under the ECHR, can be summarised as 
357 Marckx v Belgium (n 50) par. 14 and 35.
358 Ibid, par. 43.
359 ECHR art 13.
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follows. First of all, it is not needed that a violation of the latter right is 
established beyond doubt before claiming a violation of article 13; in order 
to invoke article 13 ECHR, it suffices to bring an ‘arguable complaint’.360
State parties enjoy some discretion in the implementation of this provision 
within their national legal orders, in particular with regard to the form of 
remedies.361 However, the competent national authority must deal with 
the substance of the complaint and be in the position to grant appropriate 
relief.362 What amounts to an effective remedy clearly depends on the 
specific situation in which the claimant finds itself, such as a deprivation 
of liberty.363 In the end the crucial test is whether the remedy is effective ‘in 
practice as well as in law’.364
The adoption of implementing legislation will not always suffice to 
fulfill the obligations under the ECHR; states may also be under the obli-
gation to ‘properly implement’ the laws in place. This may include the 
repression and punishment of breaches of a right entrenched in the ECHR. 
For instance, as we have seen, the ECtHR has maintained that states are 
under the duty to institute criminal proceedings in response to any inten-
tional taking of human life. In other words, the mere presence of domestic 
criminal laws is not enough; to fully comply with the relevant positive 
obligations under the ECHR, states must also apply those laws in practice.
4.1.3.4 Formal aspects
Finally, in some cases the ECtHR has demanded the observance of formal 
criteria as well, such as the requirement of clarity.365 As we have seen in A., 
B. & C. v. Ireland, this may serve the purpose of legal certainty for individ-
uals who are entitled to the protection that is offered by the ECHR rights. In 
other cases, such as Siliadin v. France, the ECtHR has emphasised the neces-
sity of clarity in order to maximise the deterrent effect of the implementing 
legislation. The interest of deterrence could also demand the adoption of 
legislation of a criminal legal nature, as opposed to civil or administrative 
legal provisions. Although the formal requirements (clarity and nature of 
the implementing legislation) that are applicable to implementing legisla-
tion might be viewed as separate criteria, it may be more convincing to 
consider these as accessory to the material requirement of effective protec-
tion. At the end of the day, the ECtHR will assess whether the state authori-
ties have provided ‘effective protection’ to an individual in the case before it.
360 A recent example is De Tommaso v Italy (App no 43395/09) ECHR 23 February 2017, par. 180.
361 B. Rainey, E. Wicks and C. Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (6th edn OUP, 
Oxford 2014) 133. 
362 Aydin v Turkey (App no 23178/94) ECHR 25 September 1997, par. 103.
363 See for an extensive discussion of the applicable criteria Council of Europe, Guide to good 
practice in respect of domestic remedies (Council of Europe, Strasbourg 2013) < www.coe.int>.
364 Wille v Liechtenstein (App no 28396/95) ECHR 1999-VII 279, par. 75.
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The clarity of the domestic law at hand may be an indication whether the 
standard of effective protection has been met. On the other hand, it could be 
argued on the basis of A., B. & C. v. Ireland that the lack of a clear legal norm 
may not be sufficient to find a violation of the ECHR when the domestic 
law, despite its obscurity, has not negatively affected the protection to which 
an individual is entitled.
4.1.4 Overview
As appears from the above, states party to the ECHR are under the duty not 
only to abstain from conduct that constitutes an infringement on the ECHR 
rights, but also to take effective measures to safeguard access to those rights 
by its citizens. These so-called positive obligations can be derived from 
article 1, read in conjunction with the various substantive rights embodied 
in the ECHR. Positive obligations may entail the adoption of all kinds of 
measures. In most cases the ECtHR has demonstrated a considerable 
level of indifference as to the nature of these measures, either legislative 
or non-legislative. In some cases, however, the ECtHR has made clear that 
a state’s positive obligations can only be successfully complied with after 
the enactment of certain legislative measures that meet the legislative stan-
dards prescribed by the ECtHR. They demand that domestic implementing 
legislation meets the requirements of effectiveness and non-discrimination. 
Moreover, with regard to the articles 2 and 4, the adoption of criminal laws 
may be mandatory, as is the application of those laws in practice and the 
provision of an effective remedy under article 13 ECHR. Finally, the ECtHR 
has stated that the observance of formal criteria may also be imperative in 
specific circumstances.
4.2 Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights
4.2.1 General
In addition to the protection of civil and political rights, as entrenched in 
the ECHR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the international community has made efforts to codify economic, 
social and cultural rights. Examples include the right to health and the right 
to an adequate standard of living. Their most comprehensive codification 
is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), the origins of which can be found in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), a (non-binding) resolution adopted by the UNGA 
in 1948.366 The UDHR enumerates various human rights, including both 
366 UNGA res 217(III)A (10 December 1948).
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civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. After its 
adoption, efforts were made to codify both categories in binding instru-
ments as well. Eventually, this resulted in two separate treaties: ICCPR and 
ICESCR.367 They are, in combination with the UDHR, often referred to as 
the International Bill of Rights.368
The ICESCR was adopted in 1966 and entered into force on 3 January 
1976. Currently 167 states are party to the ICESCR.369 In 2008 it was 
supplemented by the Optional Protocol which established an individual 
complaints procedure. As yet, 23 states are party to the protocol.370
Scholars have written extensively on the differences between civil and 
political rights (often referred to as ‘first generation human rights’) on the 
one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights (usually categorised 
as ‘second generation human rights’) on the other hand. There is neither 
a need, nor space to revisit this debate in its entirety.371 However, it may 
be useful to briefly address some perceived differences between the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR in order to fully understand the character of the obliga-
tions flowing from economic, social and cultural rights. A major difference 
between the ICCPR and the ICESCR lies in the nature of the state obliga-
tions entrenched in the respective treaty. Whereas the ICCPR provides for 
an obligation to ‘respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant’, 
ICESCR contains a state duty to take steps towards the ‘progressive realisa-
tion’ of the rights embodied in ICESCR.372 Due to the terms used in the 
ICESCR, it has been argued that economic, social and cultural rights, in 
contrast to civil and political rights, cannot be legally enforced as they do 
not contain ‘rights’ but obligations to take certain (policy) measures.373 This 
certainly is an ‘oversimplification’.374 For instance, as we have seen in the 
previous section on the ECHR, civil and political rights may also encompass 
positive obligations to take certain specified measures; they may not be 
limited to the state obligation to refrain from certain conduct if that conduct 
constitutes an infringement on the protected interest of an individual. 
Furthermore, the CESCR has emphasised that the rights entrenched in the 
367 M. Senyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2009) 26-27; M. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. A perspective on its development (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995) 6-7.
368 Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (n 367) 16-17.
369 http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (accessed 29 March 2018).
370 Ibid.
371 For an overview of this discussion, see Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ (n 367) 7-16.
372 ICCPR art 2, fi rst paragraph, and ICESCR art 2, fi rst paragraph. Although this difference 
is correct in general, there may be exceptions. Th. van Boven, ‘Categories of rights’ in: D. 
Moeckli, S. Shah and S. Sivakumaran (eds) International human rights law (2nd edn OUP, 
Oxford 2014) 143-156, 144-145.
373 B. Saul, D. Kinley and J. Mowbray, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. Commentary, cases, and materials (1st edn OUP, Oxford 2014) 1.
374 Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (n 367) 11.
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ICESCR contain ‘significant justiciable dimensions’.375 Perhaps for these 
reasons, Van Boven observes ‘a significant evolution […] over the years 
towards the enhanced status of economic, social and cultural rights’, which 
have been brought ‘on a par’ with civil and political rights.376
4.2.2 Content of the Convention
The ICESCR enumerates several economic, social and cultural rights. The 
most important rights are the right to work (article 6), the right to the enjoy-
ment of just and favourable conditions of work (article 7), the right to form 
trade unions (article 8, first paragraph, sub a), the right to strike (article 8, 
first paragraph, sub d), the right to social security (article 9), the right to 
an adequate standard of living (article 11), the right to health (article 12), 
the right to education (article 13) and the right to take part in cultural life 
(article 15). Moreover, article 1 ICESCR stipulates that all peoples have the 
right of self-determination, a provision which is an exact copy of article 1 
ICCPR.
The state obligations and, at the receiving end, the rights of individuals, 
entrenched in the ICESCR have three ‘dimensions’: an obligation to respect, 
protect and fulfil. They cannot be derived from the text of the ICESCR, but 
must be considered part and parcel of the substantive rights included in 
Part III.377 Whereas the ‘obligation to respect’ imposes a duty on states to 
refrain from conduct in violation of the applicable rights, the ‘obligation to 
protect’ provides that states must take measures to prevent violations by 
third parties. In this regard, the ‘obligation to protect’ bears some resem-
blance to the positive obligations under the ECHR examined in section 4.1. 
The ‘obligation to fulfil’ requires states to take measures aimed at the full 
realisation of the rights embedded in the ICESCR.378
In order to promote compliance with the ICESCR, it provides for the 
establishment of a supervisory body. While this task was originally intended 
to be performed by the Economic and Social Council, one of the principal 
organs of the UN, in 1985 it was decided to put in place a committee of 
independent experts to take over this task: the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.379 Its main duty is to oversee state compliance 
with the ICESCR on the basis of reports submitted by state parties pursuant 
to article 16. Furthermore, the CESCR may receive and consider complaints 
375 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 9: the domestic application of the Covenant’ (3 December 
1998) UN Doc E/C.12/1998/24, par. 10.
376 Van Boven, ‘Categories of rights’ (n 372) 149.
377 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 12: the right to adequate food (art. 11)’ (12 May 1999) UN 
Doc E/C.12/1999/5, par 15.
378 Ch. Tomuschat, Human rights. Between idealism and realism (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2008) 43.
379 ECOSOC, ‘Review of the composition, organisation and administrative arrangements 
of the Sessional Working Group of Governmental Experts on the implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ Res 1985/17 (28 May 
1985) UN Doc E/RES/1985/17.
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issued by aggrieved individuals in accordance with the Optional Protocol 
to the ICESCR.380
4.2.3 Legislative standards
4.2.3.1 Implementation and progressive realisation
States have a duty to adopt domestic measures required for the implemen-
tation of the ICESCR. This follows from article 2, first paragraph, which 
reads:
‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures’.
Whatever the means of implementation, they must be ‘adequate to ensure 
fulfillment of the obligations under the ICESCR’.381 The CESCR has 
expressed the view, in its General Comment on the above-cited provision, 
that ‘in many instances legislation is highly desirable and in some cases […] 
even indispensable’.382 For example, the CESCR has argued that it may be 
difficult to combat discrimination if a ‘sound legislative foundation’ for the 
necessary measures is absent.383 In the same vein, as was noted by Saul, 
Kinley and Mowbray, the CESCR has ‘subsequently made very clear the 
importance it attaches to states enacting legislation (and enforcing it) as 
effective means to realize the Covenant’s rights’.384
The substance of the obligation to adopt domestic legislation in order 
to implement the above-cited provision is largely dependent upon the 
meaning attributed to the phrases ‘to the maximum of [a state’s] available 
resources’ and ‘achieving progressively the full realization of the rights’. 
380 On the condition that states that are believed to be in breach of their obligations have 
become a state party to the Optional Protocol. 
381 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 9’ (n 375) par. 7.
382 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 3: the nature of states parties’ obligations (art. 2, para 1, of 
the Covenant)’ (14 December 1990) UN Doc E/1991/3, par. 3.
383 Ibid. See also paragraph 17 and 18 of the Limburg Principles on the implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Limburg Principles 
were agreed upon in 1986 by 29 ‘distinguished experts in international law’ convened 
under the auspices of the International Commission of Jurists, a non-governmental 
organisation dedicated to the protection of human rights. Although these principles do 
not have a legal basis in the Covenant, or in international law in general, they refl ect 
the experts’ view of the ‘present state of international law’ <https://www.escr-net.org/
resources/limburg-principles-implementation-international-covenant-economic-social-
and-cultural> (accessed 29 March 2018).
384 Saul, Kinley and Mowbray, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (n 373) 159.
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The reference to the maximum of a state’s available resources is ‘unavoid-
ably subjective’, as it will be the state itself that assesses which resources are 
available and until what maximum.385 On the other hand, it may be argued 
that a lack of resources may not be invoked as a justification for inertia on 
the part of the state. In this regard, the CESCR has stated that ‘a minimum 
core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum 
essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party’.386
The reference to the ‘progressive realisation’ of the rights embedded in 
the ICESCR indicates, in the view of the CESCR, that:
‘[t]he concept of progressive realization constitutes a recognition of the fact that full real-
ization of all economic, social and cultural rights will generally not be able to be achieved 
in a short period of time. […] Nevertheless, the fact that realization over time, or in other 
words progressively, is foreseen under the Covenant should not be misinterpreted as 
depriving the obligation of all meaningful content. It is on the one hand a necessary flexi-
bility device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the difficulties involved for any 
country in ensuring full realization of economic, social and cultural rights. On the other 
hand, the phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison d’être, 
of the Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for States parties in respect of the 
full realization of the rights in question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as expedi-
tiously and effectively as possible towards that goal.’387
These statements expressed by the CESCR cannot conceal the fact that the 
precise scope of article 2, first paragraph, remains somewhat vague. For 
this reason, it seems very hard to infer from these general observations 
specific legislative standards. An exception may be found in the principle 
of non-discrimination, which has a separate legal basis in the ICESCR. 
Fortunately, the interpretation of the specific ICESCR rights by the CESCR 
may provide for additional guidance as to the standards that should be met 
in the relevant domestic legislation. These principles and standards, which 
can be found in the so-called ‘General Comments’ and recommendations 
(‘Concluding Observations’) issued by the CESCR, and, to a lesser extent, 
in the views adopted by CESCR in the context of the individual complaints 
procedure under the Optional Protocol, will be discussed in the remaining 
part of this section.388
4.2.3.2 Non-discrimination
Perhaps the most important legislative standard which may be derived 
from the text of the ICESCR is the prohibition of discrimination, i.e. differ-
385 Ibid, 143-144.
386 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 3’ (n 382) par. 10.
387 Ibid, par. 9.
388 In cases where a particular legislative standard can be derived from several or even many 
sources, we have - for the sake of brevity- limited the references to the General comments 
or the most recent reports. 
519024-L-sub01-bw-Beenakker
Processed on: 18-4-2018
Chapter 4 Legislative standards as part of human rights law 97
ential treatment which cannot be objectively and reasonably justified.389 It 
has been codified in article 2, second paragraph, which stipulates:
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunci-
ated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status’.390
The CESCR has recognised that ‘non-discrimination and equality are funda-
mental components of international human rights law and essential to the 
exercise end enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights’.391 There-
fore, the standard of non-discrimination has been termed an ‘immediate 
and cross-cutting’ obligation in the ICESCR.392
The importance of equal treatment has also been emphasised with 
regard to other specific rights entrenched in the ICESCR. For example, 
with regard to discrimination on the basis of gender, article 3 stipulates 
that state parties ‘undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women 
to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights’ set forth in the 
ICESCR. Articles 2, second paragraph, and 3, have been described as ‘inte-
grally related and mutually reinforcing’.393 They require that ‘the principle 
of equality […] be respected by the legislature when adopting laws, by 
ensuring that those laws further equal enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights by men and women’.394 Identical arguments have been made 
with regard to inter alia a person’s access to social security, which must 
be ensured without discrimination, and a person’s right to participate in 
a particular cultural activity under the articles 9 and 15 respectively.395 In 
practice, this means that the domestic legislation that was enacted in order 
to implement the requirements of the ICESCR may not discriminate on 
prohibited grounds.396
389 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 20: non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural 
rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights)’ (2 July 2009) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20, par. 13.
390 Other provisions which entail a prohibition of discrimination of women can be found in 
articles 3 and 7, sub a, sub i.
391 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 20’ (n 389) par. 2. Also J. Clifford, ‘Equality’ in: D. Shelton 
(ed), The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (1st edn OUP, Oxford 2013) 
420-445, 434-435.
392 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 20’ (n 389) par. 7.
393 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 16: the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment 
of all economic, social and cultural rights (article 3 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (11 August 2005) UN Doc E/C.12/2005/4, par. 3.
394 Ibid, par. 9.
395 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 19: the right to social security (art. 9)’ (4 February 2008) 
UN Doc E/C.12/GC/19, par. 30; CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 21: the right of everyone 
to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 1 (a) of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights)’ (21 December 2009) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/21, par. 22.
396 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 20’ (n 389) par. 8. 
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4.2.3.3 Consultation
Furthermore the CESCR has underlined the importance of consultation in 
‘formulating, implementing, reviewing and monitoring laws and policies’ 
related to the right to just and favourable conditions of work, which is 
entrenched in article 7 ICESCR. In the view of the CESCR, such consulta-
tion could be performed with various organisations. Among them are the 
traditional social partners, such as workers’ and employers’ organisations, 
and other interest groups. The latter category encompasses organisations 
that represent minority groups, such as persons with disabilities, younger 
and older persons, women, workers in the informal economy, migrants, 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons, and persons that 
belong to ethnic groups and indigenous communities.397 In the same vein, 
consultations should be held by state parties that consider the enactment 
of implementing legislation in order to perform their duty under the right 
of everyone to take part in cultural life. Indeed, the CESCR asserts that the 
applicable article 15, first paragraph, sub a:
‘entails that the laws, policies, strategies, programmes and measures adopted by the State 
party for the enjoyment of cultural rights should be formulated and implemented in such a 
way as to be acceptable to the individuals and communities involved’.398
Thus, as may be derived from this statement, the main reason for holding 
consultations with parties involved is to seek support for national imple-
menting legislation.
Also beyond articles 7 and 15 ICESCR, the CESCR has emphasised the 
importance of ‘[carrying] out a broad process of consultation and participa-
tion in the drafting and adoption [of national legislation].399
4.2.3.4 Observance of applicable international law
In many cases the CESCR has also indicated that the domestic implementing 
legislation under the ICESCR must be consistent with other international 
legal obligations to which the state is bound. For instance, with regard to 
the right to just and favourable conditions of work, which emanates from 
article 7, the CESCR has stated:
397 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 23 on the right to just and favourable conditions of work 
(article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (27 
April 2016) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/23) par. 56 and 65, sub c. See also paragraphs 35 and 40 
on exceptions to limitation on daily hours of work or weekly rest periods respectively.
398 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 21’ (n 395) par. 16, sub c. 
399 For example CESCR, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Colombia (6 
October 2017) UN Doc E/C.12/COL/CO/6, par. 18; CESCR, Concluding observations on 
the sixth periodic report of Canada (4 March 2016) UN Doc E/C.12/CAN/CO/6, par. 14.
519024-L-sub01-bw-Beenakker
Processed on: 18-4-2018
Chapter 4 Legislative standards as part of human rights law 99
‘[…] States parties should ensure that other international agreements do not negatively 
affect the right to just and favourable conditions of work, for example, by restricting the 
actions that other States parties could take to implement the right’.400
A similar point was made with regard to the right to social security, to 
which the CESCR added that ‘[a]greements concerning trade liberalization 
should not restrict the capacity of a State Party to ensure the full realiza-
tion of the rights to social security’.401 In other words, state parties to the 
ICESCR must observe and continue to observe its requirements when they 
contract other international legal obligations.
Whereas the aforementioned examples reflect the requirement that 
other international agreements which are concluded by a state party 
must be consonant with the obligations of that state under the ICESCR, 
the inverse situation has also been addressed by the CESCR. In order to 
perform their obligations under the right to sexual and reproductive health, 
which is considered part of article 12 ICESCR, states ‘should be guided by 
contemporary human rights instruments and jurisprudence, as well as the 
most current international guidelines and protocols established by United 
Nations agencies, in particular WHO and the United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA)’. It then referred to several authoritative interpretations 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women.402
The CESCR has made similar statements with regard to, inter alia, the 
rights of indigenous peoples403, the rights of persons with disabilities,404, 
the rights of minors,405 the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and state-
less persons,406 the right to join and form trade unions407 and the right to 
housing408.
The CESCR’s references to other international norms must be seen as 
an attempt to ensure the consistent interpretation of the various applicable 
human rights instruments by states and, in particular, as a recognition that 
400 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 23’ (n 397) par. 72 and 79.
401 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 19’ (n 395) par. 57 and 65.
402 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 22 on the right to sexual and reproductive health (article 
12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (2 May 2016) 
UN Doc E/C.12/GC/22, par. 49. Also CESCR, Concluding observations on the initial 
report of Pakistan (23 June 2017) UN Doc E/C.12/PAK/CO/1, par. 48.
403 CESCR, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Colombia (6 October 
2017) UN Doc E/C.12/COL/CO/6, par. 18.
404 CESCR, Concluding observations on the initial report of Pakistan (n 402) par 24.
405 Ibid, par 56.
406 Ibid, par 26.
407 CESCR, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Colombia (n 403) par 40; 
CESCR, Concluding observations on the fi fth report of Australia (23 June 2017) UN Doc 
E/C.12/AUS/CO/5, par 30; CESCR, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic 
report of the Dominican Republic (7 October 2016) E/C.12/DOM/CO/4, par. 40.
408 CESCR, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Canada (4 March 2016) 
UN Doc E/C.12/CAN/CO/6, par. 40; CESCR, Concluding observations on the second 
periodic report of the Sudan (9 October 2015) UN Doc E/C.12/SDN/CO/2, par. 48.
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the interpretation of the ICESCR, and the domestic legislation which is 
adopted in order to give effect to its provisions, is subject to the meaning 
which is attributed under the other related, instruments, guidelines and 
protocols.
4.2.3.5 Monitoring of compliance and enforcement
The CESCR has indicated that the mere adoption of legislation by state 
parties in order to fulfil their obligations under the ICESCR is insufficient; 
states must also monitor compliance and ensure the adequate enforcement 
of the legislation in practice. Of course, these two elements go hand in hand; 
enforcement of legislation, in the sense of punishment of violations, presup-
poses the establishment of a breach of the law. In turn, a violation of the 
applicable legislation can only be determined if a system has been put in 
place to monitor compliance with that legislation.
Therefore, the obligation to establish a system to monitor compliance 
has been considered an integral part of the ICESCR rights. Under the right 
to water, the CESCR recommends that states adopt domestic legislation 
which provides, inter alia, for ‘national mechanisms for its monitoring’.409
In addition, as part of the right to just and favourable conditions of work, 
compliance by the private sector should be monitored ‘through an effec-
tively functioning labour inspectorate’.410 Elsewhere, with regard to the 
right to social security, the CESCR has suggested that monitoring should 
be performed ‘independently’, although it did not clarify how this criterion 
must be understood.411 In some case the CESCR has expressly mentioned 
the sectors which should be the object of compliance monitoring. For 
instance, under the right to sexual and reproductive health (article 12 
ICESCR), the state parties should aim their monitoring efforts in particular 
on private health-care providers, health insurance companies, educational 
and childcare institutions, institutional care facilities, refugee camps, 
prisons and other detention centers and pharmaceutical companies oper-
ating abroad.412
409 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 15: the right to water (arts. 11 and 12 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (20 January 2003) UN Doc 
E/C.12/2002/11, par 50.
410 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 16: the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment 
of all economic, social and cultural rights (article 3 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (11 August 2005) UN Doc E/C.12/2005/4, par. 24. 
Also CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 23’ (n 397) par. 47, sub f; Also CESCR, Concluding 
observations on the initial report of Burundi (9 October 2015) UN Doc E/C.12/
BDI/CO/1, par. 26. With regard to labour conditions for domestic workers, CESCR, 
Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Greece (9 October 2015) UN 
Doc E/C.12/GRC/CO/2, par. 26. 
411 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 19’ (n 395) par. 46. 
412 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 22’ (n 402) par. 60.
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As regards the requirement of enforcement, we could by way of 
example refer to the following statement of the CESCR, which particularly 
addresses the state obligations under article 7 on the right to just and 
favourable conditions of work:
‘States should ensure that laws, policies and regulations governing the right to just and 
favourable conditions of work, such as a national occupational safety and health policy, or 
legislation on minimum wage and minimum standards for working conditions, are ade-
quate and effectively enforced. States parties should impose sanctions and appropriate 
penalties on third parties, including adequate reparation, criminal penalties, pecuniary 
measures such as damages, and administrative measures, in the event of violation of any 
of the elements of the right.’413
However, the obligation to ensure the legislation’s enforcement is by no 
means limited to the laws that have been enacted under article 7 ICESCR. It 
must also be considered integral part of inter alia the rights codified in arti-
cles 3414, 6415, 9416, 10417, 11418, 12419 and 15, first paragraph, sub a420 and c421.
In some cases the CESCR has argued that criminal enforcement consti-
tutes the most appropriate form of enforcement. For example in the case of 
domestic violence, the CESCR has recommended:
413 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 23’ (n 397) par. 59. Also CESCR, Concluding observations 
on the initial report of Pakistan (n 402) par. 64; CESCR, Concluding observations on the 
sixth periodic report of Cyprus (7 October 2016) UN Doc E/C.12/CYP/CO/6, par. 22; 
CESCR, Concluding observations on the combined fi fth and sixth periodic reports of the 
Philippines (7 October 2016) UN Doc E/C.12/PHL/CO/5-6, par. 38; CESCR, Concluding 
observations on the sixth periodic report of Poland (7 October 2016) UN Doc E/C.12/
POL/CO/6, par. 17; CESCR, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of 
the Dominican Republic (n 407) par. 33.
414 CESCR, Concluding observations on the combined second and third periodic reports of 
Liechtenstein (23 June 2017) UN Doc E/C.12/LIE/CO/2-3, par. 16. 
415 CESCR, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Cyprus (n 413) par. 22.
416 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 19’ (n 395) par. 46 and 65.
417 CESCR, Concluding observations on the initial report of Pakistan (n 402) par 54; CESCR, 
Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Cyprus (n 413) par. 22; CESCR, 
Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Lebanon (7 October 2016) 
UN Doc E/C.12/LBN/CO/2, par. 46; CESCR, Concluding observations on the fourth 
periodic report of the Dominican Republic (n 407) par. 40; CESCR, Concluding observa-
tions on the second periodic report of Honduras (24 June 2016) E/C.12/HND/CO/2, par 
38; CESCR, Concluding observations on the combined second to fi fth periodic reports 
of Kenya (4 March 2016) UN Doc E/C.12/KEN/CO/2-5, par. 40; CESCR, Concluding 
observations on the initial report of Burundi (n 410) par. 38.
418 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 15’ (n 409) par. 43 and 44, sub b.
419 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 22’ (n 402) par 49, sub d, 55 and 64; CESCR, ‘General 
Comment no. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (11 August 2000) UN 
Doc E/C.12/2000/4 par. 49 and 51.
420 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 21’ (n 395) par. 50, sub d, and 63.
421 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 17: The right of everyone to benefi t from the protection of 
the moral and material interests resulting from any scientifi c, literary or artistic produc-
tion of which he or she is the author (article 15, paragraph 1 (c), of the Covenant)’ (12 
January 2006) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/17 par. 43 and 45.
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‘[…] that the State party should speed up the process of drafting and adopting comprehen-
sive legislation to eliminate all forms of domestic violence, under which all sorts and 
degrees of domestic and gender violence will be characterized as crimes and appropriate 
sanctions provided’.422
The CESCR has expressed a similar view with regard to the enforcement of 
for instance national legislation to combat sexual violence against women423
and sexual harassment in the work place424.
A final point that needs to be made here concerns the penalties to be 
imposed in response to violations of national implementing legislation. 
The CESCR has demonstrated a certain reluctance, also with regard to 
individual state parties, to prescribe in great detail the penalties it considers 
adequate. Instead, it has considered that sanctions should be ‘proportion-
ate’425, ‘deterrent’426 or ‘dissuasive’427.
4.2.3.6 Remedies
Another legislative standard that can be inferred from the ICESCR consists 
of the availability of domestic remedies to persons whose rights have been 
(allegedly) infringed. This was also emphasised by the CESCR, which has 
stated:
‘The Covenant norms must be recognized in appropriate ways within the domestic legal 
order, appropriate means of redress, or remedies, must be available to any aggrieved indi-
vidual or group, and appropriate means of ensuring governmental accountability must be 
put in place’.428
422 CESCR, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Chile (19 June 2015) 
UN Doc E/C.12/CHL/CO/4, par. 23. Also CESCR, Concluding observations on the 
second periodic report of China, including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China (23 
May 2014) UN Doc E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, par. 27; CESCR, Concluding observations on 
the second periodic report of the Islamic Republic of Iran, adopted by the Committee at 
its fi ftieth session (29 April-17 May 2013) (17 May 2013) UN Doc E/C.12/IRN/CO/2, par. 
17; CESCR, Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under articles 16 and 17 
of the Covenant (14 May 2004) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.97, par. 37.
423 CESCR, Concluding observations on the initial report of Indonesia (23 May 2014) UN 
Doc E/C.12/IDN/CO/1, p. 8-9.
424 CESCR, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of China (n 422) par. 55; 
CESCR, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Kuwait (29 November 
2013) UN Doc E/C.12/KWT/CO/2, par. 20; CESCR, Consideration of reports submitted 
by states parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant (28 November 2003) UN Doc 
E/C.12/1/Add.94, par. 48.
425 CESCR, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of China (n 422) par. 55; 
CESCR, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Kuwait (n 424) par. 20.
426 CESCR, Concluding observations on the initial report of Gabon (29 November 2013) UN 
Doc E/C.12/GAB/CO/1, par. 11.
427 CESCR, Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under articles 16 and 17 of 
the Covenant (20 May 2010) UN Doc E/C.12/KAZ/CO/1, par. 12.
428 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 9’ (n 375) par. 2.
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Also in the context of recommendations to states and the individual 
complaints procedure under the Optional Protocol, the CESCR has clearly 
stated that the requirement to adopt legislation to give effect to the ICERSC 
‘includes the adoption of measures that ensure access to effective judicial 
remedies for the protection of the rights recognized in the Covenant […]’.429
The availability of remedies as a legal obligation can be traced back 
to article 2, first paragraph, which was cited in section 4.2.3.1, read in 
conjunction with the other substantive provisions of the ICESCR. This view 
is supported by General Comment no. 3 on article 2, first paragraph, in 
which it was argued that ‘among the measures which might be considered 
appropriate [under this article], in addition to legislation, is the provision of 
judicial remedies with respect to rights which may, in accordance with the 
national legal system, be considered justiciable’.430
This requirement is, of course, closely related to the ICESCR’s validity 
in the domestic legal order; it may only acquire practical relevance if 
persons whose rights have been (allegedly) infringed, have legal avenues to 
enforce their rights. Therefore, it must be clear to them to what extent they 
can legally rely on the ICESCR. In this respect the CESCR has stated that the 
specific means by which the ICESCR is to be given effect in the domestic 
legal order is for each state party to decide, even though it has expressed 
its preference for the incorporation of the text into domestic law.431 In any 
case, the obligation to put in place domestic remedies which enable persons 
to enforce their rights must be considered to extend to domestic legislation 
through which the ICESCR is implemented on the national level. This was 
emphasised by the CESCR when it recommended to ‘take the legisla-
tive measures necessary to give full effect to the Covenant rights in [the 
state party’s] legal order and ensure that victims have access to effective 
remedies’.432 Only then the values that are reflected in the ICESCR can be 
realised in practice.
The CESCR may share this view, as it has suggested that states ‘may 
find it advantageous to adopt framework legislation to operationalize their 
right to water strategy’. Such legislation, the CESCR added, should include 
inter alia remedies and recourse procedures, since persons whose rights 
have been infringed ‘should be entitled to adequate reparation, including 
429 CESCR, Views of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(fi fty-fi fth session) concerning Communication No. 2/2014 (17 June 2015) par. 11.3 and 
17. Also CESCR, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of the Republic 
of Moldova (6 October 2017) UN Doc E/C.12/MDA/CO/3, par 19; CESCR, Concluding 
observations on the initial report of Pakistan (n 402) par 20; CESCR, Concluding observa-
tions on the combined second and third periodic reports of Liechtenstein (n 414) par. 12; 
CESCR, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Honduras (n 417) par 22.
430 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 3’ (n 382) par. 5.
431 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 9’ (n 375) par. 5 and 8.
432 CESCR, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Canada (n 399) par. 40.
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restitution, compensation, satisfaction or guarantees of non-repetition’.433
Similar statements have been made with regard to the rights embodied in 
article 2, second paragraph434, 3435, 6436, 7437, 9438, 11439, 12440, 15, first para-
graph, sub a441 and c442.
Another interesting question concerns the required features of those 
remedies. Under article 15, first paragraph, sub c, these characteristics 
comprise the elements of availability, accessibility and quality.443 Whereas 
the requirement of availability refers to the mere presence of domestic 
remedies, the accessibility-criterion demands that individuals have access to 
those remedies. According to the CESCR, accessibility has three dimensions: 
national courts must be physically accessible by both abled and disabled 
persons; the procedures must be economically affordable for all; and states 
must safeguard the accessibility of information in order to ensure that indi-
viduals can collect all the information that is necessary to institute proceed-
ings. Finally, the element of quality demands that the remedial procedures 
are administered ‘competently and expeditiously’ by the authorities.444 The 
CESCR has made a similar statement with regard to the right to sexual and 
reproductive health when it contended that ‘effective exercise of the right 
to remedy requires funding access to justice and information about the 
existence of these remedies’.445
433 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 15’ (n 409) par. 50 and 55.
434 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 20’ (n 389) par. 40; CESCR, Concluding observations on 
the fi fth periodic report of Costa Rica (7 October 2016) UN Doc E/C.12/CRI/CO/5, par. 
17; CESCR, Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Honduras (n 417) 
par 22.
435 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 16’ (n 410) par. 21. Also CESCR, Concluding observations 
on the sixth periodic report of Cyprus (n 413) par. 14.
436 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 18: article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ (6 February 2006) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/18, par 48. Also 
CESCR, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Cyprus (n 413) par. 22.
437 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 23’ (n 397) par. 50 and 57. Also CESCR, Concluding obser-
vations on the sixth periodic report of Cyprus (n 413) par. 22.
438 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 19’ (n 395) par. 72 and 77.
439 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 12: the right to adequate food (art. 11)’ (12 May 1999) UN 
Doc E/C.12/1999/5, par 32. Also with a view of providing protection to victims of forced 
evictions, the CESCR has recommended to ‘adopt a legislative framework providing 
adequate legal protection against forced evictions and relocations for those without 
secure tenure to land and housing, and provide compensation and redress to those forc-
ibly relocated’. CESCR, Concluding observations on the fi fth periodic report of Sri Lanka 
(23 June 2017) UN Doc E/C.12/LKA/CO/5, section C.
440 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 14’ (n 419) par. 59; CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 22’ 
(n 402) par. 49, sub h and 64.
441 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 21’ (n 395) par. 63 and 72.
442 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 17’ (n 421) par. 18, 34, 43, 44 and 51.
443 Ibid, par. 18.
444 Ibid, par. 18.
445 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 22’ (n 402) par 64.
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4.2.3.7 Evaluation of legislation
Once domestic implementing legislation has entered into force, it should be 
periodically reviewed in order to evaluate its consequences in practice. This 
obligation may be derived from article 3 on the equal treatment of men and 
women, which reads:
‘States parties should periodically review existing legislation, policies, strategies and pro-
grammes in relation to economic, social and cultural rights, and adopt any necessary 
changes to ensure that they are consonant with their obligations under article 3 of the 
Covenant’.446
Similar obligations exist under articles 7 (the right to just and favourable 
conditions of work) and 9 (right to social security) ICESCR. They seem to 
serve the same purpose. While the evaluation of legislation under article 3 
serves the purpose to ensure consonance with the ICESCR,447 such review 
under articles 7 and 9 must be performed ‘with a view to updating [labour] 
standards in the light of practice’ and ‘towards the realization of the right to 
social security’ respectively.448 To this end, the CESCR has contended that 
states should identify ‘factors and difficulties affecting implementation of 
their obligations’.449
Also in the context of other rights the CESCR has recommended the 
performance of evaluation of domestic legislation in order to give effect to 
the ICESCR, such as the right to housing450, the right to work451, the rights 
to health452 and the rights of indigenous people453.
446 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 16’ (n 410) par. 34. Elsewhere, the Committee has stated 
that ‘a failure to adopt, implement and monitor effects of laws, policies and programmes 
to eliminate de jure and de facto discrimination with respect to each of the rights enumer-
ated in articles 6 to 15 of the Covenant constitutes a violation of those rights’. Ibidem, 
par. 41. Also CESCR, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of the Russian 
Federation (6 October 2017) UN Doc E/C.12/RUS/CO/6, par 25; CESCR, Concluding 
observations on the initial report of Pakistan (n 402) par 34; CESCR, Concluding observa-
tions on the sixth periodic report of Cyprus (n 413) par. 14; CESCR, Concluding observa-
tions on the combined fi fth and sixth periodic reports of the Philippines (n 413) par. 38.
447 It may be added that in the view of the Committee, special attention must be given to 
‘adverse effects on disadvantaged or marginalised individuals or groups, particularly 
women and girls’. CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 16’ (n 410) par. 21.
448 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 19’ (n 395) par. 74; CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 23’ 
(n 397) par. 62.
449 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 19’ (n 395) par. 74.
450 CESCR, Concluding observations on the fi fth report of Australia (n 407) par 42.
451 CESCR, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Poland (n 413) par. 17.
452 CESCR, Concluding observations on the initial report of Burundi (n 410) par. 54.
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4.2.3.8 Formal aspects
The CESCR has also made statements with regard to national legislation’s 
form. In these, rather exceptional, cases it expresses its disapprovement of 
national legislation which it considers too vague. As a consequence, the 
CESCR contends, national legislation fails to provide protection as required 
under the ICESCR. An example can be found in national legislation on 
forced evictions in the context of development projects. The CESCR, fearful 
of the possibility that such evictions cause homelessness, has recommended 
to ‘strictly define the circumstances and safeguards under which evictions 
can take place’.454 Elsewhere the CESCR has criticised ‘moral turpitude’ as 
a justification for removal, dismissal or disqualification from employment 
in the civil service of Nepal on the ground that the term ‘is not defined with 
sufficient precision and which can lead to arbitrary interpretations’.455 Simi-
larly, with regard to lèse-majesté, as criminalised under Thailand’s national 
legislation, and its negative consequence for the enjoyment of the right to 
take part in cultural life, the CESCR has urged the state party to amend 
its legislation with a view to ‘ensuring clarity and unambiguity regarding 
the prohibited acts’.456 These examples demonstrate that the CESCR has on 
several occasions sought to persuade state parties to provide for national 
legislation which is clear and unambiguous, especially when the application 
of vague norms may constitute impediments to the enjoyment of economic, 
social and cultural rights embedded in the ICESCR.
4.2.3.9 Information to the public
On a few occasions, the CESCR has suggested that the provisions of the 
ICESCR may not only require the adoption of national implementing 
legislation, but may also demand that state parties undertake information 
campaigns. Sometimes the latter recommendations are expressly related to 
the adoption of national implementing legislation. Therefore, they amount 
to what we have called ‘legislative standards’ and deserve to be discussed 
here.
One example applies to domestic violence, about which the CESCR 
urged the state party to ‘adopt without delay specific legislation on domestic 
violence […] and to undertake a major information campaign to raise aware-
454 CESCR, Concluding observations on the initial report of Indonesia (n 423) par. 30. Also 
CESCR, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties in accordance with articles 
16 and 17 of the Covenant (18 November 2009) UN Doc E/C.12/TCD/CO/3, par. 28.
455 CESCR, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties in accordance with articles 
16 and 17 of the Covenant (29 August 2001) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.66, par. 25.
456 CESCR, Concluding observations on the combined initial and second periodic reports of 
Thailand (19 June 2015) UN Doc E/C.12/THA/CO/1-2, par. 35. Similarly, with regard to 
the Irish criminalisation of abortion, see CESCR, Concluding observations on the third 
periodic report of Ireland (19 June 2015) UN Doc E/C.12/IRL/CO/3, par. 30.
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ness about such legislation.’457 It has made similar statements with regard to 
information campaigns about national anti-tobacco legislation and legisla-
tion aimed at the protection of persons infected with HIV with a view on 
‘raising awareness among the public’.458
In some cases the information should, in the view of the CESCR, not 
be directed to the public in general, but to the organisations and persons 
which are primarily affected by the legislation. In the context of its discus-
sion on the need to adopt national legislation to combat corruption, it 
suggested to conduct ‘awareness-raising campaigns among political 
leaders, judges, legislators and public officials on the need to strictly enforce 
anti-corruption legislation and to work towards the complete eradication 
of that phenomenon.’459 With regard to national legislation aimed to ensure 
the protection of women on maternity leave, the CESCR has called upon the 
state party to ‘circulate its legislation widely among employers’.460
4.2.4 Overview
From the above, it may be concluded that the text of the ICESCR establishes 
only the most rudimentary standard which must be respected by states 
which adopt domestic legislation in order to perform their obligations 
under the treaty. It consists of the principle of non-discrimination, which 
means that domestic implementing legislation may not distinguish between 
persons or groups on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status, if such distinction cannot be objectively and reasonably justified. 
However, a closer look at the General Comments on the various ICESCR 
rights and the various recommendations to state parties reveals that the 
CESCR adheres to an interpretation of the ICESCR which encompasses 
several other legislative standards as well. They include, as we have seen in 
the previous sections, the elements of consultation, monitoring of compli-
ance and enforcement, remedies, the evaluation of legislation, the provision 
of information to the public and legislative clarity.
457 CESCR, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties in accordance with articles 
16 and 17 of the Covenant (16 May 2007) UN Doc E/C.12/NPL/CO/2, par. 35.
458 CESCR, Concluding observations on the initial report of Togo (17 May 2013) UN Doc 
E/C.12/TGO/CO/1, par. 31; CESCR, Consideration of reports submitted by States 
parties in accordance with articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant (18 May 2012) UN Doc 
E/C.12/SVK/CO/2, par. 23.
459 CESCR, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Morocco (8 October 
2015) UN Doc E/C.12/MAR/CO/4, par. 12.
460 CESCR, Concluding observations concerning the fourth periodic report of Belgium (29 





5 Legislative standards as part of EU law
5.1 Implementation of directives of the European Union
5.1.1 General
In section 3.4.2 it was argued that the source of obligation to implement EU 
directives may be traced back to legislative instrument itself, the treaties 
and in the so-called principle of effectiveness. In addition to this general 
obligation of the European Union’s member states to give effect to EU law 
in their respective legal orders, EU law more specifically prescribes how 
implementation by member states should be performed. The largest part 
of the normative framework that is applicable to the implementation of the 
EU’s legislative instruments, can be derived from case law pertaining to the 
implementation of directives in the sense of article 288 TFEU. This may be 
explained by the nature of the instrument, which ‘shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods’.461
On various occasions, however, the CJEU has made clear this freedom of 
choice is not unlimited. Prechal suggests that the question of correct imple-
mentation comprises ‘three closely related but nevertheless distinguishable 
issues’: requirements regarding the content of the measures, requirements 
regarding the nature of the measures and requirements regarding their 
effective application and enforcement in practice.462 This categorisation, 
which is still accurate more than a decade after the publication of the first 
edition of Prechal’s monograph on directives adopted in the framework of 
the EU, will be followed below. It will be complemented, however, by the 
obligation to ensure the implementation in due time.
The legislative standards that will be discussed below are related to 
directives as instruments, irrespective of the content of the many directives 
that have been adopted in the framework of the European Union. Contrary 
to other legal regimes discussed in Part II, therefore, this chapter will not 
include a section on the ‘content of the regime’. In section 5.2, we will 
continue our discussion of the EU’s legislative instruments and focus on EU 
regulations in particular.463
461 It may be recalled that regulations, on the contrary, have general application and are 
directly applicable in all member states. 
462 S. Prechal, Directives in EC law (2nd edition; OUP 2005) 32.
463 Since the number of cases on the implementation of directives is larger than the number 
of cases on the implementation of regulations, we will start our discussion with that 
category of legislative instruments.
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An obvious limitation can be found in the norm that implementation has 
to be accomplished in due time.464 What amounts to ‘in due time’ in this 
respect, is determined by the EU’s legislative instrument at hand, which 
prescribes a date on which the transposition period expires. This period is 
used by states to amend their national laws in order to bring them in confor-
mity with the adopted EU legislation.465 In order to meet the criterion of 
timely transposition, the piece of national implementing legislation should 
enter into force no later than the implementation deadline.466
This also means that, prior to the date on which the transposition period 
elapses, as prescribed in the relevant instrument, states are under no obli-
gation to comply with the newly established EU regime.467 Nevertheless, 
during the period of time between the entry into force of a directive and the 
implementation deadline, states are under the duty to refrain from acts that 
could seriously compromise a directive’s objectives.468 Given this limitation, 
the national authorities have to assess whether the adoption of measures 
prior to the implementing deadline is lawful. As the CJEU has explained in 
Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL:
‘[i]n making that assessment, the national court must consider, in particular, whether the 
provisions in issue purport to constitute full transposition of the directive, as well as the 
effects in practice of applying those incompatible provisions and of their duration in time.’469
464 Prechal, Directives in EC law (n 462) 16-28 and case law cited. 
465 CJEU, Inter-Environnement Wallonie, case C-129/96, judgment of 18 December 1997, 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:628, par. 44.
466 CJEU, SETAR, case C-551/13, judgment of 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2467, par. 
40 and 51. 
467 CJEU, Commission v Belgium, case C-422/05, judgment of 14 June 2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:342, 
par. 62.
468 D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, European Union law. Text and materials (3rd edition; 
CUP 2014) 214. See also CJEU, Inter-Environnement Wallonie (n 465) par. 45; CJEU, 
Stichting Zuid-Hollandse Milieufederatie, case C-316/04, judgment of 10 November 2005, 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:678, par. 42; CJEU, Adeneler and others (n 297) par. 91; CJEU, Commission v 
Belgium (n 467) par. 59; CJEU, Azienda Agro-Zootecnica Franchini Sarl and Eolica di Altamura 
Srl, case C-2/10, judgment of 21 July 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:502, par. 71 and case law cited; 
CJEU, Jetair, case C-599/12, judgment of 13 March 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:144, par. 35; CJEU, 
Federconsorzi, case C-104/14, judgment of 26 February 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:125, par. 32.
469 The Court continues by stating that ‘[f]or example, if the provisions in issue are intended 
to constitute full and defi nitive transposition of the directive, their incompatibility with 
the directive might give rise to the presumption that the result prescribed by the directive 
will not be achieved within the period prescribed if it is impossible to amend them in time. 
Conversely, the national court could take into account the right of a Member State to adopt 
transitional measures or to implement the directive in stages. In such cases, the incompat-
ibility of the transitional national measures with the directive, or the non-transposition of 
certain of its provisions, would not necessarily compromise the result prescribed’. CJEU, 
Inter-Environnement Wallonie (n 465) par. 47-49. Also Prechal, Directives in EC law (n 462) 20.
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In Jetair the CJEU was requested to render judgment on the question 
whether a Belgian tax measure could pass the test that it had formulated 
in Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL. Jetair is a Belgian travel agent which 
organises holiday journeys outside the European Union, for which it had 
paid value added tax to the Belgian tax authorities. While the said journeys 
organised by Jetair had been exempted from taxation, this exemption was 
withdrawn by the Belgian legislature with effect from 1 December 1977, 
when the amended national tax code entered into force. This was only one 
month before the transposition period, prescribed by the applicable direc-
tive, expired. This directive provided for an exemption for the taxation of 
the journeys outside the EU, including those organised by Jetair. Neverthe-
less, the relevant rules also expressly authorised member states to continue 
to tax the relevant transactions, if they had already taxed those services on 
1 January 1978. Did the contested measure that had been imposed upon 
Jetair by the Belgian tax authorities constitute a violation of EU law? The 
CJEU answered this question in the negative, and held that:
‘if Member States taxed the transactions at issue on 1 January 1978, they could continue to 
do so after that date. As the [directive] expressly set the date of 1 January 1978 as the start-
ing point for the possible retention of a tax measure, it cannot be considered that a law 
providing for taxation of such transactions adopted before that date, during the period for 
transposition of that directive, was liable seriously to compromise the attainment of the 
result prescribed by that directive’.470
Apparently, in this case, the fact that the relevant directive itself had 
expressly and deliberately provided for a transitional regime pertaining to 
the taxation of the claimant’s business activities, had persuaded the CJEU 
that the ‘result prescribed by the directive’ included the measures that were 
enacted by the Belgian legislature.
The CJEU came to the opposite conclusion in Commission v. Belgium,
in which the Commission had challenged the adoption by Belgium of 
measures aimed at the reduction of noise produced at European airports. 
The measures comprised night-time operating restrictions at all Belgian 
airports for certain types of civil subsonic jet aeroplanes and entered into 
force on 1 July 2003. This date had fallen within the transposition period 
prescribed by directive 2002/30/EEC, which introduced operating 
restrictions at airport level in order to diminish the production of noise 
by airplanes to the detriment of the environment and of people living in 
the vicinity of airports. This directive also repealed a regulation which 
contained similar rules for certain types of civil subsonic jet aeroplanes, to 
which the new Belgian national law had expressly referred. The European 
Commission (EC) complained that, in particular, the Belgian law contained 
an approach that had also appeared in the regulation, even though when 
the national law was adopted that regulation had already been repealed 
470 CJEU, Jetair (n 468) par. 34-38.
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and that approach had not been retained in the directive. Did the Belgian 
law seriously compromise the result prescribed by directive 2002/30/EC? 
In the view of the CJEU, the Belgian law:
‘gave rise to unduly unfavourable treatment for certain categories of aeroplanes and had a 
lasting impact on the conditions of transposition and implementation of the directive in the 
Community. By reason of the ban on the operation of various aeroplanes resulting from the 
application of that [law], the assessment of the noise impact provided for in the directive 
cannot take into account the noise produced by all aeroplanes in accordance with the [pre-
scribed rules] and, therefore, the optimum improvement in noise management cannot be 
achieved in accordance with the provisions set out in the directive.’471
Therefore, Belgium had failed to observe its obligations during the transpo-
sition period.
These examples demonstrate that member states enjoy a certain 
measure of freedom during the transposition period. Only after the transpo-
sition deadline states have to comply fully with the adopted EU legislation.
5.1.2.2 The nature of the implementing measures
In addition to the requirement that the implementation of EU directives has 
to be completed in due time, EU law prescribes the method of transposition. 
According to established case law of the CJEU, ‘provisions of directives 
must be implemented with unquestionable binding force, and the speci-
ficity, precision and clarity necessary to satisfy the requirements of legal 
certainty’.472 This statement by the court contains several elements which 
all serve the purpose of legal certainty. The first one, the ‘unquestionable 
binding force’ will be discussed in the present section, while the remaining 
requirements will be explored in section 5.1.2.3.
The national implementing measures should have binding force and, 
in other words, should be laid down in law. This means that in the view of 
CJEU:
471 CJEU, Commission v Belgium (n 467) par. 62-69.
472 CJEU, Commission v Germany, case C-59/89, judgment 30 May 1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:225, 
par. 24; CJEU, Commission v France, case C-225/97, judgment of 19 May 1999, 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:252, par. 37; CJEU, Commission v Italy, case C-159/99, judgment of 17 
May 2001, ECLI:EU:C:2001:278, par. 32; CJEU, Commission v France, case C-296/01, judg-
ment of 20 November 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:626, par. 54; CJEU, Commission v Germany, 
case C-441/02, judgment of 27 April 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:253, par. 73; CJEU, Commission 
v Portugal, case C-61/05, judgment of 13 July 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:467, par. 37; CJEU, 
Commission v Ireland, case C-427/07, judgment of 16 July 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:457, par. 55; 
CJEU, Commission v Ireland, case C-50/09, judgment of 3 March 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:109, 
par. 46; CJEU, Commission v Spain, case C-151/12, judgment of 24 October 2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:690, par. 26; CJEU, Commission v Poland, case C-281/11, judgment of 
19 December 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:855, par. 101; CJEU, Commission v Portugal, case 
C-277/13, judgment of 11 September 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2208, par. 43; CJEU, Commis-
sion v Poland, case C-29/14, judgment of 11 June 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:379, par. 37.
519024-L-sub01-bw-Beenakker
Processed on: 18-4-2018
Chapter 5 Legislative standards as part of EU law 113
‘[m]ere administrative practices, which by their nature are alterable at will by the authori-
ties and are not given the appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting the 
proper fulfilment of a Member State’s obligations under the Treaty.’473
In the same vein, implementing measures that consist of ‘guidelines’ or 
‘recommendations’ will not be considered adequate implementation, as 
they lack binding character.474 In Commission v. Greece, the issue was raised 
whether statements expressed by member states in court could compen-
sate for the failure to transpose a directive. In this case it was claimed that 
Greece had failed to fulfil several of its obligations under directive 98/48/
EEC on the recognition of higher-education diplomas. One specific claim 
related to the alleged failure by the Greek authorities to recognise diplomas 
of persons recruited in the public sector, as a result of which some persons 
had been recruited at a level lower than that to which they would have been 
entitled if their diplomas had been recognised by the competent authority in 
accordance with the directive.475 At the hearing the representative of Greece, 
probably aware of its omissions, stated that Greece was prepared to ‘regu-
larise with retroactive effect the situation of the persons’ who had suffered 
from the belated transposition of the directive.476 The CJEU referred to the 
applicable domestic Civil Service Code, which contained the provisions that 
contravened the norms laid down in the directive, and dryly noted:
‘[i]n this respect, mere statements, such as those made by the Hellenic Republic at the hear-
ing, which, in the continued existence of express provisions of the Civil Service Code, 
maintain, for the persons concerned, a state of uncertainty as regards the extent of their 
rights in an area governed by Community law are not sufficient.’477
The requirement that directives should be transposed with ‘unquestionable 
binding force’ is particularly relevant for provisions that intend to create 
rights for individuals, because it enables the beneficiaries of those rights to 
473 CJEU, Commission v Italy, case C-168/85, judgment of 15 October 1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:381, 
par. 13; CJEU, Commission v Ireland, case C-236/91, judgment of 17 November 1992, 
ECLI:EU:C:1992:444, par. 6; CJEU, Commission v Ireland, case C-381/92, judgment of 
26 January 1994, ECLI:EU:C:1994:22, par. 7; CJEU, Commission v Spain, case C-242/94, 
judgment of 12 October 1995, ECLI:EU:C:1995:317, par. 6; CJEU, Commission v Greece, 
case C-311/95, judgment of 2 May 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:189, par. 7; CJEU, Commission v 
Italy, case C-316/96, judgment of 16 December 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:614, par. 16; CJEU, 
Commission v Italy, case C-315/98, judgment of 11 November 1999, ECLI:EU:C:1999:551, 
par. 10; CJEU, Commission v Italy (n 472) par. 32; CJEU, Commission v Ireland, case C-455/08, 
judgment of 23 December 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:809, par. 38.
474 CJEU, Commission v Poland (n 472) par. 46.
475 CJEU, Commission v Greece, case C-274/05, judgment of 23 October 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:
585, par. 50-59.
476 Ibid, par. 57.
477 Ibid, par. 58.
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ascertain their full extent.478 To this end, states are also obliged to promul-
gate the adopted national implementing measures in order to ensure the 
existence of ‘appropriate publicity’ for those measures.479
5.1.2.3 The content of the implementing measures
Furthermore, as was already stated above, implementation has to be 
performed with ‘specificity, precision and clarity’. Again, these demands 
must be seen as an elaboration of the principle of legal certainty, to which 
the CJEU has consistently referred.480 In its case law, these three criteria do 
not seem to possess an autonomous substance; as a trias, however, they 
constitute the standards that the content of the implementing measures 
should meet. Similar to the purpose served by the binding character of the 
implementing measures, the application of the elements of specificity, preci-
sion and clarity should ensure that ‘individuals can ascertain the full extent 
of their rights and obligations and, where appropriate, rely on those rights 
before the national courts.’481 It may be added that the fact that an activity 
referred to in a directive does not yet exist in a member state cannot release 
that state from its obligation to adopt laws or regulations in order to ensure 
that all the provisions of the directive are properly transposed.482
In accordance with this case law, the principle of legal certainty does 
not demand the express implementation of a directive’s provision if that 
provision concerns only the relations between member states and the EC.483
A typical provision of this kind is an obligation imposed upon member 
states to provide information to the EC, such as the presentation of a report. 
Generally, such a provision does not affect an individuals’ rights and 
obligations, as a result of which the rationale for implementation may be 
considered to have disappeared.
Moreover, the criteria of specificity, precision and clarity do not neces-
sarily entail the obligation to reproduce a directive verbatim in a specific, 
express law or regulation, since a ‘general legal context’ may be sufficient, 
478 CJEU, Commission v Ireland, case C-455/08 (n 473) par. 23. Also CJEU, Commission v Italy, 
case C-207/96, judgment of 4 December 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:583, par. 26. 
479 CJEU, Commission v Belgium, case C-415/01, judgment of 27 February 2003, ECLI:EU:C:
2003:118, par. 21; CJEU, Commission v Poland (n 472) par. 37.
480 CJEU, Commission v Poland (n 472) par. 37; Also CJEU, Commission v France, case C-296/01
(n 472) par. 54; CJEU, Commission v Italy, case C-82/06, judgment of 14 June 2007, 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:349, par. 19; CJEU, Commission v Greece, case C-81/07, judgment of 13 
March 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:172, par. 19.
481 CJEU, Commission v France, case C-177/04, judgment of 14 March 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:173,
par. 48.
482 CJEU, Commission v Belgium (n 467) par. 59.
483 CJEU, Commission v Portugal, case C-72/02, judgment of 24 June 2003, ECLI:EU:C:
2003:369, par. 19-20; CJEU, Commission v France, case C-296/01 (n 472) par. 92; CJEU,
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depending on its content.484 As the CJEU has explained on several occa-
sions,
‘[i]n particular, the existence of general principles of constitutional or administrative law 
may render superfluous transposition by specific legislative or regulatory measures, pro-
vided, however, that those principles actually ensure the full application of the directive by 
the national administrative authorities and that, where the relevant provision of the direc-
tive seeks to create rights for individuals, the legal situation arising from those principles is 
sufficiently precise and clear and that the persons concerned are placed in a position to 
know the full extent of their rights and obligations and, where appropriate, to be able to 
invoke them before the national courts’.485
When may the general legal context that consists of national principles 
of constitutional or administrative law be sufficient for the correct imple-
mentation of a directive’s provisions? A scarce example can be found in 
Commission v. France, in which the transposition of article 3, third paragraph, 
of directive 90/313/EEC on the freedom of access to information on the 
environment, was discussed. Pursuant to this provision, ‘[a] request for 
information [submitted by any natural person or legal person] may be 
refused where it would involve the supply of unfinished documents or data 
or internal communications, or where the request is manifestly unreason-
able or formulated in too general a manner’.486 The EC had maintained 
that France was under the obligation to transpose the mentioned ground 
for refusal, as embodied in article 3, third paragraph, of the directive, into 
French national law. ‘In the absence of express transposition’, the EC held, 
‘individuals are not able to know with the requisite clarity the extent of 
their rights under the directive in that regard’.487 The French government, 
however, referred to domestic legislation that was currently in place and 
argued that the aforementioned provision of the directive had already been 
implemented in a certain law in the way it was applied by the Conseil d’État. 
In other words, ‘[the said provision] simply confers on public authorities
484 CJEU, Commission v Germany, case C-29/84, judgment of 23 May 1985, ECLI:EU:C:
1985:229, par. 23; CJEU, Commission v Italy, case C-363/85, judgment of 9 April 1987, 
ECLI:EU:C:1987:196, par. 7; CJEU, Commission v Germany, case C-131/88, judgment 
28 February 1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:87, par. 6; CJEU, Commission v Germany (n 472) 
par. 18; CJEU, Commission v Portugal, case C-392/99, judgment of 10 April 2003, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:216, par. 80; CJEU, Commission v Ireland, case C-50/09 (n 472) par. 46; 
CJEU, Commission v Poland (n 472) par. 38.
485 CJEU, Commission v Poland (n 472) par. 38. Also CJEU, Commission v Spain (n 472) 
par. 28; CJEU, Commission v Belgium, case C-475/08, judgment of 3 December 2009, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:751, par. 41; CJEU, Commission v Luxembourg (n 483) par. 34; CJEU, 
Commission v Italy, case C-456/03, judgment of 16 June 2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:388, par. 
51; CJEU, Commission v France, case C-296/01 (n 472) par. 55; CJEU, Commission v Austria,
case C-194/01, judgment of 29 April 2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:248, par. 39; CJEU, Commission 
v France, case C-233/00, judgment of 26 June 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:371, par. 76.
486 Council Directive 90/313/EEC of 7 June 1990 on the freedom of access to information on 
the environment (OJ 1990, L 158) art 3, third paragraph. 
487 CJEU, Commission v France, case C-233/00 (n 485) par. 71.
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an option which has already been acknowledged by the Conseil d’État, and the
mere codification of that option cannot protect any right of individuals’.488
The CJEU agreed and stated:
‘[T]he requirement for specific transposition would be of very little practical use since that 
provision is drafted in very general terms and sets out rules which are in the nature of gen-
eral principles common to the legal systems of the Member States. […] Compliance with a 
provision of a directive which exhibits those characteristics must thus be essentially 
ensured when it is applied in practice to a specific situation, regardless of whether it is 
transposed into national law in precisely the same words. […] In those circumstances, a 
general legal context, which finds expression in the present case in the existence of con-
cepts whose content is clear and precise and which are applied in the framework of settled 
case law of the Conseil d’État, must be held to be sufficient for the purpose of properly 
transposing Article 3(3) of Directive 90/313.’489
On another occasion, the CJEU reached the opposite conclusion. In 
Commission v. Poland, the EC challenged the implementation by the Polish 
authorities of directive 2004/23/EC on standards of quality and safety 
for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage 
and distribution of human tissues and cells, and related (implementing) 
directives. According to the EC, Poland had failed to respect its obligations 
by excluding reproductive cells and foetal and embryonic tissue from the 
scope of the national implementing instruments. This alleged failure was 
contested by Poland, which referred to approximately twenty domestic 
laws in order to substantiate the claim that, despite its exclusion from the 
national implementing act, the implementation of the directives was suffi-
ciently provided for by the ‘legislation in force in the [Polish] internal legal 
order’.490 The CJEU investigated whether this general legal context could, 
as Poland had argued, be considered to constitute an implementation in 
conformity with Poland’s obligations under the directives. Here, it empha-
sised the fact that the directive imposed specific obligations on persons and 
establishments which use human tissues and cells, and concluded:
‘It is apparent from the pleadings lodged by the Republic of Poland before the Court that 
the acts relied upon by that Member State in order to claim that it duly transposed the 
directives at issue vary in their legal nature and include both non-binding acts and provi-
sions of general application in the fields of criminal and civil law. In the light of the specific 
scope of the obligations imposed by the directives at issue and the objective of protecting 
public health which they pursue, the transposition of those directives by a multitude of acts 
combined with the exclusion of certain types of tissues and cells from the scope of the prin-
cipal transposing act, even though those tissues and cells are covered by those directives, 
fails to satisfy the requirements of specificity, precision and clarity […] In those circum-
stances, the individuals concerned by the unified framework provided for by the direc-
tives at issue are not in a position, on the basis of those acts alone, to know the full extent 
of their rights and obligations with the legal certainty required by the Court’s case law.’491
488 Ibid, par. 73.
489 Ibid, par. 80-83.
490 CJEU, Commission v Poland (n 472) par. 24.
491 Ibid, par. 47.
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From these examples it seems impossible to draw general conclusions 
about when a ‘general legal context’ existent in a EU member state will be 
viewed as a sufficient implementation of the relevant legislative instru-
ment. Instead, it will depend on the objectives and level of specificity of 
that instrument and, of course, the legislation in place in the member state. 
In most cases by far, however, the general legal context already in place 
in a member state will be insufficient for a correct implementation of a 
given directive, or any other instrument for that matter. Therefore, in those 
cases an additional implementing act will be necessary in order to meet the 
standards of specificity, precision and clarity as required by the principle of 
legal certainty.
5.1.2.4 Effective application and enforcement in practice
Once the national implementing legislation has entered into force, the 
member states have taken a significant step towards ‘full application’ of 
the applicable EU legislation. Nevertheless, an additional task has to be 
completed: the domestic implementing legislation should be effectively 
applied and enforced in practice. This obligation is binding upon all state 
authorities, including those bodies under the control of the state that have 
been given responsibility for a public-interest service and, to that end, have 
been entrusted with special powers.492
The task to effectively apply and enforce in practice includes the 
imposition of penalties in those instances where the provisions of the EU 
directive, or, more accurately, its national implementing instrument, have 
been transgressed. Again, states enjoy considerable discretion in shaping 
the application and enforcement in their domestic jurisdictions. However, 
this freedom is not unlimited. In the view of the CJEU,
‘[…] in the absence of harmonisation of European Union legislation in the field of penalties 
applicable in cases where conditions laid down by arrangements under that legislation are 
not complied with, Member States are empowered to choose the penalties which seem to 
them to be appropriate. They must, however, exercise that power in accordance with Euro-
pean Union law and its general principles, and consequently with the principle of 
proportionality.’493
The regime to which is referred here (‘European Union law and its general 
principles’), encompasses several elements. Member states are under the 
duty to provide for sanctions that are ‘effective, proportionate and dissua-
sive’. These sanctions should not only be available to the authorities, but 
492 CJEU, Portgás, case C-425/12, judgment of 12 December 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:829, par. 
34.
493 CJEU, Chmielewski, case C-255/14, judgment of 16 July 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:475, par. 
21; CJEU, Rēdlihs, case C-263/11, judgment of 19 July 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:497, par. 44; 
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also be imposed in practice in cases where transgressions of EU legislation, 
or domestic implementing acts thereof, occur. Furthermore, the punishment 
of violations of EU law should be equal to the sanctioning of similar provi-
sions of purely national origin.494
How should the terms ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ be 
interpreted? In Asociaţia Accept, the CJEU was requested to decide whether 
a penalty that was imposed in response to a violation of implementing 
legislation in the field of equal treatment in employment satisfied these 
requirements.495 Directive 2000/78/EC contained the obligation to provide 
for ‘sanctions, which may comprise the payment of compensation to the 
victim, [that are] effective, proportionate and dissuasive’.496 A Romanian 
non-governmental organisation whose aim is to promote and protect 
lesbian, gay, bi-sexual and transsexual rights, lodged a complaint for an 
alleged breach of the national legislation that implemented the aforemen-
tioned directive. According to the non-governmental organisation, a soccer 
club had discriminated against a professional football-player who was 
homosexual, because the club’s representative had made public statements 
to the effect that the football-player was not offered a contract because of 
his sexual orientation. The National Council for Combatting Discrimination, 
before which proceedings had been brought, had decided that the state-
ments that were expressed indeed constituted discrimination and issued a 
warning. The warning was the only available penalty, since the ‘limitation 
period’ of six months for the imposition of a fine had already expired. In 
reply to the request submitted to the CJEU, it established that although 
the imposition of a fine under Romanian law was not impossible, it had to 
be considered very difficult at the least, due to the brief limitation period. 
The CJEU expressed the view that ‘a purely symbolic sanction cannot be 
regarded as being compatible with the correct and effective implementation 
of Directive 2000/78’. It added, however, that:
494 These criteria may be derived from Commission v Greece, in which the Court held: ‘For that 
purpose, whilst the choice of penalties remains within their discretion, they must ensure 
in particular that infringements of Community law are penalized under conditions, 
both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringe-
ments of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make 
the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive’. CJEU, Commission v Greece, case 
C-68/88, judgment of 21 September 1989, ECLI:EU:C:1989:339, par. 24. See also CJEU, 
Åkerberg Fransson, case C-617/10, judgment of 26 February 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, 
par. 36; CJEU, Paquay, case C-460/06, judgment of 11 October 2007, ECLI:EU:C:2007:601, 
par. 52; CJEU, Mulliez, joined cases C-23/03, C-52/03, C-133/03, C-337/03 and C-473/03,
order of the Court of 4 May 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:285, par. 27; CJEU, Berlusconi, joined 
cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02, judgment of 3 May 2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:270, 
par. 36; CJEU, Adeneler and others (n 297) par. 94; CJEU, Boehringer Ingelheim (n 297) par. 59; 
CJEU, Gallotti (n 297) par. 14.
495 CJEU, Asociaţia Accept, case C-81/12, judgment of 25 April 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:275.
496 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework 
for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000, L 303) art 17.
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‘the mere fact that a specific sanction is not pecuniary in nature does not necessarily mean 
that it is purely symbolic, particularly if it is accompanied by a sufficient degree of public-
ity and if it assists in establishing discrimination within the meaning of that directive in a 
possible action for damages’.
In the present case, nonetheless, the CJEU concluded that the short limita-
tion period, as a result of which the imposition of a warning would, in most 
cases, be the only possible penalty to address violations of the Romanian 
implementing legislation, could not be considered an effective, propor-
tionate and dissuasive punishment.497
Moreover, the CJEU has held that the criterion of dissuasiveness means 
that the imposed penalties should have a ‘genuinely dissuasive effect’, 
although this clarification is hardly more revealing.498 It was put to the 
test in Le Crédit Lyonnais. Pursuant to article 23 of directive 2008/48/EC, 
which laid down rules on credit agreements for consumers, the member 
states were under the obligation to provide for effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive penalties to ensure compliance with the directive’s provisions. 
These provisions included the norm that ‘before the conclusion of a credit 
agreement the creditor must assess the consumer’s creditworthiness, where 
necessary on the basis of a consultation of the relevant database’.499 The 
dispute which had given rise to the request for this preliminary ruling 
centered around a contract between Mr. Kalhan and LCL for a personal 
loan to be obtained by Mr. Kalhan from LCL. The next year, the monthly 
repayments ceased. Subsequently, LCL requested the French court order 
Mr Kalhan to pay to it the remaining sum with interest. LCL, however, in 
contravention of French law, had failed to consult the national register to 
assess Mr. Kalhan’s creditworthiness. Under the French Consumer Code, 
this failure was punished by the forfeiture of the entitlement to interest. 
However, this only applied to contractual interest; in accordance with 
the French Civil Code, the interest remained payable at a statutory rate. 
Moreover, French case law had established that the statutory rate had to 
be increased by five percentage points if the borrower would not repay his 
debt in full within a period of two months after the decision of the court 
would have become enforceable. As the statutory interest rate, increased by 
five percentage points, was higher than the contractual interest, the applica-
tion of the French legal provisions on the forfeiture of entitlement to interest 
seemed to be advantageous to the creditor who would disregard, as in the 
present case, his obligation to establish the consumer’s creditworthiness by 
consulting the national register.500 Thus, the question was whether article 23 
497 CJEU, Asociaţia Accept (n 495) par. 62-73.
498 CJEU, Chmielewski (n 493) par. 23; CJEU, LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais, case C-565/12, judgment 
of 27 March 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:190, par. 45; CJEU, Asociaţia Accept (n 495) par. 63.
499 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on 
credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (OJ 2008, 
L 133) artt 23 and 8, fi rst paragraph.
500 CJEU, LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais (n 498) par. 14-24.
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of the directive precluded the existence of the punitive regime for a credi-
tor’s failure to ascertain the creditworthiness of the consumer, prescribed by 
French law.501
In the view of the CJEU, in order to investigate the genuinely dissuasive 
nature of the penalty, the referring French judge should make a comparison 
between the amounts which the creditor would have received by way of 
repayment of the loan if it had complied with its obligation to assess, the 
consumer’s creditworthiness, and the amounts which it would receive if 
the penalty for the breach were applied. In making this comparison, the 
CJEU should take into consideration all the circumstances and all the conse-
quences that flow from the breach.502 It held:
‘If, after carrying out the abovementioned comparison, the referring court were to con-
clude that, in the dispute before it, the application of the penalty of forfeiture of entitlement 
to contractual interest is liable to confer an advantage on the creditor, since the amounts 
which it forfeits are less than those resulting from the application of interest at the 
increased statutory rate, it would follow that, clearly, the system of penalties at issue in the 
main proceedings does not ensure that the penalty incurred is genuinely dissuasive. More-
over, the penalty of forfeiture of entitlement to contractual interest cannot be regarded, 
more generally, as being genuinely deterrent if the referring court were to find that the 
amounts which the creditor is likely to receive following the application of that penalty are 
not significantly less than those which that creditor could have received had it complied 
with that obligation. If the penalty of forfeiture of entitlement to interest is weakened, or 
even entirely undermined, by reason of the fact that the application of interest at the 
increased statutory rate is liable to offset the effects of such a penalty, it necessarily follows 
that that penalty is not genuinely dissuasive.’503
As may be derived from the CJEU’s decision, the assessment of the genu-
inely dissuasive character of a penalty will consist of two steps. First, a 
comparison has to be made between the benefits that the breaching party 
would enjoy, had it complied with its obligation, and the benefits for the 
breaching party that arise out of the established violation. Second, the 
outcome of this comparison has to be evaluated. If it appears that the 
breaching party suffers only a minor disadvantage from its actions, or, as 
in Le Crédit Lyonnais, if the violation is even beneficial to the violating party, 
the imposed penalty does not meet the criterion of dissuasiveness. In other 
words, for a penalty to be considered genuinely dissuasive, it must inflict 
significant harm to the non-compliant party.
The requirement of proportionality of sanctions demands that penalties 
do not go further than is necessary for the attainment of the legislation’s 
pursued objective.504 In order to determine whether the available sanctions 
501 Ibid, par. 30.
502 Ibid, par. 50.
503 Ibid, par. 51-53.
504 CJEU, Ecotrade, joined cases C-95/07 and C-96/07, judgment of 8 May 2008, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:267, par. 65-67; CJEU, EMS-Bulgaria Transport, case C-284/11, judgment 
of 12 July 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:458, par. 67; CJEU, Rēdlihs (n 493) par. 45-47. 
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meet the standard of proportionality, the nature and the degree of serious-
ness of the infringement which that penalty seeks to sanction, have to be 
taken into account.505 Moreover, when there is a choice between several 
appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous.506
In the case law of the CJEU, the reference to the principle of proportion-
ality seems to be closely connected to the protection of the free movement 
of goods, services and persons with the common European market, as it has 
held that:
‘[a]dministrative or punitive measures must not go beyond what is necessary for the objec-
tives pursued and a penalty must not be so disproportionate to the gravity of the infringe-
ment that it becomes an obstacle to the freedoms enshrined in the [treaties]’.507
While this reference may serve as a reminder that the effective enforcement 
of national implementing legislation may not pose threat to the legitimate 
free movement of goods, services and persons, the CJEU has until now 
not engaged in a separate application of this test. Thus, it seems to hold 
the view that enforcement of a disproportionate nature will automatically 
create an ‘obstacle to the freedoms enshrined in the treaties’.
The power to impose penalties in response to infringements of the 
implementing legislation should also, as appears from the above-cited state-
ment of the CJEU, be exercised in accordance with European Union law and 
its general principles. What does this, in addition to the applicability of the 
principle of proportionality, entail?
It is evident under current EU law that the applicable human rights 
norms, as embodied in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFR) 
and the ECHR, should be observed by the EU member states.508 Pursuant 
to article 51, first paragraph, CFR, its provisions are addressed to the […]
member states only when they are implementing Union law. In Åkerberg 
Fransson, it became clear how the CFR’s provisions could affect imple-
menting measures adopted by member states.509 Article 22 of directive 
77/388/EEC on taxes provided that ‘Member States may impose other obli-
505 Ibid.
506 CJEU, Fedesa, case C-331/88, judgment of 13 November 1990, ECLI:EU:C:1990:391, par. 
13; CJEU, Crispoltoni, joined cases C-133/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93, judgment of 5 
October 1990, ECLI:EU:C:1994:364, par. 41; CJEU, Azienda Agro-Zootecnica Franchini Sarl 
and Eolica di Altamura Srl (n 468) par. 73.
507 CJEU, Ntionik and Pikoulas (n 493) par. 54; CJEU, Commission v Greece, case C-210/91, 
judgment of 16 December 1992, ECLI:EU:C:1992:525, par. 20; CJEU, Casati, case C-203/80, 
judgment of 11 November 1981, ECLI:EU:C:1981:261, par. 27.
508 Article 6, fi rst paragraph, TEU, provides that ‘[t]he Union recognises the rights, freedoms 
and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union […] 
which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties’. Moreover, pursuant to article 6, 
third paragraph, ‘[f]undamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms shall constitute general 
principles of the Union’s law’.
509 CJEU, Åkerberg Fransson (n 494).
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gations which they deem necessary for the correct collection of the tax and 
for the prevention of evasion’, which had been implemented in Swedish 
law on tax evasion and tax assessment.510 Mr. Åkerberg Fransson, a Swedish 
national, was accused of providing false information to the Swedish tax 
authority, which resulted in a loss of revenue linked to the levying of 
income tax and value added tax. He was also prosecuted for failing to 
declare employers’ contributions, which exposed the social security bodies 
to a loss of revenue.511 In response to these alleged violations of national 
law, the Swedish tax authority ordered Mr. Åkerberg Fransson to pay a 
surcharge, including interest, in addition to the tax sums that he, illegiti-
mately, had withheld from the tax authority and the social security bodies. 
Two years later, criminal proceedings were instituted against Mr. Åkerberg 
Fransson as well. The Swedish judge, before whom the case was brought, 
was confronted with the question as to whether the charges brought against 
Mr. Åkerberg Fransson must be dismissed on the ground that a tax penalty 
has already been imposed upon him for the same acts of providing false 
information: the principle of ne bis in idem, as codified in article 50 CFR.512
The application of this principle would indeed preclude the possibility of a 
criminal conviction for the acts committed by Mr. Åkerberg Fransson, the 
CJEU held, if the penalties imposed by the Swedish tax authority were of 
a criminal nature.513 In the present case, this was a matter of the national 
authorities to decide. However, what is important here, is that national 
implementing legislation, including domestic laws that provide for penal-
ties, should be applied in accordance with human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, included in the CFR and the ECHR.514
Furthermore, the ‘principle of equivalence’ has to be taken into account 
by member states during the enforcement of national implementing legisla-
tion. This principle prescribes that the domestic norms pertaining to the 
510 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws 
of the Member States relating to turnover taxes - Common system of value added tax: 
uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977, L 145) art 22.
511 CJEU, Åkerberg Fransson (n 494) par. 12.
512 Article 50 of the Charter provides: ‘No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in 
criminal proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already been fi nally acquitted 
or convicted within the Union in accordance with the law.’
513 In the view of the Court, the penalties chosen by the member states may ‘take the form 
of administrative penalties, criminal penalties or a combination of the two. It is only if 
the tax penalty is criminal in nature for the purposes of Article 50 of the Charter and has 
become fi nal that that provision precludes criminal proceedings in respect of the same 
acts from being brought against the same person.’ CJEU, Åkerberg Fransson (n 494) par. 34.
514 In other words, in Åkerberg Fransson the Court seemed to place human rights that fl ow 
from the Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights on an equal footing 
with ‘other’ general principles of European law, such as the proportionality principle. 
See B. van Bockel and P. Wattel, ‘New  wine into  old  wineskins: the scope of the Charter 
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enforcement of a directive, where the adoption of those norms falls within 
the member states’ freedom to choose the appropriate form and method 
of achieving the aims set out in a directive, must not be less favourable 
than those governing similar domestic situations.515 In order to make an 
assessment of this similarity, it has to be ascertained whether the actions 
(based on EU law and on national law respectively) are ‘similar as regards 
their purpose, cause of action and essential characteristics’.516 Moreover, 
the determination as to whether a national procedural provision is less 
favourable, entails that the national court must take account of ‘the role of 
that provision in the procedure, viewed as a whole, of the conduct of that 
procedure and of its special features’.517
In this way, the implementation of a directive may not only achieve the 
aim of harmonisation within Europe, but could also result in harmonisation 
of enforcement procedures within each member state. Of course, whether 
this internal harmonisation will indeed occur, depends on the willingness 
of the member state; it cannot be derived from the principle of equivalence 
itself as the principle cannot be applied in a situation which does not fall 
within the scope of EU law.518
An illustration of the application of the principle of equivalence in 
practice can be found in VALE Építési. VALE Costruzioni was an Italian 
construction firm which had moved its seat and business activities to 
Hungary, where it established VALE Építési and submitted a request for 
registration in the commercial register in accordance with Hungarian law. 
In the application, the representative stated that VALE Costruzioni was the 
predecessor in law to VALE Építési. The application was rejected on the 
basis of the argument that a company which was not Hungarian could not 
be listed as a predecessor in law. Neither could VALE Építési’s intentions 
be regarded as a conversion under Hungarian law, as a result of which the 
firm would be considered Hungarian for the purpose of registration in 
the commercial register, since national law on conversions applied only to 
domestic situations.519 In its decision on the legitimacy of the Hungarian 
authorities’ decline of the request, the CJEU expressly referred to the prin-
ciple of equivalence, and stated:
515 CJEU, Adeneler and others (n 297) par. 95; CJEU, Peterbroeck, case C-312/93, judgment of 14 
December 1995, ECLI:EU:C:1995:437, par. 12; CJEU, Rewe, case C-33/76, judgment of 16 
December 1976, ECLI:EU:C:1976:188, par. 5-6.
516 CJEU, Érsekcsanádi Mezőgazdasági, case C-56/13, judgment of 22 May 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:352, par. 67; CJEU, Agrokonsulting-04, case C-93/12, judgment of 27 June 
2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:432, par. 39. 
517 CJEU, Rosado Santana (n 297) par. 90.
518 CJEU, Érsekcsanádi Mezőgazdasági (n 516) par. 63.
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‘[i]n the context of a domestic conversion, if the legislation of a Member State requires strict 
legal and economic continuity between the predecessor company which applied to be con-
verted and the converted successor company, such a requirement may also be imposed in 
the context of a cross-border conversion. However, the refusal by the authorities of a Mem-
ber State, in relation to a cross-border conversion, to record in the commercial register the 
company of the Member State of origin as the ‘predecessor in law’ to the converted com-
pany is not compatible with the  principle of equivalence if, in relation to the registration of 
domestic conversions, such a record is made of the predecessor company. […] Consequent-
ly, the refusal to record VALE Costruzioni in the Hungarian commercial register as the 
‘predecessor in law’ is incompatible with the  principle of equivalence’.520
Finally, we could refer to the ‘principle of effectiveness’ in the way it has 
been recognised in the CJEU’s case law.521 It is both a (complementary) 
source of the obligation of member states to adopt all measures necessary to 
ensure the full application of EU legislation, as we have seen in section 3.4.2, 
and a limitation on the fulfilment of that obligation. This limitation flows 
from the requirement that national implementing legislation should not 
‘render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights 
conferred by Community law’.522 It must be emphasised that this principle 
concerns the effectiveness of other EU rights and obligations than the provi-
sions flowing from the directive that is to be implemented. Therefore, the 
applicability of the principle of effectiveness may be viewed as a tool to 
ensure the internal coherence and the full application of EU law and of 
national law by which it has become part of the legal orders of the member 
states.
In order to determine whether a national procedural provision makes 
the application of EU law impossible or excessively difficult, it should be 
analysed:
‘by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its special fea-
tures, viewed as a whole, before the various national bodies. In that context, it is necessary 
to take into consideration, where relevant, the principles which lie at the basis of the 
national legal system, such as the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of 
legal certainty and the proper conduct of the proceedings’.523
520 Ibid, par. 55-57.
521 The principles of equivalence and effectiveness are often referred to simultaneously, 
to emphasise the rights of defence to which an individual is entitled under European 
law. See, for example, CJEU, Kamino International Logistics BV and Datema Hellmann 
Worldwide Logistics, joined cases C-129/13 and C-130/13, judgment of 3 July 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2041, par. 82; CJEU, Kušionová, case C-34/13, judgment of 10 September 
2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2189, par. 50; CJEU, Boudjlida, case C-249/13, judgment of 11 
December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2431, par. 42; CJEU, Mukarubega, case C-166/13, judg-
ment of 5 November 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2336, par. 52.
522 CJEU, Adeneler and others (n 297) par. 95.
523 CJEU, Pohotovosť, case C-470/12, judgment of 27 February 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:101, 
par. 51; CJEU, Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García, case C-169/14, judgment of 17 July 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099, par. 34; CJEU, Surgicare, case C-662/13, judgment of 12 February 
2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:89, par. 28; CJEU, Agrokonsulting-04 (n 516) par. 48; CJEU, Rosado 
Santana (n 297) par. 92.
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The application of this test has led the CJEU to conclude that, for instance, 
domestic legislation which lays down reasonable time-limits for bringing 
proceedings does not constitute a violation of the principle of effective-
ness.524
5.1.3 Overview
The preceding sections provide a broad overview of the existing normative 
framework, derived from EU law, that is applicable to national legislation 
that implement EU directives. It has been argued that, although member 
states possess the freedom to choose ‘form and methods’ of implementa-
tion, this freedom is restricted in numerous ways. These restrictions, which 
relate to both the implementing legislation and its enforcement and applica-
tion in practice, could be summarised as follows.
With regard to the transposition of the directive, states are under the 
obligation to perform this act in due time, i.e. before the expiration of the 
transposition period. Furthermore, to serve the purpose of legal certainty, 
domestic implementing legislation should not only have ‘unquestionable 
binding force’, but should also meet the criteria of ‘specificity, precision and 
clarity’. From the moment on which the adopted implementing legislation 
enters into force, member states have the duty to ‘effectively apply and 
enforce in practice’ the domestic implementing legislation. This entails 
the imposition of ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ penalties in 
case of breaches of the national implementing legislation. Finally, member 
states should respect ‘European Union law and its general principles’, 
which comprises principles pertaining to human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. In order to 
respect these standards set out by the CJEU, member states will have to take 
measures in their domestic legal orders. These measures will often include 
the adoption of legislation. Thus, this section has demonstrated that, in 
most cases, not only will the act of transposition itself require the adoption 
of domestic legislation, but also the application and enforcement of that 
legislation in practice.
524 CJEU, Deutsche Telekom, case C-262/06, judgment of 22 November 2007, 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:703, par. 56; CJEU, Starjakob, case C-417/13, judgment of 28 January 
2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:38, par. 62; CJEU, Specht, joined cases C-501/12 to C-506/12, 
C-540/12 and C-541/12, judgment of 19 June 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2005, par. 114; CJEU, 
Pohl, case C-429/12, judgment of 16 January 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:12, par. 29.
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5.2 Implementation of regulations of the European Union
The legislative acts of the EU include another important instrument: regula-
tions. Regulations and directives have a fundamentally different nature. 
Article 288, second paragraph, TFEU, provides that ‘[a] regulation shall 
have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States’. Thus in general regulations, in contrast 
to directives, do not require the adoption of domestic implementing 
legislation;525 they can be applied from the moment they enter into force.526
This raises the question why they should be discussed in a study on 
implementing legislation at all. The answer is that the CJEU has advanced 
some guidance as to how EU regulations and domestic legislation relate to 
each other and how they should be reconciled whenever they concur. The 
relevant case law contains some hints about the legislative standards that 
should be met by the EU member states. Therefore, EU regulations should 
be part of our analysis.
First of all, it must be emphasised that the norms that circumscribe the 
implementation of EU directives by member states to a certain extent also 
apply to EU regulations. For example, member states are under the duty 
to ensure a regulation’s ‘effective application and enforcement in practice’, 
similar to the identical obligation in relation to directives, as was discussed 
in section 5.1.2.4. Although the CJEU has so far not made express statements 
to this effect, there seems to be no reason to assume that it will justifiably 
deviate from the case law it has produced on the implementation of direc-
tives.
There is, however, one additional standard that applies exclusively to 
regulations. This exclusivity can be explained by the direct applicability of 
the instrument, as we have seen above. According to the CJEU, the adop-
tion of a regulation by the EU ‘precludes in principle the Member States 
from adopting or maintaining national provisions in parallel’.527 Similarly, 
the CJEU has stated that member states must not ‘impede the direct effect 
of regulations’528 or ‘[take] steps which are intended to alter the scope of 
525 P. Craig and G. De Búrca, EU Law. Text, cases, and materials (6th edn OUP, Oxford 2015) 107.
526 There are exceptions to this general rule, as regulations often impose obligations upon 
member states to take action, which may include the adoption of legislative measures. 
For example, article 94, fi rst paragraph, fi rst sentence, of Regulation 536/2014/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on clinical trials on medicinal 
products for human use, and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC (Offi cial Journal of the 
European Union 2014, L 158) provides: ‘Member States shall lay down rules on penalties 
applicable to infringements of this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to 
ensure that they are implemented’. 
527 CJEU, Stichting Al-Aqsa, joined cases C-539/10 P and C-550/10, judgment of 15 Novem -
ber 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:711, par. 85.
528 CJEU, Zerbone, case C-94/77, judgment of 31 January 1978, ECLI:EU:C:1978:17, par. 24.
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the regulation itself’529. This means that the adoption of national legislative 
measures is only permitted where such measures are expressly allowed 
or required under the applicable regulation, interpreted in the light of its 
objectives.530
In other words, situations in which domestic law and EU law concur 
or contradict each other should be avoided; where EU law advances, 
applicable domestic laws should be repealed. This is a direct consequence 
of the transfer of powers from the national level to the EU level, or, as the 
CJEU put it in Bollmann and Waren-Import-Gesellschaft Krohn: ‘to the extent 
to which Member States have transferred legislative powers [to the EU] 
[…] they no longer have the powers to adopt legislative provisions in this 
field’.531
Why should the parallel existence of domestic legislation be avoided? 
Since Costa v. Enel, as we have seen above, EU law has intrinsic priority over 
the domestic laws of the member states. In relation to EU regulations, this 
point was emphasised in Variola, in which the Court stated that:
‘the direct application of a regulation means that its entry into force and its application in 
favour of or against those subject to it are independent of any measure of reception into 
national law’.532
Arguably, the parallel existence of an EU regulation and domestic legisla-
tion is not problematic at all; due to the prevalence of EU law over domestic 
law, it is clear that any legal question that falls within the scope of the regu-
lation, should be answered on the basis of that regulation. In such cases any 
relevant domestic law should remain without application. It is not relevant 
whether the domestic law at hand expressly reproduces, or deviates from 
the EU regulation, even though in the latter case an additional problem will 
often be found in the fact that member states are no longer competent to 
legislate on the subject matter at hand. Although in cases of concurrence of 
EU regulations and domestic legislation there may thus not be a problem in 
the sense that the application of the regulation will be jeopardised, the CJEU 
529 CJEU, Hauptzollamt Hamburg v Bollmann, case C-40/69, judgment of 18 February 1970, 
ECLI:EU:C:1970:12, par. 4; CJEU, Stichting Al-Aqsa (n 527) par. 85.
530 For instance CJEU, Danske Svineproducenter, case C-316/10, judgment of 21 December 
2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:863, par. 43.
531 CJEU, Hauptzollamt Hamburg v Bollmann (n 529) par. 4; CJEU, Hauptzollambt Bremen, case 
C-74/69, judgment of 18 June 1970, ECLI:EU:C:1970:58, par. 4.
532 CJEU, Variola, case C-34/73, judgment of 10 October 1973, ECLI:EU:C:1973:101, par. 
10. Similarly, the Court has stated that ‘[b]y virtue of the very nature of regulations and 
of their function in the sources of Community law, the provisions of those regulations 
generally have immediate effect in the national legal systems without its being necessary 
for the national authorities to adopt measures of application.’ CJEU, Handlbauer, case
C-278/02, judgment of 24 June 2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:388, par. 25; CJEU, Danske Svinepro-
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expressly prohibits the existence of parallel domestic legislation. This prohi-
bition must, therefore, be based on other considerations than considerations 
of a strictly legal nature. On several occasions the CJEU has indicated what 
these considerations might be. As a further specification of the prohibition 
the enact parallel domestic legislation, which was discussed above, the 
CJEU has maintained the view that:
‘[…] Member States must not adopt or allow national institutions with legislative power to 
adopt a measure by which the Community nature of a legal rule and the consequences 
which arise from it are concealed from the persons concerned.’533
This statement suggests that the CJEU considers it important that the 
persons concerned are aware of the origin, either EU or domestic, of the 
applicable norm. The relevance of the norm’s origin was referred to by 
Advocate General Tizzano, who was confronted with the question whether 
member states in the particular case at hand were at liberty to assume inter-
national obligations with regard to subjects that fell within the scope of the 
EU’s competences, even if those obligations were perfectly in accordance 
with the applicable EU legislation. Advocate General Tizzano answered this 
question in the negative and added that member states may not conclude 
international agreements, in matters covered by EU legislation, ‘even if the 
texts of the agreements reproduce the common rules verbatim or incorpo-
rate them by reference’.534 This view was based on the assessment that such 
incorporation of EU rules into international agreements which member 
states conclude with third countries would prejudice the uniform applica-
tion of EU law, as it:
‘would have the effect of distorting the nature and legal regime of the common rules, and 
entail a real and serious risk that they would be removed from review by the Court under 
the Treaty’.535
Of course, the incorporation of EU rules into international agreements with 
third countries on the one hand, and the adoption of domestic legislation 
in concurrence with an EU regulation on the other hand, are distinct situa-
tions. Nonetheless, Advocate General Tizzano identifies an element which 
is relevant in both situations: the jurisdiction of the CJEU. This point had 
been made by the CJEU itself in Variola, when it was recalled that ‘the juris-
diction of the Court is unaffected by any provisions of national legislation 
which purport to convert a rule of Community law into national law’.536
533 CJEU, Zerbone (n 528) par. 26; CJEU, Variola (n 532) par. 11; CJEU, Stichting Al-Aqsa (n 527) 
par. 87.
534 CJEU, Commission v United Kingdom, case C-466/98, Opinion of Advocate General 
Tizzano of 31 January 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:63, par. 72.
535 Ibid.
536 CJEU, Variola (n 532) par. 11.
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It is thus suggested that the existence of domestic legislation parallel 
to a regulation may conceal the origin, either EU or domestic, of the appli-
cable norm. This contains the risk that the subjects to which the norm is 
addressed, will not be aware of the mechanisms that are in place to enforce 
the rights to which they are entitled under EU law. These mechanisms 
primarily entail the possibility to institute proceedings against a member 
state before national courts.537 As part of the proceedings, national courts 
may request the CJEU to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of 
EU law pursuant to article 267 TFEU.
If we return to the CJEU’s statement in Zerbone, cited above, it seems 
plausible to maintain that the simultaneous application of domestic legisla-
tion and an EU regulation should be avoided, since it may obfuscate the fact 
that ultimately any legal question that falls within the scope of the regula-
tion is subject to the CJEU’s review. Such ambiguity, in turn, may jeopardise 
the uniform application of EU law.
537 In addition to the enforcement through national courts, article 263, fourth paragraph, 
TFEU, provides that ‘[a]ny natural or legal person may […] institute proceedings against 
[…] a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing 
measures’. However, the Court has ruled that the term ‘regulatory act’ does not encom-
pass legislative acts such as regulations. CJEU, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, case C-583/11, 





6 Legislative standards as part of 
international criminal law
6.1 Implementation of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime
6.1.1 General
In contrast to the international legal regimes discussed above, which 
are mostly of European origin, the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime (CTOC) has truly global aspirations. It 
has been negotiated in response to growing concerns about the effects of 
transnational organised crime, which urged the UNGA to adopt a resolu-
tion which in 1998 called for the establishment of an intergovernmental ad 
hoc committee for the purpose of elaborating a comprehensive international 
convention in order to combat transnational organised crime.538 Over the 
course of almost two years, the ad hoc committee had drafted a Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime and two supplementary Protocols, 
which were adopted by the UNGA in late 2000.539 The protocols included 
the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, and the Protocol against the Smuggling 
of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.540 The instruments were opened for 
sig nature in December 2000.541 Today 189 states are party to the CTOC, 
which entered into force on 29 September 2003.542 It has been complemented 
with another protocol: the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition.543
538 UNGA res 53/111 (9 December 1998) UN Doc A/RES/53/111, par. 10.
539 UNGA res 55/25 (15 November 2000) UN Doc A/RES/55/25, par 2. 
540 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children (adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 25 December 2003) 2237 
UNTS 319; Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (adopted 15 
November 2000, entered into force 28 January 2004) 2241 UNTS 207.
541 UNGA res 55/25 (n 539) par 2.
542 In accordance with article 38 of the Convention, which prescribes the entry into force 
on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit of the fortieth instrument of ratifi cation, 
approval or accession. The protocols entered into force on 25 December 2003 and 28 
January 2004, respectively.
543 The protocol was adopted by the General Assembly in 2001 and entered into force in 
2005. UNGA res 55/25 (n 539) par. 2.
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6.1.2 Content of the Convention
The purpose of the CTOC is ‘to promote cooperation to prevent and combat 
transnational organized crime more effectively’.544 It is applicable to certain 
specified crimes, if they have been committed by an organised criminal 
group and if they are ‘transnational’ in nature, i.e. which affect more than 
one state.545 They include conduct that constitutes an offence punishable by 
a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious 
penalty, the participation in an organised criminal group, the laundering of 
the proceeds of crime, corruption and the obstruction of justice.546 One of 
the central obligations of the CTOC is to adopt such legislative and other 
measures as may be necessary to establish these and related acts as criminal 
offences, when committed intentionally.547 Furthermore, states must 
establish jurisdiction over these crimes, and perpetrators must be liable to 
proportionate sanctions.548 Also, article 12 CTOC imposes the duty to adopt 
measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of proceeds of crime 
derived from offences covered by the CTOC and of property, equipment 
or other instrumentalities used in or destined for use in those offences.549
Other provisions relate to, among other subjects, international cooperation, 
including extradition and the transfer of sentenced persons or of criminal 
proceedings, to the protection of witnesses and to the prevention of transna-
tional organised crime.550
In addition to these obligations, which are broad in nature as they apply 
to several crimes enumerated in the CTOC, state parties have the duty to 
take certain measures in response to certain specified crimes in particular. 
One of them is money laundering. The applicable duties encompass the 
obligation to ‘institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and super-
visory regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions […] in order 
to deter and detect all forms of money-laundering, which regime shall 
emphasise requirements for customer identification, record-keeping and 
the reporting of suspicious transactions’ and the obligation to ensure that 
‘administrative, regulatory, law enforcement and other authorities dedi-
cated to combating money-laundering […] have the ability to cooperate and 
exchange information at the national and international levels […]’.551 As a 
means to fight corruption, states that are bound by the CTOC shall ‘to the 
544 Art 1.
545 Art 3. Pursuant to the second paragraph, the ‘transnational’ character of the crimes 
can refer to the place where the crime is committed, prepared, planned, directed or 
controlled, the place where its effects materialise and the place where the involved organ-
ised criminal group is active.
546 Artt 2, sub b, 5, 6, 8 and 23.
547 Artt 2, sub b, 5, 6, 8 and 23.
548 Artt 15 and 11, fi rst paragraph.
549 Art 12, fi rst paragraph.
550 Artt 16, 17, 21, 24 and 31. 
551 Art 7, fi rst paragraph, sub a and b.
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extent appropriate and consistent with [their] legal system, adopt legisla-
tive, administrative or other effective measures to promote integrity and to 
prevent, detect and punish the corruption of public officials’ and to ‘take 
measures to ensure effective action by [their] authorities in the prevention, 
detection and punishment of the corruption of public officials, including 
providing such authorities with adequate independence to deter the exer-
tion of inappropriate influence on their actions’.552
Finally, the CTOC contains what may be considered the core obligation, 
laid down in article 34, first paragraph, to take ‘the necessary measures, 
including legislative and administrative measures, in accordance with 
fundamental principles of its domestic law, to ensure the implementation of 
its obligations under this Convention’.553
This brief overview of the content of the CTOC makes clear that the 
adoption of national measures, including legislation, is indispensable for 
states that wish to comply with its provisions. In order to attain the objec-
tives of Part II of the present study, it is necessary to examine the legislative 
standards that should be taken into account by the states party to the CTOC. 
Two types of sources may provide insight into these standards: the CTOC 
itself and the Legislative Guide, which was compiled by experts, international 
institutions and government representatives in order to assist states seeking 
to ratify or implement the CTOC.554 These standards will be discussed in 
the following section.
6.1.3 Legislative standards
6.1.3.1 Implementation, effectiveness and harmonisation
It is evident from the convention’s provisions that states have a duty to adopt 
all domestic measures, including legislation, that are required for the imple-
mentation of the CTOC. This follows from the ‘core obligation’ entrenched in 
article 34, first paragraph, cited above. Compliance with this obligation must 
be understood as a necessary precondition for the attainment of the CTOC’s 
aim: to promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organised 
crime more effectively.555 Thus, the duty to ensure the implementation of 
the CTOC is closely related to the treaty’s effectiveness. Whereas article 34, 
first paragraph, applies to the CTOC as a whole, various other CTOC norms 
impose a similar obligation to adopt domestic measures in relation to the 
attainment of a specified policy aim. Examples of the policy aims include the 
detection and deterrence of all forms of money-laundering, the prevention, 
552 Art 9, fi rst and second paragraph.
553 Art 34, fi rst paragraph.
554 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Legislative Guide for the implementation of the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and the Protocols Thereto (United 




134 Part II The regulation of implementing legislation under selected international legal regimes:
 legislative standards
detection and punishment of the corruption of public officials, the maximisa-
tion of the effectiveness of law enforcement measures, and the identifica-
tion, tracing, freezing or seizure of proceeds of crime.556 From this it may 
be derived that the effectiveness of domestic implementing measures is a 
prerequisite for state compliance with the treaty.557
A notion which is closely related to the CTOC’s implementation and 
effectiveness is the objective of harmonisation, which is considered an 
‘indispensable component of a concerted, global strategy against serious 
crime’.558 The central role attributed to this concept comes to the surface in 
several parts of the CTOC. Pursuant to article 34, third paragraph, CTOC, 
‘[e]ach State Party may adopt more strict or severe measures than those 
provided for by this Convention […]’. It thus imposes minimum standards 
of implementation, which ensure the harmonisation of domestic measures 
along the lines laid down in the CTOC. In addition to the imperative obliga-
tions included in the CTOC, it encourages harmonisation of domestic poli-
cies through the inclusion of optional measures. An example can be found 
in article 17, which stipulates that:
‘States Parties may consider entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrange-
ments on the transfer to their territory of persons sentenced to imprisonment or other 
forms of deprivation of liberty for offences covered by this Convention, in order that they 
may complete their sentences there’.
Even where the CTOC prescribes compulsory minimum standards for the 
prevention and combating of transnational organised crime, it is noted that 
domestic authorities may be responsible for the formulation of the particu-
lars of the envisaged measures. Article 7, first paragraph, sub a, for instance, 
provides that states are required to establish a domestic regulatory and 
supervisory regime within their competence in order to deter and detect 
money-laundering activities. In the Legislative Guide it is submitted that:
‘[t]his regime must be comprehensive, but the precise nature and particular elements of the 
regime are left to States, provided that they require at a minimum banks and non-bank 
financial institutions to ensure: (a) Effective customer identification; (b) Accurate record-
keeping; (c) A mechanism for the reporting of suspicious transactions.’559
Another feature of the notion of harmonisation applies to the language 
used in domestic implementing measures. There is some ambivalence in 
556 Artt 7, fi rst paragraph, sub a, 9, fi rst paragraph, 11, second paragraph, and 12, second 
paragraph.
557 In the Legislative Guide (p. 9) it is noted that ‘[t]hese general provisions and requirements 
must be clearly understood by legislative drafters and policy makers and care must be 
taken to incorporate them when preparing legislation to implement the specifi c articles 
concerned. Otherwise, the implementing measure could be out of compliance with the 
requirements of the Convention’.
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the approach taken by the CTOC’s drafters in this regard. On the one hand, 
it is noted that ‘close conformity [to the CTOC’s terminology] is desirable, 
for example to simplify extradition proceedings’.560 On the other hand, it is
‘[…] recommended that drafters check for consistency with other offences, definitions and 
legislative uses before relying on formulations or terminology contained in the Conven-
tion. The Convention was drafted for general purposes and is addressed to national Gov-
ernments. Thus, the level of abstraction is higher than that necessary for domestic legisla-
tion. Drafters should therefore be careful not to incorporate parts of the text verbatim, but 
are encouraged to adopt the spirit and meaning of the various articles.’561
In other words, state parties to the CTOC are expressly invited to ensure 
that their domestic implementing legislation corresponds to their domestic 
legal tradition, even if this tradition deviates from the language used in the 
CTOC. ‘This’, it is argued, ‘avoids the risk of conflicts and uncertainty about 
the interpretation of the new provisions by courts and judges’.562
In sum, the implementation and effectiveness of the CTOC, and the 
harmonisation which it pursues, are closely related. The harmonisation 
of domestic implementing measures leads to a certain complementarity 
between the CTOC on the one hand, and domestic legislation enacted by 
state parties on the other hand, in several respects. First, the CTOC contains 
minimum standards which encompass both imperative and optional provi-
sions, as a result of which states may go beyond the CTOC requirements in 
their efforts to prevent and combat transnational organised crime. Second, 
domestic (legislative) authorities may be responsible for the elaboration 
on the domestic level of CTOC obligations which are formulated in broad 
terms. Third, the CTOC relies to a significant extent on legal terms and 
concepts that are in use in the jurisdictions of the state parties; it does not 
require the verbatim transposition of the terms and concepts used in the 
CTOC.
6.1.3.2 Observance of applicable international and national law
Furthermore, states must ensure that the national measures, including legis-
lation, which they undertake to implement the CTOC, do not contravene 
other norms to which the state authorities are bound. These norms may 
encompass both norms of national and of international legal origin.
560 Ibid, 10. The importance of the domestic legal context may not only be inferred from 
the Legislative Guide, but is also codifi ed in the Convention itself. Article 11, sixth para-
graph, provides: ‘Nothing contained in this Convention shall affect the principle that the 
description of the offences established in accordance with this Convention and of the 
applicable legal defences or other legal principles controlling the lawfulness of conduct 
is reserved to the domestic law of a State Party and that such offences shall be prosecuted 
and punished in accordance with that law’.
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The former category comprises what has been termed ‘fundamental 
principles of domestic law’, which states must take into account when they 
adopt national implementing measures.563 It emphasises that the harmoni-
sation anticipated by the CTOC has legal limits. The phrase ‘fundamental 
principles of domestic law’ was proposed in the early stages of the nego-
tiation process and its incorporation has remained largely uncontroversial 
until the adoption of the final text.564 The justification for its inclusion in the 
treaty may be found in the desire to prevent domestic implementing legisla-
tion from ‘becoming a dead letter, or challenged as unconstitutional’.565
In the context of the general treaty obligation to ensure the CTOC’s 
effective implementation, entrenched in article 34, first paragraph, it is 
difficult to identify the specific domestic legal principles which the drafters 
had in mind. However, other articles may provide some clarification. An 
example may be found in article 26, third paragraph, which provides that:
‘[e]ach State Party shall consider providing for the possibility, in accordance with funda-
mental principles of its domestic law, of granting immunity from prosecution to a person 
who provides substantial cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of an offence 
covered by this Convention’.
In this particular context, the reference to national legal principles was 
perceived necessary to accommodate the diversity in national policies 
applicable to the granting of immunity to alleged offenders who cooperate 
with national authorities. For this reason, it is noted in the Legislative Guide
that ‘the specific steps to be taken are left to the discretion of States, which 
are asked, but not obliged, to adopt immunity or leniency provisions’.566
While other provisions have a more compulsory character, they may 
similarly refer to boundaries laid down by domestic law. Article 16, first 
paragraph, as an example, which provides for norms on extradition, 
demands that ‘the offence for which extradition is sought is punishable 
under the domestic law of both the requesting State Party and the requested 
State Party’. Furthermore, article 16, seventh paragraph, stipulates that ‘[e]
xtradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the domestic 
law of the requested State Party […] including, inter alia, conditions in rela-
563 Art 34, fi rst paragraph.
564 It was included in the early draft of the Convention, although this early proposal referred 
to ‘fundamental provisions of […] domestic legislative systems’. Ad Hoc Committee on 
the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, ‘Draft United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime’ (1st session, Vienna, 19-29 
January 1999) (15 December 1998) UN Doc A/AC.254/4, 1. 
565 UNODC, Legislative Guides (n 554) 10.
566 Ibid, 165. Similar argumentation may be applicable to, among other provisions, article 6, 
fi rst paragraph, sub b, sub i, and article 10, second paragraph, which refer to the ‘basic 
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tion to the minimum penalty requirement for extradition and the grounds 
upon which the requested State Party may refuse extradition’.567
Thus, it seems that the reference to fundamental principles of domestic 
law, as included in several provisions of the CTOC, is a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, its objective is to ensure the effectiveness of the 
CTOC itself as it dissuades state parties from adopting national imple-
menting legislation that, as a result of contravention of domestic laws or 
principles of higher rank, will remain without legal force. On the other 
hand, it serves to protect the sovereignty of states, since it ensures that 
the relevant domestic laws prevail over the applicable treaty provisions to 
the extent that a treaty obligation must be performed ‘in accordance with 
fundamental principles of domestic law’.
As regards the latter category, states ‘shall carry out their obligations 
under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sover-
eign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention 
in the domestic affairs of other States’. Moreover, the Convention provides 
for the protection of jurisdiction of the state vis-à-vis other states.568 Argu-
ably, the references to the principles of non-intervention and exclusive 
exercise of jurisdiction are redundant, since the obligation to abide by 
these principles already follows from general (customary) international 
law.569 They emerged for the first time in a proposal made by Germany570, 
which was subsequently incorporated in a draft text of the treaty that was 
prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime at its first session and seem to have 
been included in the final text of the treaty with only minor revisions.571
Their substance and the motivation for their inclusion in the text have not 
been subject of debate at all, which may very well be explained by their 
567 Also article 12, ninth paragraph, of the Convention.
568 Art 4, fi rst and second paragraph.
569 Only a few references may suffi ce. Pursuant to article 2, fi rst paragraph, ChUN, ‘the [UN] 
is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members’. Furthermore, the 
ICJ has found that ‘[b]etween independent states, respect for territorial sovereignty is an 
essential foundation of international relations’ and, on another occasion, that ‘the prin-
ciple of non-intervention […] is part and parcel of customary international law’. Corfu 
Channel Case (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, p. 35, and Case concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (n 198) par. 202, respectively.
570 Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime, ‘Proposals and contributions received from governments’ (1st session, Vienna, 
19-29 January 1999) (19 December 1998) UN Doc A/AC.254/5, 10.
571 Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime (n 564) 4. The revisions concerned the question whether the formulation should 
follow the language used in the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings (‘Nothing in this Convention entitles a State Party to […]’) or the United 
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffi c in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(‘A State Party shall not […]’). Whereas the provisions on the principles non-intervention 
and exclusive exercise of jurisdiction had originally been envisaged as part of the 
Convention article on the scope of application, it was decided to place them in a separate 
article. UNODC, Travaux préparatoires (n 189) 27, 29 and 37.
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redundancy, as noted above. This view is supported by the Legislative 
Guide.572 Its commentary on the motivation for the inclusion of article 4 on 
the protection of national sovereignty is limited to the observation that ‘its 
provisions are self-explanatory’.573
In addition to article 4, first and second paragraph, which applies to 
the CTOC as a whole, several other, specific provisions refer to other norms 
of international law that should be observed in the implementation of the 
treaty.574 These provisions indicate that the CTOC and the domestic imple-
menting measures to which it gives rise, should be adequately embedded 
in the international regulatory environment. This also applies to article 7, 
third paragraph, CTOC. Pursuant to this provision, ‘States Parties are called 
upon to use as a guideline the relevant initiatives of regional, interregional 
and multilateral organisations against money-laundering’. Although this 
provision is not compulsory in the sense that it contains a binding obliga-
tion for state parties to use the said initiatives as guidelines, it demonstrates 
a preference for international harmonisation in this regard. For this reason, 
it is stated that
‘[u]ltimately, States are free to determine the best way to implement this article. However, 
the development of a relationship with one of the organisations working to combat money-
laundering would be important for effective implementation’.575
6.1.3.3 Criminalisation and enforcement
As was noted above, the CTOC requires state to establish as criminal 
offences the acts that fall under its scope.576 Thus, CTOC’s implementation 
must be performed through the enactment of criminal laws, instead of 
civil or administrative laws.577 The choice for implementing measures of a 
criminal legal nature is based on the premise that it not only enables state 
authorities to resort to criminal powers for the investigation, prosecution 
and punishment of offenders. It also facilitates international cooperation 
among national authorities.578
Once the conduct referred to in the CTOC has been criminalised under 
domestic laws, the question arises what sanctions should be imposed on 
offenders. Here, the CTOC prescribes that sanctions should ‘take into 
account the gravity of the offence’, which may be viewed as a proportionality
572 UNODC, Legislative Guides (n 554) xv.
573 Ibid, 16.
574 Artt 13, fourth paragraph, 15, sixth paragraph, and 18, sixth paragraph.
575 UNODC, Legislative Guides (n 554) 51. 
576 Artt 2, sub b, 5, 6, 8 and 23.
577 UNODC, Legislative Guides (n 554) 18. There is one exception to this rule, which pertains 
to the liability of legal persons. This exception can be found in article 10, second para-
graph, of the Convention.
578 UNODC, Legislative Guides (n 554) 40.
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requirement.579 This proportionality of sanctions is inspired by the desire to 
provide for a minimum level of deterrence in order to ensure that sanctions 
‘clearly outweigh the benefits of the crime’.580 This, however, cannot conceal 
the fact that the punishment of offenders is primarily a responsibility and 
prerogative of the state parties, which is emphasised in article 11, sixth para-
graph. Pursuant to this provision, ‘[n]othing contained in this Convention 
shall affect the principle that […] offences shall be prosecuted and punished 
in accordance with [the domestic law of a state party]’.581
A special regime is applicable to legal persons involved in the commis-
sion of serious crimes that fall within the scope of the CTOC. Contrary to 
other obligations that are part of the CTOC, which, as we have seen, require 
criminalisation, the liability of such legal persons may be accomplished on 
the basis of civil or administrative law as well. This is stated in article 10, 
second paragraph. Whatever the nature of the sanctions imposed on the 
perpetrating legal person, however, states must ensure that it is subject to 
‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, 
including monetary sanctions’.582 Apparently this special regime for legal 
persons was contained in the CTOC as a result of the diversity in domestic 
laws on the subject, which include, among other sanctions, criminal and 
non-criminal fines, forfeiture, confiscation, restitution, the withdrawal of 
certain advantages and the suspension of certain rights.583
6.1.4 Overview
The CTOC contains a large number of obligations that will require the 
adoption of domestic legislation by the state parties.584 However, the 
legislative standards that should be respected, as stipulated by the CTOC 
and the Legislative Guide, which was compiled by experts, international 
institutions and government representatives in order to assist states seeking 
to ratify or implement the CTOC, are scarce; the CTOC seems to grant 
considerable space for domestic policies. This may be explained by the 
premise that states consider the adoption of criminal legislation as a matter 
reserved for the domestic, instead of the international, policy makers. The 
standards that have to be taken into account by the national legislature may 
be summarised as follows. First and foremost, states should ensure that the 
CTOC is effective, which requires adequate implementation on the domestic 
level. In addition, states should take into account applicable national and 
579 Art 11, fi rst paragraph.
580 UNODC, Legislative Guides (n 554) 130.
581 Ibid, 20.
582 Art 10, fourth paragraph.
583 UNODC, Legislative Guides (n 554) 120-121.
584 ‘The process by which the requirements of the Convention can be fulfi lled will vary from 
State to State. Monist systems could ratify the Convention and incorporate its provisions 
into domestic law by offi cial publication, while dualist systems would require imple-
menting legislation.’ Ibid, 6.
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international law when they adopt implementing measures. References to 
national law not only serve as a protection of state sovereignty, but also 
as a safeguard to ensure the CTOC’s effectiveness. With respect to the 
international legal obligations, this may not only be interpreted as a rather 
superfluous statement that states should act in accordance with other 
international legal obligations to which they are bound, but also serves as 
a reminder that the CTOC’s policy aims will be accomplished successfully 
if domestic implementing measures fit in with the regulatory environment 
which is already in place. In relation to the norms pertaining to the punish-
ment of offenders, the CTOC is largely limited to the requirement of propor-
tionality, which imposes the obligation on state authorities which establish 
the sanctions on offenders to take into account the gravity of the offence.
6.2 Implementation of the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
6.2.1 General
The origins of the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT) can be found in the concern about the 
‘worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifesta-
tions’.585 It may be traced back to the UNGA resolution 51/210 of December 
1996 on ‘Measures to eliminate international terrorism’, which called upon 
states, inter alia, to ‘take steps to prevent and counteract, through appro-
priate domestic measures, the financing of terrorists and terrorist organisa-
tions, whether such financing is direct or indirect […]’586 A draft convention 
on the financing of terrorism was prepared by France, which was, after 
elaboration by the ad hoc committee established by the aforementioned 
resolution,587 adopted by the UNGA’s Sixth Committee.588 On 9 December 
1999 the text was adopted by resolution 54/109 of the UNGA.589 The ICSFT 
was open for signature between 10 January 2000 and 31 December 2001. As 
of today, 188 states are party to the treaty, which entered into force on 10 
April 2002.
585 Preamble.
586 UNGA res 51/210 (17 December 1996) UN Doc A/RES/51/210, par. 3.
587 UNGA res 53/108 (26 January 1999) UN Doc A/RES/53/108, par. 11.
588 UNGA, ‘Measures to eliminate international terrorism. Report of the Working Group’ (26 
October 1999) UN doc A/C.6/54/L.2. Also UNGA, ‘Measures to eliminate international 
terrorism. Report of the Sixth Committee’ (10 December 1999) UN Doc A/54/615, par. 13.
589 UNGA res 54/109 (25 February 2000) UN Doc A/Res/54/109. 
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6.2.2 Content of the Convention
The approach taken by the ICSFT differs from previous treaties pertaining 
to terrorism, since it ‘seeks to cripple the phenomenon as a whole’ instead of 
addressing specific types or areas of terrorism.590 Although the body of the 
ICSFT does not contain an express provision on the purpose of the ICSFT, 
the purpose can be derived from the treaty’s preamble, which recalls the 
‘urgent need to enhance international cooperation among States in devising 
and adopting effective measures for the prevention of the financing of 
terrorism, as well as for its suppression through the prosecution and 
punishment of its perpetrators’.591 The provision on the ICSFT’s scope is 
embodied in article 2, first paragraph, which establishes as an offence under 
the ICSFT the financing of conduct with the intention that they should be 
used or in the knowledge that they are to be used for what may be loosely 
defined as ‘terrorist acts’.592 In order to determine what conduct constitutes 
an act of terrorism, the ICSFT refers to several international anti-terrorism 
treaties enumerated in the annex to the treaty.593 It also encompasses ‘any 
other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian […] 
when the purpose of such act, by its nature and context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a government or an international organisation to 
do or to abstain from doing any act’.594 The ICSFT, with the exception of 
the articles pertaining to international cooperation, including on matters of 
extradition or mutual legal assistance, does not apply where the commis-
sion of an offence merely affects the interests of a single state.595
State parties are under the obligation to establish as criminal offences 
under their domestic law the offences set forth in article 2 and to make 
those offences ‘punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account 
the grave nature of the offences’.596 Lavalle convincingly argues that it is 
difficult to imagine that the terrorist acts included in the anti-terrorism trea-
590 R. Lavalle, ‘The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism’ 60 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 1 (2000) 491-510, 492. Also A.C. Culley, 
‘The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. A legal 
tour de force?’ 29 Dublin University Law Journal (2007) 397-413, 397-398.
591 For an extensive discussion of the Convention’s content, see Lavalle, ‘The International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism’ (n 590).
592 In the context of the Convention, ‘fi nancing’ means the provision or collection by any 
means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, of funds.
593 Art 2, first paragraph, sub a. These treaties include inter alia the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (adopted 16 December 1970, entered into 
force 14 October 1971) 860 UNTS 105; the International Convention against the Taking 
of Hostages (adopted 17 December 1979, entered into force 3 June 1983) 1316 UNTS 205; 
and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (adopted 3 March 
1980, entered into force 8 February 1987) 1456 UNTS 101. The annex may be amended in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in article 23.
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ties to which the ICSFT refers for its scope of application, given their grave 
nature, are not punishable under the existing domestic criminal laws of any 
state. In practice, therefore, the obligation to criminalise such conduct will 
often not require any additional specific legislative action.597 Furthermore, 
a state party has a duty to take such measures as may be necessary to estab-
lish jurisdiction over the offences if they are committed in its territory or by 
one of its nationals.598
In addition to the obligations to criminalise and penalise the financing 
of terrorism and to establish jurisdiction over offences referred to in article 
2, the ICSFT imposes several duties which are closely related. They include 
the adoption of measures for the identification, detection, freezing or 
seizure, and subsequently forfeiture of any funds used for those offences, 
as well as the proceeds derived from such offences.599 Once a person is 
suspected to have a financed terrorist activities, a state which has jurisdic-
tion may choose to either prosecute or extradite the alleged offender.600
Moreover, state parties should afford one another the ‘greatest measure of 
assistance’ in connection with criminal investigations or criminal or extradi-
tion proceedings.601 Finally, in order to prevent the financing of terrorist 
acts, states must, inter alia, exchange information and adopt measures that 
require financial institutions to ensure that their customers can be identified 
and to pay special attention to unusual or suspicious transactions.602
6.2.3 Legislative standards
6.2.3.1 Implementation, effectiveness and harmonisation
In contrast to the CTOC, which was discussed in the previous chapter, 
the ICSFT does not contain one core provision of a general nature to the 
effect that states are required to adopt implementing legislation in order to 
comply with the obligations set forth in the treaty; such requirement must 
be derived from the various specific articles that were explored in section 
6.2.2. Neither does the body of the ICSFT impose a general obligation to 
ensure the effectiveness of domestic implementing measures. Aside from 
the preambular statement, referred to above, on the ‘urgent need to enhance 
international cooperation among States in […] devising and adopting effec-
tive measures for the prevention of the financing of terrorism’, such obliga-
tion must be looked for in the specific articles of the ICSFT. The notion of 
effectiveness arises only in article 5, third paragraph, which imposes the 
597 Lavalle, ‘The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism’ 
(n 590) 505.
598 Art 7, fi rst paragraph. 
599 Art 8, fi rst and second paragraph.
600 Art 10, fi rst paragraph.
601 Art 12, fi rst paragraph. 
602 Art 18, fi rst paragraph, sub b, and third paragraph.
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obligation to ensure that legal entities that commit crimes as set out in the 
ICSFT, are subject to ‘effective’ sanctions. This, of course, must not lead to 
the conclusion that the notion of effectiveness is not relevant to the states 
that are required to adopt implementing measures; effectiveness must again 
be considered inherent to the specific treaty obligations.603
With regard to the subject of harmonisation, the ICSFT contains several 
categories of norms, most notably of a compulsory nature. An example can 
be found in article 4, sub a, which provides that ‘[e]ach State Party shall 
adopt such measures as may be necessary […] to establish as criminal 
offences under its domestic law the offences set forth in article 2’. Other, 
less numerous, provisions leave a certain measure of discretion to state 
parties, such as the norms entrenched in article 12, fourth paragraph, which 
stipulates that ‘[e]ach State Party may give consideration to establishing 
mechanisms to share with other States Parties information or evidence […]’.
6.2.3.2 Observance of applicable international and national law
The ICSFT partly relies on domestic law. This can be derived, for example, 
from article 8, first paragraph, ICSFT, which reads:
‘Each State Party shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with its domestic legal prin-
ciples, for the identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or allocat-
ed for the purpose of committing the offences set forth in article 2 as well as the proceeds 
derived from such offences, for purposes of possible forfeiture’.
Similar references to domestic law can be found in the provisions pertaining 
to the forfeiture of funds that are used for the commission of terrorist 
offences and of the proceeds derived from such offences; the institution of 
criminal proceedings; extraditable offences; and the provision of mutual 
legal assistance in the absence of an applicable treaty between two or more 
state parties.604 Arguably, as was noted in the context of the CTOC, refer-
ences to national law serve both as a protection of state sovereignty, and 
as a safeguard to ensure the effectiveness of the convention. As regards the 
former, such references emphasise that the ICSFT provides for a framework 
which is to respect, instead of replace applicable domestic law. Indeed, as was 
noted during the negotiations of the draft text of article 5, first paragraph, 
the insertion of the phrase ‘in accordance with its domestic legal system’ 
was proposed in order to ‘take into consideration the diversity of national 
legal systems’.605 At the same time, the observance of applicable national 
law ensures that the ICSFT is not rendered ineffective for reasons of incom-
patibility with domestic law of higher rank.
603 For instance art 6.
604 Artt 8, second paragraph, 10, fi rst paragraph, 11, third paragraph, and 12, fi fth paragraph.
605 UNGA, ‘Measures to eliminate international terrorism. Report of the Working Group’ 
(n 588) par. 128. The phrase ‘domestic legal system’ would eventually be replaced by the 
term ‘domestic legal principles’. Ibid, par. 175.
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Several other provisions require state parties to ensure that the obliga-
tions entrenched in the ICSFT are performed in accordance with existing 
international legal norms. Examples can be found in article 7, sixth para-
graph, which reads: ‘Without prejudice to the norms of general interna-
tional law, this Convention does not exclude the exercise of any criminal 
jurisdiction established by a State Party in accordance with its domestic 
law’. During the negotiations of this particular provision it was noted ‘that 
the exercise of national terms of reference should be applied in conformity 
with international law. If not, the provision could lead to actions considered 
unacceptable under international law’.606 And such a situation, the negotia-
tors might have added, is to be avoided. Similarly, article 20 stipulates that 
states ‘shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner 
consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integ-
rity of states and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other 
states’.607 Pursuant to article 21, ‘[n]othing in this Convention shall affect 
other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals under 
international law, in particular the UN Charter, international humanitarian 
law and other relevant provisions’.608 The issue of concurrence of interna-
tional humanitarian law and the ICSFT was raised during the negotiations 
of the text because of expected ‘difficulties with the application of humani-
tarian law’ which feared to lead to ‘the situation where certain acts would 
be classed as terrorism when they would be acceptable under humanitarian 
law’.609 For this reason it was suggested that ‘the draft convention makes 
reference to the hierarchy of norms of international law, whereby in the 
context of armed conflict the application of humanitarian law would take 
precedence over that of the draft convention’.610 In short, the provisions 
emphasise the requirement that the ICSFT obligations, including those 
which necessitate the adoption of domestic legislation, must be honored in 
a way which is consistent with other international legal rights and obliga-
tions.
606 UNGA, ‘Measures to eliminate international terrorism. Report of the Working Group’ (n 
588) par. 202.
607 Closely related is article 22, which provides: ‘Nothing in this Convention entitles a State 
Party to undertake in the territory of another State Party the exercise of jurisdiction or 
performance of functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other 
State Party by its domestic law.’ Also artt 7, sixth paragraph, 8, fi fth paragraph, and 9, 
fi fth paragraph. 
608 Similarly, article 17 provides that ‘[a]ny person who is taken into custody or regarding 
whom any other measures are taken or proceedings are carried out pursuant to this 
Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment of all rights and 
guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in the territory of which that person 
is present and applicable provisions of international law, including international human 
rights law’.
609 UNGA, ‘Measures to eliminate international terrorism. Report of the Working Group’ (n 
588) par. 102.
610 Ibid, par. 85.
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6.2.3.3 Criminalisation and enforcement
As we have seen above, two of the most principal obligations embodied 
in the ICSFT concern the criminalisation of the financing of terrorism and 
related conduct and the penalisation of those crimes. As regards the latter, 
the ICSFT not only prescribes the obligation to provide for penalties on the 
domestic level, but also that the established penalties must be ‘appropriate’ 
and ‘take into account the grave nature of the offences’.611 If such offence is 
attributed to a legal entity, as opposed to a natural person, the state parties 
must ensure that those entities are subject to ‘effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive criminal, civil or administrative sanctions’ which include mone-
tary sanctions.612 In other words, the ICSFT does not express a preference 
regarding the legal nature of the prescribed sanctions (either criminal, civil 
or administrative, including monetary); they must, however, be sufficiently 
deterrent.
6.2.4 Overview
From the foregoing it may be concluded that the ICSFT does not provide for 
elaborate standards applicable to implementing legislation which must be 
observed by state parties. In addition, its drafters, contrary to the drafters 
of the Legislative Guide for the implementation of the CTOC, have not 
arranged for guidance regarding the implementation of the ICSFT provi-
sions. As a result, legislative standards can only be derived from the ICSFT 
itself. The ICSFT imposes obligations to, inter alia, criminalise the offences 
covered by the convention, to provide for penalties under domestic law, and 
to establish jurisdiction over those crimes. The choice of sanctions, either 
criminal, civil or administrative, including monetary, is left to the discretion 
of states. The ICSFT only prescribes that the available sanctions are suffi-
ciently deterrent. Furthermore, it requires that its obligations, including the 
obligations the require the adoption of domestic legislation, are performed 
in consistency with other norms to which the state is bound, either national 
or international.
611 Art 4, sub b.





7 Legislative standards as part of 
international health law
7.1 Implementation of the International Health Regulations
7.1.1 General
The international spread of disease has been a concern for the international 
community since 1851, as was discussed in Part I. The International Health 
Regulations (IHR), which are central to the present section, reflect only 
the most recent version of international cooperation on the subject. They 
were adopted in 2005 to replace their predecessor, the 1969 International 
Health Regulations, which had been amended in 1973 (to add provisions for 
cholera) and in 1981 (to exclude smallpox from the regulations’ scope).613 In 
1995 a process of revision was set in motion, which has resulted in a new 
set of rules that entered into force in 2007.614 One important innovation was 
that, contrary to their predecessors, the new regulations are not limited 
to certain specified diseases, such as yellow fever or plague; instead, they 
apply to any ‘illness or medical condition, irrespective of origin or source, 
that presents or could present significant harm to humans’.615
7.1.2 Content of the Regulations
The new regulations’ aim is ‘to prevent, protect against, control and provide 
a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that 
are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which 
avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade’.616 In 
order to achieve that aim, the IHR contain various obligations concerning 
national and international surveillance, public health response, health 
measures applied to international travelers, aircraft, ships, motor vehicles 
and goods, and public health at international ports, airports and ground 
crossings.617
613 WHO, ‘Revision of the International Health Regulations. Report by the Secretariat’ (24 
March 2003) A 56/25, 1.
614 WHA res 58.3 (n 278).
615 Art 1, fi rst paragraph.
616 Art 2 IHR.
617 WHO, ‘International Health Regulations (2005). A brief introduction to implementa-
tion in national legislation’ (World Health Organisation, Geneva 2009) WHO/HSE/
IHR/2009.2, 2 <http://www.who.int/ihr/Intro_legislative_implementation.pdf> 
(accessed 29 March 2018).
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The main obligations can be summarised as follows. Pursuant to article 4,
first paragraph, IHR, states shall designate or establish ‘National IHR Focal 
Points’ and the authorities responsible for the implementation of health 
measures under the regulations. They have a central role in communicating 
with the WHO and with other domestic authorities.618 For example, they 
serve as a channel of communications in case of an event unfolding on a 
state’s territory which may constitute a ‘public health emergency of interna-
tional concern’. States are under an obligation to report such an event to the 
WHO within 24 hours and to provide all relevant public health information. 
Subsequently the collected information will be forwarded by the WHO 
in order to enable other states to respond to the established public health 
risk.619 In addition, states have a duty to develop, strengthen and maintain 
the capacity to respond promptly and effectively to public health risks and 
public health emergencies of international concern.620 In the event of such 
an emergency, the Director-General of the WHO temporarily has the power 
to issue recommendations, which may include health measures regarding 
persons, baggage, cargo, containers, conveyances, goods and parcels in 
order to prevent or reduce the international spread of disease.621
Furthermore, the IHR impose several obligations regarding the so-called 
‘points of entry’, a term that encompasses airports, ports and ground cross-
ings. The requirements include the duty to identify the competent authorities 
and the duty to ensure the development of various ‘capacities’ at designated 
points of entry, such as the availability of medical staff in order to assess 
ill travelers and facilities to treat contaminated baggage and cargo etc.622
The IHR also stipulate that state authorities may on arrival and 
departure impose requirements for public health purposes with regard to 
travelers, such as information on the person’s itinerary or a medical exami-
nation, and inspection of baggage, cargo etc.623 Similarly, states shall take 
all practicable measures to ensure that conveyance operators comply with 
the health measures recommended by the WHO and may take action if a 
conveyance is suspected to contain sources of infection or contamination.624
Under certain conditions, a state may require invasive medical examination 
or vaccination, for instance when it is necessary to determine whether a 
public health risk exists or as a condition for travelers seeking temporary or 
permanent residence.625
While the aforementioned measures primarily seek to combat estab-
lished or suspected public health risks, the aim of the IHR is also to diminish 
unnecessary impediments to international traffic and trade. This follows 
618 Art 4, fi rst and second paragraph.
619 Artt 6, fi rst paragraph, 7 and 11.
620 Art 13, fi rst paragraph, and Annex I.
621 Art 15, fi rst and second paragraph.
622 Artt 19, sub a and b, 20 and 21, and Annex I, sub B.
623 Art 23, fi rst paragraph.
624 Art 24, fi rst paragraph, sub a, and 27, fi rst paragraph.
625 Art 31, fi rst and second paragraph.
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from various provisions, such as the prohibition of the application of health 
measures to conveyances in transit not coming from affected areas, and the 
prohibition to require other health documents than those provided for in the 
IHR.626
7.1.3 Legislative standards
7.1.3.1 Implementation and harmonisation
The ‘Toolkit for implementation in national legislation’ acknowledges 
that implementation of the IHR on the domestic level can be performed in 
various ways. It reveals, however, a preference for implementation through 
legislation since, it is submitted, ‘there needs to be an adequate legal 
framework to support and enable all these activities [required by the IHR] 
within all States Parties’.627 Implementation through legislation is desirable, 
it is stated, not only since it ‘facilitate[s] performance of IHR activities in a 
more efficient, effective or otherwise beneficial manner’, but also because 
legislation may serve to ‘institutionalize and strengthen the role of IHR 
capacities within the State Party’. An additional potential benefit may be 
found in enhanced ‘coordination among different governmental and non-
governmental entities involved in implementation […]’.628 This preference 
for implementation through legislative means can be satisfied in two ways, 
it is argued: legislation that gives effect to the various requirements in each 
relevant area; or legislation which incorporates the IHR as a whole in the 
domestic legal system, either by attaching the text of the IHR as an annex or 
by reference.629
The IHR harmonise national attitudes towards public health responses 
to the international spread of disease. However, states are expressly 
permitted to adopt ‘additional health measures’ in response to specific 
public health risks or public health emergencies of international concern 
(both terms are defined in article 1, first paragraph, IHR) which achieve the 
same or greater level of health protection than recommendations issued by 
the WHO, or which are otherwise prohibited under several provisions of 
the IHR. Such additional measures should be otherwise consistent with the 
IHR and should not be more restrictive of international traffic and not more 
invasive or intrusive to persons than reasonably available alternatives.630
Put simply, states are allowed to restrict international traffic further if it is 
626 Artt 25, 26 and 35. Also artt 33, 40 and 41.
627 WHO, ‘International Health Regulations (2005). Toolkit for implementation in national 
legislation. Questions and answers, legislative reference and assessment tool and 
examples of national legislation’ (World Health Organisation, Geneva 2009) WHO/
HSE/IHR/2009.3, 9 <http://www.who.int/ihr/Toolkit_Legislative_Implementation.
pdf?ua=1> (accessed 29 March 2018).
628 Ibid.
629 Ibid, 11. The second way is usually called ad hoc statutory incorporation. See section 2.4.
630 Art 43, fi rst paragraph.
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necessary in order to respond to an imminent and serious threat to public 
health. In the same vein, states are free to conclude additional treaties with 
other states in order to ‘facilitate the application of the IHR’.631 This means 
that the IHR does not impose one uniform framework to be applied by 
states in the context of the international spread of disease; it leaves some 
discretion to states, although the manner in which states could use this 
discretion is governed by the IHR.
7.1.3.2 Observance of human rights, including non-discrimination
One of the legislative standards that may be derived from the IHR can be 
found in the provision which calls upon Member states to implement fully 
the IHR in accordance with the principles embodied in article 3.632 These 
include the principle that the implementation of the IHR shall be ‘with 
full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
persons’. Closely related to the implementation of the IHR themselves is 
the adoption of health measures pursuant to the IHR. They must be initi-
ated and completed without delay, and applied in a transparent and non-
discriminatory manner.633 Pursuant to article 32, health measures pertaining 
to travelers must be performed ‘with respect [for travelers’] dignity, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms’, while minimizing ‘discomfort and 
distress associated with such measures’. To this end, states have a duty to 
treat all travelers with courtesy and respect, to take into consideration their 
gender and their sociocultural, ethnic or religious concerns, and to provide 
those who are quarantined, isolated or subjected to medical examination 
with adequate food, water, accommodation etc.634
7.1.3.3 Observance of applicable international and national law
The drafters of the IHR have intended to ensure that the IHR do not 
contravene other international legal obligations to which the state parties 
are bound. On a general level, it is stated that implementation shall ‘be 
guided by the Charter of the United Nations and the Constitution of the 
World Health Organisation’ and ‘by the goal of their universal application 
for the protection of all people of the world from the international spread of 
disease’.635 Nevertheless, acknowledging the possibility that tension arises 
between these internationalist objectives and the reality within the jurisdic-
tion of states, the IHR also stipulate that ‘states have, in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, 
the sovereign right to legislate and to implement legislation in pursuance of 
631 Art 57, second paragraph.
632 WHA res 58.3 (n 278).
633 Art 42.
634 Art 32, sub a, b and c.
635 Art 3, fi rst, second, and third paragraph, IHR.
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their health policies. In doing so they should uphold the purpose of these 
Regulations’.636
Other references to international law can be found in article 57, first 
paragraph, which stipulates that ‘the [IHR] and other relevant international 
agreements should be interpreted so as to be compatible’ and that the rights 
and obligations derived from those agreements shall not be affected by the 
IHR. This is not to say that other state obligations than those included in the 
IHR, will always prevail; it merely states that they should be reconciled, by 
means of interpretation, to the largest possible extent. Whenever a state party 
is bound by a legal obligation that clearly contravenes the duties set forth 
in the IHR, interpretation in accordance with article 57, first paragraph, will 
prove to be insufficient to solve the contradiction. Moreover, in article 46 
express reference is made to ‘international guidelines’ that should be taken 
into account by states to facilitate the performance various activities with 
biological substances, diagnostic specimens, reagents and other diagnostic 
materials for verification and public health response purposes.
In several places the IHR refer to national law as well. First of all, the 
terms ‘temporary residence’ and ‘permanent residence’ have the meaning 
given to them in domestic law.637 Article 45, first and second paragraphs, 
governs the treatment of personal data that have been collected or received 
in accordance with the IHR. Such data should be kept confidential and be 
anonymously processed ‘as required by national law’. Thus, the drafters 
of the IHR have decided to rely on national law for the specification of the 
cited terms and for norms pertaining to the processing of personal data, 
instead of integrating the said terms and norms in the IHR.
7.1.4 Overview
From the overview presented in the previous sections, it must be concluded 
that the legislative standards pertaining to the implementation of the IHR 
are scarce. The IHR impose various obligations on states that require imple-
menting measures, and, as we have seen, preferably implementing legisla-
tion, but they do not elaborate on the means and methods of implementing 
legislation. For instance, the IHR are silent on monitoring and enforcement 
measures. Nevertheless, on a few occasions they refer to human rights, 
including non-discrimination, international law and domestic law. These 
references are not only relevant for the interpretation of the IHR themselves, 
but also for the interpretation of domestic implementing legislation that is 
adopted to give effect to the IHR.
636 Art 3, fourth paragraph, IHR. Similarly, it is stated: ‘How the IHR requirements are to be 
implemented is up to each State Party in light of its own domestic legal and governance 
systems, socio-political contexts and policies. Each State Party should therefore determine 
the extent to which the different aspects of this guidance may be relevant or appropriate to 
their particular circumstances. WHO, ‘A brief introduction to implementation’ (n 617) 7. 
637 Art 1, fi rst paragraph.
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7.2 Implementation of the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control
7.2.1 General
Together with the IHR, probably the best known instrument of international 
health law may be found in the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC). Similar to the IHR, the FCTC was negotiated and adopted under 
the auspices of the WHO. The FCTC was adopted in 2003 by the World 
Health Assembly in accordance with article 19 of the Constitution of the 
WHO, which bestows it with the power to adopt international conven-
tions.638 It is the product of a process that commenced in 1970 with the 
adoption of a resolution on the serious health effects of smoking.639 In May 
1995 this process resulted in the adoption by the Health Assembly of a 
resolution in which the Director-General was requested to investigate the 
feasibility to develop an international instrument on tobacco control.640 In 
1999 it was decided that an intergovernmental negotiating body should 
formulate a draft text of the treaty.641 After the adoption of the text of the 
treaty in May 2003, it was opened for signature in June 2003 and entered 
into force in February 2005. The FCTC is a ‘framework convention’ and 
may be complemented by protocols in accordance with article 33. This has 
resulted in the adoption of the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco 
Products in November 2012.642 Today 181 states are bound by the FCTC; 31 
states are party to the Protocol.643
638 WHO (Resolution of the World Health Assembly), ‘WHO Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control’ (21 May 2003) WHA56.1. Article 19 of the Constitution of the WHO, 
stipulates: ‘The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt conventions or agree-
ments with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organisation. A two-
thirds vote of the Health Assembly shall be required for the adoption of such conventions 
or agreements, which shall come into force for each Member when accepted by it in 
accordance with its constitutional processes’.
639 WHO (Resolution of the World Health Assembly), ‘Health consequences of smoking’ (19 
May 1970) WHA 23.32.
640 WHO (Resolution of the World Health Assembly), ‘An international strategy for tobacco 
control’ (12 May 1995) WHA 48.11. 
641 WHO (Resolution of the World Health Assembly), ‘Towards a WHO framework conven-
tion on tobacco control’ (24 May 1999) WHA 52.18.
642 Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 
‘Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Traffi c in Tobacco Products’ Decision FCTC/COP5(1) (12 
November 2012) <http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop5/FCTC_COP5(1)-en.pdf> 
(accessed 29 March 2018).
643 See the FCTC website: http://www.who.int/fctc/signatories_parties/en/ and http://
www.who.int/fctc/protocol/en/ (accessed 29 March 2018).
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7.2.2 Content of the Convention
The objective of the FCTC is to ‘protect present and future generations from 
the devastating health, social, environmental and economic consequences 
of tobacco consumption and exposure to tobacco smoke by providing a 
framework for tobacco control measures […]’.644 In order to achieve this 
objective, the FCTC prescribes various measures. The FCTC distinguishes 
between general obligations, which are entrenched in article 5 FCTC, and 
other obligations.
The general obligations include the duty to ‘adopt and implement 
effective legislative, executive, administrative and/or other measures and 
cooperate, as appropriate, with other Parties in developing appropriate 
policies for preventing and reducing tobacco consumption, nicotine addic-
tion and exposure to tobacco smoke’.645 Furthermore, states have a duty 
to protect their public health policies with respect to tobacco control from 
undue influence of the tobacco industry and to cooperate with each other 
and with other competent international bodies.646 In addition to article 5, 
the FCTC prescribes the adoption of measures aimed at the reduction of 
demand for tobacco, the protection from exposure to tobacco smoke, the 
reduction of the supply of tobacco, the protection of the environment, 
liability, and scientific and technical cooperation.647 Examples include the 
consideration of price and tax measures in order to discourage the use of 
tobacco products, the adoption and implementation of effective measures 
providing for protection from exposure to tobacco smoke in indoor work-
places and public places, the adoption and implementation of measures to 
ensure that tobacco packages and labels contain health warnings describing 
the harmful effects of tobacco use, the adoption and implementation of 
measures aimed at strengthening public awareness on the health effects of 
tobacco use, the adoption and implementation of measures that prohibit the 
sale of tobacco products to minors, and the development and promotion of 
national research programmes relating to tobacco control.648
Furthermore, the FCTC provides for the establishment of a Conference 
of the Parties, which ‘shall keep under regular review the implementation 
of the Convention and take the decisions necessary to promote its effective 
implementation’.649
644 Art 3.
645 Art 5, second paragraph, sub b. 
646 Art 5, third, fourth and fi fth, paragraph.
647 Parts III, IV, V, and VI.
648 Artt 6, 8, second paragraph, 11, fi rst paragraph, 12, 16, fi rst paragraph, and 20, fi rst para-
graph.
649 Art 23, fi rst and fi fth paragraph.
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7.2.3 Legislative standards
7.2.3.1 Implementation, ‘guiding principles’ and harmonisation
The central obligation of the FCTC can be found in article 3, which states 
that the treaty provides for a framework for tobacco control measures ‘to be 
implemented by the Parties at the national, regional and international levels 
in order to reduce continually and substantially the prevalence of tobacco 
use and exposure to tobacco smoke’.
When states adopt the national measures required by the FCTC, they 
should take into account, it is stipulated, inter alia, the ‘guiding principles’ 
set out in article 4. These principles stress the need for information to the 
public on the health effects which result from the use of tobacco products, 
the need for ‘strong political commitment’ and international cooperation, 
the importance of ‘comprehensive multisectoral measures and responses to 
prevent health damage’, of issues of liability, and of ‘technical and financial 
assistance to aid the economic transition of tobacco growers and workers’, 
and the essential role of civil society in the attainment of the FCTC’s objec-
tives. These principles may be viewed as a brief summary of the FCTC and 
may contribute to the understanding, for the purposes of interpretation, 
of the treaty text in accordance with article 31, first paragraph, VCLT. This 
provision stipulates that the interpretation of treaties should not only be 
conducted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context, but also ‘in the light of its 
object and purpose’.650
Notwithstanding their importance as a means of interpretation, the 
guiding principles laid down in article 4 probably do not constitute autono-
mous legal obligations to be performed by the state parties, as their legal 
substance can only be established in connection with the other FCTC provi-
sions.
In this context it is worth referring to the Guidelines for implementation, 
which have been drafted and elaborated over the years in order to promote 
the implementation of the FCTC.651 These guidelines reflect ‘the consoli-
dated views of parties on different aspects of implementation, their experi-
ences and achievements, and the challenges faced’.652 Instead of focusing on 
the implementation of the FCTC in its entirety, it elaborates on the imple-
mentation of specified articles such as article 8 on the protection from the 
exposure to tobacco smoke.653 The Guidelines should probably be character-
650 VCLT art 31, fi rst paragraph.
651 WHO, Guidelines for implementation (n 177). As an additional tool to enhance compliance 
with the Convention, the Convention Secretariat annually publishes ‘Global Progress 
Reports’ on the implementation of the Convention <http://www.who.int/fctc/
reporting/summary_analysis/en/> (accessed 29 March 2018).
652 WHO, Guidelines for implementation (n 177) v.
653 Other provisions to which the Guidelines apply, are articles 5, third paragraph, 9, 10, 11, 
12, 13 and 14.
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ised as a soft law instrument, which may be derived from the statement that 
‘Parties are encouraged to use these guidelines not only to fulfill their legal 
duties under the Convention, but also to follow best practices in protecting 
public health’.654 To this end, the Guidelines on article 8 FCTC provide for 
seven ‘principles’ that should guide the implementation of article 8, and 
clarify various aspects of the implementation, such its scope, enforcement, 
monitoring and evaluation.655
Finally, the FCTC contains minimum standards. This may be derived 
from article 2, first paragraph, which encourages state parties to ‘imple-
ment measures beyond those required by this Convention [..]’, adding that 
‘nothing in these instruments shall prevent a Party from imposing stricter 
requirements’.656
7.2.3.2 Observance of applicable international and national law
Several provisions of the FCTC refer to international and national law, 
which indicates that implementation should be performed in a manner that 
is consistent with other legal norms to which the state is bound. As was 
noted above, the state parties to the FCTC may adopt stricter requirements 
than the requirements prescribed by the FCTC in order to better protect 
human health. However, there are two conditions that have to be met: those 
additional measures must be consistent with the provisions of the FCTC 
and with international law in general.657 Similarly, the FCTC expressly stip-
ulates that state parties have the right to conclude bilateral and multilateral 
agreements, provided that those agreements are compatible with the obliga-
tions under the FCTC. In short, the FCTC requires what may be termed 
consistency with other international legal provisions. This requirement may 
seem, at first sight, unnecessary, since it is nothing more than an affirma-
tion of the obvious principle that states should act in accordance with the 
obligations to which they are bound: pacta sunt servanda. However, it may be 
understood to point to a certain hierarchy, which ensures the prevalence of 
the FCTC over other applicable international agreements or domestic laws. 
Which international legal norms the drafters had in mind remains unclear, 
unfortunately, since the FCTC and the Guidelines for Implementation are silent 
on this topic.
654 WHO, Guidelines for implementation (n 177) 19.
655 Principle 4, for example, provides that ‘[g]ood planning and adequate resources are 
essential for successful implementation and enforcement of smoke free legislation’. 
WHO, Guidelines for implementation (n 177) 21-29.
656 Art 2, fi rst paragraph. See also article 13, fi fth paragraph.
657 Art 2, fi rst paragraph.
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In addition to the references to international law, the FCTC on several 
occasions points to national law.658 In these cases, the FCTC does not impose 
one single, harmonised norm to be followed by all state parties; instead, it 
allows some level of discretion to national authorities that are responsible 
for the implementation of the relevant provision. An example may clarify 
this point. Article 13, fourth paragraph, sub a, provides:
‘[…] in accordance with its constitution or constitutional principles, each Party shall: (a) pro-
hibit all forms of tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship that promote a tobacco 
product by any means that are false, misleading or deceptive or likely to create an errone-
ous impression about its characteristics, health effects, hazards or emissions’;
In the Guidelines for Implementation, relating to this particular provision, it is 
accepted that domestic law may provide for limitations on the imposition 
of a ban on tobacco advertising. Given these limitations, it is submitted, the 
state in question should apply restrictions on tobacco advertising which 
are ‘as comprehensive as possible in the light of those [limitations]’.659 In 
this particular aspect, thus, the FCTC provision may not be interpreted as 
to prevail over domestic (constitutional) laws applicable to tobacco adver-
tising.
In other FCTC articles, references to domestic laws ensure the comple-
mentary, instead of restrictive, character of those laws. This is the case in 
article 16, first paragraph, which stipulates:
‘Each Party shall adopt and implement effective legislative, executive, administrative or 
other measures at the appropriate government level to prohibit the sales of tobacco prod-
ucts to persons under the age set by domestic law, national law or eighteen’.
Here, the legal regime pertaining to the sale of tobacco products to minors 
that is entrenched in the FCTC relies on domestic law for the purpose of 
setting an age limit; only if such domestic laws are absent, the FCTC sets the 
age limit on eighteen years. Admittedly, the characterisation of references 
to national law in the text of the FCTC as ‘restrictive’ or ‘complementary’ is 
in essence a matter of perspective; in principle, any such reference may be 
viewed as both restrictive and complementary at the same time. Whereas 
a preference for a qualification as restrictive may reveal support for the 
protection of state sovereignty, the labeling as ‘complementary’ points to 
an internationalist approach in which states take common action to solve 
common problems. In the end, the key issue is that the references to national 
law which are part of the FCTC, indicate that the FCTC on the one hand and 
the domestic laws of a state party on the other, are connected. In those cases, 
as a consequence, it is imperative to take into account both sides in order to 
identify the applicable law.
658 For instance, articles 5, third paragraph, 6, second paragraph, 10, 11, fi rst paragraph, 13, 
14, fi rst paragraph, 16, fi rst paragraph, 19, third paragraph, 20, fourth paragraph.
659 WHO, Guidelines for implementation (n 177) 103.
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7.2.3.3 Compliance and enforcement
Moreover, the implementation of the FCTC entails the obligation to put in 
place a compliance and enforcement mechanism in order to ensure compli-
ance with the specified FCTC articles. It must be emphasised that the FCTC 
does not contain any obligation to this effect that is applicable to the treaty 
as a whole. Rather, it must be derived from specified treaty articles or, in 
the absence thereof, from the Guidelines for Implementation. Pursuant to the 
Guidelines for Implementation compliance with article 8 should be moni-
tored, which requires the establishment of inspection procedures. These 
procedures may, it is added, be integrated into existing health and sanita-
tion inspections, inspections for workplace health and safety or fire safety 
inspections.660 As regards articles 9 and 10 FCTC on the regulation of the 
content of tobacco products, including the publication of information about 
their content, the Guidelines for Implementation stipulate that domestic imple-
menting measures ‘should identify the authority or authorities responsible 
for enforcement, and should include a system both for monitoring compli-
ance and for prosecuting violators’.661 The Guidelines for Implementation
proceed to describe in detail the features of this compliance mechanism, 
such as the availability of a budget, information to stakeholders and the 
recommendation to use inspectors and enforcement agents to conduct 
regular visits to manufacturing facilities to verify whether any prohibited 
ingredient is being used.662 State authorities should have the authority to 
seize, forfeit and destroy any tobacco products that do not meet the require-
ments of the articles 9 and 10.663
Other enforcement measures may be required under on article 5, third 
paragraph, FCTC, which codifies the duty of states to protect their public 
health policies from the commercial interests of the tobacco industry.664 The 
obligation to provide for an enforcement mechanism includes the possi-
bility for the imposition of penalties for violations of the FCTC. Again, the 
FCTC does not contain a general obligation to this effect. Therefore, it must 
be partly derived from two specified articles, which provide for the obliga-
tions to ‘[…] enact or strengthen legislation, with appropriate penalties and 
remedies, against illicit trade in tobacco products, including counterfeit and 
contraband cigarettes’ and to ‘[…] adopt and implement effective legisla-
tive, executive, administrative or other measures, including penalties against 
sellers and distributors, in order to ensure compliance with the obligations 
contained in [article 16, paragraphs 1 to 5]’.665
660 Ibid, 26.





665 Artt 15, fourth paragraph, sub b, and 16, sixth paragraph. Italics added.
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Although the 2013 edition of the Guidelines for Implementation do not 
elaborate on the requirement of penalisation as referred to in articles 15 
and 16, it does imply the need for, and the duty to impose, penalties for 
transgressions of other provisions of the FCTC. This is remarkable, because 
the latter FCTC provisions do not contain an obligation to this effect. Here 
the Guidelines for Implementation clearly go beyond what could derived from 
the text of the treaty itself. According to the Guidelines for Implementation
regarding article 11, ‘[p]arties should specify a range of fines or other penal-
ties commensurate with the severity of the violation […]’.666 Similarly, states 
should ‘introduce and apply effective, proportionate and dissuasive penal-
ties’ in response to violations of the prohibition of, or restrictions applicable 
to, tobacco advertising, as embodied in article 13.667 The penalties may 
encompass fines, corrective advertising remedies and licence suspension 
or cancellation.668 With respect to the aforementioned articles 9 and 10, the 
Guidelines for Implementation prescribe that ‘[p]arties should specify appro-
priate sanctions, such as criminal sanctions, monetary amounts, corrective 
actions, and the suspension, limitation or cancellation of business and 
import licences’.669
7.2.3.4 Participation of stakeholders
In addition, the FCTC and its supporting documents envisage the involve-
ment of stakeholders in the implementation of measures to attain the 
formulated policy aims. The most important stakeholders include a wide 
range of organisations or groups, businesses, restaurant and hospitality 
associations, employer groups, trade unions, the media, health profes-
sionals, organisations representing children and young people, institutions 
of learning or faith, the research community and the general public.670
The involvement of stakeholders which are part of civil society may 
be based partly on the guiding principle entrenched in article 4, seventh 
paragraph, already discussed above, which emphasises the participation of 
civil society in order to achieve the objective of the FCTC. To this end, it is 
recommended that states ‘work with civil society to create a climate of atti-
tude that […] identifies legislative priorities and helps develop and enforce 
666 Ibid, 66.
667 The emphasis on deterrence also becomes visible in relation to article 8. In the Guidelines 
for Implementation, it is noted that ‘penalties should be suffi ciently large to deter viola-




670 Ibid, 24. A distinction must be made between the tobacco industry and other stake-
holders. As regard the former, states should take into account in article 5, third para-
graph, which provides that national public health policies regarding the use of tobacco 
product should be protected from commercial or other interests of the tobacco industry. 
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legislative measures’.671 Elsewhere it is noted that ‘broad consultation with 
stakeholders is also essential to educate and mobilize the community and to 
facilitate support for legislation after its enactment’.672
Also after its entry into force, contacts with stakeholders are believed to 
enhance compliance with domestic implementing measures. In the context 
of article 8 FCTC on protective measures against the harmful effects of 
tobacco smoke, the Guidelines for Implementation provide that:
‘[o]nce legislation is adopted, there should be an education campaign leading up to imple-
mentation of the law, the provision of information for business owners and building man-
agers outlining the law and their responsibilities and the production of resources, such as 
signage. These measures will increase the likelihood of smooth implementation and high 
levels of voluntary compliance. Messages to empower non-smokers and to thank smokers 
for complying with the law will promote public involvement in enforcement and smooth 
implementation.’673
7.2.3.5 Monitoring and evaluation of measures
After domestic implementing measures have been adopted, the question 
arises whether those measures should be monitored and, if yes, how. 
Under several FCTC obligations, the need for monitoring and evaluation of 
measures is emphasised. Their exact purpose, as formulated in the Guide-
lines for Implementation, varies from article to article. In relation to article 8, 
for instance, it is noted that the monitoring and evaluation of measures to 
reduce tobacco smoke serve multiple aims, such as the increase of public 
and political support for strengthening and extending legislative provisions 
and to shed light on efforts made by the tobacco industry to undermine 
implementation measures.674 Under article 11, on packaging and labeling 
of tobacco products, the objective of monitoring and evaluation seems to 
be broader, namely to assess the impact and possible improvement of the 
adopted measures.675 Similarly, the monitoring and evaluation of the laws 
adopted under article 12 on education, communication, training and public 
awareness regarding tobacco control issues, allows states to ‘measure prog-
ress’ and to ‘identify best practices’.676 A purpose that is connected to moni-
toring and evaluation and which is common to all of the aforementioned 








677 Ibid, 28, 67 and 86.
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7.2.4 Overview
In view of the above, several conclusions may be drawn in relation to the 
implementation regime that has been established under the FCTC. In order 
promote the implementation of the FCTC, the Conference of the Parties 
have drafted Guidelines for Implementation which clarify and elaborate the 
obligations to which states are bound under the treaty. Their legal status is 
such that they probably do not constitute binding obligations supplemen-
tary to the FCTC text. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the guidelines go 
beyond what is required under the text of the treaty. They refer to the need 
for inspection and enforcement procedures under several FCTC provisions, 
whereas those provisions do not stipulate such obligation. The formulation 
of standards on the consultation with stakeholders and on the evaluation 
of domestic implementing measures is quite rare in international legal 
practice. In addition to these standards for legislation, it is clear that the 
drafters have intended to embed the FCTC, and the required domestic 




8 Legislative standards as part of 
international environmental law
8.1 Implementation of the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species
8.1.1 General
During the 1960’s and 1970’s the international trade in wildlife has increased 
dramatically.678 In 2005 the value of legitimate global trade in wildlife and 
plants, excluding timber, was estimated at 21 billion US dollars.679 The ille-
gitimate trade in international trade in wildlife, on the other hand, is valued 
at between 5 billion and 20 billion US dollars.680 High demand for wildlife 
has had detrimental effects on the survival of species, which, apart from 
the species’ intrinsic value, has several negative consequences. For instance, 
animals and plants may be indispensable for the development of new drugs 
and other forms of medical treatment. Similarly, plants are a source of infor-
mation which may prove important to increase the world’s food produc-
tion. If species become extinct, their value is lost.681 In an attempt to address 
the disadvantages of the international trade in wildlife, the international 
community deemed it necessary to provide for an international approach, 
which has resulted in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species, known by its abbreviation CITES. It can be traced back to the 
United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, 
during which a recommendation was adopted which called for an interna-
tional convention on the export, import and transit of certain species of wild 
animals or plants.682 The treaty was adopted in March 1973 and entered into 
678 D. Kueck, ‘Using international political agreements to protect endangered species: a 
proposed model’ 2 University of Chicago Law School Round Table (1995) 345-354, 345. This 
estimate dates back to 1987.
679 G.E. Rosen and K.F. Smith, ‘Summarizing the evidence on the international trade in 
illegal wildlife’ 7 EcoHealth 1 (2010) 24-32, 24. Also J.E. Scanlon ‘The international dimen-
sion of illegal wildlife trade’ (Presentation on the occasion of the 1st session of the United 
Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) in Nairobi, Kenya, on 24 June 2014) <https://
cites.org/eng/international_dimension_of_illegal_wildlife_trade> (accessed 29 March 
2018). Scanlon adheres to an estimation of 20 billion US dollars.
680 Rosen and Smith, ‘Summarizing the evidence on the international trade in illegal wild-
life’ (n 679) 24.
681 D. Mahony, ‘The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora 
and Fauna. Addressing problems in global wildlife trade enforcement’ 3 New England 
International and Comparative Law Annual (1997) 1-23, 2-3.
682 Recommendation 99, third paragraph, of the Stockholm Action Plan. ‘Report of the 
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force in July 1975 pursuant article XXII CITES. As yet, 183 states are party 
to the treaty, which has been described as perhaps the most successful of all 
international treaties concerned with the conservation of wildlife.683
8.1.2 Content of the Convention
The purpose of the CITES is the ‘protection of certain species of wild fauna 
and flora against over-exploitation through international trade’.684 To this 
end, it regulates international trade in endangered species, encompassing 
both plants and animals, thus balancing the interests of lucrative trade and 
the protection of wild life.685
The CITES distinguishes between three categories of species, each of 
which is included in appendices I, II or III. Appendix I contains species 
which are threatened with extinction. In order not to endanger further their 
survival, it is stipulated, trade in specimens of these species may only be 
authorised in exceptional circumstances.686 The species included in appen-
dices II and III are subject to less strict regulations, as they do not (yet) face 
the threat of extinction.687 The core provision of the CITES is laid down in 
article II, fourth paragraph, which provides that trade in specimens and 
species included in the appendices I, II and II to the CITES, is prohibited. 
From this prohibition is exempted trade in accordance with the provisions 
of the CITES, which essentially consists of a permit system.688
The articles III, IV and V prescribe for the species included in each 
appendix the applicable trade restrictions.689 They include the presenta-
tion of permits for the import or export of a specimen to which appendix 
I applies; re-export or introduction from the sea of a specimen of this 
category is allowed only with a certificate.690 States must designate one 
or more authorities which are authorised to issue permits and certificates 
683 M. Bowman, P. Davies and C. Redgwell, Lyster’s international wildlife law (2nd edn CUP, 
Cambridge 2010) 484. For the number of state parties visit http://www.cites.org (accessed 
29 March 2018). 
684 Preamble.
685 S. Patel, ‘The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species: enforcement and 
the last unicorn’ 18 Houston Journal of International Law 2 (1995) 157-213, 161. Similarly, K. 
Hill, ‘The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. Fifteen years later’ 
13 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal 2 (1990) 231-278, 232.
686 Art II, fi rst paragraph. ‘Specimens’ are defi ned as ‘any animal or plant, whether alive or 
dead [or] any readily recognizable part or derivative thereof’ (Art I, sub b). 
687 Art II, second and third paragraph.
688 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, Lyster’s international wildlife law (n 683) 485.
689 For a more extensive discussion of the applicable trade restrictions, see Bowman, Davies 
and Redgwell, Lyster’s international wildlife law (n 683) 499-509.
690 ‘Re-export’ means export of any specimen that has previously been imported (article I, 
sub d). ‘Introduction from the sea’ means transportation into a State of specimens of any 
species which were taken in the marine environment not under the jurisdiction of any 
State (art I, sub e).
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and give advice on behalf of that state.691 Furthermore, the CITES provides 
which conditions must be fulfilled before the required document can 
be issued. For instance, for this species an export permit may only be 
granted if a (scientific) state authority of the exporting state has advised 
that such export will not be ‘detrimental to the survival of that species’ and 
if a state authority is satisfied that a living specimen will be ‘so prepared 
and shipped as to minimise the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel 
treatment’.692 A separate permit is required for the import of the specimen, 
which may only be granted if the specimen is not to be used for primarily 
commercial purposes.693 In sum, the international trade of such species may 
only be authorised in ‘exceptional circumstances’.694
The CITES imposes similar, but less stringent, requirements on permits 
and certificates for trade in species included in appendices II and III.
The CITES also provides for exemptions to the permit system. Permits 
are not required for the ‘transit or transshipment of specimens through or in 
the territory of a Party while the specimens remain in Customs control’.695
Neither do the limitations prescribe by the CITES apply to specimens that 
can be considered ‘personal or household effects’.696
In addition, the CITES imposes some related requirements on state 
parties, such as the obligation to minimise the delay caused by the formali-
ties which are part of the trade in specimens under the CITES and the obli-
gation to keep records of trade in specimens which fall within the scope of 
the CITES. Such records must include the names and addresses of importers 
and exporters, the official documents that were issued, the types of speci-
mens etc.697
8.1.3 Legislative standards
8.1.3.1 Implementation and harmonisation
The CITES does not contain an obligation of a general nature which requires 
the adoption of domestic measures in order to give effect to its norms. 
However, in March 1992 the Conference of the Parties adopted a resolu-
tion, which ‘urges all Parties that have not adopted appropriate measures 
for effective implementation of the Convention to do so […]’.698 In 2013, 
691 Art IX, fi rst paragraph.
692 Art III, second paragraph, sub a and c. 
693 Art III, third paragraph, sub c.
694 Art II, fi rst paragraph.
695 Art VII, fi rst paragraph.
696 Art VII, third paragraph.
697 Art VIII, third and sixth paragraph.
698 Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered 
Species, ‘National laws for implementation of the Convention’ Resolution Conf. 8.4 
(March 1992) <https://www.cites.org/eng/res/index.php> (accessed 29 March 2018).
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ensuring compliance with and implementation and enforcement of the 
treaty was identified as one out of three ‘strategic goals’ as part of CITES 
Strategic Vision.699
Leaving aside these documents, any binding obligation to adopt 
implementing legislation must be derived from the CITES provisions of 
a special character, such as the aforementioned duty to prohibit trade of 
endangered species which is not in accordance with the CITES.700 Pursuant 
to article XIV, first paragraph, states are permitted to apply stricter domestic 
measures to the trade, possession or transport of specimens of species 
included in the appendices to the CITES, including the complete prohibition 
thereof. The CITES thus prescribes minimum norms.701
8.1.3.2 Information to the public
Another obligation that may be considered a legislative standard consists of 
the requirement to make available to the public the periodic reports on the 
implementation of the CITES. These reports must encompass a summary 
of the records of trade in specimens, as was discussed above, and a report 
on the legislative, regulatory and administrative measures that were taken 
to enforce the provisions of the CITES.702 Under the condition that will be 
discussed in section 8.1.3.3, these reports must be made public.
8.1.3.3 Observance of applicable international and national law
There are few examples of CITES provisions that refer to domestic laws. 
One of them can be found in the obligation to prepare periodic reports 
on the implementation of the treaty, which was discussed in the previous 
section, and to make these reports available to the public, if such publica-
tion ‘is not inconsistent with the law of the Party concerned’.703
Furthermore the CITES contains an express provision on its ‘effects on 
domestic legislation and international conventions’.704 In addition to the 
right of state parties to impose domestic restrictions on trade of endangered 
species that go beyond the minimum requirements of the CITES, state 
699 Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered 
Species, ‘CITES Strategic Vision 2008-2020’, Resolution Conf. 16.3 (March 2013) <https://
www.cites.org/eng/res/index.php> (accessed 29 March 2018).
700 See also art VIII, first paragraph, which provides that states ‘shall take appropriate 
measures […] to prohibit trade in specimens in violation [of the Convention]’.
701 In the same vein, state parties may impose restrictions on the trade in specimens of 
species which are not included in the appendices to the Convention (art XIV, fi rst para-
graph, sub b).
702 Art VIII, seventh and eighth paragraph.
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parties have the right to maintain domestic laws pertaining to other aspects 
of trade, taking, possession or transport of specimens such as customs, 
public health, veterinary or plant quarantine.705
The same applies to similar norms which derive from international 
treaties; they are not affected by the CITES.706 Domestic implementing 
legislation must also be consistent with the obligations that flow from 
international treaties establishing transnational trade areas or customs 
unions.707 Moreover, if a state party is also bound by an international treaty 
that provides protection to marine species which are included in appendix 
II and which are taken by ships that are registered in that state, that treaty 
prevails over the CITES.708
8.1.3.4 Enforcement
Pursuant to article VIII, first paragraph, state parties are obliged to take 
measures required for the enforcement of the treaty.709 These must include, 
as a minimum, measures to provide for the penalisation of unlawful trade 
in, or possession of, specimens, and measures to provide for the confisca-
tion or return to the state of export of such specimens.710 State parties may 
choose to provide for internal reimbursement for expenses incurred as a 
result of such confiscation.711
These elementary legislative standards do not further provide for 
criteria applicable to penalisation, such as the severity of sanctions.712 Reso-
lution 11.3 of the Conference of Parties on compliance and enforcement of 
the CITES offers some additional guidance, albeit in a non-binding manner. 
In this resolution it is recommended that state parties advocate sanctions 
for infringements that are ‘appropriate to their nature and gravity’.713 In 
the view of several scholars, the enforcement of the CITES has been a major 
weakness. Hill, for instance, asserts that ‘[w]ithout a central administrative 
body, any compliance and enforcement takes on a ragged, almost anarchic 
705 Art XIV, second paragraph.
706 Art XIV, second paragraph.
707 Art XIV, third paragraph.
708 Art XIV, fourth paragraph.
709 Also E. McOmber, ‘Problems in enforcement of the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species’ 27 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 2 (2002) 673-701, 678.
710 See also art VIII, fourth paragraph.
711 Art VIII, second paragraph.
712 Also W. Burns, ‘CITES and the regulation of international trade in endangered species of 
fl ora. A critical appraisal’ 8 Dickinson Journal of International Law 2 (1990) 203-223, 221.
713 Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered 
Species, ‘Compliance and Enforcement’, Resolution Conf. 11.3 (April 2000) <https://
www.cites.org/eng/res/index.php> (accessed 29 March 2018).
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quality’.714 Mahony describes the general enforcement provision, embedded 
in article VIII, as ‘relatively innocuous’.715 Similarly, Wijnstekers argues that 
in many states party to the Convention penalties are ‘insufficiently high 
and not much of a deterrent for illegal traders’.716 A slightly less pessimistic 
argument is made by Patel, who adds that:
‘[h]eavier sanctions will not necessarily eliminate the incentives to smuggle, but they 
might reduce the trade involving small wildlife dealers who cannot afford to take the risk 
of being apprehended.’717
8.1.4 Overview
In the view of the above, the international legal regime embodied in CITES 
hardly provides for legislative standards that must be observed in the 
adoption of domestic implementing legislation by state parties. The drafters 
of the CITES have, however, considered it important to ensure that treaty 
implementation would not jeopardise the observance of certain national 
laws and international conventions. In addition to this requirement of 
consistency with existing law, the CITES imposes an obligation on state 
parties to provide for enforcement measures. In particular, domestic laws 
must provide for penalties to be imposed for infringements of the CITES’ 
provisions and for measures to enable authorities to confiscate and return 
specimens which have been traded in contravention of the treaty. As a 
result, it seems justified to conclude that domestic legislators are largely free 
to choose the most suitable means and methods for its implementation.
714 K. Hill, ‘The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species’ (n 685) 273. Also 
McOmber, ‘Problems in enforcement’ (n 709) 696-698; Patel, ‘The Convention on Inter-
national Trade in Endangered Species’ (n 685) 184-188; T. Hewitt, ‘Implementation and 
enforcement of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora in the South Pacifi c Region. Management and scientifi c authorities’ 6 
Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 2 (2002) 98-130, 115. 
715 Mahony, ‘The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and 
Fauna’ (n 681) 11.
716 W. Wijnstekers, The evolution of CITES. A reference to the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (9th edn International Council for Game and 
Wildlife Conservation, Budakeszi 2011) 238. 
717 Patel, ‘The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species’ (n 685) 206.
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8.2 Implementation of the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal
8.2.1 General
The desire to improve the international regulation of toxic waste may be 
traced back to the 1970’s and 1980’s.718 Typically, at least in the view of the 
public,719 such waste had originated from the developed countries and was 
moved to developing countries for disposal. The main incentive for this 
transport was economic: due to a lack of environmental regulation, toxic 
wastes could be dumped at lower costs in the developing world. This led 
to a situation in which the countries responsible for the production of the 
lion’s share of toxic waste placed the burden of disposal on other, often 
developing, countries. Of course, the ‘waste colonialism’720 posed severe 
risks to the environment and public health in those regions, as was demon-
strated in several disasters.721 Against this backdrop, it may not come as 
a surprise that the elaboration of the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal 
(CCTMW) was hampered by opposing interests between the developed 
world and the developing world: whereas many developing countries, 
supported by environmental organisations, demanded a complete ban on 
the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes, industrialised states 
were reluctant to accept such a ban and proposed regulation instead.722 To 
substantiate their claim, the latter maintained that a complete ban would 
result in the flourishing of illegal markets.723 The negotiations culminated 
in a compromise solution: a limited ban on the international movement of 
hazardous waste. Under this limited ban, importing states have a right to 
refuse the import of hazardous waste.
718 W. Schneider, ‘The Basel Convention ban on hazardous waste exports: paradigm of 
effi cacy or exercise in futility’ 20 Suffolk Transnational Law Review (1996) 247-288, 250.
719 Kummer, writing in 1992, notes that ‘the focus of public opinion during the negotiation 
process on the Basel Convention was almost exclusively on the “North-South” aspect of 
the problem […]. The fact that the vast majority of international waste transport takes 
place between industrialized nations was widely ignored’. K. Kummer, ‘The interna-
tional regulation of transboundary traffi c in hazardous wastes: the 1989 Basel Conven-
tion’ 41 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 3 (1992) 530-562, 535.
720 V. O. Okaru, ‘The Basel Convention: Controlling the movement of hazardous wastes to 
developing countries’ 4 Fordham Environmental Law Report 2 (1992) 137-165, 152.
721 For an extensive discussion of the development which sparked the drafting of the 
Basel Convention, see Okaru, ‘The Basel Convention’ (n 720) and Schneider, ‘The Basel 
Convention’ (n 718).
722 Kummer, ‘The international regulation of transboundary traffi c in hazardous wastes’ (n 
719) 535-536.
723 Okaru, ‘The Basel Convention’ (n 720) 152.
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The drafting of the CCTMW started in 1987 and was completed in 
March 1989, when it was adopted in the Swiss city that has given the treaty 
its name. The CCTMW entered into force on 5 May 1990 in accordance with 
article 25, first paragraph. As yet, there are 186 state parties to the treaty.724
Whereas the original treaty text (which is currently in force) imposed 
a limited ban on the movement of hazardous waste, as mentioned above, 
debate has continued on the scope of the ban. The main driving force behind 
the discussion was the developing world, which had felt that their interests 
had been taken into account insufficiently. A renewed negotiation process 
unfolded and led to the ‘ban amendment’, which was adopted in 1995 and 
constitutes a complete prohibition on the transfer of hazardous wastes from 
developed countries (OECD-countries, the member states of the EU and 
Liechtenstein) to developing countries for disposal.725 Furthermore, in 1999 
states adopted a supplementary protocol on liability and compensation for 
damage resulting from the transboundary movement of hazardous waste 
and their disposal, in accordance with article 12 CCTMW.726 Both the ban 
amendment and the protocol, however, have not yet entered into force due 
to a lack of ratifications.727
8.2.2 Content of the Convention
The purpose of the CCTMW may, in the absence of an express statement 
in the articles of the treaty, be inferred from the preamble. It refers to the 
determination to ‘protect, by strict control, human health and the environ-
ment against the adverse effects which may result from the generation and 
management of hazardous wastes and other wastes’.728 This policy aim 
is pursued in three ways: to reduce to a minimum the amount of trans-
boundary shipments of hazardous waste, to encourage the treatment and 
disposal of hazardous wastes as close to their points of origin as possible 
and to reduce the amount of hazardous waste in total.729
724 The number of state parties is available at <http://www.basel.int> (accessed 29 March 2018).
725 United Nations Environmental Programme, ‘Amendment to the Basel Convention’ 
(Decision III/1 of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention, 3rd Meeting, 
18-22 September 1995) (28 november 1995) UN Doc UNEP/CHW.3/35. See also K. 
Kummer, ‘The Basel Convention. Ten years on’, 7 Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law 3 (1998) 227-236, 229.
726 Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage resulting from Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (adopted 10 December 1999, not 
yet in force) UN Doc UNEP/CHW.1/WG.1/9/2. For a discussion of the protocol, see M. 
Tsimplis, ‘Liability and compensation in the international transport of hazardous wastes 
by sea: the 1999 Protocol to the Basel Convention’ 16 International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 2 (2001) 295-346.
727 Status of ratifi cations of both instruments is available through <http://www.basel.int> 
(accessed 29 March 2018).
728 Final preambular section.
729 M.L. Buckingham, ‘The Basel Convention’ 10 Colorado Journal of International Environmental 
Law and Policy (1999) 291-298, 291. Also Schneider, ‘The Basel Convention’ (n 718) 268.
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Similar to the CITES, the scope of the CCTMW is limited to ‘hazardous’ 
or ‘other’ wastes which are included in annexes to the treaty, or which 
have been designated as ‘hazardous’ under domestic law.730 Schneider 
correctly notes that the CCTMW fails to define ‘hazardous’ precisely. As 
a consequence, the CCTMW’s exact scope remains unclear. This problem, 
however, cannot be easily resolved, as it must be considered impractical 
to exhaustively and specifically enumerate wastes that must be viewed as 
‘hazardous’.731 Under the CCTMW, the term ‘waste’ must be understood 
as substances or objects which are disposed of.732 The meaning of the term 
‘disposal’ is clarified in a separate annex to the treaty (IV).733
The main obligations of the CCTMW are the following. First of all, 
states must prohibit the export of hazardous or other wastes if importing 
states have indicated their objection to it. This objection may result from a 
state’s right to prohibit the import of the waste, or from the state’s refusal to 
consent in writing to the anticipated transport.734 These restrictions consti-
tute what has been called the ‘limited ban’, as opposed to a ‘complete ban’. 
States thus have a right to prohibit the import of hazardous wastes, which 
may be based on another international treaty: the Bamako Convention.735
This treaty, which was adopted in the framework of the Organisation of 
African Unity and entered into force in 1998, prohibits the import of 
hazardous wastes into Africa.736
In addition, under the CCTMW states are under a duty to take appro-
priate measures in order to reduce the generation and transboundary 
movement of hazardous wastes to a minimum, to ensure the availability of 
adequate disposal facilities and to prevent pollution due to hazardous and 
other wastes.737 Furthermore, states must not allow the export of hazardous 
wastes to countries which have prohibited by their legislation all imports, 
or if they have ‘reason to believe that the wastes in question will not be 
managed in an environmentally sound manner’.738 The meaning of the 
latter phrase is hardly clarified by the definition included in article 2, sub 
8, which refers to environmentally sound management as ‘taking all practi-
730 Artt 1, fi rst and second paragraph, and 3.
731 Schneider, ‘The Basel Convention’ (n 718) 271.
732 Or, as article 2, fi rst paragraph, provides: intended or legally required to be disposed of.
733 Operations that amount to ‘disposal’ are, for instance: deposition into or onto land, 
release into a water body, incineration on land etc.
734 Art 4, fi rst paragraph, sub a-c.
735 United Nations Environmental Programme (Committee for Administering the 
Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance of the Basel Convention), 
‘Manual for the implementation of the Basel Convention’ (24 June 2015) UN Doc UNEP/
CHW.12/9/Add.4/Rev.1, 12.
736 Bamako Convention on the ban of the import into Africa and control of transboundary 
movement and management of hazardous wastes within Africa (adopted 30 January 
1991, entered into force 22 April 1998) 2101 UNTS 177, art 4, fi rst pragraph. 
737 Art 4, second paragraph, sub a-d.
738 Art 4, second paragraph, sub e.
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cable steps to ensure that hazardous wastes or other wastes are managed in 
a manner which will protect human health and the environment against the 
adverse effects which may result from such wastes’.
States have to prohibit all persons under their jurisdiction from trans-
porting or disposing of hazardous wastes, with the exception of persons 
which are expressly authorised to perform these tasks.739 Article 4, ninth 
paragraph, imposes additional restrictions which inter alia consist of the 
requirement that hazardous and other wastes are only exported for recy-
cling purposes or if the exporting state does not have the technical capacity 
and the necessary facilities, capacity or suitable disposal sites in order to 
dispose of the wastes in an environmentally sound and efficient manner.740
In order to facilitate the implementation of the CCTMW, states are 
under the duty to designate one or more competent authorities and one 
‘focal point’.741 These national bodies serve as a channel of communication 
between the exporting state and the importing state or states whenever 
hazardous or other wastes are proposed to be transported across the 
border. The applicable procedure, which is prescribed by article 6 CCTMW 
and referred to as ‘prior informed consent procedure’, is initiated when 
the competent authorities of the anticipated importing state or states are 
informed by the exporting state of a planned transboundary movement of 
hazardous or other waste. The authorities that have received the notifica-
tion shall respond with a written consent to the planned transport, either 
with or without conditions, with a refusal or with a request of additional 
information.742 The transport may only commence after the written consent 
of the importing state and on the condition of the existence of a contract 
between the exporter and the disposer.743
Other obligations embodied in the treaty concern international 
co-operation with regard to, inter alia, the development of new waste-
related technologies and systems for waste-management and the exchange 
of information between state parties engaged in the transboundary move-
ment of hazardous or other wastes.744 Such information may relate to the 
occurrence of accidents during the transport of waste and to decisions made 
by state authorities to limit or ban the export of hazardous or other wastes. 
States must also annually submit a report on various aspects covered by the 
CCTMW.745
739 Art 4, seventh paragraph, sub a.
740 Art 4, ninth paragraph, sub a and b.
741 Art 5. It is not necessary that such designation is performed through the adoption of 
implementing legislation. See UNEP, ‘Manual for the implementation of the Basel 
Convention’ (n 735) 14.
742 Art 6, fi rst and second paragraph.
743 Art 6, third paragraph.
744 Artt 10 and 13.
745 Art 13, third paragraph.
519024-L-sub01-bw-Beenakker
Processed on: 18-4-2018
Chapter 8 Legislative standards as part of international environmental law 171
8.2.3 Legislative standards
8.2.3.1 Implementation and minimum requirements
Under article 4, fourth paragraph, CCTMW, state parties are under the 
obligation to take ‘appropriate legal, administrative and other measures 
to implement and enforce the provisions of this Convention, including 
measures to prevent and punish conduct in contravention of the 
Convention’.746 Aside from this general obligation to ensure the realisation 
of the CCTMW on the domestic level, norms of a more special character, as 
was discussed in the previous section, will often require the adoption of 
domestic legislation. For instance, article 4, seventh paragraph, sub a, can 
only be complied with if the state puts in place some domestic regulatory 
framework which provides for a legal prohibition complemented with 
certain exceptions.747 Similarly, the designation of national competent 
authorities in accordance with article 5 may also require a legal act of the 
state.
States retain the right to impose additional requirements for the protec-
tion of human health and the environment, under the condition that those 
domestic laws are consistent with the provisions of the CCTMW and with 
international law in general.748 In other words, the CCTMW contains 
minimum requirements.
8.2.3.2 Observance of applicable international and national law
As may be derived from several CCTMW provisions, domestic imple-
menting legislation must be consistent with other applicable legal instru-
ments, both international and national. For instance, hazardous wastes and 
other wastes that are intended to be the subject of transboundary move-
ment, must be packaged and labeled in conformity with ‘generally accepted 
and recognized international rules and standards’.749 Similarly, radioactive 
wastes and garbage which result from normal shipping operations, are 
excluded from the treaty’s scope, as they are subject to other international 
regimes.750 Apparently, the contracting parties have intended to avert a 
situation in which the aforementioned subject matter is covered by more 
than one international legal regime.751 Furthermore, whenever a state party 
746 Art 4, fourth paragraph.
747 Art 4, seventh paragraph, sub a, stipulates: ‘[Each Party shall] prohibit all persons under 
its national jurisdiction from transporting or disposing of hazardous wastes or other 
wastes unless such persons are authorized or allowed to perform such types of opera-
tions’.
748 Art 4, eleventh paragraph.
749 Art 4, seventh paragraph, sub b.
750 Art 1, third and fourth paragraph. 
751 Okaru, ‘The Basel Convention’ (n 720) 143-144.
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chooses to adopt stricter requirements for the protection of the environment 
and of public health, those additional domestic laws must respect ‘rules of 
international law’.752 More generally, it is stipulated that the CCTMW shall 
not:
‘affect in any way the sovereignty of States over their territorial sea established in accor-
dance with international law, and the sovereign rights and the jurisdiction which States 
have in their exclusive economic zones and their continental shelves in accordance with 
international law, and the exercise by ships and aircraft of all States of navigational rights 
and freedoms as provided for by international law and as reflected in relevant interna-
tional instruments’.753
Article 11 governs legal relations among state parties beyond from the 
CCTMW and relations between a state party and a third state. It provides 
that state parties may enter into bilateral, multilateral or regional agree-
ments regarding the transboundary movement of hazardous or other 
wastes, under the condition that those agreements are not less ‘environmen-
tally sound’ than the CCTMW.754 The CCTMW thus imposes limitations on 
the conclusion of other treaties on hazardous waste. In this way, the treaty 
aims to avoid waste exports to regions where applicable standards are less 
stringent.755 For the same reason, export to or import from third states is 
prohibited if no agreements, referred to in article 11, apply.756
Similarly, several of its provisions refer to national law. Most notably, in 
accordance with article 1, first paragraph, sub b, state parties may designate 
certain wastes not included in the annexes to the CCTMW as ‘hazardous’ 
under domestic law. In other words, the scope of the CCTMW may be 
broadened through the adoption of a national legal act.757
Put briefly, the aforementioned provisions indicate that under several 
specific CCTMW provisions, states that adopt domestic implementing 
measures have to pay heed to other relevant international law and national 
law.
752 Art 7, eleventh paragraph.
753 Art 4, twelfth paragraph.
754 Art 11, fi rst paragraph. Also Kummer, ‘The international regulation of transboundary 
traffi c in hazardous wastes’ (n 719) 546.
755 Ibid, 532.
756 Art 4, fi fth paragraph.
757 Pursuant to article 3, fi rst paragraph, a state party shall, within six months after it has 
become a party to the Convention, notify the Secretariat of the Convention of wastes 
which are labelled as ‘hazardous’ under its domestic law. Amendments to the applicable 
domestic laws must be brought to the attention of the Secretariat in accordance with 
article 13 second paragraph, sub b.
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8.2.3.3 Enforcement
Above we argued that parties to the CCTMW are not only under the duty 
to take appropriate measures to implement the treaty, but also to ‘enforce 
[its provisions], including measures to prevent and punish conduct in 
contravention of the Convention’.758 Thus, the mere adoption of domestic 
implementing legislation does not suffice; it must also be enforced.
In particular, the CCTMW imposes the obligation to ‘consider that 
illegal traffic in hazardous wastes or other wastes is criminal’ and to 
enact appropriate domestic legislation to prevent and punish illegal traf-
fic.759 Kummer notes that the labeling of illegal traffic as ‘criminal’ must 
be viewed as a ‘fairly rhetorical statement’.760 This statement, however, 
seems to differ from the approach taken in the relevant excerpt of the 
(non-binding) ‘Manual for implemention’, which reads: ‘[i]n deciding what 
penalties to impose, parties should also take into account article 4(3), which 
states that illegal traffic in hazardous wastes or other wastes is criminal’.761
Conduct that amounts to ‘illegal traffic’ is specified in article 9, first 
paragraph, and encompasses, in short, the transboundary movement 
of hazardous waste without the (valid) consent of concerned states or 
otherwise in contravention of the CCTMW. With regard to the obligation 
to prevent and punish illegal traffic, the Manual for implementation empha-
sises that state parties ‘have no discretion to implement administrative or 
other measures towards that end’; the enactment of domestic legislation is 
required.762
Whenever the occurrence of the illegal traffic on the part of the exporter 
or generator is established, the exporting state must ensure that the 
hazardous or other wastes are taken back by the exporter or generator, or 
to ensure the disposal of those wastes in accordance with the CCTMW.763
If, on the other hand, illegal traffic is the result of conduct on the part of 
the importer or disposer, the importing state have to ensure that the wastes 
are disposed of in an environmentally sound manner by the importer or 
disposer or, if necessary, by itself.764
758 Art 4, fourth paragraph. 
759 Artt 4, third paragraph, and 9, fi fth paragraph.
760 Kummer, ‘The international regulation of transboundary traffi c in hazardous wastes’ (n 
719) 551.
761 UNEP, ‘Manual for the implementation of the Basel Convention’ (n 735) 19.
762 Ibid.
763 Art 9, second paragraph.
764 Art 9, third paragraph.
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8.2.4 Overview
The analysis of the CCTMW, conducted in the previous sections, justifies 
the conclusion that the treaty imposes only a few legislative standards that 
must be observed in its implementation. First of all, applicable interna-
tional law must be respected, for instance norms with regard to labelling 
and packaging of hazardous wastes or other wastes. Domestic law may 
be relevant for the implementation as well, as categories of waste that are 
deemed ‘hazardous’ may be brought under the the scope of the CCTMW 
through a national legal act. These references to international and national 
law may indicate that the drafters of the CCTMW have made efforts to fit 
the treaty itself, and the national implementing measures to be adopted 
on the basis of the treaty, in the existing regulation of the transport of 
hazardous waste. Second, the CCTMW provides for the legislative standard 
to ensure the treaty’s enforcement on the domestic level. More specifically, 
it requires state parties to adopt the necessary measures for the prevention 
and punishment of violations of the CCTMW, most notably through the 
imposition of criminal sanctions.
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9 Legislative standards as part of 
international labour law
9.1 Implementation of the Maritime Labour Convention
9.1.1 General
The Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) was negotiated and adopted in the 
framework of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), an international 
organisation that was founded in 1919. In 1946 the ILO was incorporated 
in the newly established structure of the UN as a ‘specialised agency’.765
Its aim is to promote social justice and respect for labour rights. To this end 
it develops international labour standards.766 They encompass not only 
general topics, such as forced labour, child labour, equal renumeration etc., 
but also instruments that are applicable to specified groups of workers. 
An example of this latter category is the MLC, which lays down rights for 
seafarers. It was adopted at the 94th International Labour Conference in 
2006, which marked the end of a five year period of negotiations between 
representatives of states, shipowners and seafarers.767 This process had 
been instigated by the shipowning industry, which complained about the 
vast body of applicable legal instruments, each of which was ratified by a 
varying number of states. They believed a new and consolidated interna-
tional treaty would limit the negative consequences of the existing ‘check-
erboard of legal requirements’.768 The MLC is considered to be the ‘fourth 
pillar’ of international law to make shipping safer and more humane, in 
addition to three instruments which are known under the abbreviations 
765 The Instrument of Amendment to the ILO Convention and ChUN art 57, fi rst paragraph.
766 Constitution of the International Labour Organization (adopted 28 June 1919, entered 
into force 28 June 1919) 225 CTS 189 (Constitution of the ILO, as amended) preamble and 
art 1. Also General Conference of the International Labour Organisation, ‘Declaration 
concerning the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organisation (Declara-
tion of Philadelphia)’ (26th session 10 May 1944) <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO#declaration> (accessed 29 
March 2018).
767 International Labour Conference, ‘Adoption of an instrument to consolidate maritime 
labour standards’ Report I (1a) (94th session 7-23 February 2006) <http://www.ilo.org/
ilc/ILCSessions/94thSession/lang--en/index.htm> (accessed 29 March 2018).
768 J.I. Blanck jr., ‘Refl ections on the negotiation of the Maritime Labor Convention 2006 at 
the International Labor Organisation’ 31 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 1 (2006) 35-55, 39. 
Also P.B. Payoyo, ‘The contribution of the 2006 ILO Maritime Labour Convention to 
global governance’ in: A. Chircop, T. McDorman and S. Rolston (eds), The future of ocean 
regime-building. Essays in tribute to Douglas M. Johnston (Brill, Leiden 2009) 385-408, 399.
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SOLAS, MARPOL and STCW.769 It replaces 37 earlier ILO-Conventions, the 
first of which have been adopted in 1920.770 Therefore, the MLC has been 
described as ‘the very first comprehensive consolidation of international 
labour standards’.771 84 States have ratified the MLC, which entered into 
force on August 20, 2013.772
9.1.2 Content of the Convention
The text of the MLC does not contain an express statement of its purpose, 
except for the preambular section that refers to the desire to ‘create a single, 
coherent instrument embodying as far as possible all up-to-date standards 
of existing international maritime labour Conventions and Recom-
mendations, as well as the fundamental principles to be found in other 
international labour Conventions […]’ and the reference to ‘decent employ-
ment’ in article I MLC.773 However, its aim can be said to be twofold: the 
improvement of labour conditions for seafarers774 and to provide for a ‘level 
playing field’ for the industry. In other words, the MLC aims to ensure that 
dishonest shipowners do not enjoy competition advantages at the expense 
of their personnel, thus preventing a ‘race to the bottom’ in the protection of 
decent working conditions for seafarers.775
The MLC’s structure and content may be summarised as follows. The 
MLC’s core obligation is laid down in article I, which imposes the obliga-
769 The abbreviations refer to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(adopted 1 November 1974, entered into force 25 May 1980) 1184 UNTS 277; International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (adopted 2 November 1973, 
entered into force 2 October 1983) 1340 UNTS 184; International Convention on Stan-
dards of Training, Certifi cation and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (adopted 7 Juliy 1987, 
entered into force 28 April 1984) 1361 UNTS 190 respectively. Blanck jr., ‘Refl ections on 
the negotiation of the Maritime Labor Convention’ (n 768) 36-37. Also O. Adăscălţei, ‘The 
Maritime Labour Convention 2006. A long-awaited change in the maritime sector’ 149 
Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences (2014) 8-13, 9; Payoyo, ‘The contribution of the 2006 
ILO Maritime Labour Convention to global governance’ (n 768) 402.
770 MLC art X. 
771 Payoyo, ‘The contribution of the 2006 ILO Maritime Labour Convention to global gover-
nance’ (n 768) 387.
772 In accordance with article VIII, third paragraph, of the Convention.
773 See also article I of the Convention and paragraph 7 of the Explanatory note to the 
Regulations and the Code of the Maritime Labour Convention, which identifi es three 
‘underlying purposes’: to lay down a fi rm set of rights and principles, fl exibility in imple-
mentation and compliance and enforcement of those rights and principles. ILO, ‘Explan-
atory note to the regulations and the code of the Maritime Labour Convention’ <http://
www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:91:0::::P91_SECTION:MLCA_
AMEND_N1> (accessed 29 March 2018).
774 P.J. Bauer, ‘The Maritime Labour Convention: an adequate guarantee of seafarer rights, 
or an impediment to true reforms?’ 8 Chicago Journal of International Law 2 (2008) 643-659, 
643.
775 Blanck jr., ‘Refl ections on the negotiation of the Maritime Labor Convention’ (n 768) 37. 
Also Payoyo, ‘The contribution of the 2006 ILO Maritime Labour Convention to global 
governance’ (n 768) 389, 392 and 394-395.
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tion on states to ‘give complete effect to [the treaty’s] provisions in the 
manner set out in Article VI in order to secure the rights of all seafarers to 
decent employment’. Article VI refers to the ‘Regulations’ and the ‘Code’ 
that are annexed to the MLC. It thus comprises three parts: the articles, the 
Regulations and the Code. The articles and Regulations contain the ‘core 
rights and principles and basic obligations’ of states. The Code provides for 
additional guidance in a more detailed manner, which consists of manda-
tory ‘standards’ and non-mandatory ‘guidelines’.776
The Regulations and the Code apply to five subject areas: minimum 
requirements for seafarers to work on a ship; conditions of employment; 
accommodation, recreational facilities, food and catering; health protec-
tion, medical care, welfare and social security protection; and compliance 
and enforcement.777 These areas are covered by five ‘titles’, each of which 
contains regulations, standards and guidelines. As a rule, the Regulations 
tend to be more concise than the (mandatory) standards and (non-manda-
tory) guidelines; the three categories combined comprise 28 regulations and 
cover 73 pages.
In addition, articles III and IV MLC codify several ‘fundamental rights 
and principles’ and seafarer’s rights, jointly referred to as the ‘Seafarer Bill 
of Rights’778 encompassing inter alia the abolition of child labour and the 
right to a safe and secure workplace.779 The rights embodied in article IV 
are to be ‘fully implemented in accordance with the requirements of this 
Convention’.780
Finally, pursuant to article V, first paragraph, a state party has a duty 
to ‘implement and enforce laws or regulations or other measures that it has 
adopted to fulfil its commitments under this Convention with respect to 
ships and seafarers under its jurisdiction’. This requirement entails inter alia 
the exercise of jurisdiction and control over ships by the flag state, which 
is to be achieve ‘by establishing a system for ensuring compliance’ with 
the MLC.781 In addition to the responsibilities of the flag state, port states 
may conduct inspections in order to determine whether the ship meets the 
requirements of the MLC.782
776 Art VI, fi rst paragraph, and ILO, ‘Explanatory note’ (n 773), par. 2-4. Also Blanck jr., 
‘Refl ections on the negotiation of the Maritime Labor Convention’ (n 768) 42-43.
777 ILO, ‘Explanatory note’ (n 773) par. 5.
778 Blanck jr., ‘Refl ections on the negotiation of the Maritime Labor Convention’ (n 768) 
45-46.
779 Artt III, sub c, and IV, fi rst paragraph. As Payoyo notes, the fundamental rights enumer-
ated in article III, refer to the ‘core’ ILO-Conventions which have been identifi ed in the 
preamble to the Maritime Labour Convention. The rights referred to in article IV refl ect 
the range of the 37 conventions, mentioned in article X, which the Maritime Labour 
Convention seeks to consolidate. Payoyo, ‘The contribution of the 2006 ILO Maritime 
Labour Convention to global governance’ (n 768) 404.
780 Art IV, fi fth paragraph.
781 Art V, second paragraph.
782 Art V, fourth paragraph.
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9.1.3 Legislative standards
9.1.3.1 Implementation, harmonisation and flexibility
In the previous section it was stated that parties are under the obligation 
to give ‘complete effect’ to the MLC’s provisions. First and foremost, they 
include the extensive body of requirements embodied in the Regulations 
and the Code, as stated in article VI, second paragraph. Second, the obliga-
tion to give effect to the MLC relates to the employment and social rights 
entrenched in article IV. For both categories, states are required to ‘imple-
ment and enforce laws or regulations or other measures that is has adopted 
to fulfill its commitments under this Convention’.783
Above is was argued that the Code, which is part of the MLC, distin-
guishes between mandatory regulations and standards (‘Part A’) and 
non-mandatory guidelines (‘Part B’). Whereas the former category of norms 
have to be respected and implemented, the implementation of the latter 
category ‘should be given due consideration’.784 The consequence of this 
distinction is explained as follows:
‘If, having duly considered the relevant Guidelines, a Member decides to provide for dif-
ferent arrangements which ensure the proper storage, use and maintenance of the contents 
of the medicine chest, to take the example given above, as required by the Standard in Part 
A, then that is acceptable. On the other hand, by following the guidance provided in Part 
B, the Member concerned, as well as the ILO bodies responsible for reviewing implementa-
tion of international labour Conventions, can be sure without further consideration that 
the arrangements the Member has provided for are adequate to implement the responsi-
bilities under Part A to which the Guideline relates.’785
From this it may be derived that states are not only required to abide by the 
compulsory provisions of the MLC, but are also encouraged to observe its 
optional norms. The treaty thus imposes minimum requirements. This is 
also reflected in article 19, eighth paragraph, of the Constitution of the ILO, 
which provides that the conventions adopted in the framework of the ILO 
contain minimum requirements; states are allowed to provide for additional 
protection.786
In addition to its harmonisation efforts which consist of both manda-
tory and non-mandatory provisions, the regime allows for some measure of 
783 Artt I, fi rst paragraph, and V, fi rst paragraph.
784 Art VI, second paragraph.
785 ILO, ‘Explanatory note’ (n 773) par. 10. Also Bauer, ‘The Maritime Labour Convention’ (n 
774) 646 and Payoyo, ‘The contribution of the 2006 ILO Maritime Labour Convention to 
global governance’ (n 768) 387.
786 Article 19, eighth paragraph, of the Constitution of International Labour Convention, 
reads: ‘In no case shall the adoption of any Convention or Recommendation by the 
Conference, or the ratifi cation of any Convention by any Member, be deemed to affect 
any law, award, custom or agreement which ensures more favourable conditions to the 
workers concerned than those provided for in the Convention or Recommendation’.
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flexibility in accordance with the statement ‘inflexible with respect to rights 
and flexible with respect to implementation’.787 This flexibility is pursued in 
two ways. State parties may choose to give effect to the standards included 
in the Code through national measures which are ‘substantially equivalent’ 
to those standards, a term which was derived from the 1976 Merchant Ship-
ping Convention.788 This exemption does not apply to Title 5 of the Regula-
tions and the Code regarding compliance and enforcement.789 To determine 
whether the ‘substantial equivalence’-criterion is met, the state party should 
satisfy itself that the national measure ‘is conducive to the full achievement 
of the general object and purpose’ of the relevant provision and that it 
‘gives effect’ to that provision.790 Moreover, flexibility was anticipated by 
the formulation of the mandatory provisions ‘in a more general way, thus 
leaving a wider scope for discretion as to the precise action to be provided 
for at the national level’.791
9.1.3.2 Observance of specified human rights
Under the MLC, implementation must be performed in accordance with 
what we have termed ‘legislative standards’. Article III on ‘fundamental 
rights and principles’ which provides that a state party ‘shall satisfy itself 
that the provisions of its law and regulations respect, in the context of this 
Convention, the fundamental rights to freedom of association and the effec-
tive recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of all 
forms of forced or compulsory labour, the effective abolition of child labour 
and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupa-
tion’. The substance of this duty remains somewhat vague due to the choice 
of the term ‘satisfy’, which may possess a nature that is less compulsory 
than, for instance, an obligation to ‘ensure’ that its domestic laws respect 
to aforementioned rights. In this regard, it is noted in the commentary to 
the MLC that the state has to satisfy itself that ‘those fundamental rights 
are reflected in the relevant legislation’.792 It is thus clear that domestic 
implementing legislation is circumscribed, to a certain extent at least, by the 
rights entrenched in article III.
787 International Labour Conference, ‘Adoption of an instrument to consolidate maritime 
labour standards’ (n 767) 10.
788 Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention (adopted 29 October 1976, 
entered into force 28 November 1981) ILO C147, art 2. Also Blanck jr., ‘Refl ections on the 
negotiation of the Maritime Labor Convention’ (n 768) 51.
789 Title 5, paragraph 2, of the Regulations and the Code.
790 Art VI, third and fourth paragraph. Also I. Christodoulou-Varotsi, ‘Critical review of the 
consolidated Maritime Labour Convention (2006) of the International Labour Organisa-
tion. Limitations and perspectives’ 43 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 4 (2012) 
467-489, 473-475.
791 ILO, ‘Explanatory note’ (n 773) par. 9.
792 International Labour Conference, ‘Adoption of an instrument to consolidate maritime 
labour standards’ (n 767) 19-20.
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Interestingly, an inverse approach is taken with regard to the implemen-
tation of employment and social rights, embodied in article IV, to which 
seafarers are entitled. Contrary to the requirement of article III, discussed 
above, that fundamental rights shall be taken into account in the imple-
mentation of the convention, article IV prescribes that the MLC must be 
observed in the implementation of the employment and social rights.793
With regard to the implementation of the employment and social 
rights, it is noteworthy that it is expressly provided that ‘[…] such imple-
mentation may be achieved through national laws or regulations, through 
applicable collective bargaining agreements or through other measures or 
in practice’.794 The MLC thus expressly addresses the nature of domestic 
measures aimed at the implementation of its codified human rights 
provisions. Although this may be considered remarkable as it specifically 
enumerates the various means of implementation that may be resorted 
to, the possible means of implementation are described in such a broad 
manner, especially as a result of the reference to ‘other measures’ and ‘prac-
tice’, that it is difficult to conceive of an implementing measure that would 
fall outside the scope of this provision.
9.1.3.3 Observance of applicable international and national law
In addition to the legislative standards which refer to human rights, 
which were discussed in the previous section and which are part of the 
MLC itself, one provision expressly requires that the adoption of domestic 
implementing measures should be performed in accordance with other
norms of international law. As will be discussed below, the MLC contains 
an obligation to provide for sanctions in response to violations of the treaty. 
This obligation shall be performed ‘in accordance with international law’.795
What does this restriction entail? As may be derived from the commentary 
to the MLC, it encompasses ‘other relevant Conventions, such as UNCLOS’, 
referring to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.796 The 
drafters may have had in mind article 217, eight paragraph, of this treaty, 
which reads: ‘[p]enalties provided for by the laws and regulations of States 
for vessels flying their flag shall be adequate in severity to discourage viola-
tions wherever they occur’. This phrase is almost identical to its equiva-
lent that is included in the MLC and may thus serve as a reminder that, 
as regards penalties, the MLC should be interpreted in conformity with 
UNCLOS.
793 Art IV, fifth paragraph, first sentence, provides: ‘Each Member shall ensure, within 
the limits of its jurisdiction, that the seafarers’ employment and social rights set out in 
the preceding paragraphs of this Article are fully implemented in accordance with the 
requirements of this Convention’.
794 Art IV, fi fth paragraph, second sentence.
795 Art V, sixth paragraph.
796 International Labour Conference, ‘Adoption of an instrument to consolidate maritime 
labour standards’ (n 767) 21.
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In addition, the obligations codified in the MLC which require the 
adoption of domestic implementing legislation contain references to national
law. A few examples may suffice here. Standard A1.1, second paragraph, 
stipulates that night work of seafarers under the age of 18 is prohibited. It is 
added that the term ‘night’ is to be defined in national law. With regard to 
medical care state parties have a duty to ‘ensure that, to the extent consistent 
with the Member’s national law and practice, medical care and health protec-
tion services while a seafarer is on board ship or landed in a foreign port are 
provided free of charge to seafarers’.797 Furthermore, under standard A.4.2, 
first paragraph, sub b, shipowners are required to ‘provide financial secu-
rity to assure compensation in the event of the death or long-term disability 
of seafarers due to an occupational injury, illness or hazard, as set out in 
national law, the seafarers’ employment agreement or collective agreement’. 
Finally, a state party is under the obligation to ensure that all seafarers and, 
to the extent provided for in its national law, their dependents have access to 
social security protection.798 The italicised phrase must be understood as to 
leave the determination of the particulars of coverage to the national law 
of the flag state.799 The importance of these references to international law 
and national law lies in the fact that the drafters of the text have considered 
that the domestic implementing legislation should be subject to applicable 
international and national legal norms. In other words, the treaty obliga-
tions must be implemented in a way that is consistent with other applicable 
law of both national and international origin.
9.1.3.4 Compliance and enforcement
Compared to other international legal instruments, the MLC contains 
elaborate norms applicable to its enforcement. They have been called the 
‘lynchpin’800 of the MLC and can be derived from article V, second para-
graph, which stipulates: ‘[e]ach Member shall effectively exercise its juris-
diction and control over ships that fly its flag by establishing a system for 
ensuring compliance with the requirements of this Convention, including 
regular inspections, reporting, monitoring and legal proceedings under 
the applicable laws’. In addition to this responsibility of the flag state, port 
states are permitted to inspect foreign ships in order to determine whether 
they abide by the Convention requirements.801 Title 5 of the Regulations and 
Code on compliance and enforcement includes 18 pages of mandatory and 
797 Standard A4.1, fi rst paragraph, sub d.
798 Regulation 4.5, fi rst paragraph.
799 International Labour Conference, ‘Adoption of an instrument to consolidate maritime 
labour standards’ (n 767) 45.
800 Blanck jr., ‘Refl ections on the negotiation of the Maritime Labor Convention’ (n 768) 53.
801 Art V, fourth paragraph.
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non-mandatory provisions that describe in detail the responsibilities of state 
parties.802 The mandatory provisions may be summarised as follows.
Flag states are responsible for the establishment of an effective system 
for the inspection and certification of maritime labour conditions. This 
system may include the authorisation of public institutions or other organ-
isations to carry out inspections and to issue maritime labour certificates.803
The entities authorised to carry out the inspections should be competent 
and independent, which means inter alia that they should have the neces-
sary expertise in the relevant aspects of the MLC and an appropriate 
knowledge of ship operations.804 Inspectors must be qualified to adequately 
perform their tasks and must be bestowed with the necessary powers.805
The presence of a maritime labour certificate is required for ships over 500 
gross tonnage and is prima facie evidence that the ship has satisfied the 
requirements set forth in the MLC.806 The document, a model of which is 
annexed to the MLC, can only be obtained after inspection and is usually 
valid for five years.807 In addition, flag states have a duty to provide for 
on-board complaint procedures for the fair, effective and expeditious 
handling of seafarer complaints about alleged breaches MLC, to initiate an 
investigation into any serious marine casualty which results in injury or loss 
of life.808
Whereas flag states have an obligation to perform inspections, port 
states may subject ships to such procedures as well. In absence of any 
indication to the contrary, port states shall accept the maritime labour 
certificate as prima facie evidence of compliance with the MLC.809 If, on the 
other hand, an official of the port state has reasons to believe that the ship 
does not entirely abide by the MLC’s provisions, he may carry out a more 
detailed inspection and, if necessary, take appropriate measures, including 
the prevention of sailing.810 Finally, a port state is, similar to the flag state, 
required to provide for an onshore procedure through which seafarers can 
file a complaint in relation to an alleged breach of the MLC.811
Enforcement also encompasses penalisation. Above it was noted that 
a state party is under the obligation to ‘prohibit violations of the require-
ments of this Convention’ and to establish, in accordance with international 
802 S. Ruano Albertos, and A. Vicente Palacio, ‘Adopting European legislation to the Mari-
time Labour Convention 2006 regulations in relation to the state responsibilities of both 
the fl ag state and the control of ships by port state control’ 4 Beijing Law Review 4 (2013) 
141-146; Bauer, ‘The Maritime Labour Convention’ (n 774) 648.
803 Regulation 5.1.1, second and third paragraph.
804 Regulation 5.1.2, fi rst paragraph, and standard A5.1.2, fi rst paragraph.
805 Regulation 5.1.4 and standard A5.1.4, fi rst, second, third and seventh paragraph.
806 Regulation 5.1.1, fi rst and third paragraph.
807 Regulation 5.1.1, third and fi fth paragraph, and standard A5.1.3, fi rst paragraph, and 
appendix A5-II.
808 Regulations 5.1.5 and 5.1.6.
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law, ‘sanctions or require the adoption of corrective measures under its 
laws which are adequate to discourage such violations’.812 The prohibition 
and penalisation of transgressions of the MLC will, given the principles of 
nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege, often require the adoption of 
domestic legislation. The standard which is imposed by the MLC thus does 
not go beyond the element of deterrence (‘adequate to discourage viola-
tions’).
In sum, the MLC provides for an extensive regulatory framework in 
order to ensure compliance with and enforcement of the treaty. The manda-
tory provisions of this framework must be included in the domestic imple-
menting legislation.
9.1.3.5 Prohibition of favourable treatment of third states
Finally, an important element of the MLC regime can be found in the prohi-
bition of a more favourable treatment of states that are not a party in the 
implementation of [the] responsibilities under the treaty.813 This, of course, 
is an important component of the international legal regime that aims 
to improve labour conditions of seafarers across the globe, as it removes 
competitive advantages that states, and ships flying under their flags, may 
enjoy as a consequence of non-ratification.814 For the states party to the 
MLC, this means that domestic implementing legislation applicable to the 
treatment of foreign ships may not distinguish between states bound by the 
MLC and states that are not, if that distinction gives rise to more favourable 
treatment of ships flying the flag of a third state.
9.1.4 Overview
The MLC consolidates many existing ILO-conventions and serves to 
protect the rights of seafarers. It does so by prescribing detailed standards 
laid down in mandatory and non-mandatory provisions. State parties are 
under the obligation to give effect to its provisions. To this end, they must 
adopt implementing measures on the national level. These implementing 
measures are governed by several elements of the MLC, which may be 
summarised as follows. First of all, domestic implementing legislation 
should not infringe on the fundamental rights to which seafarers are 
entitled. Second, national measures that serve to implement specific MLC 
obligations refer to (other) international law and national laws, thereby 
812 Art V, sixth paragraph.
813 Article V, seventh paragraph, provides: ‘Each Member shall implement its responsibili-
ties under this Convention in such a way as to ensure that the ships that fl y the fl ag of any 
State that has not ratifi ed this Convention do not receive more favourable treatment than 
the ships that fl y the fl ag of any State that has ratifi ed it’.




184 Part II The regulation of implementing legislation under selected international legal regimes:
 legislative standards
ensuring consistency with other applicable norms. Third, particular atten-
tion has been given to compliance and enforcement of the MLC, which 
imposes obligations on flag states and port states to ensure that the MLC’s 
provisions and domestic implementing legislation is respected. The impor-
tance attributed to issues of compliance and enforcement may be explained 
by the MLC’s aim to create a ‘level playing field’ between shipowners 
across the globe. This objective was also the motivation for the inclusion of 
a prohibition of favourable treatment of third parties.
9.2 Implementation of the Convention concerning Decent Work 
for Domestic Workers
9.2.1 General
While the ILO-Convention that was discussed in paragraph 9.1 is particu-
larly aimed at seafarers’ rights, the Convention concerning Decent Work 
for Domestic Workers (CDWDW) aims to enhance the protection of, as the 
name indicates, domestic workers. It has been estimated that the number 
of domestic workers worldwide is between 53 and 100 million persons, 
compared to roughly 1 million seafarers.815 Domestic workers, often 
women, perform household tasks in a ‘largely unregulated and unprotected 
sector of the economy’.816 This may be explained by the fact that domestic 
work is performed in the privacy of the employer’s household.817 In this 
environment, domestic workers are confronted with poor working condi-
tions and exploitation.818 Moreover, the existing body of international 
labour standards were perceived to address the problems faced by domestic 
wokers in an incomplete manner.819 In order to provide the necessary 
protection to this group of workers, efforts were made to draft a legally 
binding international treaty, which was adopted in 2011. The underlying 
assumption of the CDWDW is that domestic workers should be treated 
as any other employee and therefore should receive equal protection. In 
other words, it is the employment relationship that counts, not the type 
of work.820 Once such relationship has been established, the CDWDW 
815 A. Blackett, ‘Current developments. The Decent Work for Domestic Workers Convention 
and Recommendation, 2011’ 106 American Journal of International Law 4 (2012) 778-794, 
779-780.
816 M. Tomei and P. Belser, ‘New ILO standards on decent work for domestic workers. A 
summary of the issues and discussions’ 150 International Labour Review 3-4 (2011) 431-438, 432.
817 Ibid. Also E. Albin and V. Mantouvalou, ‘Recent legislation. The ILO Convention on 
Domestic Workers. From the shadows to the light’ 41 Industrial Law Journal 1 (2012) 67-78, 69.
818 Albin and Mantouvalou, ‘Recent legislation’ (n 817) 69.
819 M. Oelz, ‘The ILO’s Domestic Workers Convention and Recommendation. A window of 
opportunity for social justice’ 153 International Labour Review 1 (2014) 143-172, 149.
820 Albin and Mantouvalou, ‘Recent legislation’ (n 817) 75-76. Also Blackett, ‘Current devel-
opments’ (n 815) 779-780.
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provides for certain human rights to which the domestic worker is entitled. 
It was supplemented by the non-binding Recommendation concerning 
Decent Work for Domestic Workers, which offers additional guidance for 
the implementation of the Convention. As yet, 24 states have ratified the 
CDWDW, which entered into force in 2013.821
9.2.2 Content of the Convention
The purpose of the CDWDW is not expressly codified in the body of the 
treaty, but can be derived from its preamble. It is stated that domestic 
workers are ‘particularly vulnerable to discrimination in respect of condi-
tion of employment and of work, and to other abuses of human rights’. 
Against this background, it was considered ‘desirable to supplement the 
general [ILO-]standards with standards specific to domestic workers so as 
to enable them to enjoy their rights fully’.822
In order to achieve this objective, the CDWDW contains various obliga-
tions, such as the duty to set a minimum age for domestic workers in accor-
dance with the provisions of the Minimum Age Convention and the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour Convention.823 Furthermore, state parties must take 
measures to ensure that domestic workers enjoy effective protection against 
abuse, harassment and violence, and fair terms of employment and decent 
working conditions and, if domestic workers reside in the household, 
decent living conditions that respect their privacy.824 Article 9 provides for 
additional rights for domestic workers, such as the freedom to reach agree-
ment with their (potential) employer on whether to reside in the household 
and the right to keep their identity documents. Moreover, state parties are 
under the obligation to take measures ensuring equal treatment between 
domestic workers en workers generally in relation to ‘normal hours of work, 
overtime compensation, periods of daily and weekly rest and paid annual 
leave’ in accordance with domestic law.825 These words were agreed upon 
after it was concluded that measuring working hours was impractical due to 
the varying intensity of domestic work as a result of the changing needs of 
the household throughout the day.826 Domestic workers are also entitled to 
minimum wage coverage, if such coverage exists, and to a safe and healthy 
821 Information available at: <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:
11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:2551460> (accessed 29 March 2018). 
822 In this regard, ‘[g]eneral’ refers to other ILO-Conventions and recommendations which 
are not particularly aimed at domestic workers, but which are applicable to domestic 
workers nonetheless, such as the Migration for Employment Convention.
823 Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (adopted 26 June 
1973, entered into force 19 June 1976) 1015 UNTS 297 (Minimum Age Convention) art 4, 
fi rst paragraph. 
824 Art 5 and 6.
825 Art 10, fi rst paragraph.
826 Tomei and Belser, ‘New ILO standards on decent work for domestic workers’ (n 816) 435.
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working environment.827 Another important right which is created by the 
CDWDW is laid down in article 14, first paragraph, which provides that 
states have to ensure that domestic workers enjoy conditions that are not 
less favourable than those applicable to workers generally in respect of 
social security protection, including with respect to maternity.828
9.2.3 Legislative standards
9.2.3.1 Implementation and harmonisation
Pursuant to article 3, first paragraph, ‘[e]ach Member shall take measures 
to ensure the effective promotion and protection of the human rights of all 
domestic workers, as set out in [the] Convention’. This provision may be 
viewed as the general obligation to adopt implementing legislation on the 
national level, which must be distinguished from various particular obli-
gations to enact domestic legislation with a view of achieving a specified 
policy aim. An example of such particular obligation may be found in article 
8, fourth paragraph, which reads: ‘Each Member shall specify, by means of 
laws, regulations or other measures, the conditions under which migrant 
domestic workers are entitled to repatriation on the expiry or termination of 
the employment contract for which they were recruited’.
Article 3, first paragraph, is complemented by the requirement 
en trenched in article 18, which stipulates:
‘Each Member shall implement the provisions of this Convention, in consultation with the 
most representative employers and workers organisations, through laws and regulations, 
as well as through collective agreements or additional measures consistent with national 
practice, by extending or adapting existing measures to cover domestic workers or by 
developing specific measures for them, as appropriate.’
Aside from the duty to consult employers and workers organisations, the 
normative value of this general provision is probably limited, however, as 
the suggested means and methods of implementation are formulated in a 
very broad manner; it may be hard to imagine a domestic implementing 
measure which cannot be accepted to meet the standards set out in article 18.
In addition to the general obligation embodied in article 3, first para-
graph, the CDWDW also imposes the obligation to take the measures set out 
in the treaty to ‘respect, promote and realize the fundamental principles and 
rights at work’. According to article 3, second paragraph, these encompass 
inter alia the freedom of association and the effective abolition of child labour.
As was noted with regard to the MLC, discussed in section 9.1 the 
CDWDW contains minimum standards; state parties are permitted to main-
827 Artt 11 and 13, fi rst paragraph.
828 Art 14, fi rst paragraph.
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tain or adopt national measures that are more favourable from the worker’s 
perspective.
The efforts to harmonise national policies towards domestic workers 
have resulted in binding norms, codified in the CDWDW, which have to 
be observed by the state parties. As stated above, these norms are supple-
mented by the non-binding Recommendation concerning Decent Work for 
Domestic Workers, which should be considered in conjunction with the 
provisions of the CDWDW. Above it was stated that domestic workers are 
entitled, under article 6 CDWDW, to decent working conditions and, if they 
reside in the household, decent living conditions that respect their privacy. 
This may include the provision of food and accommodation, if the worker 
and his employer so agree in accordance with article 7 CDWDW. Pursuant 
to paragraph 17 of the Recommendation, these rights are supplemented 
with the following, non-mandatory provision:
‘When provided, accommodation and food should include, taking into account national 
conditions, the following: (a) a separate, private room that is suitably furnished, adequate-
ly ventilated and equipped with a lock, the key to which should be provided to the domes-
tic worker; (b) access to suitable sanitary facilities, shared or private; (c) adequate lighting 
and, as appropriate, heating and air conditioning in keeping with prevailing conditions 
within the household; and (d) meals of good quality and sufficient quantity, adapted to the 
extent reasonable to the cultural and religious requirements, if any, of the domestic worker 
concerned.’
Put briefly, the Recommendation contains additional guidelines, often with 
a more specific character than the provisions laid down in the CDWDW. 
Thus, the Recommendation’s provisions go beyond what is strictly required 
by the CDWDW. In one respect, however, the CDWDW itself seems to 
make a distinction between mandatory and non-mandatory measures and 
thus permits states to go beyond the minimum requirements. According 
to article 7, states are under the obligation to take measures to ensure that 
domestic workers are informed of their terms and conditions of employ-
ment in an appropriate, verifiable and easily understandable manner. ‘[P]
referably, where possible’, it is added, such information must be provided 
‘through written contracts’ which contain certain specified elements that are 
enumerated in the CDWDW.829
829 These elements include: the name and address of the employer and of the worker; the 
address of the usual workplace or workplaces; the starting date and, where the contract 
is for a specified period of time, its duration; the type of work to be performed; the 
remuneration, method of calculation and periodicity of payments; the normal hours of 
work; paid annual leave, and daily and weekly rest periods; the provision of food and 
accommodation, if applicable; the period of probation or trial period, if applicable; the 
terms of repatriation, if applicable; and terms and conditions relating to the termina-
tion of employment, including any period of notice by either the domestic worker or 
the employer. For additional, non-mandatory elements, see paragraph 6, sub 2, of ILO 
Recommendation R201: Recommendation concerning Decent Work for Domestic 
Workers (100th Conference session Geneva 16 June 2011).
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9.2.3.2 Observance of applicable international and national law
Some provisions of the CDWDW expressly refer to other international legal 
instruments that have to be observed during its implementation. Article 
8, first paragraph, contains the right of migrant domestic workers, once 
they are recruited in one country to work in another, to receive written job 
offers or contracts of employment that are enforceable in the latter country. 
This provision, however, does not apply to ‘domestic workers who enjoy 
freedom of movement for the purpose of employment under bilateral, 
regional and multilateral agreements, or within the framework of regional 
economic integration areas’. Of course, this exception aims to accommodate 
the existence of regions which consist of multiple states, such as the EU, in 
which employees can move freely.
There is another example of a CDWDW provision which refers to 
other international legal instruments for the purpose of its implementa-
tion. Pursuant to article 19, the CDWDW ‘does not affect more favourable 
provisions applicable to domestic workers under other international 
labour Conventions’. In section 9.2.2 it was argued that the CDWDW was 
intended to ‘supplement’ the general ILO-standards to which domestic 
workers are entitled. The provision contained in article 19 emphasises the 
supplementary, instead of exclusive, nature of the CDWDW. In giving effect 
to the CDWDW’s provisions, therefore, state authorities must ensure that 
the implementation is performed in a way that is consistent with other, 
for domestic workers more favourable, provisions which are applicable to 
domestic workers.
Other parts of the treaty prescribe that applicable domestic laws 
must be respected during the implementation. Article 13, first paragraph, 
requires state parties to ‘take, in accordance with national laws, regulations and 
practice, effective measures […] to ensure the occupational safety and health 
of domestic workers’. Furthermore, with regard to the right of domestic 
workers to be paid directly in cash at regular intervals at least once a 
month, as laid down in article 12, first paragraph, such payment can be 
made by bank transfer, bank cheque, postal cheque or other lawful means 
of monetary payment, ‘[u]nless provided for by national laws, regulations 
or collective agreements’.830 These examples indicate that the implementa-
tion of the CDWDW should be performed in a way that is consistent with 
domestic laws.
Domestic law can be relevant in other, more subtle ways. Under the 
CDWDW, a domestic worker is ‘any person engaged in domestic work 
within an employment relationship’.831 Blackett notes that the use of terms 
‘employment relationship’ bears the risk that migrant workers without legal 
830 Similar references to domestic law can be found in articles 7, 10, fi rst and third paragraph, 
14, fi rst paragraph, 15, fi rst paragraph, sub a, 16 and 17, second and third paragraphs.
831 Art 1, sub b.
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migration status fall outside the scope of the definition of ‘domestic worker’ 
if their employment contracts are considered unenforceable, since domestic 
legal practice varies on the effects of migrant status on the employment 
relationship.832 Of course, such ‘interaction with national legal doctrines’,833
with respect to the interpretation of terminology agreed upon on the 
international level, is inherent to any international regime that requires the 
adoption of national implementing measures.834
Furthermore, article 4, first paragraph, refers to both international law 
and national law, since it stipulates that state parties are under the obligation 
to ‘set a minimum age for domestic workers consistent with the provisions 
of the the Minimum Age Convention […] and the Worst Forms of Child 
Labour Convention, […] and not lower than that established by national 
laws and regulations for workers generally’.835 In practice, this means that 
domestic work is considered to be child labour when workers below the age 
of 18 are younger than the minimum age required for admission to work or 
if they are in a situation amounting to work that is detrimental to children, 
including slavery.836 With regard to the determination of a minimum age 
for domestic workers, the adoption of implementing legislation must be 
consistent with these national and international legal provisions.
9.2.3.3  Remedies, complaint mechanisms, monitoring of compliance and 
enforcement
The codification of domestic workers’ rights may remain without practical 
effect unless those rights can be enforced on the domestic level. Therefore, 
state parties have accepted the obligation to ‘establish effective and acces-
sible complaint mechanisms and means of ensuring compliance with 
national laws and regulations for the protection of domestic workers’. 
Similarly, they have to ‘ensure […] that all domestic workers, either by 
themselves or through a representative, have effective access to courts, 
tribunals or other dispute resolution mechanisms under conditions that are 
not less favourable than those available to workers generally’. Moreover, 
they have a duty to ‘develop and implement measures for labour inspec-
tion, enforcement and penalties […] in accordance with national laws and 
regulations’.837 In other words, the enforcement of the CDWDW on the 
832 Blackett, ‘Current developments’ (n 815) 787.
833 Ibid.
834 In this context, Oelz notes that the Convention’s preamble contains a reference to the 
Employment Relationship Recommendation which contains some guidance on the 
existence of an employment relationship. Oelz, ‘The ILO’s Domestic Workers Convention 
and Recommendation’ (n 819) 154.
835 Also Recommendation concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers (n 829) par. 5.
836 Oelz, ‘The ILO’s Domestic Workers Convention and Recommendation’ (n 819) 158.
837 Artt 16 and 17, fi rst and second paragraph. With regard to migrant workers, see also 
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national level, in accordance with the provisions cited above, is envisaged 
in two ways. First, enforcement by or on behalf of the domestic worker who 
claims that his rights have been violated through national courts, tribu-
nals or similar complaint procedures. Second, enforcement by the public 
authorities through inspections and the imposition of penalties for violation 
of the domestic worker’s rights. As regards the latter, the treaty negotia-
tors were aware of the fact that labour inspections will, given the nature of 
domestic work, often require access to private premises. As a result, labour 
inspections were considered to be problematic, given the inviolability of 
the home, as entrenched in international human rights law and national 
constitutions.838 This may explain why the CDWDW does not prescribe 
how the domestic worker’s right to protection and the employer’s right to 
privacy must be balanced; it is left to states to ‘specify the conditions under 
which access to household premises may be granted, having due respect for 
privacy’.839
9.2.3.4 Non-discrimination
In section 9.2.1 it was argued that the underlying assumption of the 
CDWDW is that domestic workers should be treated as any other employee 
and therefore should receive equal protection. Thus, the notion of non-
discrimination of domestic workers (vis-à-vis other categories of workers) 
lies at the heart of the CDWDW and influences the adoption of national 
implementing legislation in several respects. For instance, article 10, first 
paragraph, provides that states must take measures towards ‘ensuring equal 
treatment between domestic workers and workers generally in relation to 
normal hours of work, overtime compensation, periods of daily and weekly 
rest and paid annual leave in accordance with national laws, regulations 
and collective agreements, taking into account the special characteristics of 
domestic work’.840 Arguably, it goes too far to derive from this provision a 
requirement that domestic legal regimes applicable to domestic workers on 
the one hand, and to other categories of workers on the other hand, must 
be identical. Nevertheless, discrepancies between the legal regimes seem to 
be acceptable only if they relate to the ‘special characteristics of domestic 
work’.
838 Oelz, ‘The ILO’s Domestic Workers Convention and Recommendation’ (n 819) 166-167.
839 Art 17, third paragraph. Paragraph 24 of the (non-binding) Recommendation adds: ‘In so 
far as compatible with national law and practice concerning respect for privacy, Members 
may consider conditions under which labour inspectors or other officials entrusted 
with enforcing provisions applicable to domestic work should be allowed to enter the 
premises in which the work is carried out’. Also Tomei and Belser, ‘New ILO standards 
on decent work for domestic workers’ (n 816) 437-438.
840 See also artt 12, second paragraph, and 14, fi rst paragraph.
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9.2.3.5 Consultation with stakeholders
In several provisions of the CDWDW reference is made to the requirement 
of consultation with stakeholders. For example, pursuant to article 15, 
first paragraph, state parties should take various measures aimed at the 
protection of domestic workers, including migrant domestic workers, who 
are recruited or placed by private employment agencies against abusive 
practices. These measures include the obligation to regulate the operation 
of private employment agencies, to provide for procedures for the inves-
tigation of complaints, alleged abuses and fraudulent practices by those 
agencies and measures to ensure that fees charged by such agencies are not 
deducted from the remuneration of domestic workers.841 In giving effect 
to these provisions, state parties shall ‘consult with the most representa-
tive organisations of employers and workers and, where they exist, with 
organisations representative of domestic workers and those representative 
of employers of domestic workers’.842
Why was the obligation to consult the aforementioned organisations 
included in the treaty text? It may be explained by the important role 
they fulfill in the defense of the domestic workers’ interests, which is also 
reflected by their involvement in the treaty negotiations. As Oelz puts it, 
‘the [CDWDW and the Recommendation] recognize that workers’ and 
employers’ organisations are important not only because they support their 
members and for the purpose of collective bargaining, but also because 
they are actors in the development of policies to promote decent work for 
domestic workers more generally.’843
9.2.3.6 Information to employers and domestic workers
Finally, it is ‘recommended’, instead of mandatory, that state parties take 
additional measures aimed at informing stakeholders of their rights and 
obligations, most notably employers and domestic workers. With regard to 
employers, it is suggested that employers’ awareness of their obligations 
be enhanced by ‘providing information on good practices in the employ-
ment of domestic workers, employment and immigration law obligations 
regarding migrant domestic workers, enforcement arrangements and sanc-
tions in cases of violation’.844 Furthermore, states are requested to provide 
841 Art 15, fi rst paragraph, sub a, b and e.
842 Article 15, second paragraph. Similar obligations are contained in articles 13, second 
paragraph, 14, second paragraph and 18.
843 Oelz, ‘The ILO’s Domestic Workers Convention and Recommendation’ (n 819) 165. 
Similarly, Blackett argues that the Convention and the Recommendation reaffi rm the 
contemporary relevance of social dialogue in working to forge consensus in international 
law’. Blackett, ‘Current developments’ (n 815) 794.
844 Recommendation concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers (n 829) par. 21, sub d, 
of the Recommendation concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers.
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for a ‘public outreach service’ to inform domestic workers of their rights, 
applicable laws, available complaint mechanisms and legal remedies etc.845
This recommendation thus acknowledges the importance of complementing 
the adoption of domestic implementing legislation with the provision of 
information to the public, in particular to those groups to which the newly 
adopted legislation applies.
9.2.4 Overview
From the foregoing it may be concluded that the CDWDW contains 
minimum standards. They may be supplemented with additional domestic 
measures, for which the non-binding Recommendation on Decent Work 
for Domestic Workers may be a source of inspiration. Furthermore, the 
CDWDW provides for several legislative standards that may derived from 
its text. First, states are under the obligation to ensure consistency with 
applicable international and national law. The applicable international legal 
provisions concern other international labour standards to which domestic 
workers are entitled and regional arrangements for the free movement 
of persons. The CDWDW relies on domestic laws to ensure, for instance, 
the occupational safety and health of domestic workers. A second legisla-
tive standard may be found in the duty of states to establish enforcement 
mechanisms, both in the form of procedures accessible to injured persons 
and of public enforcement through labour inspections. Third, domestic 
workers are entitled to treatment that, in principle, is equal to the treatment 
of other categories of workers. In other words, the CDWDW imposes the 
legislative standard of non-discrimination. Other legislative standards that 
have been identified above concern the consultation with stakeholders and 
the provision of information to workers and employers on their rights and 
obligations.
845 Recommendation concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers (n 829) par. 21, sub d, 
of the Recommendation concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers.
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In this part we have explored the requirements applicable to domestic 
implementing legislation under selected international legal regimes. Our 
analysis has revealed a diverse practice with regard to the regulation of 
implementing legislation: whereas some regimes stipulate in much detail 
the standards that national legislatures should comply with, other regimes 
provide hardly any guidance in this regard. An example of the former 
category can be found in the FCTC and its supporting documents (such 
as the ‘Guidelines for implementation’), which contain several prescribed 
features of national implementing legislation and legislative procedure. 
Considerably less legislative standards can be discerned under the criminal 
legal regimes discussed in the present part, such as CTOC and ICSFT. The 
question arises how these differences can be explained. Apparently, drafters 
of international legal regimes have deemed it necessary or desirable to 
provide guidance to the national legislature responsible for the adoption of 
implementing legislation to a varying extent. Although it is impossible to 
explain the willingness (or reluctance) to include legislative standards in a 
specific regime on the basis of the findings of Part II alone, a possible hint 
might be found in the regime’s subject matter and its perceived link to the 
state’s sovereignty (which may be stronger in the case of instruments which 
affects a state’s criminal law, such as CTOC and ICSFT).
Although the findings presented in this chapter are based on a limited 
number of international regimes and, as a result, apply only to the regimes 
discussed above, it has become clear that the regulation of implementing 
legislation on the domestic level seems to possess common features. The 
most prominent legislative standard is what may be called to criterion of 
‘effectiveness’, although the exact substance of this standard may vary 
from regime to regime. As we have seen, this overarching standard is often 
supplemented by several standards of a more specific character. They 
include consistency with other applicable law, including the prohibition 
of non-discrimination, consultation with stakeholders, the provision of 
information to the public, monitoring of compliance, enforcement, remedies 
and evaluation. Of these standards, the requirements of consistency with 
applicable law and of enforcement are the most firmly engrained in interna-
tional practice; they emerge under almost every regime discussed in Part II. 
Other legislative standards, in contrast, can be identified under two regimes 
only, such as the standards to perform a consultation with stakeholders or 
to perform ex post evaluation of implementing legislation. In addition, there 
may also be formal standards pertaining to domestic implementing legisla-
Conclusion to Part II
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tion in the interest of legal certainty, although this criterion only comes to 
the fore under the case law that flows from the ECHR, the ICESCR and EU 
law. In other words, it is a legislative standard ‘created’ by judges and (in 
the case of the ICESCR) independent experts. The aforementioned legisla-




Assessment of legislative 
standards under international 
law
Introduction to Part III
In Part II we have explored several international legal regimes in order to 
provide an answer to the question to what extent domestic implementing 
legislation is regulated by international law. The purpose of the present part 
is twofold. First, in Chapter 10 we explore the methods of harmonisation 
pursued by international regimes and the scope, character and substance of 
the legislative standards established in Part II. This will enable us to further 
clarify the common features of the international legal regimes discussed 
in Part II. Second, the present part aims to make an assessment of those 
features. In doing so, it builds on the findings presented in Part II and in 
Chapter 10. This assessment aims to establish whether the international 
legal regulation of implementing legislation can be considered adequate. As 
we have explained in Chapter 1, this question coincides with the question to 
what extent this regulation ensures legislative quality. The notion of legisla-
tive quality will be explored in Chapter 11. It will be the yardstick through 





10 Methods of harmonisation and legislative 
standards under international law: 
common features
10.1 Introduction
The findings presented below further clarify the various features of 
domestic implementing legislation which are prescribed under several 
international regimes, as we have established in Part II. They are important, 
as they shed light on the means and methods of implementation that are 
deemed relevant by international policy makers in the fulfilment of their 
objectives. As we will see, the various international legal regimes reveal 
several common features. Together, these components constitute what may 
be called a legislative framework that will be further elaborated in this 
chapter.
Admittedly, the term ‘legislative framework’ is somewhat misleading, 
as it seems to suggest the existence of one coherent legal framework that is 
applicable to domestic implementing legislation. As we have seen, this does 
not reflect current international legal practice; the framework presented 
below is not part of positive law. Rather it must be seen as an abstract 
concept which is inferred from international legal practice. Practice itself 
with regard to legislative standards is, as we have also established, highly 
fragmented. First and foremost, this is the consequence of the lack of an 
authoritative international codification of such principles similar to the role 
played by, for instance, the VCLT and the ILC Draft Articles on the Respon-
sibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in the fields of the law of 
treaties and the law of state responsibility respectively.846
This fragmentation is, however, also present within international legal 
regimes. This is the result of a varying scope of application of a particular 
legislative standard: whereas in some cases a legislative standard’s scope 
of application is confined to one particular aspect of the required imple-
menting legislation, in other cases a legislative standard may be applicable 
to the whole body of implementing legislation that is required on the 
basis of the specified international legal regime. An example of the former 
category can be found in article 13, fourth paragraph, sub a, FCTC, which 
provides that misleading or false tobacco advertising and which is just 
one of many topics covered by that Convention, must be prohibited in 
accordance with the constitutional principles of the state party. On the most 
general level, a legislative standard may be applicable to implementing 
measures in general, not only those of legislative nature. In those cases, of 
course, the term ‘legislative standard’ is not entirely adequate, since the 
846 (n 36) and (n 15).
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standard’s scope of application is not limited to ‘legislation’. An example of 
such legislative standard is the prohibition of discrimination, entrenched in 
article 14 ECHR. This provision stipulates that the ‘enjoyment of the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimi-
nation […]’. As was discussed in section 4.1.3.2, this phrase also applies to 
domestic implementing legislation that is adopted in order to perform the 
positive obligations under the ECHR.
Prior to the analysis of the legislative framework, section 10.2 explores 
the various methods of harmonisation that may be derived from the 
international legal regimes discussed in Part II. Although methods of 
harmonisation do not have particular relevance for our understanding of 
the legislative standards included in the aforementioned legal regimes, they 
are closely related to the regimes’ implementation on the national level, as 
they determine the extent to which an international regime leaves room for 
national considerations in the implementation. With a view to providing a 
complete picture of the subject matter, the methods of harmonisation will 
be addressed below.
10.2 Methods of harmonisation under international law
10.2.1 Harmonisation
Let us assume, somewhat simplistically, that states enter into international 
agreements in order to solve common problems. Such agreements produce 
legal regimes which prescribe specified conduct in a specified policy field. 
As we have seen, they often require implementation on the domestic level. 
As a consequence, national laws in that particular field will converge.
Carbonara and Parisi distinguish between three methods to diminish 
the differences between legal systems. ‘Legal transplantation’ is a process 
in which states transplant laws present in foreign domestic legal orders 
into their own legal order. This concept, however, is controversial, as some 
authors argue that legal transplantation is impossible given the close rela-
tionship between ‘law’ and the culture or society in which it emerges. The 
migration or borrowing of law from other societies neglects this close bond, 
it is contended, and thus cannot exist.847 This point of view was defended 
by Pierre Legrand, who asserted that:
‘At best, what can be displaced from one jurisdiction to another is, literally, a meaningless 
form of words. […] In any meaning-ful sense of the term, ‘legal transplants’ cannot happen. 
847 V. Perju, ‘Constitutional transplants, borrowing and migrations’ in: M. Rosenfeld and A. 
Sajó (eds), The Oxford handbook of comparative constitutional law (1st edn OUP, Oxford 2012) 
1304-1327, 1309-1310. Also S. Choudhry, ‘Migration as a new metaphor in comparative 
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No rule in the borrowing jurisdiction can have any significance as regards the rule in the 
jurisdiction from which it is borrowed. This is because, as it crossed boundaries, the origi-
nal rule necessarily undergoes a change that affects it qua rule. The disjunction between the 
bare propositional statement and its meaning thus prevents the displacement of the rule 
itself.’848
Alan Watson, who has adopted a diametrically opposed stance in this 
debate, has conceded that ‘a transplanted rule is not the same thing as it 
was in its previous home’.849 However, in Watson’s view legal borrowing 
or legal transplanting (which he seems to treat as synonyms) are the main 
cause of similarities between legal systems.850 Contrary to what Legrand has 
considered impossible, Watson observes that ‘massive successful borrowing 
is commonplace in law’.851 In our view, this could hardly be denied.
‘Legal harmonisation’ refers to a common approach in which states 
agree on a shared set of policy aims. Each state subsequently makes the 
modifications to its domestic legislation it deems necessary to meet the 
formulated policy aims. Finally, the concept of ‘legal unification’ means that 
the applicable domestic laws are replaced with a single set of rules agreed 
upon on the intergovernmental or supranational level.852
In this view, legal unification may be seen as an extreme version of legal 
harmonisation.853 Legal unification in the international legal sphere is not 
without problems, however, as it presupposes the existence of a unified 
legal order. As we have seen in Part I, this does not reflect the current state 
of international law, under which international law is not per se valid in 
the domestic legal order. As a consequence, the crucial element of legal 
unification, the replacement of domestic legal rules by a common set of 
international norms, cannot materialise until all state parties have accepted 
the norms’ legal validity in the domestic legal order and have repealed 
concurring domestic laws. This cannot be easily achieved. For this reason, 
Wilets has argued that:
‘[t]he globalization of norms that result from the process of [transnational legal harmonisa-
tion] frequently consists of harmonisation of rules rather than direct vertical application of 
international norms from a supranational body’.854
848 P. Legrand, ‘The impossibility of legal transplants’ 4 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 2 (1997) 111-124, 120.
849 A. Watson, Legal transplants and European private law (Ius Commune lectures on European 
private law, Ius Commune Research School, Maastricht 2000) 2.
850 Ibid, 4.
851 Ibid, 12.
852 E. Carbonara and F. Parisi, E., ‘The paradox of legal harmonisation’ 132 Public Choice 3-4 
(2007) 367-400, 368.
853 N. Garoupa and A. Ogus, ‘A strategic interpretation of legal transplants’ 35 Journal of 
Legal Studies (2006) 339-363, 343.
854 J.D. Wilets, ‘A unifi ed theory of international law, the state, and the individual: trans-
national legal harmonisation in the context of economic and legal globalization’ 31 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 3 (2014) 753-825, 756.
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In this respect, the nature of the legal order of the European Union seems 
to provide for better conditions for legal unification, which implies ‘the 
wholesale integration of domestic legal orders, effectively replacing national 
law with Union legislation’.855 In particular, regulations of the EU reflect a 
process of legal unification, which, as we have seen, are qua EU law directly 
applicable in the legal orders of EU member states. In addition, EU law 
prohibits the existence of domestic laws that regulate subject matter covered 
by the EU legislation. In practice, this amounts to the direct application of a 
common set of norms: legal unification. The example of EU regulations also 
makes clear that in practice, harmonisation and unification often go hand in 
hand; while a regulation may provide for a unified legal framework which 
is directly applicable in the legal orders of the member states, they often 
contain provisions that require additional implementing measures as well.
Furthermore, whereas legal transplantation is a unilateral process, 
harmonisation and unification require multilateral action. As we have seen 
in the previous part, such multilateral conduct often consists of treaty nego-
tiations between state representatives. On other occasions, international 
legal regimes have been developed in the framework of an international 
organisation, such as the IHR of the WHO. In both situations, however, the 
multilateral nature of the convergence process is evident. This is not to say 
that the implementation of the said harmonised international legal regimes 
is a multilateral process. That is certainly not the case, as the adoption of 
domestic implementing measures, including legislation, falls within the 
domain of the state.
It follows that the international legal regimes examined in the previous 
part, with the exception of regulations of the European Union, are manifes-
tations of ‘legal harmonisation’ in the meaning attributed to this term by 
Carbonara and Parisi. Legal harmonisation itself is, however, an ambiguous 
term. This may be explained by the fact that policy aims on the one hand, 
and the legislative means to achieve these ends on the other hand, cannot 
always be easily distinguished. To clarify this point, it is necessary to 
explore the various forms or methods through which harmonisation has 
taken shape under the international legal regimes discussed in Part II. This 
will be the subject of the following sections.
10.2.2 Harmonisation through minimum requirements
The international legal regimes discussed in the previous part have been 
developed in order to protect certain interests, both of the individual and of 
the community. They include, inter alia, as we have seen, the ‘freedom from 
fear and want’ of individuals, the combat against terrorism, the protection 
of public health against the international spread of disease, the protection of 
species of wild flora and fauna and decent labour conditions for seafarers. 
855 M. Dougan, ‘Approximation of laws in the EU’ in: P. Cane and J. Conaghan (eds), The 
New Oxford Companion to Law (OUP, Oxford 2009).
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Most of the regimes discussed in the previous part aim to protect the identi-
fied policy aims through the imposition of minimum requirements on state 
parties. This can be derived from, for instance, article 34, third paragraph, 
CTOC, which reads:
‘Each State Party may adopt more strict or severe measures than those provided for by this 
Convention for preventing and combating transnational organized crime’.856
Under this and similar provisions, states may adopt measures that go 
beyond what is required as a minimum under the relevant international 
regime. In other words, the instrument may be said to reflect the lowest 
common denominator that state parties can agree upon in a particular 
policy area. It raises the question about the nature of the domestic laws 
beyond this threshold. With regard to the above-cited provision of the 
CTOC, for instance, what does ‘more strict’ or ‘more severe’ mean? Given 
the purpose of the CTOC, these phrases may be loosely translated as 
‘harsher’ on crime; in other words, they may refer to more severe sanc-
tions.857 Similarly, under article 2, first paragraph, FCTC, states may impose 
stricter requirements ‘in order to better protect human health’. It means that 
additional domestic measures are permitted if they further restrict the use 
of tobacco products. Thus, the meaning of the term ‘strict’ in these examples 
is closely related to and dependent upon the objective(s) of the applicable 
legal regime. Arguably, under the international legal regimes discussed in 
Part II, this will not constitute a problem, as the objective(s) are formulated 
in a rather clear manner.
Also in the case of directives of the EU, it is often necessary to determine 
the nature and purpose of the regime and, as a result, whether specific addi-
tional measures are permitted. The imposition of minimum requirements 
in directives is commonly known as ‘minimum harmonisation’, whereby a 
minimum standard is set in the EU directive, but which also allows states to 
put in place norms that exceed the minimum standard.858
An example from the CJEU’s case law may clarify the concept of 
minimum harmonisation as laid down in EU directives. Mr. Zeman, a Slova-
kian national, was in possession of a firearms licence which allowed him 
to carry a weapon for a specific aim: the protection of his person and his 
property in Slovakia. He applied for a European firearms pass, on the basis 
of directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of 
weapons, which would enable him to move freely with his weapon within 
856 CTOC art 34, third paragraph. Similarly, see IHR art 43, fi rst paragraph; FCTC art 2, fi rst 
paragraph; CITES art XIV, fi rst paragraph, and the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal art 4, eleventh para-
graph. The ‘minimum’ character of the Maritime Labour Convention and the Convention 
concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers follows from article 19, eighth paragraph, 
of the Constitution of the ILO.
857 UNODC, Legislative Guides (n 554) par. 41.
858 Craig and De Búrca, EU Law (n 525) 84 and 600.
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the European Union.859 In particular, Mr. Zeman relied on article 1, fourth 
paragraph, of the directive, which stipulates that ‘a European firearms 
pass shall be issued on request by the authorities of a Member State to a 
person lawfully entering into possession of and using a firearm’. However, 
pursuant to Slovakian implementing legislation, a European firearms pass 
could only be issued for hunting and targeted shooting purposes; not for the 
aim for which Mr. Zeman had acquired his licence. Accordingly, the Slova-
kian authorities had refused his request. The question which was submitted 
to the CJEU was whether directive 91/477/EEC permitted the adoption 
of national legislation which authorised the issue of a European firearms 
pass only to holders of weapons used for hunting and target shooting 
purposes.860 In order to provide an answer to this question, the CJEU first 
analysed the directive’s objectives, which included establishing the internal 
market and the abolition of controls on the safety of objects transported and 
on persons. This has resulted in the approximation of weapons legislation.861
In particular, the Court derived from several of the directive’s recitals that:
‘one of the objectives of Directive 91/477 is the prohibition, in principle, of cross-border 
transport within the European Union of firearms which are not used for hunting or target 
shooting purposes […].’862
Subsequently, the CJEU established that the directive entailed minimum 
harmonisation, since article 3 of the directive stipulates that ‘Member 
States may adopt in their legislation provisions which are more stringent 
than those provided for in [the] directive, subject to the rights conferred 
on residents of the member states by [article 12, second paragraph, of the 
directive]’.863 The latter provision stipulates that, put briefly, hunters and 
marksmen may freely travel across the EU’s internal border with their 
weapons upon presentation of a European firearms pass. On the basis of 
a textual analysis of the directive, the CJEU found that the obligation of 
member states to issue a European firearms pass is limited to hunters and 
sport shooters.864 The right of member states to impose more stringent 
requirements than those included in directive 91/477/EEC, as embodied in 
article 3, cited above, is thus restricted by the obligation to ensure the rights 
of hunters and sport shooters. As a consequence, member states are not 
required to issue a European firearms pass to other holders of weapons.865
859 Council Directive 91/477 of 18 June 1991 on control of the acquisition and possession of 
weapons as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 May 2008 (OJ 1991, L 256).
860 CJEU, Zeman, case C-543/12, judgment of 4 September 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2143, par. 
40.
861 Ibid, par. 41-42.
862 Ibid, par. 46.
863 Art 3.
864 CJEU, Zeman (n 860) par. 53.
865 Ibid, par. 54.
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Thus, in this case, the Slovak authorities had chosen to adhere to the mini-
mum standard entrenched in the directive. In doing so, the CJEU concluded, 
the Slovakian legislature had acted in accordance with the directive. This 
example makes clear that the precise consequences of minimum harmonisa-
tion in the context of a particular EU directive may not be as obvious as 
the implications of minimum requirements under other international legal 
regimes discussed in Part II.866
It is important to note that the domestic measures which go beyond the 
minimum standard laid down in the directive, must meet the standards 
laid down in the TFEU. In practice, this means that additional domestic 
restrictions on the ‘four freedoms’ (i.e. the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital) have to serve a legitimate aim and have to be 
proportional etc.867 This, of course, is an important difference with the other 
international legal regimes discussed in Part II, which can be explained 
by the (regulation of the) EU internal market. An additional limitation on 
more stringent domestic measures can be found in the condition that those 
measures ‘are not liable seriously to compromise achievement of the result 
prescribed by the directive in question’.868
From the foregoing it may be concluded that under the international 
legal regimes discussed in Part II, harmonisation of national legislation 
often is cast in the form of minimum harmonisation. Also in the framework 
of the EU minimum harmonisation is a widely used method of harmoni-
sation.869 In addition to the minimum norm, national legislators are free to 
impose additional norms to protect the common interest.
10.2.3 Other methods of harmonisation
10.2.3.1 Optional provisions
In addition to the imposition of minimum standards, harmonisation may 
occur through the inclusion of optional provisions. As appears from our 
discussion of several international legal regimes, this method of harmonisa-
866 Admittedly, the cases brought before the CJEU can be presumed to be the more contro-
versial ones. Were it clear from the outset to what extent directive 91/477/EEC provided 
for the harmonisation of laws in the fi eld of weapons control, the Slovakian national 
court would not have found it necessary to make a request for a preliminary ruling by the 
CJEU under article 267 TFEU.
867 L. Woods and Ph. Watson, EU Law (12th edn OUP, Oxford 2014) 349.
868 CJEU, Muladi, case C-447/15, judgment of 7 July 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:533, par. 43.
869 It is important to note, however, that many EU directives prescribe ‘complete’ harmoni-
sation. In contrast to EU directives which contain minimum harmonisation, complete 
harmonisation does not allow states to adopt additional domestic norms which go 
beyond the minimum standard. In other words, the EU directive exhaustively prescribes 
the content of domestic implementing legislation. This particular form of harmonisation 
is characteristic for the EU’s legislative instruments and cannot be found under the other 
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tion has been used, although not very often. One of the few examples of 
optional provisions that may give rise to implementing measures on the 
domestic level is article 12, fourth paragraph, ICSFT, which stipulates that:
‘[e]ach State Party may give consideration to establishing mechanisms to share with other 
States Parties information or evidence needed to establish criminal, civil or administrative 
liability’.
Similarly, as we have seen in Part II, article 17 CTOC, reads:
‘States Parties may consider entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrange-
ments on the transfer to their territory of persons sentenced to imprisonment or other 
forms of deprivation of liberty for offences covered by this Convention, in order that they 
may complete their sentences there’.
Such provisions contain a suggestion and perhaps a recommendation 
to undertake the described conduct, but the establishment of the said 
mechanisms and the conclusion of agreements respectively are by no 
means mandatory. Other regimes, as we have seen, distinguish between 
mandatory provisions and non-mandatory provisions on a more structural 
basis. The Code annexed to the MLC, for instance, contains regulations and 
standards contained in Part A on the one hand, and guidelines contained in 
Part B on the other hand. The implementation of the latter category ‘should 
be given due consideration’, a clear indication of its optional character.870
Under EU law, ‘optional harmonisation’ is a more common phenom-
enon and thus widely present in the legislative instruments of the EU. By 
way of example, we could refer to directive 2014/60/EU on the return of 
cultural objects, article 3 of which stipulates that cultural objects that have 
been unlawfully removed from the territory of a member state, should be 
returned in accordance with the procedure laid down in that directive.871
While the directive contains binding provisions with regard to cultural 
objects removed from a member state’s territory after 1992, it is added that:
‘[e]ach Member State may apply the arrangements provided for in this Directive to 
requests for the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of other 
Member States prior to 1 January 1993.’ 872
Thus, extension of the directive’s temporal scope is optional and, as a conse-
quence, so is this particular aspect of the implementation of the directive.
It may seem contradictory to consider the inclusion of optional provi-
sions in an international regime beneficial to the harmonisation of laws. 
870 Art VI, second paragraph.
871 Directive 2014/60/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on 
the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State 
and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 (OJ 2014, L 159).
872 Artt 14 and 15, second paragraph.
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If state parties are not required to comply with a certain provision as its 
character is merely optional, how could this positively contribute to the 
convergence of national laws? In this regard, it must be recalled that inter-
national legal regimes are the products of negotiations of several, or even 
many, (state) representatives. Whenever they cannot reach consensus on 
the codification of a certain agreement as a mandatory requirement, inclu-
sion as an optional provision may prove to be the best possible result to 
its proponents. Therefore, the inclusion of non-mandatory provisions in an 
international legal regime should not be seen as an alternative to the inclu-
sion of mandatory provisions, but as an alternative to not including norms 
on a particular topic at all.873 This perspective justifies the conclusion that 
optional provisions, in fact, have a positive impact on the harmonisation of 
domestic legislation. This size of this impact is, of course, dependent on the 
number of states that chooses to implement the particular provision within 
their respective national legal orders, despite its optional character.
10.2.3.2 Language
Another interesting aspect of the implementation of international legal 
regimes consists of the use of language. Stricty speaking, the use of 
language is not in itself a method of harmonisation. Rather it may be 
viewed as an element of a certain ‘style of legislation’.874 However, since 
the use of domestic legal terms and concepts differs among domestic legal 
systems, the imposition of limitations on this variety may prove beneficial 
to harmonisation. For this section, therefore, it is particularly relevant to 
what extent harmonisation of language has been deemed feasible. This ques-
tion came to the fore in the framework of the CTOC and the MLC, but is 
inherent to any international regime that pursues legal harmonisation.
With regard to the CTOC, in section 6.1.3.1 it was argued on the one 
hand that is was considered desirable to achieve uniformity in language 
as much as possible. To this end, terminology used in domestic legislation 
should correspond to the language used in the treaty. This would, it was 
stated in the Legislative Guide, simplify extradition proceedings between 
states. On the other hand, legislative drafters were encouraged to ensure 
consistency with domestic legal terms and definitions, which would often 
imply a deviation from the CTOC’s terminology, in order to avoid conflicts 
873 Moreover, in the framework of EU law, the inclusion of a provision as ‘optional’ may a 
be necessity if the directive at hand constitutes complete harmonisation, i.e. the member 
states are not allowed the apply additional laws to the subject matter under regulation. In 
that situation, an exception to the general (mandatory) regime laid down in the directive 
could only be applied by member states if it is expressly acknowledged in that directive 
as an ‘option’.
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and uncertainty about the judicial application of the new provisions in 
practice.875
The latter element, discretion of states with regard to the use of termi-
nology in domestic implementing legislation, emerged under the MLC as 
well. However, the motivation for its inclusion was a different one; as we 
have seen in section 9.1.3.1, the drafters of the MLC had opted for a formu-
lation of the mandatory provisions in a more general way, since this would 
leave ‘a wider scope for discretion as to the precise action to be provided for 
at the national level’.876 Thus, whereas terminological discretion for state 
parties under the CTOC would serve the purpose of legal certainty on the 
domestic level, under the MLC it would enhance flexibility with regard to 
the choice of implementing measures.
On a more abstract level, the issue raised under the CTOC and the MLC 
embodies the tension between the advantage of convergence of domestic 
laws on the hand, and discretion granted to states in the implementation of 
the applicable international legal regime. How these interests are balanced, 
will vary from one regime to the other.
10.2.3.3 Equivalent measures
A final method of harmonisation may be found in the possibility to adopt 
measures that are equivalent to the measures prescribed by a particular 
regime. Article VI, third paragraph, MLC, provides:
‘A Member which is not in a position to implement the rights and principles in the manner 
set out in Part A of the Code may, unless expressly provided otherwise in this Convention, 
implement Part A through provisions in its laws and regulations or other measures which 
are substantially equivalent to the provisions of Part A’.
In order to determine whether domestic laws meet the standard of substan-
tial equivalence, a state party must satisfy itself that the applicable piece of 
legislation ‘is conducive to the full achievement of the general object and 
purpose’ of the applicable Convention provisions and that it ‘gives effect’ 
to them.877
Also in the field of international labour law, article 2, second paragraph, 
sub a, CDWDW, stipulates that:
‘A Member which ratifies this Convention may, after consulting with the most representa-
tive organisations of employers and workers and, where they exist, with organisations rep-
resentative of domestic workers and those representative of employers of domestic work-
ers, exclude wholly or partly from its scope […] categories of workers who are otherwise 
provided with at least equivalent protection’.
875 Section 6.1.3.1.
876 (n 791).
877 MLC art VI, fourth paragraph.
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Under EU law the implementation of legal instruments of the EU may 
only be performed through the adoption of ‘equivalent measures’ if it is 
expressly stipulated in the applicable instrument. An example can be 
found in directive 2010/31/EU on the energy performance of buildings, 
which provides, inter alia, that member states ‘shall lay down the necessary 
measures to establish a regular inspection of the accessible parts of systems 
used for heating buildings […]. That inspection shall include an assessment 
of the boiler efficiency and the boiler sizing compared with the heating 
requirements of the building.’878 It is added that:
‘As an alternative to [the provision cited above] Member States may opt to take measures 
to ensure the provision of advice to users concerning the replacement of boilers, other 
modifications to the heating system and alternative solutions to assess the efficiency and 
appropriate size of the boiler. The overall impact of this approach shall be equivalent
[emphasis added] […]’.879
When no harmonisation in the form of specific EU legislation has been 
undertaken, convergence of legal systems is influenced by the principle of 
‘mutual recognition’ in the context of the internal market. In practice, this 
principle may demonstrate great similarity with harmonisation through 
equivalent measures. It originates from the CJEU’s judgment in Cassis de 
Dijon. This case concerned the legality of German requirements on the 
minimum alcohol content of beverages. The question arose whether the 
German authorities could legally prohibit the market entry of a French 
fruit liquer, Cassis de Dijon, which contained less alcohol. Since there was no 
EU legislation on alcohol levels in beverages, the CJEU had to investigate 
whether the German national legislation amounted to a ‘measure having 
equivalent effect’ in the sense of article 34 TFEU.880 The CJEU held:
‘Obstacles to movement within the community resulting from disparities between national 
laws relating to the marketing of the products in question must be accepted insofar as 
those provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory 
requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection 
of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer. 
[…] It is clear from the foregoing that the requirements relating to the minimum alcohol 
content of alcoholic beverages do not serve a purpose which is in the general interest and 
such as to take precedence over the requirements of the free movement of goods, which 
constitutes one of the fundamental rules of the Community’.881
878 Directive 2010/31/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on 
the energy performance of buildings (OJ 2010, L 153) art 14, fi rst paragraph.
879 Art 14, fourth paragraph. 
880 Article 34 TFEU provides: ‘Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having 
equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States.’
881 CJEU, Cassis de Dijon, case C-120/78, judgment of 20 February 1979, ECLI:EU:C:1979:42, 
par. 8 and 14.
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The CJEU thus ruled that the German authorities were obliged to admit the 
import of French fruit liquer in Germany, even though it contained a lower 
alcohol percentage than prescribed by German law.882 Put differently, the 
CJEU held that whenever a product was lawfully placed on the market in 
one of the member states, it should also be accepted in other member states; 
‘the foreign must be recognised as functionally equivalent, at least in all 
really important aspects, to the domestic’.883 Of course, mutual recognition 
benefits economic actors that sell their products across the internal borders 
of the EU, since they have to comply with one regulatory regime only. 
From this point of view, the principle of mutual recognition, as entrenched 
in article 34 TFEU, should a considered as a particular manifestation of 
harmonisation through equivalent measures. In sum, in the framework 
of the EU, harmonisation through equivalent measures could based on a 
specific legislative instrument or, in the absence thereof, on article 34 TFEU 
(although in the latter case, its scope is limited to the internal market).
It can be argued that the possibility to adopt ‘equivalent measures’ may 
have a negative impact on the convergence of domestic laws in a particular 
area, and perhaps even promote divergence, as it provides states with a 
certain measure of discretion with regard to the choice of means to achieve 
the identified policy aims. This statement may be true, but it ignores the fact 
that the possibility to adopt equivalent measures provides an additional 
manner to obtain the aims which are pursued under an international legal 
regime. In this regard, it may be useful to emphasise the distinction between 
a specified policy aim and the means to achieve that aim; while the provision 
for the adoption of equivalent measures under an international legal regime 
may promote convergence between national legal orders with regard to 
the achievement of a specified policy aim, it may promote divergence with 
regard to the choice of means on the domestic level. Moreover, similar to 
what has been argued above in respect of the inclusion of optional provi-
sions, the permission of ‘equivalent measures’ may be a prerequisite for 
consensus among state representatives; if states cannot reach consensus on 
the choice of means to attain a certain policy aim, the permission of ‘equiva-
lent measures’ may be a price worth paying to attain international agreement.
10.3 Legislative standards
10.3.1 Introduction
Now we have analysed the various ways in which international legal 
regimes encourage the convergence of laws in specific policy fields and, 
as a corollary, the extent to which an international regime leaves room 
for national considerations in its implementation, it is time to resume our 
882 CJEU, Cassis de Dijon (n 881).
883 Chalmers, Davies and Monti, European Union law (n 468) 775.
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analysis of the legislative standards in Part II. In this section, therefore, we 
will examine the substance and scope of those standards. This enquiry is 
a prerequisite for their assessment in the light of theory and practice with 
regard to legislative quality.
The outline of this section reflects a certain hierarchy between legisla-
tive standards. In this hierarchy, the standard of effectiveness is considered 
the supreme, overarching legislative standard. Several other legislative 
standards are presented as subsidiary to the standard of effectiveness. How 
can this distinction be justified? The answer to that question is that the 
legislative standards of a subsidiary nature ultimately serve the purpose 
of ensuring the regime’s effectiveness. In other words, they are not an end 
in itself, but only a means to achieve a ‘higher’ objective: effectiveness. The 
standard of effectiveness and its subsidiary elements thus fundamentally 
differ in the purpose they serve.
Indications for the existence of such hierarchy between effectiveness 
and other legislative standards can also be derived from the grounds that 
led to the inclusion of the subsidiary legislative standards under the regimes 
discussed in the previous part. For instance, in the context of our discussion 
of the CTOC, it was argued that consistency with fundamental principles 
of domestic law serves to ‘ensure the effectiveness of the Convention itself as 
it dissuades state parties from adopting national implementing legislation 
that, as a result of contravention of domestic laws or principles of higher 
rank, will remain without legal force’.884 A similar point can be made with 
regard to the relation between the legislative standards of legal certainty 
and effectiveness under the ECHR, as we will see below. Having said that, 
let us now turn to the legislative standards that constitute the legislative 
framework referred to in section 10.1.
10.3.2 Effectiveness
10.3.2.1 Effectiveness under the selected international legal regimes
The examination of the international legal regimes, as conducted in Part II, 
reveals that the notion of effectiveness has a prominent place as a legislative 
standard. It demands that domestic implementing legislation is adopted 
and applied in such a way that a specified international legal regime is 
effective within the domestic legal order. Its place is, however, not identical 
under the various international legal regimes. In this section it is argued 
that ‘effectiveness’ as a legislative standard, according to which state parties 
must adopt domestic legislation that puts into effect the objectives formu-
lated in the legal instrument, is present on two distinct levels. These levels 
differ in scope. On both levels, however, express reference to ‘effectiveness’ 
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First of all, the adoption of effective implementing measures may be 
required with regard to the international legal regime in its entirety. As we 
have seen, the way in which it is codified may vary from regime to regime. 
In the context of the ICESCR, for instance, the notion of effectiveness is 
termed ‘realisation’; the core obligation of that treaty imposes the obligation 
to take measures ’with a view to achieving progressively the full realization 
of the rights’ embedded in it.885 Apart from the exact meaning of the notion 
of progression, which was discussed in Part II, it is difficult to see how ‘real-
isation’ and ‘effectiveness’ can be distinguished in the legal context of this 
regime. In the same vein, the legislative standard of effectiveness is firmly 
embedded in the ECHR. Whereas the ICESCR contains the term ‘realisa-
tion’, the ECHR provides that the rights and freedoms embedded in it, must 
be ‘secured to everyone’.886 The prominence of the notion of effectiveness 
was also recalled by the ECtHR when it famously stated that ‘the Conven-
tion is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical and illusory but 
rights that are practical and effective’.887 For this reason, Rietiker asserts that 
the principle of effectiveness has become a fundamental cornerstone for the 
protection of Convention rights and freedoms’.888
Outside the context of the protection of human rights, effectiveness as 
a legislative standard which is applicable to an international regime in its 
entirety, can be identified under several of the regimes discussed in Part II. 
Again, the absence of the term ‘effectiveness’ does not justify the conclusion 
that this legislative standard does not apply. Article 4, fourth paragraph, 
CCTMW, stipulates that state parties are under the obligation to take 
‘appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement and 
enforce’ its provisions. Similarly, article 3 FCTC states that its provisions 
are ‘to be implemented by the Parties’. While under the MLC state parties 
are required to ‘give complete effect’ to its provisions, parties to the CTOC 
have a duty to take ‘necessary measures […] to ensure the implementation 
of its provisions’.889 In sum, the legislative standard of effectiveness which 
applies to the relevant regime as a whole, can be found under several of 
the regimes discussed in Part II. The exact terms in which this standard is 
phrased, however, are not identical.
Second, ‘effectiveness’ may be required with regard to a specified policy 
aim embodied in the international instrument. Here, the scope of the stan-
dard of effectiveness is usually limited to a specified and detailed policy 
aim, in contrast to the notion of effectiveness which applies to the regime 
885 Art 2, fi rst paragraph.
886 Art 1. 
887 Airey v Ireland (n 347) par. 24.
888 D. Rietiker, ‘The principle of “effectiveness” in the recent jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights: its different dimensions and its consistency with public interna-
tional law- no need for the concept of treaty sui generis’, 79 Nordic Journal of International 
Law 2 (2010) 245-277, 256. 
889 MLC art I and CTOC art 34, fi rst paragraph.
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as a whole. In principle, this standard of effectiveness with a narrow scope 
is inherent to any international legal provision that requires the adoption of 
implementing legislation on the domestic level. Thus, it can be argued that 
effectiveness and implementation overlap. Exactly this point was made in 
section 1.2 when it was argued that there is no such thing as implementa-
tion which is not effective.
A few examples may be sufficient to emphasise the diversity of the 
norms that contain this narrow application of the standard of effectiveness. 
Often, in its most general sense, it is present in the obligation to ‘ensure’ 
the attainment of a specified policy aim, which leaves the means to achieve 
that objective entirely to the state party. For instance, in order to combat the 
spread of infectious diseases, states ‘shall ensure […] that container loading 
areas are kept free from sources of infection or contamination, including 
vectors and reservoirs’.890 If, under the CCTMW, hazardous waste is object 
of illegal traffic, the state of export ‘shall ensure that the wastes in question 
are taken by the exporter […]’.891 Moreover, in the field of the prevention of 
the financing of terrorism, states ‘shall ensure […] that legal entities liable 
[for transgressions of the treaty] are subject to effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive criminal, civil or administrative sanctions’.892
Sometimes express reference is made to the means through which a 
specified policy aim must be pursued, even though these means are often 
formulated in general terms. Examples include obligations to ‘institute 
domestic regulatory and supervisory regimes for banks […] in order to 
deter and detect all forms of money-laundering’;893 to ‘adopt and imple-
ment effective legislative, executive, administrative or other measures 
requiring manufacturers and importers of tobacco products to disclose to 
governmental authorities information about the contents and emissions 
of tobacco products’;894 to ‘take appropriate measures to prohibit trade in 
specimens in violation [of the Convention]’895.
This overview also begs the question to what extent the legislative 
instruments of the EU, most notably directives and regulations, fit within 
the categorisation presented in this section. It is important to note that 
they are instruments (similar to treaties or other sources of international 
law) instead of regimes in the meaning attributed to this term in the present 
study.896 As a consequence, directives and even regulations which have 
been adopted by the institutions of the EU contain provisions that are 
similar to all the aforementioned manifestations of the standard of effective-
ness, just as treaties and other binding decisions of international organisa-
890 IHR art 34, second paragraph.
891 Art 9, second paragraph, sub a.
892 ICSFT art 5, third paragraph.
893 CTOC art 7, fi rst paragraph, sub a.
894 FCTC art 10.
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tions do.897 Moreover, as was already discussed in section 3.4.2, EU law 
contains a general principle of effectiveness, closely related to the principle 
of loyalty as embodied in article 4, third paragraph, TEU, which requires 
that ‘[t]he measures taken by the Member States must be such as to ensure 
that a directive is fully effective, in accordance with the objective which 
it pursues’.898 In other words, also in the implementation of legislation 
adopted in the framework of the EU, the legislative standard of effective-
ness must be observed.
Perhaps the most important step following the adoption of imple-
menting legislation is its application in practice. This requirement makes 
clear that the mere existence of implementing legislation is not sufficient for 
a state to respect its international obligations; it must be applied in practice 
as well. Put differently, the implementation of international law within the 
domestic legal order must go beyond the drafting or modification of legal 
texts. It is reflected in the statement of the ECtHR, already cited in section 
4.1.3.1, that the ECHR intends to guarantee rights that are ‘practical and 
effective’, instead of ‘theoretical and illusory’.899 This requirement cannot 
be considered a separate legislative standard, however, since it does apply 
neither to the substance or form of legislation, nor to legislative procedure. 
Nevertheless, it has received special attention in the case law of the CJEU, 
which has stated that domestic implementing legislation should be ‘effec-
tively applied and enforced in practice’. This responsibility rests upon all 
state authorities or private entities which are attributed with public powers 
under the relevant legislation.900
In view of the above, it is safe to conclude that the legislative standard 
of effectiveness has a prominent place within the legal regimes discussed 
in Part II. What is more, it has become clear that this standard may vary in 
scope and manifests itself in various formulations. Furthermore, it does not 
only apply to the legislation itself, but also, under EU law and the ECHR 
at least, to its application in practice. This notwithstanding, the standard of 
effectiveness acquires practical relevance only after the national legislature 
has engaged in the interpretation of the applicable international legal provi-
sion with a view of establishing its substance, since the act of interpretation 
provides an answer to the question which national legislation is required 
in order to ensure the effectiveness of the applicable international legal 
provision that has to be implemented. The act of interpretation itself is also 
subject to norms of international law, in particular the law of treaties, under 
which the notion of effectiveness emerges once again.
897 It must be recalled that the directives and regulations are different in nature. See (n 461).
898 CJEU, Von Colson (n 297) par. 15.
899 Airey v Ireland (n 347) par. 24.
900 Sections 5.1.2.4 (with regard to EU directives) and 5.2 (with regard to EU regulations).
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10.3.2.2 Effectiveness in the context of treaty interpretation under general 
international law
In addition to the importance of the notion of effectiveness under the inter-
national legal regimes discussed in Part II, we can also discern a principle of 
effectiveness under general international law. The principle of effectiveness 
emerges in different international legal contexts, among them the context of 
treaty interpretation.901 Since most international legal regimes that we have 
examined derive from treaty law, this principle of interpretation deserves 
our attention. The notion of effectiveness is reflected in the maxim ut res 
magis valeat quam pereat, which can be translated as ‘that the matter may 
have effect rather than fail’.902 Put briefly, it requires that a treaty provision 
is interpreted in a manner that renders the applicable norm ‘effective’.
To what extent can it be considered part of international law? Lauter-
pacht, writing in 1949, argued that the principle of effectiveness is firmly 
rooted in both national law and international law.903 In particular, he has 
demonstrated that international case law, most notably of the PCIJ, has 
‘constantly acted upon the principle of effectiveness as the governing canon 
of interpretation’.904 In 1961, Lord McNair took a rather skeptical stance 
when he stated:
‘[…] we doubt whether this so-called rule means more than to say that the contracting par-
ties obviously must have had some purpose in making a treaty, and that it is the duty of a 
tribunal to ascertain that purpose and do its best to give effect to it, unless there is some-
thing in the language used by the parties which precluded the tribunal from doing so’.905
The case law of the ICJ has made clear that the attribution of effectiveness to 
a treaty provision is neither the only, nor the most important rule of treaty 
interpretation. This was emphasised in the South West Africa Cases, in which 
the ICJ was confronted with the question whether it was entitled to apply 
the teleological principle of interpretation according to which ‘instruments 
must be given their maximum effect in order to ensure the achievement of 
their underlying purposes’.906 The ICJ had to decide whether Ethiopia and 
Liberia, as former members of the League of Nations (LoN, which ceased to 
exist after the Second World War), could be considered to have a legal right 
or interest with regard to the governance of the Mandate of South West 
901 For an overview of the various meanings given to the principle of effectiveness under 
international law, see H. Taki, ‘Effectiveness’ in: R. Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia 
of public international law (online edn OUP, Oxford).
902 Ibid, par. 1 and 17.
903 H. Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive interpretation and the principle of effectiveness in the inter-
pretation of treaties’ 26 British Yearbook of International Law (1949) 48-85, 68.
904 Ibid.
905 Lord McNair, The law of treaties (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1961) 385.
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Africa.907 The Mandate of South West Africa had been established after the 
First World War and constituted the international administration on behalf 
of the LoN, under which the former colony German South West Africa was 
placed. The ICJ dismissed the claim advanced by Ethiopia and Liberia. On 
the basis of interpretation of the applicable instruments, most notably article 
22 of the Covenant of the LoN, the ICJ asserted that the power to intervene 
in the governance of the Mandate was vested in the LoN institutions, not in 
its individual members.908 A reference to the principle of effectiveness could 
not alter this conclusion, as the ICJ stated that:
‘[t]he principle of interpretation expressed in the maxim: ut res magis valeat quam pereat, 
often referred to as the rule of effectiveness, cannot justify the Court in attributing to the 
provisions for the settlement of disputes in the Peace Treaties a meaning which, as stated 
above, would be contrary to their letter and spirit.’909
The principle of effectiveness is not mentioned as such in the VCLT, the 
authoritative 1969 (which was only 3 years after the ICJ delivered judgment 
in the South West Africa Cases) codification of the law of treaties. However, it 
must be regarded as the teleological principle of interpretation underlying 
article 31, first paragraph, VCLT, which contains the obligation to interpret 
treaty provisions in the light of their object and purpose. In this view, ‘[c]
onsideration of a treaty’s object and purpose together with good faith will 
ensure the effectiveness of its terms’.910
In view of the foregoing, the principle of effectiveness is relevant for the 
interpretation of treaty provisions in conformity with article 31 VCLT. This 
was reaffirmed in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, in which the ICJ stated that 
the principle of effectiveness ‘has an important role in the law of treaties 
and in the jurisprudence of this Court’.911 The references to this principle 
in international case law seem to justify the conclusion that the principle of 
effectiveness is part and parcel of the obligation to interpret treaty provi-
sions in the light of their object and purpose. This applies equally to treaty 
provisions that call for the enactment of implementing legislation in the 
domestic legal order.
907 Ibid, par. 14.
908 Ibid, par. 34-35.
909 Ibid, par. 91. The Court referred to Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania (Second phase) (Advisory Opinion) [1950] ICJ Rep 221, p. 229.
910 M. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2009) 428. Similarly Aust, Modern treaty law and practice (n 165) 
208-209; R. K. Gardiner, Treaty interpretation (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2015) 179; Sorel and 
Boré Eveno maintain the view that effectiveness is a ‘mixture of the criteria of the object 
and purpose and of the principle of good faith’. Sorel and Boré Eveno (n 38) 817. Also 
Rietiker, ‘The principle of “effectiveness”’ (n 888) 256.
911 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada) (Jurisdiction) (Judgment) [1998] ICJ Rep 432, par. 52.
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10.3.3 Subsidiary elements of effectiveness
10.3.3.1 Legal certainty
Now we have explored the prominence of ‘effectiveness’ under interna-
tional legal norms that require the adoption of implementing legislation 
on the domestic level, let us proceed to its subsidiary legislative standards, 
among them the requirement of legal certainty. Legal certainty is a multi-
faceted concept which is considered an essential component of the rule of 
law. This is not the place to engage in a thorough discussion of the various 
meanings attributed to the notion of legal certainty.912 Nevertheless, for the 
purpose of the present study, we should clarify how this notion has been 
referred to under the regimes discussed in Part II. It may be surprising that, 
out of the regimes explored in Part II, the notion of legal certainty arises 
only under the ECHR, the CESCR and under the law of the EU. From 
this we might derive a general reluctance to include the standard of legal 
certainty in the regulation of implementing legislation beyond the commu-
nity of European states.
In section 4.1 we have seen that the standards of legal certainty and 
of effectiveness are closely related. In this view, legal certainty is an indis-
pensable element of effective protection to which individuals are entitled 
under the ECHR. In A., B. and C. v Ireland, the ECtHR considered that article 
8 ECHR requires the adoption of domestic legislation which contains an 
‘accessible and effective procedure’ according to which women could 
establish whether they qualify for a lawful abortion. The ECtHR held that 
the applicable Irish constitutional provision contributed to substantial 
uncertainty, which constituted ‘a significant chilling factor for both women 
and doctors in the medical consultation process’. After all, they ran the risk 
of criminal prosecution.913
As we have seen in section 4.2, the CESCR has made an almost identical 
argument with regard to the uncertainty surrounding the Irish legislation 
on abortion. On a more general level the CESCR demands national legisla-
tion which is clear and unambiguous, especially when the application of 
vague norms may constitute impediments to the enjoyment of economic, 
social and cultural rights embedded in the ICESCR.914
Furthermore, as we have seen, on the basis of the ECtHR’s case law it 
can be argued that the standard of legal certainty demands that domestic 
implementing legislation is formulated in sufficiently clear terms in order 
to ensure its deterrent effect. This can be derived from Siliadin v France, 
in which a Togolese woman had come to France as a minor and was held 
in servitude and was subjected to forced labour for several years.915 The 
912 Such as the relevance of ‘legitimate expectations’.
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French Criminal Code covers the acts of ‘exploitation through labour and 
subjection to working and living conditions that are incompatible with 
human dignity’. In the view of the ECtHR, however, these provisions did 
not afford the applicant practical and effective protection, as appears from 
the fact that they had been open to ‘very different interpretations from 
one court to the next’.916 In other words, the ECtHR suggested, the French 
criminal legal provisions lacked an effective deterrent character.917
Both cases have in common that they involve formal requirements 
pertaining to the domestic implementing legislation. In the view of the 
ECtHR they follow from the standard of legal certainty and are expressly 
related to the notion of ‘effective protection’ of the individual. What is more, 
in both cases the ECtHR emphasised the need to clearly circumscribe acts 
threatened with criminal punishment; it is thus relied on in a criminal legal 
context. This latter similarity may suggest that the notion of legal certainty 
has, in the context of domestic legislation which implements the (positive) 
obligations under the ECHR, a rather narrow scope. This raises the question 
whether the ECtHR has referred to the notion of legal certainty in other 
areas, including outside the context of legislation that gives effect to the 
positive obligations under the ECHR.
The answer is: yes, the ECtHR has, in particular in the field of the imple-
mentation of limitations of ECHR rights. The most important human rights 
treaties allow for the limitation of the rights entrenched in the conventions 
(with the exception of the so-called ‘absolute rights’, from which no deroga-
tion is permitted), under the condition that the imposed limitations meet the 
requirements that have been established under the applicable convention. 
These specific requirements may vary from one convention to the other. 
Nevertheless, they have at least one common denominator: the limitation 
imposed upon the individual’s rights must be provided for by the domestic 
law of the state. This criterion may be considered an aspect of the concept 
of legal certainty, which stipulates that the state could not infringe upon its 
citizens’ liberty except with a legal basis, and should prevent arbitrariness 
on the part of state authorities. As a result of this common feature, domestic 
legislation which provides for a limitation on the enjoyment of specified 
human rights by the state’s citizens (or, more accurately: domestic legisla-
tion which, in order to achieve the formulated policy aims, also imposes 
restrictions on the enjoyment of some specified human rights), to a large 
extent resembles what has been previously called domestic ‘implementing 
legislation’. Admittedly, domestic limitations on human rights differ from 
other categories, because, contrary to other international legal norms that 
give rise to implementing legislation on the domestic level, the limita-
tion of human rights is not prescribed by international law. Indeed, from 
the perspective of international law, as may become clear from a human 
rights treaty’s object and purpose, such limitations must be discouraged. 
916 Siliadin v France (n 327) par. 142-149.
917 Ibid, par. 144.
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It remains true, nonetheless, that if a state prefers to impose limitations on 
the rights incorporated in a human rights treaty, such restrictions should 
meet criteria established by international law. In this sense, they must be 
viewed as subject to normative frameworks that are applicable to domestic 
implementing legislation.
How has this particular manifestation of the standard of legal certainty 
been applied by the ECtHR? The notion of legal certainty can be said to be 
referred to by the ECHR with the phrases ‘prescribed by law’ or ‘in accor-
dance with the law’.918 In Sunday Times v the United Kingdom, the ECtHR 
observed that the requirement of a basis in law does not necessarily demand 
legislation or norms of lower rank, including regulatory measures taken by 
professional regulatory bodies under independent rule-making powers 
delegated to them by the legislature, but may also encompass unwritten 
law.919 Thus, the finding of established case law in national courts may 
suffice to fulfil the requirement of legal certainty.920
The ECtHR has adhered to a substantive standard, which comprises two 
elements: accessibility and foreseeability. Accessibility refers to the require-
ment that ‘the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in 
the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case’.921 This condi-
tion will be fulfilled if the relevant legislation has been published in the offi-
cial gazette.922 The criterion of foreseeability demands that the domestic law 
which imposes the restriction upon the ECHR rights is sufficiently precise 
in order to enable citizens to ‘foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the 
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail’.923 Those 
consequences include the formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties 
which may be attached to such conduct if it is established that the conduct 
constitutes a breach of the applicable national law.924 As the ECtHR has 
918 Articles 5, fi rst paragraph (right to liberty), 8, second paragraph (right to respect for 
private and family life) 9, second paragraph (freedom to manifest one’s religion or 
beliefs), 10, second paragraph (freedom of expression), and 11, second paragraph (right 
to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others). 
919 Sunday Times v the United Kingdom (App no 6538/74) ECHR 26 April 1979, par. 47; Cantoni 
v France (App no 17862/91) ECHR 11 November 1996, par. 35; Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v 
Turkey (App no 23536/94 and 24408/94) ECHR 1999-IV 261, par. 36; Špaček s.r.o. v Czech 
Republic (App no 26449/95) ECHR 9 November 1999, par. 54; Association Ekin v France 
(App no 39288/98) ECHR 2001-VIII 323, par. 46; Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v the Netherlands 
(App no 38224/03) ECHR 14 September 2010, par. 83.
920 Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v France (App no 40454/07) ECHR 14 June 2007, 
par. 33.
921 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (n 919) par. 49. Also Silver and others v the United Kingdom 
(App no 5947/72, 6205/73, 7052/75, 7061/75, 7107/75, 7113/75, 7136/75) ECHR 25 
March 1983, par. 85-88.
922 Piroğlu and Karakaya v Turkey (App no 36370/02 and 37581/02) ECHR 18 March 2008, par. 
53; Rotaru v Romania (App no 28341/95) ECHR 2000-V 109, par. 54. 
923 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (n 919) par. 49. Also Silver and others v United Kingdom (n 
921) par. 85-88.
924 Kazakov v Russia (App no 1758/02) ECHR 18 December 2008, par. 23; Siryk v Ukraine (App 
no 6428/07) ECHR 31 March 2011, par. 35.
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submitted on various occasions, this condition serves to protect individuals 
against arbitrary interferences by the public authorities. To this end, the law 
must ‘indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of any such discretion and the 
manner of its exercise’.925 The interpretation of the criterion of foreseeability 
in an individual case depends to a considerable degree on the content of the 
text in issue, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of 
those to whom it is addressed.926 It may give rise to specific responsibilities 
for the persons involved, which may include the task to take appropriate 
legal advice.927 In particular, this applies to persons who are engaged in 
professional activities. As may be derived from the ECtHR’s case law, they 
cannot easily claim that legal provisions that have been relied upon to 
their detriment, lack the foreseeability that is required under the ECHR.928
It means, for example, that it could be expected from a business company 
that wishes to broadcast across the border to inform itself fully about the 
telecom regulations in force in that country, if necessary with the help of 
advisers.929 Moreover, a manager of a supermarket who claimed to be under 
the impression that he had engaged in the lawful sale of medicinal prod-
ucts, should have taken steps to inform himself about the possible conse-
quences of what turned out to be the unlawful sale of medicinal products.930
In addition to the element of precision, the criterion of foreseeability 
requires that ‘the applicable law must provide minimum procedural safe-
guards commensurate with the importance of the principle at stake’.931
Such principle may include press freedom and the journalistic privilege 
of source protection. In Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v the Netherlands the ECtHR 
investigated the forcing of journalists to disclose the identity of journalistic 
sources, or information that could lead to the identification of the sources, 
which allegedly contravened article 10 ECHR. Journalists who had attended 
an illegal street race, had made photographs of the participants. One of the 
cars that participated, it was suspected by the police and the prosecuting 
authorities, had been used as a getaway car following a ram raid. Therefore, 
the authorities had summoned the journalists to hand over the photographs 
925 Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v Ukraine (App no 77703/01) ECHR 14 June 2007, par. 
127-128; Koretskyy and others v Ukraine (App no 40269/02) ECHR 3 April 2008, par. 47; 
Munjaz v the United Kingdom (App no 2913/06) ECHR 17 July 2012, par. 88.
926 Cantoni v France (n 919) par. 44.
927 Tolstoy Miloslavsky v the United Kingdom (App no 18139/91) ECHR 13 July 1995, par. 37; 
Grigoriades v Greece (App no 24348/94) ECHR 25 November 1997, par. 37.
928 July and SARL Libération v France (App no 20893/03) ECHR 14 February 2008, par. 52; 
Cantoni v France (n 919) par. 35; Chauvy and Others v France (App no, judgment of 29 June 
2004, par. 43-45; Delfi  AS v Estonia (App no 64569/09) ECHR 16 June 2015, par. 128-129; 
Varvara v Italy (App no 17475/09) ECHR 29 October 2013, par. 34.
929 Groppera Radio AG and others v Switzerland (App no 10890/84) ECHR 28 March 1990, par. 
68.
930 Cantoni v France (n 919) par. 35.
931 N.K.M. v Hungary (App no 66529/11) ECHR 14 May 2013, par. 48; Gáll v Hungary (App no 
49570/11) ECHR 25 June 2013, par. 47; R.Sz. v Hungary (App no 41838/11) ECHR 2 July 
2013, par. 37; Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v the Netherlands (n 919) par. 88.
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of the street race. After their initial refusal to cooperate, the journalists, put 
under pressure by the authorities, had complied with the request. Before 
the ECtHR, the journalists’ employer, applicant in the present case, argued 
that the domestic legal basis for the seizure of the photographs, an interfer-
ence with its right to receive and impart information, as protected by article 
10 ECHR, lacked foreseeability. The ECtHR agreed and stressed the ‘vital 
importance’ of press freedom and the protection of journalistic sources. In 
those circumstances, it maintained, the required minimal procedural safe-
guards should have included the guarantee of review by a judge or other 
independent and impartial decision-making body to make an assessment 
as to whether the interest of the criminal investigation overrode the public 
interest in the protection of journalistic sources.932
Thus, in addition to the standard of legal certainty as applied by the 
ECtHR to domestic legislation which implements the positive obligations of 
the ECHR, the ECtHR has turned to the requirement of legal certainty in the 
assessment of domestic legislation that imposes limitations on the ECHR 
rights. In both cases, legal certainty relates to formal aspects of domestic 
law, such as clarity, accessibility and foreseeability.
The legislative standard of what we have termed ‘legal certainty’ also 
emerges in the case law of the CJEU. As we have seen in Chapter 5 on the 
implementation of the EU’s legislative instruments, this entails, inter alia, 
that national implementing measures should have ‘unquestionably binding 
force’. Contrary to implementation through mere administrative practices, 
implementation through binding law ensures appropriate publicity.933 The 
underlying premise is that individuals should be able to inform themselves 
on the law currently in force. Moreover, domestic implementing legislation 
should meet the requirements ‘specificity, precision and clarity necessary to 
satisfy the requirements of legal certainty’. In the view of the CJEU, they 
enable individuals to ‘ascertain the full extent of their rights and obliga-
tions’.934 These elements from the CJEU’s case law show a striking similarity 
to the case law of the ECtHR: both institutions have formulated require-
ments to the formal aspects of implementing legislation, which encompasses 
criteria pertaining to the text of the law and criteria pertaining to its acces-
sibility and foreseeability. Apparently, both courts consider these elements 
part and parcel of the notion of legal certainty and a legislative standard to 
be observed by states that adopt national implementing measures.
Nevertheless, under the ECHR and EU law the application of the notion 
of legal certainty is not restricted to formal aspects of domestic imple-
menting legislation. On several occasions the ECtHR has stated that the 
notion of legal certainty is an underlying value of the ECHR, thus suggesting 
a very broad application of this standard.935 It is ‘implicit in all the Articles 
932 Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v the Netherlands (n 919) par. 90.
933 Section 5.1.2.2.
934 Section 5.1.2.3.
935 Fabris v France (App no 16574/08) ECHR 2013-I 425, par. 66.
519024-L-sub01-bw-Beenakker
Processed on: 18-4-2018
220 Part III Assessment of legislative standards under international law
of the Convention and constitutes one of the basic elements of the rule of 
law’.936 In the view of the ECtHR, it requires, inter alia, that where the courts 
have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into 
question.937 Also under EU law, the notion of legal certainty, often referred 
to as the ‘principle’ of legal certainty, has a broader application than merely 
encompassing formal elements of domestic implementing legislation.938
In Heinrich, the CJEU stated:
‘[…] the principle of legal certainty requires that Community rules enable those concerned 
to know precisely the extent of the obligations which are imposed on them. Individuals 
must be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and take 
steps accordingly.’939
In addition to the requirement of clarity, to which we referred above, the 
principle of legal certainty prevents a measure from taking effect prior to its 
publication (retroactivity). It may apply to legal situations which have been 
concluded at the time of publication of the relevant measure, or to situations 
which continue to exist after the publication. It cannot be deviated from 
when imposing penalties.940
In view of the discussion of the various manifestations of the standard 
of legal certainty under the ECHR, the ICESCR and the law of the EU, as 
presented above, can we make some general statements about the stan-
dard’s scope and application? In the context of a discussion of the features 
of domestic implementing legislation, the foregoing has made clear that 
the notion of legal certainty demands that implementing legislation is 
drafted in clear and precise terms. Moreover, the law must be accessible and 
foreseeable, requirements that are intended to ensure that individuals can 
inform themselves about the laws in force.
10.3.3.2 Observance of applicable international and national law
Another legislative standard that may be derived from our examination of 
international legal practice in Part II is ‘consistency with applicable law’. 
This requirement provides that domestic implementing legislation should 
be in conformity with other laws in force. As we have seen, they may 
have international or national origins. In Part II we described the relation 
936 Beian v Romania (no. 1) (App no 30658/05) ECHR 2007-V 193, par. 39.
937 Brumărescu v Romania (App no 28342/95) ECHR 1999-VII 201, par. 61.
938 T.C. Hartley, The foundations of European Union law. An introduction of the constitutional 
and administrative law of the European Union (8th edn OUP, Oxford 2014) 162-164. Also 
Chalmers, Davies and Monti, European Union law (n 468) 441.
939 CJEU, Heinrich, case C-345/06, judgment of 10 March 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:140, par. 44.
940 Hartley, The foundations of European Union law (n 938) 162-164. Also Chalmers, Davies and 
Monti, European Union law (n 468) 441. For a thorough analysis of the principle of legal 
certainty and the related concept of legitimate expectations, see P. Craig, EU Administra-
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between domestic implementing legislation and other laws applicable to the 
same subject matter with the metaphor of a double-edged sword. It makes 
clear that references to national and international norms in an international 
legal instrument serve to ensure the effectiveness of that instrument and, at 
the same time, to protect the sovereignty of states.
We have seen that many international legal regimes refer to national 
laws.941 Such references can be divided into two categories. On the one hand, 
domestic implementing legislation should not contravene domestic laws of 
higher rank, as it would render the implementing legislation ineffective.942
This standard of observance of applicable law is thus closely linked to the 
standard of effectiveness. On the other hand, international legal regimes 
may expressly grant states the freedom to ‘fill in’ parts of it on the national 
level. Examples include, as we have seen, the liberty to adopt immunity or 
leniency provisions and to provide for conditions for extradition under the 
CTOC943, to determine the meaning of the terms ‘temporary’ and ‘perma-
nent’ residence under the IHR944, to extend the scope of the CCTMW to 
categories of waste that are labelled ‘hazardous’ under national law945 and 
to specify during which nocturnal hours seafarers under 18 are allowed to 
work.946 Such references indicate that international policy makers considered 
it unnecessary or undesirable to harmonise these particular elements. From a 
different angle, the inclusion of such references in international legal regimes 
may be said to serve the protection of state sovereignty.
In addition, our analysis has made clear that international legal regimes 
often refer to other international norms.947 Again, these references serve two 
distinct purposes, both of which are relevant for the drafting of domestic 
implementing legislation. On the one hand, they make clear that domestic 
implementing legislation should respect certain legal limits. They consist of, 
inter alia, the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states 
and the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other states under 
the CTOC948 and the ICSFT949 and obligations under international treaties 
establishing transnational trade areas or customs unions under the CITES950. 
On the other hand, a reference to other, existing international norms may 
clarify that the regime is intended to build on, instead of deviate from, 
those existing norms. As a consequence, domestic implementing legislation 
should equally rely on those norms. Examples include, as we have seen, the 
941 CTOC, ICSFT, IHR, FCTC, CITES, CCTMW, MLC and CDWDW.
942 This point has been expressly made with regard to CTOC and ICSFT. Section 6.1.3.2 with 
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reliance on ‘international guidelines and protocols established by UN agen-
cies’ in the interpretation of article 12 ICESCR on the rights to sexual and 
reproductive health951, on ‘relevant initiatives of regional, interregional and 
multilateral organisations against money laundering’ under the CTOC952, on 
the packaging and labeling of hazardous waste in accordance with ‘gener-
ally accepted and recognized international rules and standards’ under the 
CCTMW953 and on the regulation of penalties under the MLC in accordance 
with the UNCLOS954. Despite their distinct purposes, references to other 
international norms in international legal regimes have in common that they 
aim to ensure that the national legislature takes into account other relevant 
international norms when it is adopting domestic implementing legislation.
Such references thus also have some harmonising effects, as they 
contribute to the convergence of domestic legislation of the policy fields 
covered by the international legal norms to which is referred. The refer-
ences’ normative force differs, however. In some instances, they make 
clear that observance of a specific international legal norm is compulsory. 
In other situations, references are formulated in looser terms. In order to 
perform their obligations to implement article 12 ICESCR, states ‘should be 
guided by contemporary human rights instruments and jurisprudence, as 
well as the most current international guidelines and protocols established 
by United Nations agencies, in particular WHO and the United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA)’.955
The distinction between references to national law and references to 
international law may prove not entirely accurate if we try to fit in national 
legislation which serves to implement legislation adopted in the frame-
work of the EU. However, the same mechanism applies: the enforcement 
of domestic implementing legislation should not contravene ‘EU law and 
its general principles’, which includes human rights principles, as we have 
elaborately discussed in section 5.1.2.4.
This raises the question whether compliance with human rights should 
be considered as an autonomous legislative standard to be distinguished 
from the observance of (other) national and international law. Practice with 
regard to the regulation of implementing legislation suggests a negative 
answer to this question, since we have established that only the IHR stress 
the importance of ‘dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms’ in the 
context of the imposition of health measures on travelers.956 Admittedly, the 
MLC also contains references to human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
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In contrast, the principle of non-discrimination seems to be more firmly 
embedded as an important legislative standard to be observed in the adop-
tion of domestic implementing legislation. Similar to the aforementioned 
general principles of EU law, the standard of non-discrimination may be 
difficult to categorise, as it may apply on the basis of both international 
law and national law. The legislative standard of non-discrimination has 
been recognised under the ECHR957, the ICESCR958, the IHR959 and the 
CDWDW960. It demands that preferential treatment of persons in domestic 
implementing legislation is allowed only if that distinction could be, in the 
phrase used by the ECtHR, ‘objectively and reasonably justified’.961
In sum, from international practice we can derive a legislative standard 
that prescribes the observance of international and national law in the 
adoption of domestic implementing legislation. It may be considered to 
encompass the principle of non-discrimination as well. In the context of EU 
law, references to ‘EU law and its general principles’ fulfil a similar role.
10.3.3.3 Consultation with stakeholders
The next legislative standard that could be inferred from the international 
legal regimes discussed in Part II entails the requirement to enter into 
consultation with relevant parties in the process of the adoption of national 
implementing legislation.962 Three questions arise: with whom, why and 
when?
Which parties are deemed relevant? The CDWDW expressly refers to 
representative organisations of workers and employers.963 As we have seen 
in section 4.2.3.3, under the ICESCR, stakeholders may include workers’ 
and employers’ organisations, partners that may be considered particularly 
relevant for the adoption of domestic implementing legislation on labour 
rights. Other interest groups encompass organisations that represent 
minority groups.964 Of the regimes that have been part of our examination, 
the FCTC has the most extensive enumeration of actors that should be 
involved in the consultation process: businesses, restaurant and hospitality 





961 Marckx v Belgium (n 50) par. 43.
962 Under EU law, however, there is no obligation for member states to organise a consulta-
tion process whenever they adopt domestic implementing legislation. On the contrary, 
consultation is part of the EU’s legislative process. On this subject, see J. Mendes, Partici-
pation in EU-Rulemaking. A rights-based approach (Oxford Studies in European Law, OUP, 
Oxford 2011).
963 Section 9.2.3.5.
964 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 23’ (n 397) par. 56 and 65, sub c. Also paragraphs 35 and 
40 on exceptions to limitation on daily hours of work or weekly rest periods respectively.
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sionals, organisations representing children and young people, institutions 
of learning or faith, the research community and the general public.965 In 
short, stakeholders include groups and organisations whom are particularly 
affected by the envisaged implementing legislation.
What purpose does consultation with stakeholders serve? The CESCR 
has argued that, in relation to the domestic legislation that gives effect to the 
right to take part in cultural life, as embedded in the ICESCR, consultation 
with stakeholders ensures that domestic implementing legislation is ‘accept-
able to the individuals and communities involved’.966 Similarly, under 
the FCTC, consultation serves to ‘facilitate support for legislation after its 
enactment’.967 One motivation for the involvement of stakeholders thus 
seems to consist of public support for domestic implementing measures.
Consultation with stakeholders is closely related to, and may consider-
ably overlap with, the participation of civil society. Under the FCTC, civil 
society seems to encompass academic institutions and non-governmental 
organisations.968 The treaty itself is unambiguous on the importance of civil 
society participation; it is considered ‘essential’ in attaining the objectives of 
the FCTC and its Protocols.969 Elsewhere the aim of civil society participation 
is described in more vague terms, as it is believed to ‘create a climate of 
attitude that [inter alia] identifies legislative priorities and helps develop and 
enforce legislative measures’ implementing the FCTC.970 Thus, here the main 
rationale for stakeholder participation seems to lie in the desire to enact 
materially sound legislation that can be applied and enforced in practice.
The question remains in which phase of the legislative process the 
consultation should be undertaken. A corollary of the aforementioned 
purposes of consultation is, first and foremost, that stakeholders must be 
involved during the legislative drafting process. However, this involvement 
should not cease upon the enactment or entry into force of the applicable 
laws, as may be inferred from the international legal regimes discussed in 
Part II. Rather, under the ICESCR, it is considered ‘advisable’ to continue 
stakeholder consultation after the moment on which the adopted laws come 
into effect; it is also needed during the implementation in practice of the 
adopted legislation, and the reviewing and monitoring thereof.971
965 WHO, Guidelines for implementation (n 177) 24. A distinction must be made between the 
tobacco industry and other stakeholders. As regards the former, states should take into 
account in article 5, third paragraph, which provides that national public health poli-
cies regarding the use of tobacco product should be protected from commercial or other 
interests of the tobacco industry. 
966 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 21’ (n 395) par. 16, sub c.
967 WHO, Guidelines for implementation (n 177) 24.
968 WHO, Guidelines for implementation (n 177) 44. 
969 Art 4, seventh paragraph.
970 WHO, Guidelines for implementation (n 177) 83.
971 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 23’ (n 397) par. 56 and 65, sub c.
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In sum, under the regimes discussed in Part II, consultation is believed 
to enhance both support for, and quality of, domestic implementing legisla-
tion, before and after its entry into force. This may be reflected in one of the 
‘principles’ identified under article 8 FCTC, which reads:
‘Civil society has a central role in building support for and ensuring compliance […] with 
measures, and should be included as an active partner in the process of developing, imple-
menting and enforcing legislation’.972
10.3.3.4 Provision of information concerning legislation
Another legislative standard that must be considered part of our legisla-
tive framework is the requirement to provide information to the public 
with regard to the newly established or modified legal regime. Contrary 
to consultation, the provision of information is a non-interactive process; 
it is limited to the communication in one direction only: from the state 
authorities to the public. Furthermore, the legislative standard that will be 
discussed in this section does not extend to the policy instrument of infor-
mation or education campaigns in general, but is confined to the provision 
of information concerning the adopted legislation. Admittedly, this distinction 
cannot always be easily upheld, as both campaigns may be initiated simul-
taneously and may even be traced back to the same legal instrument. The 
FCTC, for instance, refers to both; whereas on the one hand it is stated that 
‘there should be an education campaign […] outlining the law’, on the other 
hand it emphasises the need of ‘raising awareness among the public and 
opinion leaders about the risk of second-hand tobacco smoke exposure’.973
Having said that, to whom should the information about the newly 
adopted legislation be directed? Under the FCTC, the information campaign 
should be aimed at business owners and building managers whom are 
addressed by the norms of the treaty.974 Similarly, under the CDWDW, the 
circle of recipients of the said information is also limited; it is recommended 
that the information is directed towards employers and domestic workers, 
the two groups whose position is directly affected by domestic measures 
which implement the CDWDW.975 The information that is to be provided 
includes newly enacted legal obligations, enforcement arrangements and 
sanctions in case of violations, complaint mechanisms and legal remedies.976
The objectives which are pursued by the provision of information to the 
public consist of an ‘increase in the likelihood of smooth implementation 
972 WHO, Guidelines for implementation (n 177) 21. A similar statement is made with regard to 
domestic implementing measures under article 12 of the Convention. Ibid, 37.
973 WHO, Guidelines for implementation (n 177) 24.
974 Ibid.
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and high levels of voluntary compliance’.977 Also in the context of the 
implementation of the obligations contained in the ICESCR, the CESCR has 
recommended to undertake information campaigns in order to bring the 
new legislation to the attention of its addressees.978
From the foregoing it may be concluded that international law envis-
ages the instigation of information campaigns following the adoption of 
domestic implementing legislation. They should be aimed at the persons 
or entities affected by the newly adopted legislation. However, it must be 
added that this legislative standard has emerged under only three of the 
regimes discussed in Part II.
10.3.3.5 Monitoring of compliance
Once domestic implementing legislation has entered into force, it has been 
considered imperative to monitor compliance with the newly established 
regime. This legislative standard has been recognised under several of the 
international legal regimes discussed in Part II and consists of multiple 
elements. First and foremost, it encompasses the obligation to establish 
mechanisms for compliance monitoring at the national level.979 The exis-
tence of these arrangements, of course, is a prerequisite for the enforcement 
of the newly adopted legislation in practice, which is probably the reason to 
expressly include this standard in the applicable international legal instru-
ment. On the other hand, this standard may be viewed as self-evident, thus 
not requiring any codification. The fact is, however, that of the regimes 
discussed in Part II, only four have made reference to the legislative stan-
dard to establish mechanisms for compliance monitoring.
Under the CDWDW this obligation is formulated in concise terms, 
without further details on the specific features of these monitoring mecha-
nisms.980 A similar statement can be made with regard to the monitoring 
of compliance of implementing legislation under the ICESCR. In section 
4.2.3.5, it was argued that, apart from references to ‘national mechanisms for 
[…] monitoring’ and ‘effectively functioning labour inspectorates’, there is 
hardly any more detailed provision on the scope and substance of the legis-
lative standard to ensure the monitoring of compliance. This is different 
under the MLC, where a similar treaty provision is elaborated in ‘the Code’. 
As we have seen in section 9.1.3.4, the Code is relatively elaborate in respect 
of the requirements pertaining to the monitoring of compliance. They 
encompass, inter alia, the provision that inspectorates must be competent 
977 WHO, Guidelines for implementation (n 177) 24.
978 Section 4.2.3.9.
979 MLC art V, second paragraph; CDWDW art 17, second paragraph; CESCR, ‘General 
Comment no. 15’ (n 409) par. 50; CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 16’ (n 410) par. 24. Also 
CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 23’ (n 397) par. 47, sub f.
980 CDWDW art 17, second paragraph.
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(i.e., in possession of the necessary expertise) and independent.981 On the 
level of individual inspectors, it is stated that ‘inspectors [should] have the 
training, competence, terms of reference, powers, status and independence 
necessary or desirable so as to enable them to carry out [their task]’.982
These powers include the power to board ships, to carry out examina-
tions, tests and inquiries and to give orders with a view of addressing 
‘deficiences’.983 Furthermore, it must be guaranteed that inspectors have 
the ‘status and conditions of service to ensure that they are independent 
of changes of government and of improper external influences’.984 Finally, 
inspections must be performed on a regular basis and at least once in a three 
year period.985 Less detailed provisions on compliance monitoring can be 
discerned under the FCTC.
In short, most of the international legal regimes seem to presuppose a 
responsibility of state parties to ensure the monitoring of compliance with 
the newly established legal regime; only four of them include an express 
codification of this legislative standard. The MLC and its supporting docu-
ments contain the most elaborate description this standard and stress, inter 
alia, the importance of competent and independent inspectorates.
10.3.3.6 Enforcement
In accordance with the legislative standards which may be most widely 
accepted under the international legal regimes we have discussed in Part 
II, domestic implementing legislation must be enforced. Contrary to the 
standard of compliance monitoring, ‘enforcement’ entails the use of force in 
response to non-compliant conduct. The relevant provision of the CCTMV 
is exemplary for the international codification of the legislative standard 
of enforcement and requires state parties to ‘enforce [its provisions], 
including measures to prevent and punish conduct in contravention of the 
Convention’.986 Similarly, under the CDWDW, state parties are under the 
duty to ‘develop and implement measures for […] enforcement and penal-
ties […]’.987 This requirement, which is closely related to the legislative 
standard of compliance monitoring, may be considered to encompass two 
elements. First, it demands that states put in place a regulatory framework 
for the enforcement of implementing legislation (regulatory element). 
Second, this regulatory framework should be used by the responsible 
authorities in order to ensure that legislation is enforced in practice (prac-
tical element).
981 Regulation 5.1.2, fi rst paragraph.
982 Standard A5.1.4, third paragraph.
983 Standard A5.1.4, seventh paragraph.
984 Standard A5.1.4, fourth paragraph.
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The regulatory element of enforcement requires first and foremost 
the identification of the national authorities responsible for the regime’s 
enforcement. Often, this will be the same entity or entities as those endowed 
with the task of compliance monitoring, as we have discussed in the 
previous section. Furthermore, states should put in place the legislative 
framework required for the imposition of penalties in response to viola-
tions of domestic implementing legislation. In this regard, the analysed 
international legal regimes, including the legislative instruments adopted 
in the framework of the EU, take a rather uniform approach, which consists 
of effective, proportionate and sufficiently deterrent penalties. Under EU 
law, this obligation is supplemented with the principle of equivalence, 
which demands that the conditions under which infringements of EU law 
are punished should be equal to the enforcement of similar domestic legal 
provisions.988
In addition to the imposition of penalties, the international legal 
regimes may refer to other enforcement measures to be implemented on the 
domestic level. In the terminology of the MLC, they are labelled ‘corrective 
measures’.989 The CESCR refers to inter alia ‘administrative measures’ when 
it clarified the obligations under the ICESCR.990 In exceptional cases, the 
international legal regimes more specifically prescribe the nature of such 
alternative enforcement measures. Under the FCTC, for instance, states 
are called upon to endow their national enforcement authorities with the 
authority to seize, forfeit and destroy’ non-compliant tobacco products.991
Under the CITES, states are obliged to take measures for the confiscation or 
return to the exporting state of specimens that were traded unlawfully.992
These exceptions notwithstanding, our examination has demonstrated that 
states are left with a wide margin of discretion to further specify the open 
norms pertaining to the severity of penalties and on the nature of alterna-
tive enforcement measures.
The regulatory element of the legislative standard to enforce domestic 
implementing legislation seems to fulfil a slightly different role under two 
of the regimes that we have discussed in Part II, both of which are part of 
international criminal law: the CTOC and the ICSFT. Their character differs 
from the other regimes’ nature, because under the CTOC and the ICSFT, 
enforcement itself is the policy aim central to the regimes; both treaties’ core 
obligations demand the establishment as criminal offences of the acts that 
fall under their scope and to impose sanctions in response to the criminal-
ised conduct. Compared to the other international legal regimes, therefore, 
the requirement of enforcement seems be more prominent under the CTOC 
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infringements of the international legal regimes’ provisions, is by no means 
limited to international criminal law. As we have seen, criminalisation may 
also be required under the positive obligations derived from the ECHR993, 
the ICESCR994, the FCTC995 and the CCTMW.996
The second element requires that domestic implementing legislation 
should be enforced in practice. Arguably, this requirement is self-evident 
and must be read into the treaty or other obligations that call upon states 
to ensure the effectiveness or the enforcement of the international legal 
instrument at hand. Nevertheless, the practical element of enforcement 
has received separate attention under the ECHR. In the view of the ECtHR, 
states have to ‘properly implement’ the applicable laws, which may entail 
inter alia the obligation to institute criminal proceedings in response to any 
intentional taking of life under article 2 ECHR.997
10.3.3.7 Remedies
Furthermore, the provision of legal remedies may been considered impera-
tive for the adoption of domestic implementing legislation. ‘Remedies’ can 
be loosely defined as legal procedures open to individuals to enforce rights 
to which they are entitled; the availability of remedies enables aggrieved 
individuals to enforce their rights. For the purpose of the present study, we 
are particularly interested in the remedies to enforce rights entrenched in 
domestic implementing legislation.
The legislative standard to provide for remedies differs from the 
enforcement of domestic implementing legislation by non-judicial public 
authorities, such as labour inspectorates or the criminal prosecutor. On 
the other hand, it remains true that remedies serve as a means to enforce 
domestic legislation, just as labour inspectorates and the criminal prose-
cutor do. This common purpose, namely enforcement, has been underlined 
in the framework of the implementation of the positive obligations under 
the ECHR. As we have seen in section 4.1.3.3, under the right to life, the 
ECtHR makes a distinction between the ‘intentional taking of life’ and other 
breaches of the right to life. While the former requires action by the public 
prosecutor, the latter category may also be addressed through the establish-
ment of legal procedures which can be followed by individuals in order to 
obtain civil redress. For the purpose of the present section, therefore, it is 
important to note that the availability of legal remedies complements the 
enforcement of legislation through public authorities.
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The legislative standard to ensure the existence of legal remedies for 
aggrieved individuals has been acknowledged under several of the regimes 
discussed in Part II. Since remedies serve as an instrument to enable 
individuals to enforce their rights, their importance has been recognised 
primarily under legal regimes that endow individuals with certain rights. 
Therefore, it may come as no surprise that the establishment of remedies, 
as a legislative standard, can be found most notably under human rights 
instruments. Perhaps the most prominent codification of the obligation to 
provide for an effective remedy can be found in article 13 ECHR, as was 
discussd in section 4.1.3.3.
Under the ICESCR, the existence of legal remedies in order to enforce 
the rights embedded in the treaty has been considered ‘advisable’, as we 
have seen in section 4.2.3.6. The purpose of remedies under the ICESCR 
lies in the enforcement of rights through reparation, which encompasses 
restitution, compensation, satisfaction or guarantees of non-repetition.998
While the specific features of the required remedies remain unspecified, 
the CESCR has formulated three principles which must be observed: avail-
ability, accessibility and quality. Together, they ensure that the remedies that 
have been put in place truly enable an individual to enforce his right(s).
The right to a legal remedy is also firmly established under EU law and 
also applies to rights and obligations prescribed by national implementing 
legislation. Its origins may be traced back to the CJEU’s ruling in Johnston, 
in which it was called ‘a general principle of law which underlies the consti-
tutional traditions common to the member states’.999 Nowadays it is often 
referred to as the principle of effective judicial protection.1000 It is codified in 
article 19 TEU, which provides:
‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the 
fields covered by Union law.’
For the purpose of this section, we limit ourselves to remedies available 
to individuals, as opposed to EU institutions or member states, to enforce 
rights conferred upon them by implementing legislation adopted by the EU 
member states. Such remedies must be obtained before national courts, as 
individuals do not have the right to directly institute proceedings before 
the CJEU (or the General Court).1001 Typically, in situations like these, an 
998 Section 4.2.3.6.
999 CJEU, Johnston, case C-222/84, judgment of 15 May 1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:206, par 18.
1000 For instance CJEU, UNIBET, case C-432/05, judgment of 13 March 2007, 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:163, par. 37; CJEU, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, case 
C-64/16, judgment of 27 February 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, par. 35.
1001 Article 263, second and fourth paragraph, TFEU. However, national courts could request 
the CJEU to issue a so-called ‘preliminary ruling’ under article 267 TFEU. They do so by 
referring particular questions on the interpretation of EU law, raised in a legal case before 
it, to the CJEU.
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individual claims that his rights under EU law have been violated as a 
consequence of inadequate implementation on the part of the member state.
Does EU law further specify the requirements for national remedies? 
Some basic elements are included in article 47 CFR.1002 But even before the 
entry into force of the CFR, the CJEU had developed a doctrine regarding 
national remedies. This doctrine basically entails three principles, which 
were stated by the CJEU in Rewe in 1976:
‘[I]n the absence of Community rules on this subject, it is for the domestic legal system of 
each Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the proce-
dural conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the protection of the rights 
which citizens have from the direct effect of Community law, it being understood that such 
conditions cannot be less favourable than those relating to similar actions of a domestic 
nature’.1003
The CJEU thus departs from the view that member states are at liberty to 
shape the legal remedies in their domestic legal order, which is commonly 
called the principle of procedural autonomy. However, member states must 
observe two additional principles. First, the conditions for the enforcement 
of rights derived from EU law must be identical to the enforcement of rights 
derived from purely national law (principle of equivalence). Or, as the CJEU 
put it, the ‘procedural rule at issue [should apply] without distinction to 
actions alleging infringements of Community law and to those alleging 
infringements of national law’.1004 The application of this standard thus 
requires a comparison between the procedural safeguards applicable to 
rights derived from EU law and national law. Second, the available remedy 
must provide effective protection (principle of effectiveness).1005 In recent 
case law, this principle is referred to as requiring that ‘[…] the detailed 
procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individ-
uals derive directly from EU law, […] do not render practically impossible 
or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law’.1006 Since 
1002 It reads: ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are 
violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the 
conditions laid down in this Article. Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously estab-
lished by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and repre-
sented. Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack suffi cient resources in so far 
as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice’.
1003 CJEU, Rewe (n 515) par. 5.
1004 For instance, CJEU, Edis, case C-231/96, judgment of 15 September 1998, 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:401, par. 36.
1005 Woods and Watson, EU Law (n 867) 183-184.
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Rewe the CJEU has produced a large amount of case law on the application 
of those principles to individual cases.1007
A different, but closely related, question concerns the situation in which 
an individual has suffered losses as a result of the failure of a member state 
to correctly implement EU directives. Thus, it is a very particular kind of 
remedy available to individuals under EU law. In such a situation, should 
the state award compensation? The CJEU has answered this question in the 
affirmative and has accepted the existence of state liability, provided that 
the conditions developed in its case law have been fulfilled. The conditions 
originate from the Francovich judgment:
‘The first of those conditions is that the result prescribed by the directive should entail the 
grant of rights to individuals. The second condition is that it should be possible to identify 
the content of those rights on the basis of the provisions of the directive. Finally, the third 
condition is the existence of a causal link between the breach of the State’s obligation and 
the loss and damage suffered by the injured parties.’1008
In Brasserie du Pêcheur, which concerned the liability of member states for 
violations of EU law in general (instead of for non-transposition of a direc-
tive), the CJEU ‘replaced’ the second condition from the Francovich judg-
ment, cited above, with the requirement that the breach committed by the 
state is ‘sufficiently serious’, although the criteria developed in Francovich
still apply in situations of non-transposition of EU directives.1009 The appli-
cation of this test, the CJEU stated, involves inter alia an assessment of the 
clarity and precision of the rule breached, and of the measure of discretion 
left by that rule to the national authorities.1010 If the EU instrument at hand 
leaves discretion to the member state to make ‘legislative choices’, a suffi-
ciently serious breach cannot be established until the state has ‘manifestly 
and gravely’ disregarded the limits of its rule-making powers. If, on the 
other hand, the EU instrument leaves only a small margin of discretion, or 
no discretion at all, a mere infringement of EU law may be enough to find a 
‘sufficiently serious’ breach.1011
If we leave the domain of EU law and return to other international 
legal regimes, discussed in Part II, it becomes clear that a particular kind 
remedy lies in complaint mechanisms. In the framework of the CDWDW, 
state parties have an obligation to provide for complaint mechanisms, 
1007 For a recent overview, see M. Avbelj, ‘National procedural autonomy: concept, practice 
and theoretical queries’ in: A. Lazowski and S. Blockmans (eds) Research handbook on EU 
institutional law (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham and Northampton 2016) 421-440.
1008 CJEU, Francovich, cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, judgment of 19 November 1991, 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:428, par. 40. 
1009 CJEU, Brasserie du Pêcheur, joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, judgment of 5 March 1996, 
ECLI:EU:C:1996:79, par. 51-55. Also Woods and Watson, EU Law (n 867) 213.
1010 CJEU, Brasserie du Pêcheur (n 1009) par. 56.
1011 CJEU, Dillenkofer, joined cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 and C-190/94, 
judgment of 8 October 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:375, par. 25.
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which must be ‘effective’ and ‘accessible’.1012 Although the treaty and the 
applicable Recommendation are silent on the origin of those complaints, the 
group most likely to issue complaints, consists of domestic workers, given 
their vulnerable position.1013 Similarly, under the MLC, flag states have a 
duty to provide for ‘on-board complaint procedures for the fair, effective 
and expeditious handling of seafarer complaints’.1014 These qualifications 
of the applicable complaint procedure have a general nature; the regimes at 
hand do not prescribe in more detail the various requirements that should 
be met. Apparently, this is for states themselves to decide.
In sum, a legislative standard to provide for legal remedies as a means 
of enforcement, including complaint mechanisms, can be discerned under 
several of the international legal regimes discussed in Part II. Criteria 
pertaining to the substance of such remedies are largely left for state parties 
to decide, a freedom which may be described as ‘national procedural 
autonomy’. An exception to this general rule may be found under the 
ICESCR, where it has been argued that remedies must meet the standards 
of availability, accessibility and quality. Similarly, under EU law national 
remedies should respect the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. 
Finally, article 13 ECHR demands a remedy that is effective ‘in law and 
practice’.
10.3.3.8 Ex post evaluation of legislation
Finally, we can derive from the regimes analysed in Part II a legislative stan-
dard which requires the evaluation of domestic implementing legislation 
after it has been adopted (ex post). First, several provisions of the ICESCR 
have been understood as containing an obligation to periodically review 
legislation in order to assess whether it still corresponds to the rights 
laid down in the treaty.1015 A similar requirement can be identified under 
various provisions of the FCTC.1016 It must be added, however, that this 
legislative standard can be found under two of the examined regimes only, 
which may be viewed as an indication that international policy makers do 
not demonstrate a widely shared willingness to accept such an standard.
What is the purpose of the ex post evaluation of implementing legisla-
tion? This purpose may be twofold, as appears from our analysis in Part 
II. First of all, the evaluation of implementing legislation enables state 
parties to assess whether they comply with the applicable international 
1012 Art 17, fi rst paragraph. A similar requirement can be identifi ed under the MLC (regula-
tion 5.2.2).
1013 Article 15, first paragraph, sub b, of the Convention, refers to the ‘investigation of 
complaints, alleged abuses and fraudulent practices concerning the activities of private 
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legal regime. Second, the evaluation of implementing measures is an 
important towards the improvement of those measures.1017 Arguably, both 
aims are closely related, especially in the context of regimes which can be 
characterised by their ‘dynamic’ nature. As an example, we could refer to 
the ICESCR, which contains, as we have seen, the obligation the ‘progres-
sively realize’ the rights set forth in the treaty. Thus, the ICESCR requires 
the improvement of domestic law from a human rights’ perspective rather 
than a static legal situation to be realised by the state parties. Against this 
background, it could be argued, periodic ex post evaluation of domestic 
legislation is of great importance, as it is a tool to measure progress on the 
part of the state.
10.3.4 Conclusion
With regard to legislative standards, our examination of the international 
legal regimes indicates that the standard of effectiveness, in various 
manifestations, could be viewed as the overarching standard that must 
be observed by states bound to which the regime applies. According to 
this standard, states must ensure that domestic implementing legislation 
is adopted and applied in such a way that a specified international legal 
regime is effective. Furthermore, the regimes discussed in Part II justify 
the conclusion that several legislative standards of a subsidiary nature 
ultimately serve the purpose of effectiveness. In this chapter, eight of those 
standards have been identified. Our exploration of the scope and substance, 
as conducted in the previous sections, has unveiled both their rudimentary 
character and the high level of fragmentation that can be observed.
With regard to the rudimentary character of the legislative standards, 
it is not easy to overlook the fact that they have been formulated in broad 
terms, without giving much detail as to how those standards must be 
complied with. For instance, it is clear that the monitoring of compliance 
with domestic implementing legislation, under some of the analysed 
regimes at least, is considered imperative under the applicable international 
legal regime. How this compliance monitoring must be performed, however, 
is often not described in detail.
With regard to fragmentation, it is (re-)emphasised that the legislative 
standards under the various international legal regimes discussed in Part 
II differ from one regime to the other; some regimes contain more legisla-
tive standards than other regimes. Moreover, fragmentation can even be 
observed within single international legal regimes. For instance, a specified 
legislative standard may apply to some provisions of the regime only; it is 
thus of no relevance to other norms contained in the said regime. In sum, as 
we may conclude here, the regulation of domestic implementing legislation 
under the regimes discussed here is neither extensive nor coherent.
1017 WHO, Guidelines for implementation (n 177) 67.
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10.4 Binding character of legislative standards
In the previous sections we have presented, on the basis of the selected 
regimes discussed in Part II, the common features (or: standards) of the 
international regulation of domestic implementing legislation. We have 
also pointed to the fragmentation which emerges from our analysis; the 
various international legal regimes differ in the ways in which they regulate 
implementing legislation. This is true not only for an international legal 
regime vis-à-vis other regimes, but also for the various obligations to adopt 
implementing legislation within each regime.
In the present section, we highlight a third aspect of the established 
fragmentation. This aspect is related to the character of the legislative 
standards entrenched in the various international legal regimes discussed 
in Part II. It stresses the fact that in some cases international policy makers 
(and judges) have accepted legislative standards as ‘binding’, which for 
the purpose of this section must be understood as flowing from one of 
the formal sources of international law, most notably treaty law. In other 
cases, as we have seen in Part II, legislative standards have been ‘accepted’, 
but only as part of non-binding documents. Put differently, we examine 
the character of legislative standards (as binding law or as non-binding 
norms) which have been formulated under the international legal regimes 
discussed in Part II. Roughly three categories can be distinguished.
At the one end of the spectre we find legislative standards which are 
firmly embedded in the applicable and binding international legal instru-
ment. In some cases they can be derived from a treaty or a decision of an 
international organisation on the basis of a textual analysis of the instru-
ment at hand. An example of this category can be found in article 8, first 
paragraph, ICSFT, which demands the ‘observance of domestic legal prin-
ciples’ in the adoption of national implementing legislation on the identifi-
cation, detection, freezing or seizure of funds (allegedly) used for terrorist 
purposes. Furthermore, we could refer to the right to an effective remedy, 
which is codified in article 13 ECHR. In other cases, they have been read 
into the text by judges entrusted with the task to authoritatively interpret 
the text. The most prominent example of this category can be found in the 
jurisdiction of the CJEU, which, as we have seen, has developed an exten-
sive body of case law on the implementation of directives and regulations 
by the EU member states. Whatever the method of interpretation, textual or 
otherwise, under both categories the source of the legislative standard can 
be traced back to the applicable binding legal instrument.
At the other end of the spectre we find legislative standards which 
cannot be directly based on a binding international legal instrument. 
Instead, they must be derived from supporting documents. In section 
7.2.3.3 on the enforcement of the FCTC, for instance, we have seen that the 
‘Guidelines for Implementation’ prescribe the imposition of proportionate 
penalties for violations of several FCTC provisions, whereas such an obli-
gation cannot be directly derived from the FCTC text. Other documents 
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which codify legislative standards have names such as ‘Legislative guide’ 
or ‘Toolkit for implementation in national legislation’. They tend to have 
one thing in common: they have been drafted by experts under the auspices 
of an international organisation which serves as the instrument’s guardian. 
While the ‘Toolkit for implementation in national legislation’ was drafted 
by the secretariat of the WHO ‘in response to requests for guidance’, the 
‘Legislative guide’ for the implementation of the CTOC was drafted by 
a professor in the field of criminal justice with the participation of other 
experts and national governments’ and international organisations’ repre-
sentatives.1018 As a result, from a legal point of view, the weight attached to 
the guidance provided in the documents may be rather limited.
The third category basically covers everything in between. It includes 
legislative standards which can be traced back to the applicable binding 
legal instrument. At the same time, the legislative standard at hand is elabo-
rated in supporting documents. A case in point may be the Code annexed 
to the MLC, Title V of which covers the topic of ‘compliance and enforce-
ment’. It contains a binding norm and imposes the duty to bestow upon 
inspectors the necessary powers for inter alia the boarding of ships and the 
performance of inspections.1019 This (binding) standard is supplemented 
with a (non-binding) guideline which prescribes the attribution of several 
additional powers to inspectors, including the power to question the ship’s 
master and the power to take samples of products.1020 In other words, 
legislative standards which can be categorised under this group are partly 
binding, and partly non-binding.
The examples included in the second and third category make clear 
that the distinction between three groups is, indeed, a rough one; in the 
end, it cannot always be determined from the outset whether an established 
legislative standard is derived from the binding legal text itself. A typical 
example is the ICESCR. While the legislative standard of non-discrimina-
tion is firmly embedded in the treaty itself, many of the other legislative 
standards referred to in section 4.2 seem to be ‘invented’ by the CESCR in 
the general comments. In this regard, it could be argued that the general 
comments produced by the CESCR fulfil a similar function as implementing 
guidelines, handbooks etc. under the second category. This view may be 
contested by others who take the stance that the CESCR’s general comments 
do not complement the text of the ICESCR, but merely serve as an interpreta-
tion of it.
In sum, the extent to which a particular legislative standard can be 
traced back to the international legal instrument itself, can be a matter of 
dispute. The availability of an authoritative interpretation, most notably 
through courts on the basis of compulsory jurisdiction, can provide some 
welcome guidance for policy makers involved in the adoption of domestic 
1018 WHO, ‘Toolkit. Questions and answers’ (n 627) 4. UNODC, Legislative Guides (n 554) v.
1019 Standard A.5.1.4, seventh paragraph.
1020 Guideline B.5.1.4, eighth paragraph.
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implementing legislation. In other situations, similar direction can be 
given in the form of implementing guidelines, legislative guides etc. This 
information is not only relevant as an element of our examination of the 
international law governing implementing legislation, but also indicates to 
what extent states, as negotiating parties, have (voluntarily) contracted legal 
obligations in this regard. Apparently, we may conclude, states are reluctant 
to accept legislative standards of a binding nature; they may consider 
it neither necessary nor desirable to restrict space for national decision 
making on implementing legislation.
10.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have approached the findings of Part II more systemati-
cally. This view has enabled us to identify the commonalities and differences 
of the various international legal regimes that have been under examination 
in the previous part. The findings in this chapter may be summarised as 
follows.
The regimes discussed in Part II constitute ‘legal harmonisation’, 
instead of transplantation or unification. This means that the policy aims to 
be achieved are formulated on the international level, whereas the means 
to achieve those aims within domestic legal orders are for state parties 
to decide. An important aspect of this harmonisation is the imposition of 
minimum requirements which may be complemented with domestic laws 
that provide additional protection to a (public) interest. In a few cases, 
we have found that the inclusion of optional provisions may contribute 
to further harmonisation, as may the permission to consider domestic 
‘equivalent measures’ a substitute for the implementation of certain aspects 
of regimes that are part of international labour law.
Furthermore, we have deduced a virtual framework on the quality of 
implementing legislation under international law. This framework includes 
requirements, entrenched in binding or non-binding instruments, that 
govern the way in which the domestic implementation through legislative 
means must be performed. It has been argued that ‘effectiveness’ is the 
most prominent of elements incorporated in the framework. That standard 
is, however, complemented by subsidiary legislative standards which have 
been discussed in section 10.3.3. Together, they constitute a rudimentary set 
of criteria that must be observed, either mandatory or non-mandatory, by 
states that adopt implementing legislation in their national legal order.
We have also argued that the application of legislative standards is 
highly fragmented. This means that there is no uniform set of rules that is 
applied by international policy makers whenever a new international legal 
instrument is drafted. It is for this reason that the framework presented in 
this chapter has been called a virtual framework pertaining to the quality 
of implementing legislation. Hence, it reflects international legal practice 
regarding several existing legal regimes, but is itself not part of inter-
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national law. Consequently, the overview presented in Part II and in the 
present chapter cannot be accepted as an adequate reflection of current 
international law as a whole. Given the small number of regimes that were 
selected in Part II, our analysis is too limited for statements on international 
legal practice in general. However, such statements on international legal 
practice in general are not essential in order to achieve the purposes of this 
study. What is essential, on the contrary, is the assessment from the perspec-
tive of legislative quality, of the legislative standards to which international 
policy makers have resorted, as we have seen in Part II and in this chapter. 
This assessment will be conducted in the next chapter.
519024-L-sub01-bw-Beenakker
Processed on: 18-4-2018
11 Legislative standards and the quality of 
implementing legislation
11.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we explored the scope and substance of identi-
fied legislative standards under selected international legal regimes. To 
complete our assessment of those standards, it is imperative to determine to 
what extent they contribute to the quality of domestic implementing legis-
lation. Therefore, in the present chapter we turn to existing policies -both 
international and national- in an attempt to determine to what extent the 
quest for legislative quality has been translated in international and national 
efforts on the subject. Subsequently we will explore theories and practices 
with regard to the quality of implementing legislation. In this way, this 
chapter aims to present an answer to the question how the notion of legisla-
tive quality must be understood and discusses the relevance of legislative 
standards for the assessment of a law’s quality. Together, our findings will 
enable us to make a comparison -in Chapter 12- between current practice 
with regard to the inclusion of requirements pertaining to implementing 
legislation in international legal regimes on the one hand, and the state of 
the art with regard to policies to enhance legislative quality on the other 
hand.
The present chapter is divided into several sections. Section 11.2 is 
dedicated to national practices in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
with regard to quality of domestic implementing legislation in general, and 
legislative standards in particular. Then our focus shifts towards two inter-
national approaches, adopted in the framework of the OECD and the EU 
respectively (section 11.3). Building on the findings from these national and 
international practices, the concept of ‘quality of legislation’ and its most 
important (and problematic) aspects will be further elaborated in section 
11.4.
11.2 National approaches to the quality of implementing 
legislation
11.2.1 Introduction
How do national governments approach the concept of legislative quality, 
or, more specifically, which legislative standards have been identified in 
order to increase the quality of legislation in general and of implementing 
legislation in particular? For reasons of space, the analysis contained in 
this chapter is limited to two domestic legal orders: the Netherlands and 
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the United Kingdom. Their inclusion is not only the somewhat arbitrary 
product of the language barrier; also the diverse way in which international 
law is received in their legal orders and their characterisation as civil law 
and common law justify the selection these two legal orders. Of course, 
the findings presented in this chapter cannot be said to reflect all existing 
national approaches to implementing legislation; the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom serve as mere examples.
11.2.2 The Netherlands
11.2.2.1 General policy on the quality of legislation, including implementing 
legislation
The backbone of Dutch policy on legislative quality has been laid down 
in the Instructions for law-making. They are codified in an internal guid-
ance document that was adopted by the prime-minister. The initial version 
of the document in its present form entered into force on 1 January 1993, 
although earlier guidance documents go back to 1951;1021 over the years, the 
Instructions for law-making have been revised several times.1022 They apply 
to various kinds of legislation that is adopted by the central government1023
and, if expressly indicated, to ‘treaties, binding decisions of the European 
Union and other decisions of international organisations’.1024
The Instructions for law-making consolidate the evolution of Dutch 
legislative policy, the modern origins of which may be traced back to the 
early 1990’s, when a policy document was formulated ‘with a view of the 
further development and implementation of a general legislative policy, 
aimed at the improvement of rule of law aspects and administrative aspects 
of government policy’.1025 To this end, several measures were proposed, 
including the formulation of quality standards applicable to legislation.1026
These standards require, first of all, that legislative proposals do not 
infringe on law of higher rank, such as EU law and (under Dutch constitu-
tional law) international law, and on general principles of law such as the 
principle of legal certainty. In this context, it was noted that to an increasing 
extent international and EU law had been restricting room for domestic 
policy making. Therefore, it was expressly added, attention had to be paid 
to supranational law, with regard to both the development of ‘autonomous’ 
1021 Ph. Eijlander and W. Voermans, ‘Nieuwe aanwijzingen voor de regelgeving’ Nederlands 
Juristenblad 5 (1993) 169-174, 170.
1022 ‘Instructions for law-making’, issued by the Prime-Minister (18 November 1992) (Stcrt. 




1025 Minister van Justitie, ‘Zicht op wetgeving’ (5 March 1991) Parliamentary Papers II 
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national legislation and national implementing legislation.1027 Second, 
legislation must, in an efficient manner, contribute to the realisation of the 
formulated policy objectives. The standards of effectiveness and efficiency 
require a clear and exhaustive formulation of policy aims underlying the 
proposed piece of legislation.1028 Third, the requirements of subsidiarity 
and proportionality serve to protect the ‘balance between government 
and society’. Subsidiarity demands that, as a rule, responsibilities must be 
entrusted to municipal and provincial governments and non-governmental 
actors, unless action by the central government is inevitable. ‘Proportion-
ality’ refers to the standard that requires a balancing between the costs and 
benefits of the intervention. Fourth, legislation must be practicable and 
enforceable. The inclusion of this standard is motivated by the assumption 
that laws which cannot be applied in practice and enforced will remain inef-
fective. This, it is noted, is unacceptable from a policy perspective and a rule 
of law perspective.1029 Fifth, laws must contribute to the coherence of the 
whole body of legislation in force for the purpose of transparency and the 
coordination of policies and exercise of powers. In absence of consistency 
with other applicable laws, it is argued, the achievement of the formulated 
policy aims will be impeded.1030 Sixth, laws must be simple, clear and acces-
sible.1031 Although it was acknowledged that in practice it may not always 
be possible to satisfy all of the aforementioned legislative standards, policy 
makers should seek to observe the quality criteria to the largest extent 
possible.1032
A few years later, in 1994, the Dutch government established a ministe-
rial commission on competition, deregulation and legislative quality in an 
attempt to ‘reinforce economic growth’.1033 As part of this effort, the govern-
ment pledged to decrease and simplify laws that unjustifiably impeded 
civilian and economic life. This approach entailed, inter alia, a decrease of 
the regulatory and administrative burden to a minimum, the repeal of laws 
that unnecessarily obstruct competition and the enhancement of legislative 
quality.1034 In 2000, the Dutch government reaffirmed the importance of the 
quality standards it had formulated less than a decade before, although it 








1033 Minister van Justitie, ‘Marktwerking, deregulering en wetgevingskwaliteit’ Parliamen-
tary Papers II 1994/95, 24036, no. 1, p. 1.
1034 Ibid, 2-3.
1035 Minister van Justitie, ‘Wetgevingskwaliteitsbeleid en wetgevingsvisitatie’ (6 November 
2000) Parliamentary Papers II 2000/01, 27475, no. 2, p. 5-6 and 8-9.
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In a policy document that was published in 2008, the government 
announced a shift of attention towards the decision making process; the 
formulation of quality criteria was not sufficient, it held, but should be 
complemented by guidance during the preparatory stages of the policy 
process.1036 It thus introduced an ‘Integrated framework for the assessment 
of policy and legislation’.1037 In brief, this document includes several ques-
tions that serve as guidance for policy makers. They emphasise, among 
other things, the problem analysis, the policy aim, the choice of the appro-
priate policy instrument, its legality, and the expected consequences for 
affected persons, companies, the environment etc. Although the Integrated 
framework for the assessment of policy and legislation is closely related to 
the quality of legislation, it has a wider scope than quality of legislation as 
it extends to public policy in general, also encompassing policies that do 
not require the adoption of legislation. Therefore, for the following discus-
sion of the legislative standards adhered to in the Netherlands we will rely 
primarily on the Instructions for law-making. They can be divided into 
three categories: instructions dealing with substantive legislative issues, 
instructions regarding legislative technique and instructions regarding 
legislative procedure.1038
The instructions dealing with substantive legislative issues are part 
of Chapter 2 of the Instructions. One of the most important provisions is 
Instruction 6, which provides that the process to develop a legislative 
proposal shall be set in motion only if the adoption of legislation is strictly 
necessary. Once this test has been passed, policy makers should acquire all 
relevant knowledge on the relevant subject and formulate in specific terms 
the policy aims that are to be achieved. Subsequently, it must be discussed 
whether the aspired objectives can be realised without government inter-
vention and, if this is not the case, whether existing legislative instruments 
suffice. If this question must be answered in the negative as well, a new 
legislative proposal can be justified.1039 Moreover, the Instructions for law-
making stipulate that whenever policy makers consider the various options 
to obtain the policy objectives, special attention must be paid to the extent 
to which a new law may contribute to the realisation of those objectives, to 
the consequences of the considered piece of legislation and to the expected 
regulatory burden (such as administrative or financial obligations) for 
affected individuals, companies or other institutions.1040 With regard to the 
latter element, a legislative proposal must be designed in a manner that 
1036 Minister van Justitie, ‘Integraal wetgevingsbeleid’ (6 October 2008) Parliamentary Papers 
II 2008/09, 31731, no. 1, p. 7.
1037 Ibid, 7-8 and 10.
1038 N.A. Florijn, ‘The instructions for legislation in the Netherlands. A critical appraisal’ 4 
Legisprudence 2 (2010) 171-191, 175.
1039 Instruction no. 7.
1040 Instruction no. 9.
519024-L-sub01-bw-Beenakker
Processed on: 18-4-2018
Chapter 11 Legislative standards and the quality of implementing legislation 243
reduces the regulatory burden to a minimum.1041 In respect of foreseen 
negative consequences, if applicable, they must be proportionate compared 
to the pursued aims.1042 Furthermore, a new law may not be introduced 
until it has been clarified whether it could be applied and enforced in prac-
tice.1043 Another important legislative standard requires the observance of 
legal norms of higher rank, such as EU law or the Dutch Constitution.1044
The instructions regarding legislative technique can be found in Chap-
ters 3, 4 and 5 of the Instructions. For instance, legal text must be formulated 
as concise as possible; the use of superfluous terms must be avoided.1045
Moreover, drafters should use common language to ensure comprehensi-
bility.1046 Other instructions concern the consistent use of terms, not only 
within a single legal instrument, but across the entire body of Dutch legisla-
tion. Examples can be found in Instructions 71 and 88b, which prescribe the 
way in which laws should refer to the overseas territories of the Nether-
lands and the institutions of the European Union respectively. Furthermore, 
the Instructions for law-making stipulate the various elements, both formal 
and substantive, which should be included in the proposed legal instru-
ment. The formal components include, among other things, the formulation 
of the preambular section of a law.1047 The legislative standards with regard 
to substantive components of a law concern, among other things, directives 
which require a thorough motivation of the establishment of advisory 
organs or quasi-governmental organisations or the mutual recognition of 
goods, if applicable.1048 Elements of laws that emerge more often include 
the appointment of supervisory authorities, the attribution of powers for 
the purpose of enforcement, a legal basis for the imposition of penalties on 
offenders, provisions on legal remedies against the exercise of governmental 
authority, provisions for the ex post evaluation of a law’s effectiveness and 
transitional provisions.1049
The instructions on legislative procedures, codified in Chapter 6 of the 
Instructions, contain directives with regard to the involvement of actors 
in the legislative process, including departments of the central govern-
ment and advisory bodies such as the Council of State. They stipulate, for 
instance, that legislative drafts must be assessed by the Legal Section of the 
Ministry of Justice and Security, in particular with regard to the extent they 
meet the six legislative demands described above.1050 Furthermore, legis-
lative drafts must be sent to the EC if they impose ‘technical regulations’ 
1041 Instruction no. 13.
1042 Instruction no. 15.
1043 Instruction no. 11.
1044 Instruction no. 18.
1045 Instruction no. 52.
1046 Instruction no. 54.
1047 Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3.
1048 Instructions no. 123a, 124a and 131c respectively.
1049 Instructions no. 133 and sections 4.9, 4.10, 4.13, 4.14. 
1050 Instruction no. 254.
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which may constitute an impediment to the free movement of goods across 
the internal borders of the EU.1051
11.2.2.2 Specific legislative standards applicable to legislation to implement 
EU instruments
In addition to the directives applicable to legislative proposals in general, 
Dutch legislative policy provides for instructions which apply to laws 
aimed at the implementation of EU instruments in particular. They can be 
found in Chapter 8 of the Instructions for law-making. The instructions 
included in this chapter aim to ensure the timely and correct implementa-
tion of binding decisions of the EU in the Dutch legal order.1052 As a point of 
departure, it is stipulated that the instructions on legislation in general, as 
discussed above, equally apply to legislative proposals that serve to imple-
ment binding decisions of the EU, unless indicated otherwise.1053 In other 
words, in principle, the legislative standards codified in the Instructions for 
law-making do not distinguish between implementing legislation and non-
implementing legislation.
For the purpose of timely implementation, implementing legislation 
may not contain elements that are not strictly required by the EU instru-
ment at hand, in order to avoid delay as a consequence of political debates 
on added ‘national’ elements for which there may be no tight deadline.1054
For the same reason, the Dutch legislature may choose to delegate the 
power to adopt implementing measures to the council of ministers or even a 
particular minister, if the provisions that require implementation are highly 
detailed or leave little room for decision making on the national level.1055
Such delegation decreases the time needed to accomplish implementation, 
since the adoption of legislation by the council of ministers or a particular 
minister tend to be less lengthy procedures.
In addition to Chapter 8 of the Instructions for law-making, the Dutch 
authorities have drawn up a manual on implementation matters, among 
them the requirements pertaining to legislation that serves to implement 
binding decisions adopted in the framework of the EU.1056 These require-
ments primarily flow from the case law of the CJEU on questions of imple-
1051 Section 6.1a. The obligation to inform the European Commission and other EU member 
states in the case of the introduction of ‘technical regulations’ is derived from Directive 
2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying 
down a procedure for the provision on information in the fi eld of technical regulations 
and of rules on information society services (codifi cation) (OJ 2015, L 241).
1052 Instruction no. 328, explanatory note.
1053 Instruction no. 329.
1054 Instruction no. 331. 
1055 Instruction no. 334, sub a and b.
1056 Ministerie van Justitie, Handleiding Wetgeving en Europa. De voorbereiding, totstandkoming 
en nationale implementatie van Europese regelgeving (Ministerie van Justitie, Den Haag 2009) 
<http://www.kcwj.nl> (in Dutch) (accessed 29 March 2018).
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mentation. This case law has been discussed extensively in Part II and will 
not be repeated here. Through the manual, policy makers and legislative 
lawyers are supported to prepare their legislative proposals in full confor-
mity with EU case law on the matter.
11.2.2.3 Specific legislative standards applicable to legislation to implement 
non-EU international instruments
Chapter 7 of the Instructions for law-making is dedicated to ‘treaties’, 
although it encompasses both treaties and decisions of international organ-
isations.1057 With regard to treaties, Instruction 311, second paragraph, 
distinguishes between the act of approval (goedkeuring), in accordance 
with the terms used in article 91 of the Dutch Constitution, and the act of 
implementation (implementatie or uitvoering). As a rule, the approval of a 
treaty requires the adoption of a parliamentary act of approval.1058 Whether 
implementation also requires the enactment of legislation by the Dutch 
legislature, depends on the substance of the treaty and on the answer to 
the question whether existing legislation provides for the delegation of the 
power to adopt implementing legislation to the government or to a specified 
minister. If existing domestic legislation is not in conformity with the treaty 
regime and, as a consequence, the enactment of an amending parliamentary 
act of implementation is required, Instruction 311, second paragraph, states 
that, as a rule, the act of approval and the act of implementation must be 
submitted for parliamentary approval simultaneously. Furthermore, the 
explanatory memorandum to the act of approval must provide insight into 
the legal consequences, including the consequences for domestic legislation, 
of the treaty for which approval is sought.1059
There are some additional instructions that apply to decisions of inter-
national organisations, such as the requirement that representatives of the 
state that are engaged in negotiations on a new decision must pay heed to 
the consequences for domestic legislation.1060
However, it is clear that the instructions contained in Chapter 7 of 
the Instructions for law-making concern procedural issues only, such as 
the involvement of advisory bodies, relevant policy makers and the over-
seas territories that are part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In other 
words, Dutch policy on legislative quality does not provide for legislative 
standards that apply particularly to domestic legislation that implements 
non-EU international instruments.
1057 The terms ‘treaties’ (verdragen) and decisions of international organisations (besluiten van 
volkenrechtelijke organisaties) are derived from articles 94 and 95 of the Dutch Constitution.
1058 Act on the approval and publication of treaties (Rijkswet goedkeuring en bekendmaking 
verdragen) art 4.
1059 Instruction no. 313, fourth paragraph.
1060 Instruction no. 310, fi rst paragraph. A similar instruction is included for treaties (Instruc-
tion 307, fi rst paragraph).
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11.2.3 The United Kingdom
11.2.3.1 General policy on the quality of legislation, including implementing 
legislation
In the United Kingdom, the most prominent actor in the legislative process 
is the Office of Parliamentary Counsel (OPC), which performs the actual 
drafting of a bill. The OPC is part of the Cabinet Office, a ministerial 
department which supports the Prime Minister. Contrary to countries such 
as France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands, the task 
of drafting legislative text is thus entrusted to a centralised government 
agency.1061 The OPC consists of around forty specialised legislative drafters, 
who work from instructions prepared by departmental lawyers and the bill 
team, which is composed of several civil servants of the responsible govern-
ment ministry.1062 It has often been argued that the OPC’s considerations 
are limited to matters of form, whereas policy and substance fall within the 
domain of policy officers etc. An example can be found in Dale, who in 
1977 published Legislative drafting: A new approach.1063 It contains a compara-
tive analysis of the drafting of laws in France, Germany, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom and was made at the request of the secretary-general of 
the Commonwealth.1064 In the study’s preface, Dale points at a difference 
in approach between the United Kingdom and the ‘continent’. Whereas to 
the continental lawyer the ‘“drafting” of a law is not a process independent 
of the formulation of its content’, in the reality of the common law world 
this distinction is upheld.1065 Nevertheless, it has also been pointed out that 
form and substance cannot be entirely separated.1066 As Laws puts it, the 
Parliamentary Counsel are not just ‘wordsmiths’ but are also counsel who 
provide legal advice and, in doing so, may have considerable influence on 
the process of policy formulation.1067 In this regard, the size of the juris-
diction may play a role as well; legislative drafters who work in smaller 
jurisdictions tend to be more involved with substance and policy than their 
colleagues in larger jurisdictions.1068
1061 S. Höffl er, M. Nussbaumer and H. Xanthaki, ‘Legislative drafting’ in: U. Karpen and H. 
Xanthaki (eds), Legislation in Europe. A comprehensive guide for scholars and practitioners 
(Hart Publishing; Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2017) 145-163, 153-156.
1062 M. Zander, The law-making process (7th edn Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 
2015) 9 and 18.
1063 W. Dale, Legislative drafting: A new approach. A comparative study of methods in France, 
Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Butterworths, London 1977).
1064 Ibid, vii.
1065 Ibid, viii.
1066 C. Stefanou, ‘Drafters, drafting and the policy process’ in: H. Xanthaki and C. Stefanou 
(eds), Drafting legislation. A modern approach (Routledge, London 2008) 321-333, 321.
1067 S. Laws, ‘Drawing the line’ in: H. Xanthaki and C. Stefanou (eds), Drafting legislation. A 
modern approach (Routledge, London 2008) 19-34, 20.
1068 Stefanou, ‘Drafters, drafting and the policy process’ (n 1066) 325 and 332.
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With regard to regulation in a broad sense rather than legislation, which 
is only one means of government regulation1069, the United Kingdom has 
defined five principles of good regulation: proportionality, accountability, 
consistency, transparency and targeting. The application of these principles 
determine whether government intervention can be justified and, if so, 
which regulatory tool should be selected.1070 Thus, the principles of good 
regulation may serve a similar purpose as the ‘Integrated framework for 
the assessment of policy and legislation’ in the Netherlands. The principles 
of good regulation have been codified in the Legislative and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2006.
Turning from regulatory policy to legislative policy, the United 
Kingdom has, contrary to the Netherlands, only recently taken up the 
task to codify its policy with regard to legislative quality. Indeed, in 2010 
Xanthaki stated that ‘the UK still rejects the introduction of a manual for 
drafting applicable to its own territory’.1071 Recent developments suggest 
a change in attitude towards the use of manuals. An event that deserves to 
be mentioned here is the publication of the report Ensuring standards in the 
quality of legislation by the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee 
of the House of Commons.1072 It was written in reaction to ‘repeated criti-
cism in recent years’ about the quantity and quality of legislation.1073 In this 
report, the Committee recommended the formulation of a ‘Code of Legisla-
tive Standards’ for good quality legislation (a draft of which was annexed 
to the report), since it considered such code a necessary precondition for 
the improvement of legislative quality.1074 The committee emphasised the 
code’s character as a draft and invited the government and Parliament to 
consider it ‘as the basis for discussion and agreement’.1075 From the absence 
of codified legislative standards until the publication of the draft code, can 
we draw the conclusion that a government policy with regard to legislative 
quality, or even legislative quality itself, has been non-existent in the United 
1069 The distinction between regulation and legislation will be further discussed in section 
12.2.4.
1070 C. Radaelli and F. De Francesco, Regulatory quality in Europe: concepts, measures and 
processes (Manchester University Press, Manchester 2007) 33.
1071 H. Xanthaki, ‘Drafting manuals and quality in legislation. Positive contribution towards 
certainty in the law or impediment to the necessity for dynamism of rules?’ 4 Legispru-
dence 2 (2010) 111-128, 120.
1072 House of Commons (Political and Constitutional Reform Committee), Ensuring standards 
in the quality of legislation, vol I, Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence
(1st report of session 2013-2014) (The Stationary Offi ce, London 2013) <https://publica-
tions.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmpolcon/85/85.pdf> (accessed 29 March 
2018). A brief discussion of the document can be found in A. Samuels, ‘Ensuring stan-
dards in the quality of legislation’ 34 Statute law review 3 (2013) 296-299.
1073 House of Commons, Ensuring standards in the quality of legislation (n 1072) 5.
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Kingdom? Certainly not, as drafting manuals are neither a sufficient, nor 
the only way to achieve legislative quality.1076
The codification process has not yet been successfully concluded and it 
remains uncertain whether it will in the future; in a response on the report’s 
publication, the government stated that ‘[it] does not believe that a Code of 
Legislative Standards is necessary or would be effective in ensuring quality 
legislation’.1077 Nevertheless, it is interesting to briefly examine the draft 
Code of Legislative Standards, which encompasses fourteen subjects.1078
From this examination it becomes clear that the draft code exclusively 
covers legislative drafts’ substantive aspects. Although formal criteria seem 
to emerge as part of the standard of ‘understandability and accessibility’ of 
the draft, a closer look reveals that this element refers to purpose or over-
view clauses, definitions, formulae and new drafting techniques or innova-
tions. Indeed, it is expressly noted in the report that the document does not 
contain ‘set standards for drafting’.1079 The legislative standards included in 
the draft code are formulated as commands or questions. For instance, the 
legislative draft should make clear how the bill relates to existing legisla-
tion, including EU legislation. Also it must be explained what the policy 
objectives of the bill are, its desired outcome and why legislation was 
necessary to fulfill the policy objective. With regard to the involvement of 
stakeholders, the draft code prescribes that a summary of the internal or 
external consultation must be written, as well as an estimation of the costs 
of preparing and implementing the law.1080
In 2013, the OPC launched the ‘Good law initiative’, which stresses the 
importance of necessary, clear, coherent, effective and accessible laws. In the 
view of the OPC, the quality of laws is determined by four interconnected 
topics: content, language and style, architecture of the statute book and 
publication. ‘Content’ includes the necessity of a law, the level of detail and 
its consistency with other laws. Under the heading ‘language and style’ the 
OPC emphasises the importance of laws that are easy to understand. The 
‘architecture of the statute book’ refers to the structure of statute law and to 
the delegation of legal provisions to regulations. Finally, the way in which 
a law is presented to the (online) user of legislation is considered to be part 
of the ‘publication’.1081
1076 This will be further discussed in section 11.3.2.
1077 House of Commons, Ensuring standards in the quality of legislation (n 1072) appendix, 
section 12.
1078 They include: responsibility for the bill; purpose; extent, application and devolution; 
legislative background; policy background; pre-legislative scrutiny; consultation; emer-
gency legislation; public bodies; large multi-topic bills; is the legislation understandable 
and accessible?; offences; costs; scrutiny and secondary legislation.
1079 House of Commons, Ensuring standards in the quality of legislation (n 1072) annex A.
1080 Ibid.
1081 The Good law initiative’s website is: <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/good-law> 
(accessed 29 March 2018).
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Only a couple of years later, in August 2015, the OPC issued a Drafting 
guidance. As stated in the introduction to the document, the guidance is 
an instrument for internal use and does not aspire to be a ‘comprehensive 
guide to legislative drafting or to clarity in legal writing’; members of the 
OPC are ‘asked to have regard to’ it.1082 The Drafting guidance consists of 
eleven parts, each of which is solely concerned with formal aspects of legis-
lation.1083 This gives the guidance its character as a highly technical docu-
ment, which can be explained by the OPC’s role in the legislative process, 
as discussed above. Put differently, the document is limited to the activity 
of drafting, which can be described as the process whereby the conceptu-
alisation of some new legislation is transformed into an actual legislative 
text and which encompasses planning, composing, revising and editing.1084
For instance, for the sake of clarity, members of the OPC are requested to 
use short sentences, to tell their story in a ‘moderate, level tone’, to use the 
active voice instead of the passive voice and to use precise and concrete 
words.1085 With regard to language and style, it is recommended to draft 
legislation in a gender-neutral manner, to use figures for all numbers above 
10 and to use the ‘%’ mark as a substitute of ‘per cent’.1086 Part 3 of the guid-
ance in concerned with the structure of the legislative text and suggests the 
inclusion of headings in order to help people to find what they are looking 
for. Moreover, it is recommended to avoid the use of ‘sandwiches’ and 
unnecessary cross-references in legal clauses.1087 Furthermore, in respect 
of definitions, it is stipulated that labels must not cover terms that are not 
expected by the reader and should not include operative provisions.1088 The 
document also contains detailed directives on the way in which legislative 
drafts should refer to domestic or EU legislation, and how amendments 
(including repeals) to existing legislation should be formulated.1089 Other 
provisions which underline the highly technical character of the Drafting 
guidance include the preference, with regard to the creation of statutory 
bodies, for ‘[name] is established’ over ‘there is to be [name]’ and, with 
regard to reference to periods of time, of ‘14 days beginning with’ over ‘14 
days beginning on’.1090 Part 9 is concerned with subordinate (delegated) 
legislation, including procedures applicable to it. The final provisions of 
legislative proposal are the subject of Part 10, which inter alia prescribes 
1082 Office of Parliamentary Counsel, Drafting guidance (2015) I <https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/drafting-bills-for-parliament> (accessed 29 March 2018).
1083 The ‘parts’ of the document concern the following subjects: clarity; language and style; 
structure; defi nitions; citation; amendments; bodies corporate; periods of time; subordi-
nate legislation; fi nal provisions; words and phrases.
1084 Höffl er, Nussbaumer and Xanthaki, ‘Legislative drafting’ (n 1061)152.
1085 Offi ce of Parliamentary Counsel, Drafting guidance (n 1082) 1-6. 
1086 Ibid, 7-12.
1087 Ibid,13-21 and 26.
1088 Ibid, 30 and 31.
1089 Ibid, 32-50.
1090 Ibid, 51 and 53.
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the running order of the final provisions, including provisions with regard 
to the entry into force and applications in the jurisdictions of the United 
Kingdom, transitional provisions and sunset clauses.1091 Finally, in Part 11, 
the Drafting guidance clarifies the exact meaning of several terms in order 
to facilitate their correct use in legislative texts.
Also of interest to us is the Guide to making legislation, which was 
published by the Cabinet Office in April 2017.1092 The Guide describes 
the procedures for the drafting and adoption of primary legislation and 
aims to support bill teams and policy officials.1093 The document not only 
sheds light on the ‘Good law initiative’, but also contains some standards 
pertaining to the quality of legislation. First of all, the Guide states the 
need to ensure compliance with the ECHR. The bill team should include 
an explanation of this particular point in their instructions to the OPC; 
observance of the ECHR should also be part of the explanatory notes to the 
legislative proposal.1094 Furthermore, under section 19 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998, which incorporates the ECHR in the domestic legal order of the 
United Kingdom, as we have seen in Part I, the responsible minister should 
make a statement (‘section 19 statement’) to both houses of Parliament as to 
the proposal’s compatibility with the ECHR.1095 While compliance with the 
ECHR receives a considerable amount of attention in the Guide, the confor-
mity with other international legal obligations of the United Kingdom, 
including human rights treaties, receives far less attention.1096 Second, the 
Guide provides that consideration should be given to the EU law aspects of 
the proposal to ensure there is no conflict with EU law. A third legislative 
standard that can be derived from the Guide is the requirement to perform 
impact assessments for all ‘government interventions of a regulatory nature’ 
that cover economic, social, environmental and equality impacts.1097 This 
impact assessment should contain an identification of the problem, a state-
ment of policy objectives, possible solutions, the impacts, costs and benefits 
of each solution, an analysis of enforcement and of the proposal’s applica-
tion in practice and, finally, a plan for evaluation.1098 Fourth, as part of the 
pre-legislative scrutiny procedure, which entails the examination of legisla-
tive drafts by a parliamentary committee prior to their formal introduction 
1091 Ibid, 65-74.
1092 Cabinet Offi ce, Guide to making legislation (2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/guide-to-making-legislation> (accessed 29 March 2018).
1093 Ibid, 5.
1094 Ibid, 72 and 103.
1095 Ibid, 117.
1096 Nevertheless, in the Guide the role of the Joint Committee on Human Rights of Parlia-
ment is explained. In this context, it is stated that ‘[t]he JCHR may also ask about compli-
ance with any international human rights instrument which the UK has ratifi ed; it does 
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in Parliament, drafts may also be published as part of public consultation. 
This has ‘enormous value’ for stakeholders, it is stated, ‘as it provides an 
extra opportunity for them to comment having seen how the legislation 
would work in practice’.1099 In 2016 the Cabinet Office published a short 
document on ‘consultation principles’ in which it elaborated the contours 
of the public consultation procedure. The principles stipulate, for instance, 
that consultation should have a purpose and be informative, targeted and 
proportional.1100
11.2.3.2 Specific legislative standards applicable to legislation to implement 
EU instruments
The United Kingdom, as a member of the EU, is under the obligation to 
adopt the necessary measures for the implementation of the EU’s legislative 
instruments. Again, a guidance document sets out the policy with regard 
to those implementing measures: Transposition guidance: How to implement 
European directives effectively, which also encompasses the Guiding principles 
for EU legislation.1101 As a point of departure, this document stipulates 
that before starting transposition it must be determined how the aims of 
the EU law and domestic policies ‘will be brought into harmony so that 
transposition neither has unintended consequences in the UK nor risks 
infraction’.1102 This task must be carried out in a way that implementing 
legislation delivers what is required by the EU instrument without going 
beyond its minimum requirements.1103 However, ‘goldplating’ may be the 
preferable option in exceptional circumstances if it is ‘justified by a cost-
benefit analysis and consultation with stakeholders’.1104 Similarly, as a 
general rule, the Transposition guidance states that the date of entry into 
force of implementing legislation should be on the date prescribed by the 
EU instrument rather than before that date. On the other hand, early imple-
mentation is recommended if that provides an advantage to businesses or 
other stakeholders.1105
Moreover, the document recommends the inclusion of a statutory provi-
sion containing an obligation to review the implementing law every five 
years. This is an ‘essential check on whether the original policy objectives 
1099 Ibid, 169.
1100 Cabinet Offi ce, Consultation principles: guidance (2016) 1-2 <https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi le/492132/20160111_Consulta-
tion_principles_fi nal.pdf> (accessed 29 March 2018).
1101 HM Government, Transposition guidance: How to implement European directives effectively 
(2013) <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/fi le/229763/bis-13-775-transposition-guidance-how-to-implement-europe-
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(including expected benefits and costs) are being achieved, and whether any 
changes or improvements could be made’. Also, the findings of the evalua-
tion could be used in future discussions on the EU level.1106 With regard to 
the evaluation, it is argued in particular that:
‘The principal focus should be on identifying areas where implementation and enforce-
ment could be improved to reduce burdens or increase effectiveness, learning from experi-
ence both in the UK and in other Member States. Where other Member States have imple-
mented EU legislation, you should consider aligning implementation in the UK to ensure 
British businesses are not put at a competitive disadvantage. However, you should also 
consider whether there is evidence, and potential for an alliance with other EU Member 
States, that would support taking a request for a wider review of the objectives of the 
underlying Directive to the European Commission’.1107
This means that under the United Kingdom legislative policy it is recom-
mended to engage in a periodical evaluation of the implementing law, 
irrespective of whether an evaluation of the EU instrument itself is foreseen. 
This might lead to the situation in which the evaluation of the domestic 
implementing law reveals some serious flaws in the applicable regime, 
even though this regime cannot be changed without the adoption of a new 
legislative proposal to amend the existing EU regime, with all its lengthy 
discussions on the EU level.
Finally, in respect of consultation of legislative proposals that aim to 
implement EU instruments, the document adheres to the general rule that 
consultation with stakeholders must be performed. However, in some cases 
written consultation may not be proportionate.1108
11.2.3.3 Specific legislative standards applicable to legislation to implement 
non-EU international instruments
The implementation of non-EU instruments is hardly a specific topic in 
the United Kingdom’s codified legislative policy. However, the fact that 
a legislative proposal serves to implement international legal obligations 
may be a reason to be treated as a priority and thus may be considered 
as an argument for its inclusion in the legislative programme.1109 Contrary 
to what has been said above with regard to public consultation of legisla-
tion, legislative proposals that implement international commitments may 
not be suitable for publication in draft if ‘there is little flexibility around 
implementation’.1110 In this regard, the exception for legislative proposals 
implementing EU law to the general rule to engage in public consultation 
equally applies to the proposals that implement non-EU instruments.
1106 Ibid, 13. 
1107 Ibid.
1108 Ibid, 16. 
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11.2.4 Conclusion
Our discussion of legislative quality policy in the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom has revealed that the legislative policies in the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom share important elements. For instance, the 
need for accessible laws through the use of understandable and common 
language is firmly embedded in the legislative process in both countries. 
Similarly, with regard to the more substantive elements of legislative 
proposals, both countries acknowledge the importance of impact assess-
ments, consultation of stakeholders and burden reduction when preparing 
new legislative proposals. The examination carried out in previous sections 
also suggests a consensus on quality standards pertaining to the decision 
making process even before legislation is chosen as a means of government regu-
lation. Here legislative quality borders on regulatory quality. As we have 
seen, in the Netherlands the ‘Integrated framework for the assessment of 
policy and legislation’ demands a problem analysis, the formulation of a 
policy aim, the choice of the appropriate policy instrument and the expected 
consequences for affected persons, companies, the environment etc. Similar 
instructions are part of the ‘Guide to making legislation’ in the United 
Kingdom, which prescribes the performance of an impact assessment for 
all ‘government interventions of a regulatory nature’ that cover economic, 
social, environmental and equality impacts.1111 This impact assessment 
should contain an identification of the problem, a statement of policy objec-
tives, possible solutions, the impacts, costs and benefits of each solution. 
This similarity also makes clear that legislative quality and regulatory 
quality often coincide; the performance of impact assessments is considered 
to be part of both. As a consequence, such assessment should equally be 
carried for government intervention of a non-legislative nature.
From the foregoing we may also conclude that the legislative policies 
in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom do not include specific quality 
standards with regard to legislation aimed at the implementation of non-EU 
law. Thus, the quality of implementing legislation is evaluated on the basis 
of general legislative quality requirements.
These common features cannot conceal the fundamentally different ways 
in which both countries aim to ensure the quality of legislation. They may be 
explained by differences in legal or legislative culture, of which the central-
ised organisation of the legislative function in the OPC is merely one element. 
Another important difference concerns the codification of the legislative 
quality policy. While the Netherlands have used its main drafting manual, 
the Instructions for law-making, for several decades, such codification has 
been rejected in the United Kingdom until recently. As is often the case with 
matters regarding culture, it is difficult to precisely pinpoint the source of 
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11.3 International approaches to the quality of implementing 
legislation
11.3.1 Introduction
As stated above, our discussion of the national approaches to legislative 
quality in general and implementing legislation in particular, must be 
complemented with an examination of two international approaches to 
legislative quality. Again, both approaches differ significantly. Whereas the 
OECD is primarily concerned with the quality of national legislation, the 
EU focuses on the quality of EU law, i.e. legislation adopted by the institu-
tions of the EU. Despite this fundamental difference, both policies can be 
considered the most elaborate international attempts to ensure the quality 
of legislation and thus deserve attention in this chapter.
11.3.2 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
On the international level, the OECD seeks to enhance domestic regula-
tory quality under the heading of ‘regulatory reform’. Although the OECD 
uses the terms ‘regulation’ and ‘regulatory’, it is clear that it is intended to 
refer to what has been called ‘legislation’ elsewhere in the present study, as 
‘regulation’ is defined as ‘the diverse set of instruments by which govern-
ments set requirements on enterprises and citizens. Regulations include 
laws, formal and informal orders and subordinate rules issued by all levels 
of government, and rules issued by non-governmental or self-regulatory 
bodies to whom government has delegated regulatory powers’.1112 ‘Regula-
tory quality’ encompasses ‘performance, cost-effectiveness, or legal quality 
of regulations and related government formalities’.1113 Although regulation 
and legislation often can be used synonymously, both terms have different 
origins and meanings, as will be further explained in section 11.4.2.1114
The organisation’s dedication to the subject of legislative quality was 
codified in the 1995 Recommendation of the Council on improving the 
quality of government regulation, in which member states were called 
upon to ‘take effective measures to ensure the quality and transparency of 
government regulations’.1115 To succeed in its task, the Council proposed 
1112 OECD, ‘The OECD Report on regulatory reform. Synthesis’ (OECD, Paris 1997) 6 
<http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/2391768.pdf> (accessed 29 March 2018). 
For a further clarifi cation of the distinction between legislation and regulation, see W.J.M. 
Voermans, ‘Legislation and regulation’ in: U. Karpen and H. Xanthaki (eds), Legislation 
in Europe. A comprehensive guide for scholars and practitioners (Hart Publishing; Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2017) 17-32.
1113 OECD, ‘Synthesis’ (n 1112) 6. 
1114 Voermans, ‘Legislation and regulation’ (n 1112) 18.
1115 OECD, ‘Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on Improving the Quality of 
Government Regulation’ (9 March 1995) C(95)21/fi nal < http://www.oecd.org/regre-
form/> (accessed 29 March 2018). 
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a checklist for regulatory decision-making, which includes ten questions 
that reflect ‘principles of good decision-making’. They include questions 
such as ‘is the problem correctly defined?’, ‘is government action justified?’ 
and ‘do the benefits of regulation justify the costs?’.1116 Other questions are 
more concerned with the text and structure of the regulation, such as ‘is the 
regulation clear, consistent, comprehensible and accessible to users?’1117
Two years after the adoption of Recommendation C(95)21 the OECD 
published a report on regulatory reform in which it identified a ‘real risk 
[…], particularly in a time of profound and rapid change in economic and 
social conditions, that regulations […] become an obstacle to achieving the 
very economic and social well-being for which they are intended’.1118 A lack 
of legislative quality was seen as a potential threat to the competitiveness of 
national economies. In order to remove this threat, seven policy measures 
were proposed, which included, inter alia, the systematic review of the 
effectiveness and efficiency of existing regulations and the transparent, 
non-discriminatory and efficient application of regulations. Other measures 
related to the strengthening of competition policy, the removal of trade and 
investment barriers, which emphasise the predominantly economic concern 
with regard to legislative quality.1119 In 2005 the Council adopted the OECD 
Guiding principles for regulatory quality and performance, which were an 
elaboration of the principles adopted in 1997.1120
Several years later, in 2012, the Council adopted the Recommendation 
on regulatory policy and governance, which constituted an update of (and 
demonstrate considerable overlap with) the ‘guiding principles’ it had 
adopted in 2005. In its own words, the 2012 Recommendation:
‘provides governments with clear and timely guidance on principles, mechanisms and 
institutions required to improve the design, enforcement and review of their regulatory 
framework to the highest standards’.1121
The 2012 Recommendation, which is still the leading OECD document, 
contains twelve principles, the most important of which will be highlighted 
here. Member states are urged to ‘commit at the highest political level to 
1116 OECD, Recommendation C(95)21/fi nal (n 1115) appendix.
1117 Ibid, question no. 8.
1118 OECD, ‘Synthesis’ (n 1112) 5.
1119 Ibid, 27-38. Also M. Mousmouti, ‘Operationalising quality of legislation through the 
effectiveness test’ 6 Legisprudence 2 (2012) 191-205, 196.
1120 OECD, ‘Guiding principles for regulatory quality and performance’ (OECD, Paris 2005) 
<http://www.oecd.org/fr/reformereg/34976533.pdf>. In addition to the 2005 Guiding 
principles, the ‘Integrated checklist on regulatory reform. A policy instrument for regula-
tory quality, competition policy and market openness’ (<http://www.oecd.org/regre-
form/34989455.pdf>) was published. This document was the product of the cooperation 
between OECD and Asian-Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC).
1121 OECD, ‘Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance’ 
(22 March 2012) foreword <http://www.oecd.org/governance/regulatory-
policy/49990817.pdf> (accessed 29 March 2018).
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an explicit whole-of-government policy for regulatory quality’.1122 Such 
policy should ‘define the process by which a government, when identifying 
a policy objective, decides whether to use regulation as a policy instrument, 
and proceeds to draft and adopt a regulation through evidence-based 
decision-making’.1123 This policy is not in itself a quality criterion applicable 
to legislation, but emphasises the need to put in place an institutional 
framework within governments with a view of increasing legislative 
quality. Furthermore, governments are requested to promote stakeholder 
participation in the regulatory process and to ensure that regulations are 
comprehensible and clear and that parties can easily understand their rights 
and obligations.1124 Another important principle concerns the performance 
of ex ante regulatory impact assessments in the early stages of the decision 
making process. This entails, inter alia, the identification of a specific policy 
aim, the exploration of the various ways of pursuing that aim; subsequently, 
the selection of the most appropriate instrument and an assessment of 
the economic, social and environmental impacts.1125 Once legislation has 
been adopted, it must be reviewed retrospectively (ex post) against ‘clearly 
defined policy goals, including consideration of costs and benefits, to 
ensure that regulations remain up to date, cost-justified, cost-effective and 
consistent and delivers the intended policy objectives’.1126 Finally, the 2012 
Recommendation urges member states to ensure the availability of effective 
remedies in order to review the legality of the adopted legislation.1127
In 2014, the OECD published two additional documents on regulatory 
policy. One of them specifically focuses on inspections in OECD countries 
and provides ‘best practices’. They consist of eleven principles, such as the 
need for evidence-based, risk-based and proportional enforcement, the need 
for a clear legal framework for the performance of inspections and enforce-
ment and the importance of professional inspectors.1128 It thus elaborates on 
the legislative standard of compliance monitoring and enforcement.
The other 2014 complementary document to the 2012 Recommendation 
concerns ‘the governance of regulators’. It was intended to support member 
states in developing a policy on the ‘role and functions of regulatory agen-
cies’.1129 Instead of focusing on the quality of laws themselves, this docu-
ment looks primarily into the adequacy of the national bodies producing 
1122 Ibid, section I, paragraph 1.
1123 Ibid, section I, paragraph 1, and section 1 of the Annex.
1124 Ibid, section I, paragraph 2, and section 2 of the Annex.
1125 Ibid, section I, paragraph 4, and section 4 of the Annex.
1126 Ibid, section I, paragraph 5, and section 5 of the Annex.
1127 Ibid, section I, paragraph 8, and section 5 of the Annex.
1128 OECD, Regulatory enforcement and inspections (OECD Best practice principles for regula-
tory policy, OECD Publishing, Paris 2014) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264208117-
en> (accessed 29 March 2018).
1129 OECD, The governance of regulators, OECD Best practice principles for regulatory policy, 
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laws. Although it falls outside the scope of the present study to thoroughly 
examine such institutional aspects of legislative quality, the document 
illustrates that the regulatory quality policy developed by the OECD also 
concerns other aspects than legislative standards.
In sum, the OECD approach to legislative quality goes beyond the mere 
application of checklists by policy makers or legislative drafters; it also 
provides for guidelines for the adoption of a legislative policy, the attribu-
tion of responsibilities within the government apparatus and the role and 
functions of regulators. Several legislative standards are firmly embedded 
in the legislative quality policy propagated by the OECD, among them 
stakeholder participation, ex ante and ex post evaluation, comprehensibility 
and clarity of the anticipated laws and the availability of remedies. These 
elements of legislative quality apply to legislation in general, comprising 
both truly national legislation and national implementing legislation; up 
until now, the efforts of the OECD in this field have not included guidance 
with regard to implementing legislation in particular.
11.3.3 European Union
Another major player in the international quest for legislative quality is the 
EU. Whereas the OECD efforts aim at the improvement of national legisla-
tion, the activities instigated by the EU focus on the quality of supranational
legislation: the legislative instruments adopted in the framework of the EU. 
The present study’s main subject is national implementing legislation. As 
a consequence, it could be argued that the quality of legislation adopted 
beyond the national legal order, such as EU regulations and directives, 
should remain outside the scope of our analysis. On the contrary, it cannot 
be ignored that the EU’s efforts to improve the quality of its legislative 
instruments have led to elaborate policies that, judged by its measure of 
detail, could easily compare to the policies developed under the auspices 
of the OECD. Moreover, from a more substantive viewpoint, the legisla-
tive policies propagated by the OECD and the EU reveal several common 
features, which may be an indication that the quality of national legislation 
and international legislation should be assessed by the same standards. 
Finally, discussions of the quality of EU legislation transcend the traditional 
distinction between civil law and common law, as it must accommodate 
both.1130 For these reasons, a discussion of the efforts undertaken by the 
EU’s institutions to improve the quality of EU legislation, should be part of 
the present study.
The EU’s current policies aimed at the quality of legislation are known 
under the heading ‘better law-making’ and ‘better regulation’. It is an 
agenda pursued by the EC, the body that is entrusted with the task to ensure 
1130 H. Xanthaki, ‘Emerging trends in legislation in Europe’ in: U. Karpen and H. Xanthaki 
(eds), Legislation in Europe. A comprehensive guide for scholars and practitioners (Hart 
Publishing; Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2017) 275-296, 275.
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the application of the measures adopted by the institutions of the EU.1131
Better law-making, better regulation and related policies have been on the 
EU agenda since the early 1990’s.1132 Some milestones in its development 
will be highlighted here. 1992 saw the publication of a report commonly 
known as the Sutherland report, which signalled a ‘growing unease that, 
in practice, Community legislation may be too heavy-handed’.1133 This and 
other reports triggered the adoption of Declaration no. 39 on the quality of 
drafting of Community legislation. In this statement, which was annexed to 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, it was agreed that ‘the three institutions involved 
in the procedure for adopting Community legislation […] should lay down 
guidelines on the quality of drafting of the said legislation […]’.1134 In 1998 
this resulted in the adoption of the Interinstitutional agreement adopted by 
the three main legislative bodies of the EU, which contains several state-
ments on the technical quality of EU legislation.1135 The agreement provides, 
inter alia, that the legislative acts adopted by the EU should be drafted in 
a clear, simple and precise manner.1136 Furthermore, the drafting of acts 
‘shall take account of the persons to whom they are intended to apply’ and 
terminology used in a given act ‘shall be consistent both internally and with 
acts already in force’.1137
Another milestone was the adoption of the Interinstitutional Agreement 
on Better Law-making in 2003.1138 In this document the three legislative 
institutions pledged ‘to observe general principles such as democratic 
legitimacy, subsidiarity and proportionality, and legal certainty and […] to 
1131 Article 17, fi rst paragraph, TEU.
1132 In the developments ever since, fi ve ‘layers’ of policies can be discerned, each of which 
had its own focal point: technical quality, reduction and simplifi cation, burden reduction, 
enforceability and legitimacy. See W.J.M. Voermans, ‘Beating about the bush in ‘Better 
regulation’ in: B. Steunenberg, W. Voermans and S. van den Bogaert (eds), Fit for the 
future? Refl ections from Leiden on the functioning of the EU (Eleven International Publishing, 
The Hague 2016) 69-88. Other publications which provide an overview of the EU’s efforts 
with regard to legislative quality include Xanthaki, ‘Emerging trends in legislation in 
Europe’ (n 1130); W.J.M. Voermans, ‘Concern about the quality of EU legislation. What 
kind of problem, by what kind of standards?’ 2 Erasmus Law Review (2009) 59-95 and W. 
Robinson, ‘Manuals for drafting of European Union legislation’ 4 Legisprudence 2 (2010) 
129-155.
1133 High Level Group on the Operation of the Internal Market, presided over by P. Suther-
land, ‘The internal market after 1992. Meeting the challenge’ (report to the EEC Commis-
sion) (28 October 1992) <http://aei.pitt.edu/1025/1/Market_post_1992_Sutherland_1.
pdf> (accessed 29 March 2018). 
1134 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing 
the European Communities and certain related acts, annex, OJ 1997, C 340, 1. 
1135 Interinstitutional agreement of 22 December 1998 of the European Parliament, the 
Council of the European Union and the Commission of the European Communities on 
common guidelines for the quality of drafting of Community legislation (OJ 1999, C 73). 
1136 Ibid, section 1.
1137 Ibid, sections 3 and 6.
1138 Interinstitutional agreement of 16 December 2003 of the European Parliament, the 
Council of the European Union and the Commission of the European Communities on 
better law-making (OJ 2003, C321).
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promote simplicity, clarity and consistency in the drafting of laws and the 
utmost transparency of the legislative process’.1139 Compared to the 1998 
Interinstitutional Agreement, the 2003 agreement had a broader scope, since 
it also entailed other aspects of legislative quality than the mere technical or 
formal. It emphasised the need for greater transparancy, improvement of 
the consultation process and for impact assessments and the observance of 
the principles of necessity, subsidiarity and proportionality.1140 It also called 
for the simplification and reduction of the existing body of legislation.1141
The following years saw the transition from ‘better law-making’ to 
‘better regulation’, which was announced by the EC in 2005.1142 The EC 
asserted that the approach to regulation was to be developed ‘to ensure 
that the defence of public interests is achieved in a way that supports and 
does not hinder the development of economic activity’.1143 With ‘better 
regulation’, legislative quality acquired a more economic perspective. As 
part of better regulation, the EC stressed the need for impact assessments, 
consultation of stakeholders, the reduction of administrative burden and 
the simplification of legislation.1144
In 2010 the EC further developed its legislative quality policies under 
the heading of ‘smart regulation’, which must be seen against the back-
ground of the economic and financial crisis unfolding in those years.1145
In this document the EC stated that stakeholder consultation and impact 
assesments were ‘now essential parts of the policy making process’. 
However, the EC also concluded that ‘better regulation must become smart 
regulation’.1146 Many elements of this strategy can already be found in 
earlier policy documents, such as the need for simplification of legislation 
and the reduction of administrative burden.
An important new impulse to the debate on legislative quality was 
given during the EC presidency of Jean-Claude Juncker, when a commu-
nication was issued on ‘Better regulation for better results – an EU agenda’ 
in May 2015. In this document, ‘better regulation’ is described as a tool to 
provide a basis for timely and sound policy decisions. The application of the 
1139 Ibid, section 2.
1140 Ibid, sections 10, 16, 25-30.
1141 Ibid, section 35.
1142 EU (European Commission), ‘Better regulation for growth and jobs in the European 
Union’, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment (16 March 2005) COM (2005) 97. Also EU (European Commission), ‘A strategic 
review of better regulation in the European Union’, Communication from the Commis-
sion to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions (14 November 2006) COM (2006) 689.
1143 European Commission, ‘Better regulation for growth and jobs in the European Union’ (n 
1142) 1.
1144 Ibid, 5-8.
1145 EU (European Commission), ‘Smart regulation in the European Union’, Communication 
from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic 
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principles of better regulation will, it is stipulated, ‘ensure that measures are 
evidence-based, well designed and deliver tangible and sustainable benefits 
for citizens, business and society as a whole’.1147 In order to make these 
ambitions come true, the EC contended that EU legislation should be:
‘[…] fit for purpose, modern, effective, proportionate, operational and as simple as possi-
ble. Legislation should do what it is intended to do, it should be easy to implement, pro-
vide certainty and predictability and it should avoid any unnecessary burden. Sensible, 
realistic rules, properly implemented and enforced across the EU.’1148
The communication stresses the importance of several criteria applicable 
to legislation. For instance, the EC emphasises the importance of openness 
and transparency through the consultation of stakeholders. This enhances 
the availability of evidence, it is argued, which positively contributes to a 
law’s effectiveness.1149 Other topics that are addressed by the EC are the 
limitation of burdens, in particular for small and medium enterprises, the 
importance of effect monitoring and evaluation, and the need for accessible, 
comprehensible, consistent and clear laws.1150 In 2016, the EC published 
another communication on better regulation under the title ‘Better regula-
tion: delivering better results for a stronger Union’.1151 In this document the 
EC reaffirmed its commitment to better regulation policies and its elements. 
In addition, it stressed the need for effective application and redress for 
citizens.1152
While the 2015 and 2016 communications issued by the EC serve to 
present and explain its youngest priorities in the field of legislative policies, 
the Better Regulation Guidelines, which were published simultaneously 
with the 2015 communication, enumerate more systematically the quality 
criteria applicable to EU legislation.1153 Together, they must lead to ‘better 
regulation’, which is described as ‘designing EU policies and laws so that 
they achieve their objectives at minimum cost’.1154
The guidelines are divided in 6 categories, each of which corresponds 
to one phase in the policy cycle: planning; impact assessment; stakeholder 
1147 EU (European Commission), ‘Better regulation for better results- an EU agenda’, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (19 May 




1151 EU (European Commission), ‘Better regulation: Delivering better results for a stronger 
Union’, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Euro-
pean Council and the Council (14 September 2016) COM (2016) 615. 
1152 Ibid, 9.
1153 EU (European Commission), ‘Better regulation guidelines’, Commission staf working 
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consultation; preparing proposals, implementation and transposition; moni-
toring; and evaluation and fitness checks.1155
The Better Regulation Guidelines1156 start with the planning for a new 
policy proposal. In this phase, EC officials are required to, among other 
things, ensure that the anticipated proposal has received political validation 
at the appropriate level.1157 If a policy proposal receives the political support 
needed for its continuation, the Guidelines require the performance of an 
impact assessment. This involves the formulation of ‘logical reasoning’ that 
explores possible solutions to the problem, which must include an analysis 
of the expected consequences of those policy options.1158 This ‘inception 
impact analysis’ must be shared with stakeholders, in particular through 
a 12-week public consultation. Subsequently, EC officials must estimate 
the economic, social and environmental impacts of the formulated policy 
options, on the basis of quantitative data, if available. This leads to the 
drafting of the final impact assessment report, which includes not only a 
description of the economic, social and environmental impact and the 
consultation results, but also an analysis of the expected consequences for 
affected persons or entities, in particular for small and medium enterprises, 
and for competitiveness.1159
During the next stage, the proposal must be codified in a legal text. 
This text should be well drafted ‘in order to ensure it adequately reflects 
the intention of the legislator and can achieve its regulatory aim’.1160 To this 
end, a ‘Joint practical guide’ has been compiled, the first edition of which 
dates back to 2000.1161 It provides for 22 principles which mainly concern 
the formal aspects of the drafting of EU legislation. It includes the require-
ment, already mentioned above, that the text must be ‘clear, simple and 
precise’. Furthermore, the text must be concise as possible, the use of long 
articles and sentences must be avoided and the terminology used must be 
consistent within the instrument and with other legislation in force. Also, 
the legislative proposals should follow the same standard structure, where 
necessary, and references to other legal texts must be kept to a minimum.1162
Once the legislative proposal is adopted and has entered into force, the 
EC must examine whether member states comply with the legislative text 
1155 Ibid, chapters II-VII.
1156 The guidelines are complemented by the Better Regulation Toolbox. The Toolbox 
provides more detailed information on the instructions already codifi ed in the Guide-
lines. Therefore, a separate discussion is not necessary for the purpose of this chapter.




1161 The current edition was published in 2015. EU, Joint Practical Guide of the European Parlia-
ment, the Council and the Commission for persons involved in the drafting of European Union 
legislation (Publications Offi ce of the European Union, Luxembourg 2015).
1162 Ibid, principles 1, 4, 6, 7, 16.
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through implementation and transposition, if needed.1163 The next phase 
of the policy cycle is concerned with monitoring. This means that it must 
be identified whether the regulatory intervention is functioning in practice 
as expected, which also entails the gathering of data in a systematic way 
in order to improve future interventions.1164 Finally, the Better Regulation 
Guidelines prescribe the activities to be undertaken in the evaluation and 
fitness check phase. ‘Evaluation’ is defined is as an evidence-based judg-
ment of the extent to which an intervention has been ‘effective, efficient and 
[…] relevant given the needs and its objectives, […] coherent internally and 
with other EU policy interventions and achieved ‘EU added-value’.1165 In 
addition to the evaluation instrument, which focuses on one policy inter-
vention only, ‘fitness checks’ must be performed. These checks concern a 
number of related interventions for a larger policy area, which enables the 
EC to address the ‘cumulative effects of the applicable framework’.1166 The 
guidelines describe in great detail the manner in which both assessments 
must be carried out.1167
The guidelines are codified in a EC staff working document, which 
suggests its application to legislative proposals drafted by the EC. As a 
consequence, they may, in principle, not apply to the EU’s co-legislating 
institutions: the Council and the European Parliament.1168 On the other 
hand, these institutions have also committed themselves to the better 
regulation policies, most notably through a new Interinstitutional agree-
ment that was concluded in April 2016.1169 In this agreement, the institu-
tions recognised their ‘joint responsibility in delivering high-quality Union 
legislation’.1170 This entails, the agreement reads, inter alia, the entrenchment 
of public and stakeholder consultation, ex-post evaluation of existing legis-
lation, impact assessments of new initiatives, simplification and regulatory 
burden reduction in the EU’s legislative products and processes.1171





1168 TFEU art 289.
1169 Interinstitutional agreement of 13 April 2016 between the European Parliament, the 
Council of the European Union and the European Commission on better law-making (OJ 
2016, L 123).
1170 Ibid, second preambular section.
1171 Chapters III and VIII. Also sixth and eighth preambular sections. In the provisions 
on common objectives and commitment (Chapter I), it is stipulated that ‘the three 
institutions […] agree to observe general principles of Union law, such as democratic 
legitimacy, subsidiarity and proportionality, and legal certainty. They further agree to 
promote simplicity, clarity and consistency in the drafting of Union legislation and to 
promote the utmost transparency of the legislative process [and] that Union legislation 
should be comprehensible and clear, allow citizens, administrations and businesses to 
easily understand their rights and obligations, include appropriate reporting, monitoring 
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In sum, the ‘better law-making’ and ‘better regulation’ policies that 
have emerged in the framework of the EU contain many aspects which 
have attracted a varying degree of attention over the years. We can observe 
a significant overlap between the legislative standards formulated under 
the guidance of the OECD and the EU respectively. They apply to the EU’s 
supranational legislation, however, and thus ignore the quality of national
implementing legislation.
11.3.4 Conclusion
How can we assess this overview? From a distance, it could be described as 
an extensive enumeration of various standards which aim to enhance the 
quality of legislation adopted in the framework of the EU. This is certainly 
true, but not the whole story. Although the EU’s efforts to increase legisla-
tive quality is concerned first and foremost with the quality of EU legisla-
tion instead of national legislation, it is difficult to ignore the similarities 
with the legislative standards formulated under the responsibility of the 
OECD. This may suggest a high degree of consensus on the value of those 
standards for legislative practice. For instance, both organisations stress 
the importance of the performance of impact assessments, evaluations and 
clear and accessible legal texts. They thus go beyond the mere application 
of checklists by legislative drafters. Moreover, both policies do not contain 
legislative standards for implementing legislation in particular. However, we 
can also observe differences between the approach adopted by the OECD 
and the EU. They can be partly explained by the specific features of the EU. 
For instance, the application of the principles of subsidiarity and propor-
tionality to the exercise of authority by the institutions of the EU, including 
the adoption of legislation, are characteristic for the division of competences 
between the EU and its member states.1172
11.4 The quality of implementing legislation: common ground?
11.4.1 Introduction
In the previous section we discussed two national and two international poli-
cies which aim to enhance legislative quality. But what constitutes ‘quality of 
legislation’? This question is both essential and difficult to answer. It is essen-
tial, since it forces us to clarify what we are seeking; we can only succeed 
in analysing attitudes towards the quality of implementing legislation if we 
can provide a sufficiently clear description of what is part of it, and what is 
not. At the same time, in the absence of a universally accepted definition of 
1172 TEU art 5, third and fourth paragraphs. Also Protocol (no 2) on the Application of the 
Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, OJ 2008, C 115, 201; Interinstitutional 
agreement of 13 April 2016 (n 1169), third preambular section.
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the term, the delineation of ‘quality of legislation’ is a difficult task, since it 
may be viewed as ‘an elusive and vague concept for many authors mainly 
due to the numerous perspectives through which the quality of a piece of 
legislation or the legislative process may be evaluated’.1173 According to 
Mousmouti, legislative quality is a relative concept, as its meaning differs 
depending on various factors, among them historical, political and social 
contexts, the viewpoint of different actors and on different legal tradi-
tions.1174 Wintgens states that a concrete definition of legislative quality does 
not exist.1175 A possible explanation for this state of affairs lies in the perspec-
tives that have been adopted in order to address the quality of legislation. 
To come to grips with this diversity, we need to understand the difference 
between regulation and legislation, and, as a corollary, between regulatory 
quality and legislative quality. Subsequently we discuss several standards 
which can be considered part and parcel of the notion of legislative quality.
11.4.2 Regulatory quality and legislative quality: a matter of perspective
‘Regulation’ refers to the exercise of public authority with the aim of 
bringing about change in the behaviour of societal actors. These actors 
encompass individuals and organisations (including companies). There 
are several ways for this behavioural change to be accomplished, for 
instance through financial incentives or through the imposition of penal-
ties. ‘Legislation’ is a specific form in which the proposed regulation may 
be cast. If policy makers choose to discourage the consumption of sugary 
beverages for public health reasons, they may consider the imposition of an 
additional tax on these products (regulation). In a community committed to 
the rule of law, it must laid down in law and often this will be written law: 
legislation.1176 The question may arise whether less direct interventions in 
society could be considered legislation. If a government chooses to establish 
a public body which is attributed by law with the task of providing advice 
to the government, can this be considered ‘regulation’? Since this law only 
modifies the internal organisation of the government, it could be argued that 
this legislation does not amount to regulation. The point here is that legisla-
tion and regulation often, but not always, coincide.
Traditionally, the topic of regulation has been the domain of econo-
mists.1177 They have been interested in efficiency (the flow of goods to the 
1173 T. Drinóczi, ‘Concept of quality in legislation revisited. Matter of perspective and a 
general overview’ 36 Statute Law Review 3 (2015) 211-227, 212. Also Voermans, who 
describes legislative quality as an ‘elusive buzzword’. Voermans, ‘Concern about the 
quality of EU legislation’ (n 1132) 64.
1174 Mousmouti, ‘Operationalising quality of legislation’ (n 1119) 192.
1175 Wintgens, ‘Rationality in legislation’ (n 67) 7.
1176 As stated earlier, the term ‘legislation’ should be understood in a broad manner, 
including both primary and secondary legislation.
1177 R. Baldwin, M. Cave and M. Lodge, ‘Introduction: regulation- the fi eld and the developing 
agenda’ in: Idem (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP, Oxford 2010) 3-16, 4.
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place where they are valued the highest) and market failures (resulting from 
market power, the imposition of externalities on third parties, the need for 
public goods and information asymmetry) which prevent the achievement 
of efficiency, as a justification for government intervention.1178 Furthermore, 
this economic view on regulation has concerned the drafting of cost-
effective rules and the removal of inefficient outcomes of existing laws.1179
It has led to, inter alia, the development of regulatory impact studies, an 
instrument to measure the effects of a particular intervention.1180 Scholars 
and other contributors to the field of regulation have also raised the topic 
of ‘better regulation’: ways to improve regulatory interventions and, inevi-
tably, debates on the meaning of ‘good’ regulation.1181
Nowadays, regulation theory has evolved into a multi-disciplinary 
field of research.1182 It can be said to have merged partly with the field of 
legisprudence, which includes elements of, inter alia, juridical sciences, 
economics, social and political sciences, and philology. Whatever the 
perspective adopted by a scholar, it is important to emphasise that it is 
basically a different perception of the same phenomenon: legislation. The 
same can be said of our quest for quality, which has been aspired under 
both the heading of regulatory quality and of legislative quality; several 
characteristics of ‘good regulation’ have found their way into discussions 
on ‘good legislation’ as well. A case in point may the reduction of admin-
istrative burden. Whereas regulatory quality may demand the reduction of 
administrative burden imposed on societal actors, legislative quality may 
require that a legislative proposal is shaped in a way as to minimise its 
administrative burden.
But even with regard to legislative quality there seems to be no 
consensus on its meaning and scope. This may be the result of the different 
functions attributed to legislation. In the words of Voermans, ‘[l]egislation 
comes with different meanings in different contexts at different times’.1183
In democracies governed by the rule of law, six functions can be attributed 
to legislation. First, legislation may serve as the basis and framework for 
the exercise of public authority (constitutional function). Second, the legal 
certainty function of legislation becomes visible whenever a law enshrines 
rights and obligations, which also imposes a limitation on government 
interference. Third, the instrumental function refers to the ability of 
legislation to attain certain policy objectives. Fourth, legislation may also 
1178 C. Veljanovski, ‘Economic approaches to regulation’ in: R. Baldwin, M. Cave and M. 
Lodge (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP, Oxford 2010) 17-35, 19-22.
1179 Ibid, 27.
1180 C. Radaelli and F. de Francesco, ‘Regulatory impact assessment’ in: R. Baldwin, M. Cave 
and M. Lodge (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP, Oxford 2010) 279-298, 279.
1181 For an overview of the discussion, see R. Baldwin, ‘Better regulation: the search and the 
struggle’ in: R. Baldwin, M. Cave and M. Lodge (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation 
(OUP, Oxford 2010) 259-278. 
1182 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, ‘Introduction’ (n 1177) 4.
1183 Voermans, ‘Legislation and regulation’ (n 1112) 18.
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facilitate the political process and reflect the outcome of the balancing of 
political actors’ interests (political function). Fifth, the adoption of a law 
expresses popular support for it and serves to legitimise the exercise of 
public authority, which is called the democratic function of legislation. 
Sixth, the enactment of legislation may possess a symbolic function as well, 
as it reflects and reaffirms public morals and values.1184 Of course, a piece 
of legislation will often perform several of the aforementioned functions 
simultaneously.
According to Voermans, the functions of legislation translate into 
different ‘views’ on legislation, including views with regard to quality.1185
This means that the diversity of views on the meaning of the concept of 
legislative quality may be explained by the diversity of legal contexts; 
the notion of legislative quality is inseparable from its institutional envi-
ronment. As an example, Voermans refers to the EU’s better law-making 
initiative pursued in the years between 2002 and 2006. While this legislative 
policy seemed to emphasise the constitutional (including the bureaucratic 
function), democratic and instrumental functions of legislation adopted 
in the framework of the EU, the Better regulation activities of the years 
2006-2014 seemed to address the instrumental and political functions.1186
In other words, the institutional environments in which laws are developed 
may differ with regard to the function(s) attributed to legislation on a more 
structural level. This may depend on the legal tradition of a particular state 
or international organisation and even may evolve over time.
Although the stance adopted by Voermans may explain the existence 
of diverging views on the precise meaning of legislative quality, it may 
also be unsatisfactory if it prevents us from seeking common ground in the 
debate on legislative quality. This would be problematic for any attempt 
to formulate the elements of legislative quality which aspires to transcend 
individual state jurisdictions, such as the attempts codified in the interna-
tional legal regimes we have explored in the previous part. Therefore, in 
the present section we aim the find common ground in the quality debate 
and, to a certain extent, reconcile the different views expressed by national 
governments, international organisations and scholars. In doing so, we will 
propose a definition that can serve as a basis for the assessment of interna-
tionally codified legislative standards, to be performed in Chapter 12.
1184 Ibid, 23-24. Voermans mentions a seventh function of legislation: the bureaucratic func-
tion. This function becomes apparent when a piece of legislation lays down the frame-
work for action by a bureaucracy. As he correctly argues, this function must be seen as 
part of the constitutional function.
1185 Ibid, 25.
1186 Ibid, 30. Elsewhere, Xanthaki observes a ‘transposition from legislation as an autono-
mous product to legislation as a regulatory tool’. Xanthaki, ‘Emerging trends in legisla-
tion in Europe’ (n 1130) 279.
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11.4.3 Defining the quality of implementing legislation
How should ‘quality of legislation’ be defined? A functional approach to 
this question will provide the following answer: legislative quality can be 
defined as the extent to which a legislative act succeeds in achieving its 
aims. As Xanthaki puts it, ‘good legislation is legislation that manages to 
achieve the desired regulatory results’.1187 She explains:
‘Since governments use legislation as a tool of successful governing, namely as a tool for 
putting into effect policies the desired regulatory results, the qualitative measure of suc-
cessful legislation coincides with the prevalent measure of policy success, which is the 
extent of production of the desired results’.1188
In the view of Xanthaki, the ultimate goal for regulation is efficacy.1189
Efficacy is described as the ability to produce a desired or intended result; 
efficacy is synonymous with regulatory quality.1190 Regulation, in her view, 
is a broader concept than legislation; legislation is only one of the means 
of regulation used by governments.1191 Similarly, legislative drafters are 
merely one of the many actors in the regulatory process; others include inter 
alia policy makers and enforcement authorities.1192 Against this backdrop, 
‘efficacy’ must be considered inadequate as a means to assess the quality of 
legislation. In Xanthaki’s words:
‘[t]he achievement of a policy objective or purpose is not the sole task of the drafter. […] If 
one accepts the multiplicity of actors in the policy process […], efficacy cannot be a goal set 
for the drafter alone. As a result, despite acknowledging efficacy as the highest virtue in 
the policy process, efficacy cannot be viewed as the connecting function of drafters’.1193
Instead, in her view, the crucial test for legislative quality lies in the 
standard of effectiveness: legislative quality equals effectiveness.1194 The 
latter term is described by Mader as ‘the extent to which the observable 
1187 Xanthaki, ‘Emerging trends in legislation in Europe’ (n 1130) 284. Also Xanthaki, 
‘Drafting manuals and quality in legislation’ (n 1071) 114.
1188 Xanthaki, ‘Emerging trends in legislation in Europe’ (n 1130) 284.
1189 Xanthaki, ‘Drafting manuals and quality in legislation’ (n 1071) 114.
1190 Xanthaki, ‘Emerging trends in legislation in Europe’ (n 1130) 285. Also H. Xanthaki, 
‘On transferability of legislative solutions: the functionality test’ in: H. Xanthaki and C. 
Stefanou (eds), Drafting legislation. A modern approach (Routledge, London 2008) 12-24, 
14. Elsewhere, she defi nes ‘effi cacy’ as ‘the extent to which regulators achieve their goal’. 
Xanthaki, ‘Drafting manuals and quality in legislation’ (n 1071) 114.
1191 This coincides with our view on the difference between regulation and legislation, as 
described in the previous section.
1192 Xanthaki, ‘On transferability of legislative solutions’ (n 1190) 14.
1193 Ibid.
1194 H. Xanthaki, ‘Quality of legislation: an achievable universal concept or a utopian 
pursuit?’ <http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/4854/1/Nomos_book_Quality_of_legislation_a_
utopian_pursuit.pdf> (accessed 29 March 2018) (Author’s original manuscript. Also 
published in: M. Travares Almeida (ed), Quality of Legislation (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2011) 
75-85) 81. Also Xanthaki, ‘Drafting manuals and quality in legislation’ (n 1071) 115.
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attitudes of the target population […] correspond to […] the attitudes and 
behaviours prescribed by the legislator’.1195 Efficacy and effectiveness are 
closely related, but must be clearly distinguished. Xanthaki argues that ‘[w]
ithin the umbrella of efficacy, the drafter pursues effectiveness in legislation’ 
(emphasis added).1196 Elsewhere, she elaborates on the difference between 
efficacy and effectiveness in the following manner:
‘[E]ffectiveness seems to reflect the relationship between the effects produced by legisla-
tion and the purpose of the statute passed. It is different from efficacy in that it relates to 
the effect of the statute and not to the effect of the policy which the statute sets out to 
achieve. In other words, effectiveness can be described as the drafter’s efficacy’.1197
In addition to this understanding of legislative quality, several authors 
consider other elements than effectiveness relevant as well. They adhere to 
a broader concept of legislative quality than the functional approach. For 
instance, in the view of Drinóczi, the ‘quality of legislation’ constitutes the 
law’s ability to achieve ‘short-, medium- and long-term social and economic 
goals in a planned way by an open and evidence-based preparation and 
adoption process of constitutional, efficient and implementable laws’.1198
The definition of legislative quality preferred by Vanterpool comprises 
two elements: quality in the substance of the law and quality in the form 
of the law. Whereas the former requires that legislation is ‘appropriate, 
adequate and precise in solving the problem it is intended to solve’, the 
latter demands a ‘language and structure that is readily understandable to 
those who are affected by it and those who must administer it’.1199 Mous-
mouti distinguishes between quality of process, content, form and impact 
of the laws on the one hand (which she refers to as a ‘rational process of 
applying legal principles in order to make democratic decisions’); she 
contends, on the other hand, that quality ‘essentially refers to real world 
outcomes of legislation and the degree of achievement of its goals’ (which 
she labels ‘effectiveness’). Effectiveness, in her view, is the ‘real’ and ‘ulti-
mate’ measure of legislative quality.1200 Finally, Timmermans argues that 
quality of the legislative instruments adopted in the framework of the EU 
consists of several elements that can be placed under three headings: quality 
of drafting and presentation of texts, conformity with general principles, 
particularly of good and proper legislation, and requirements as to the 
effectiveness of rule-making. The three categories encompass more detailed 
standards, among them the easy accessibility of legislative texts, the obser-
1195 L. Mader, ‘Evaluating the effects. A contribution to the quality of legislation’ 22 Statute 
Law Review 2 (2001) 119-131, 126.
1196 Xanthaki, ‘Drafting manuals and quality in legislation’ (n 1071) 114. 
1197 Xanthaki, ‘On transferability of legislative solutions’ (n 1190) 14.
1198 Drinóczi, ‘Concept of quality in legislation revisited’ (n 1173) 216.
1199 V, Vanterpool, ‘A critical look at achieving quality in legislation’ 9 European Journal of law 
Reform 2 (2007) 167-204, 170.
1200 Mousmouti, ‘Operationalising quality of legislation’ (n 1119) 197, 201 and 202.
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vance of the principle of legal certainty and the requirement that rules must 
be capable of being enforced.1201
In view of the above, it may indeed be concluded that there is no 
generally accepted definition of ‘legislative quality’. On a more positive 
note, however, authors seem to embrace the more essential (in the view 
of Xanthaki, for example) element of effectiveness. Thus, although there 
may be disagreement on the peripheral elements, there seems to be general 
consensus on its essence: effectiveness. Also Mousmouti, after stating that 
‘quality’ is a vague and elusive term, agrees that ‘effectiveness appears to 
be unanimously accepted as an essential expression of quality’.1202 Given 
this state of affairs, it seems feasible to adhere to the approach of legisla-
tive quality which places ‘quality of legislation’ on the same footing with 
‘effectiveness of legislation’.
However, effectiveness itself is a multifaceted concept. Here, the various 
functions of legislation, already touched upon in section 11.4.2, come into 
play. It is submitted that effectiveness of legislation is narrowly entwined 
with the function of a specific piece of legislation. Thus, it is not limited 
to the instrumental function, or the ability of legislation to attain certain 
policy objectives. Also legislation which has merely a symbolic function 
can be considered effective if it succeeds in fulfilling its symbolic aim, for 
instance by expressing moral values. In the same vein, if a certain legislative 
proposal’s aim is to adequately reflect political consensus (political function 
of legislation), the proposal can be considered effective if it is supported 
by the relevant political actors. Therefore, in the remainder of the present 
study legislative quality will be understood as the law’s ability, taking into 
account its function or functions, to achieve the formulated aims. While 
the notion of ‘effectiveness’ is thus at the center of this definition (‘achieve 
the formulated aims’), it must be stressed that effectiveness itself is a 
broader concept than merely effectiveness in an instrumental sense, i.e. the 
achievement of policy aims. In other words, in this definition effectiveness 
is a dynamic concept, which acquires its substance in a particular case only 
after the law at hand is analysed in the light of its function or functions. 
This state of affairs may be perfectly captured in Vanterpool’s statement that 
‘[o]verall, the pursuit of quality in legislation therefore advocates a certain 
balance arising from the foundation that legislation achieves its highest 
quality when it has attained its true function’ (emphasis added).1203
Now we have clarified our understanding of the term ‘legislative 
quality’, the question may arise whether this definition could also be 
applied to implementing legislation without further adjustment. In other 
words, does implementing legislation possess specific features, distinct 
from ‘non-implementing’ legislation, which could justify or even force us 
1201 Ch. Timmermans, ‘How can one improve the quality of community legislation?’ 34 
Common Market Law Review (1997) 1229-1257, 1237 and 1254.
1202 Mousmouti, ‘Operationalising quality of legislation’ (n 1119) 205.
1203 Vanterpool, ‘A critical look at achieving quality in legislation’ (n 1199) 170.
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to resort to a different concept of legislative quality? This question must 
be answered in the negative. It is true that, most notably, implementing 
legislation serves to attain aims that have been formulated on a different 
level and with different actors than legislation of a purely national origin. 
It follows that domestic implementing legislation must adequately reflect 
international agreement, i.e. comply with the applicable international 
instrument, whereas non-implementing legislation must reflect national 
agreement, i.e. the aims that are pursued by relevant national actors. As we 
have seen above, however, this factor is of no relevance from the perspective 
of legislative quality. Therefore, when assessing the quality of implementing 
legislation, there seems to be no reason to adhere to a different concept of 
legislative quality than the one we have explored above. Nevertheless, in 
one respect the definition requires amendment in order to clarify the level 
on which the aims have been formulated. This leads us to the following 
definition of the ‘quality of implementing legislation’:
‘the national law’s ability, taking into account its function or functions, to achieve the aim 
or aims embedded in the international legal instrument’.
In this definition, ‘law’ is synonymous to ‘legislation’ and must be inter-
preted in the widest possible sense; it is not limited to acts passed by a 
state’s representative legislative body, but may also include secondary legis-
lation.1204 Again, it must be noted that the phrase ‘taking into account its 
function or functions’ in the definition serves to emphasise that the notion 
of effectiveness (achievement of aims) is a broader concept than the achieve-
ment of policy aims. In the end, a law’s effectiveness cannot be considered 
distinct from a law’s function.
11.4.4 Legislative quality and legislative standards
In Part II we discussed legislative standards that have been identified on the 
international level. Subsequently we have explored the concepts of ‘quality 
of legislation’ and ‘quality of implementing legislation’ in the previous 
section. The next question that deserves our attention is how the relation 
between legislative standards and legislative quality must be understood. 
As has become clear in the previous section, the notion of legislative quality 
and legislative standards are closely entwined; legislative standards are 
often, in contrast to our basic definition proposed in the previous section, 
considered to be part of the definition of legislative quality. As Mousmouti 
puts it, ‘[q]uality is a broad term, which applies in a variety of contexts and 
is usually judged by reference to specific predetermined standards’.1205
A similar stance is adopted by Voermans, who maintains that ‘legislative 
1204 In this respect, this chapter adheres to the same concept of legislation as Karpen, ‘Intro-
duction’ (n 13) 2.
1205 Mousmouti, ‘Operationalising quality of legislation’ (n 1119) 192.
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quality is the degree to which legislative instruments and procedures live 
up to the legislative standards’.1206 Radaelli and De Francesco simply state: 
‘[q]uality is defined by principles’.1207
How can this reliance on legislative standards for the determination 
of a law’s quality be justified? On the one hand, the concept of legislative 
quality remains rather ambiguous, perhaps too ambiguous to be effectively 
applied in practice. This situation is made more complex by the qualifica-
tion, as proposed above, of effectiveness as a multifaceted concept; a law’s 
effectiveness cannot be assessed except through the lense of the law’s func-
tion. Against this backdrop, it could be argued that legislative standards 
are merely specific features that are believed to enhance a law’s effective-
ness. In this view, reliance on legislative standards offers us the instru-
ments required to make an assessment of a law’s quality in practice and to 
improve it whenever necessary.
On the other hand, the narrow focus on legislative standards may result 
in a distorted view of a law’s quality. Xanthaki adopts a critical stance 
towards the acceptance or adherence to legislative standards as synony-
mous to legislative quality. Instead, she proposes a phronetic perspective:
‘[W]ithin the realm of legislative drafting as phronesis, rules and conventions only serve as 
a selection of tools which can be chosen by the subjective learned drafter in order to pro-
duce good laws. Since the rules and conventions of phronetic legislative drafting cannot 
possibly be applied with the rigidity and teleogenesis or inexorableness of rules of epis-
temic disciplines, promoting them to elements sine qua non of the concept of quality in 
legislation is an unfortunate logical faux pas. […] In phronetic legislative drafting repeti-
tion of application of the same rule can produce, by definition, variable results’.1208
Thus, the environment in which legislation is drafted is subject to contin-
uous change. In this dynamic context, the repeated application of legislative 
standards (or ‘rules and conventions’, in the terminology used by Xanthaki) 
leads to varying results. As a result, their observance cannot be considered 
to suffice for the production of ‘good laws’ in every situation they are 
applied, which ‘deprives them from credibility as elements of quality’.1209
Xanthaki’s criticism is, however, not irreconcilable with the viewpoint, 
described above, that legislative standards are merely specific elements 
which make a positive contribution to a law’s quality. Again, the real test 
for a law’s quality lies in its ability, taking into account its function or 
functions, to achieve the formulated aims; the observance of one or more 
legislative standards can be no more than an indication that a particular 
piece of legislation will indeed pass the quality test. This assessment can, 
as Xanthaki convincingly argues, only be made on a case by case basis, 
taking into account that particular law’s context. Therefore, in our view 
1206 Voermans, ‘Concern about the quality of EU legislation’ (n 1132) 64.
1207 Radaelli and De Francesco, Regulatory quality in Europe (n 1070) 32.
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the relation between legislative quality and legislative standards is one 
that is characterised by hierarchy: the observance of legislative standards 
positively contribute to a law’s ability to achieve the formulated aims and 
thus to its quality.
Observance of legislative standards is, however, not a task that can be 
fulfilled in a binary manner; it is not a matter of whether a legislative standard 
is respected, but to what extent. This is important, since the observance of one 
legislative standard may produce tension with another. For instance, a law’s 
formulation in conformity with other national (constitutional) and interna-
tional provisions may result in a decrease of the law’s effectiveness. Hence, 
the observance of legislative standards is a matter of degree. It follows that 
legislative quality is a matter of degree as well. As a consequence (and this 
may be both troublesome and reassuring), there is no such thing as a perfect 
law.1210
Moreover, similar to what has been pointed out with regard to a law’s 
quality, the application of legislative standards depends on the law’s func-
tion. Thus, in order to decide which standards should be applied and to 
what extent, it is crucial to understand the law’s function. For example, 
the need for clear and accurate language may be less compelling in case 
of a legislative proposal which has a largely symbolic function, compared 
to a law with a mainly constitutional function. While the consultation of 
stakeholders seems to be highly relevant for a piece of legislation with an 
instrumental function, this may be much less so for legislative proposals 
with a largely bureaucratic function. This line of reasoning leads us to the 
conclusion that the various legislative standards which have been included 
in policy documents and academic scholarship, may tell us more about the 
propagator’s stance adopted towards the functions of legislation. This may 
vary not only between different legislative proposals within a single juris-
diction, but also between multiple jurisdictions or legal cultures. Perhaps 
more importantly, it explains the broad spectre of available legislative 
standards.
Various authors have made attempts to (exhaustively) enumerate the 
standards they consider of paramount importance for the evaluation of 
legislative quality. For the purpose of the present study it is not necessary 
to separately analyse these attempts in depth. Nevertheless, in order to gain 
an impression of the proposed lists of legislative standards it is useful to 
discuss two approaches to legislative standards in more detail.
As we have seen in section 11.4.3, Xanthaki places the notion of ‘quality 
of legislation’ on the same footing as ‘effectiveness of legislation’; both terms 
are synonyms. Subsequently, she argues that effectiveness can be obtained 
1210 N.A. Florijn, ‘Quality of legislation: a law and development project’ in: J. Arnscheidt, B. 
van Rooij and J.M. Otto (eds), Lawmaking for development. Exploration into the theory and 
practice of international legislative projects (Leiden University Press, Leiden 2008) 75-89, 77. 
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in two ways: either through efficiency (which refers to the ‘use of minimum 
costs for the achievement of optimum benefits of the legislative action’) or, 
second, by clarity, precision and unambiguity.1211 The legislative standard of 
clarity refers to the quality of being clear and easily perceived and the stan-
dard of precision must be understood as exactness of expression. Unambi-
guity is, in the meaning attributed to it by Xanthaki, ‘certainty’. Together, 
through the use of plain language and gender neutral language, they ensure 
that the law’s content can be understood by the legal subjects to which it is 
addressed.1212 The aforementioned standards, Xanthaki contends, are the 
‘main principles of legislative drafting’ that should be at the core of any 
drafting manual.1213 More importantly, they possess relative universality: 
they are entrenched in legislative practice across Europe, in both countries 
with a common law or a civil law tradition.1214
Drinóczi proposes an alternative list. In her view, quality of legislation 
may be achieved if the legislature observes the following standards, which 
she labels ‘principles’: legality, effectiveness, intelligibility, transparency, 
accessibility, ‘due’ legislative process, rational policy making and enforce-
ability. In order to honor these principles to the largest possible extent, she 
adds, states should safeguard the quality of the legislative process, since 
‘legislation cannot be seen as isolated from the legislative activities of the 
state’.1215
A quick comparison of the lists proposed by Xanthaki’s and Drinóczi’s 
respectively, set out above, reveals two different approaches. Whereas 
Xanthaki’s list seems to be confined to standards with regard to the formal 
aspects of legislation, arguably Drinóczi’s list has a wider scope, as it also 
encompasses standards with regard to the substance of a law, such as 
the law’s enforceability. Admittedly, it may not be entirely fair to present 
the views of both authors as contradictory, as they contain similarities as 
well. Nevertheless, the comparison indicates that attempts to formulate 
standards in the quest for legislative quality, has produced various results 
which encompass procedural, formal and substantive aspects of legislative 
quality.
Finally, it must be emphasised that no legislative standards which 
are specifically aimed at the quality of implementing legislation have been 
advanced in the scholarly debate on legislative quality; arguably, legislative 
standards are believed apply to both legislation of truly domestic origin or 
to EU legislative instruments.
1211 Xanthaki, ‘Drafting manuals and quality in legislation’ (n 1071) 115. Vanterpool suggests 
an almost identical list which comprises ‘clarity, unambiguousness, simplicity and preci-
sion’. Vanterpool, ‘A critical look at achieving quality in legislation’ (n 1199) 186-195.
1212 Xanthaki, ‘Drafting manuals and quality in legislation’ (n 1071) 115-117.
1213 Ibid, 117.
1214 Ibid, 120.
1215 Drinóczi, ‘Concept of quality in legislation revisited’ (n 1173) 216. 
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11.4.5 Conclusion
In this section we defended the thesis that legislative quality must be 
understood as the law’s ability, taking into account its function or functions, 
to achieve the formulated aim or aims. In particular, it was argued that a 
law’s effectiveness (achievement of aims) can only be assessed with the 
specific function of the anticipated law in mind. This may vary not only 
between different legislative proposals within a single jurisidiction, but 
also between multiple jurisdictions or legal cultures. If we apply this view 
to the context of implementing legislation, it is justified to advance the 
following definition of ‘quality of implementing legislation’: the national 
law’s ability, taking into account its function or functions, to achieve the aim 
or aims embedded in the international legal instrument. In order to enhance 
legislative quality, authors have resorted to legislative standards. They must 
be viewed as hierarchical subordinate to the notion of effectiveness; the 
observance of legislative standards positively contribute to a law’s effective-
ness and thus to its quality. In other words, they constitute the means to an 
end: quality. Similar to the notion of effectiveness itself, the application of 
legislative standards to a specific legislative proposal is dependent on the 
law’s function or functions. This explains why in a particular case the one 
standard should have prevalence over the other.
11.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have explored the concept of legislative quality. As part 
of this endeavour, we have first explored two international (OECD and EU) 
and two national policies (the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) with 
regard to legislative quality. This analysis has revealed a certain degree of 
diversity in the approaches towards the questions how legislative quality 
must be understood and how it should be achieved. This diversity may 
be explained by the specific features of legal orders and their develop-
ment over the course of time. For instance, the legislative quality policy 
in the Netherlands has taken the shape of the codified Instructions for 
law-making, whereas in the United Kingdom legislative quality has been 
pursued by specialised lawyers working for the OPC.
In an attempt to seek common ground in the various approaches, we 
have distinguished between several perspectives on two levels: first, the 
distinction between regulation and legislation and, as a corollary, between 
regulatory quality and legislative quality. We have also seen how both 
perspectives have been prominent in different stages of legislative policies 
in the past. Second, we have also submitted that the meaning attributed to 
the notion ‘legislative quality’ depends on the function of a particular piece 
of legislation, which equally applies to implementing legislation: constitu-
tional, legal certainty, instrumental, political, democratic and symbolic. This 
has led us to the following definition of ‘quality of implementing legisla-
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tion’: the national law’s ability, taking into account its function or functions, 
to achieve the aim or aims embedded in the international legal instrument. 
The various standards that have been suggested in literature and which 
serve to operationalise the notion of legislative quality can be divided into 
three categories: standards with regard to legislative procedure, standards 
with regard to legislative substance and standards with regard to legisla-
tive form. This is where we can observe common ground; most legislative 
standards emerge under all of the legislative quality policies, such as the 
need for ex ante and ex post impact assessments, the need for legislation that 
is enforceable and the need for clear and accessible legal texts.
Under the four policies that we have discussed, legislative standards 
tend to apply to legislation in general; there is no reason to assume that 
other legislative standards come into play when states adopt legislation in 





12 Quality standards pertaining to 
implementing legislation and international 
legal practice: a gap to bridge?
12.1 Introduction
In the present chapter we bring together our examination of international 
legal practice and our findings with regard to legislative quality. It enables 
us to establish whether the international legal regulation of implementing 
legislation can be considered adequate, which, as we have already 
explained, coincides with the question to what extent the regulation of 
implementing legislation ensures legislative quality. Thus, the purpose of 
the present chapter is, first and foremost, to assess whether the features of 
national implementing legislation, which are prescribed under international 
law, live up to the legislative standards which can be considered part and 
parcel of the notion of legislative quality. This question will be answered in 
section 12.2.
Our assessment of the international regulation of implementing 
legislation requires a systematic approach, which means that the objects 
of comparison should be relevant from the perspective of the regulation of 
implementing legislation and of the policies aimed at legislative quality. 
Furthermore, given the fact that the international legal regimes discussed 
in Part II do not perfectly reflect international legal practice in its entirety, 
but are merely an indication of that practice, we propose to look beyond the 
detailed features of one particular legal regime. Therefore, in section 12.2 
we focus on three elements of the regulation of implementing legislation: 
its scope, character and substance. ‘Scope’ points to the scope of applica-
tion, i.e. to the norms to which the regulation of implementing legislation 
applies. ‘Character’ refers to the extent to which a legislative standard can 
be considered binding on the national legislature, which is closely related 
to the question whether a legislative standard is codified and if so, in what 
form or instrument. The ‘substance’ of the regulation of implementing 
legislation covers the various features of national implementing legislation 
and legislative standards respectively. The three elements combined will 
provide us with a clear indication of the adequacy of international legal 
regulation of implementing legislation.
At the other end of the balance we need a yardstick that could be 
used to conduct our comparative analysis. To this end, we will resort to 
the OECD’s policy with regard to legislative quality. The selection of the 
policy with regard to the quality of national legislation developed under 
the guidance of the OECD could be justified with the argument that it is 
the single global regime on the topic, although it is acknowledged that the 
OECD membership has a ‘western’ bias; of the 35 member countries, 29 are 
located in Europe, North-America and Oceania. In this respect, it differs 
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from the legislative quality policies developed in the framework of the EU, 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The policy developed by the 
EU’s institutions does not apply to national legislation, but to supranational 
legislation, i.e. the EU’s legislative instruments. The British and Dutch poli-
cies to increase legislative quality are national regimes which apply to one 
state only. Therefore, they may be less suitable to serve as the yardstick that 
we are seeking. For these reasons, the OECD’s policy with regard to the 
quality of national implementing legislation is best suited to serve as the 
normative framework for our assessment.
Finally, on the basis of our assessment, in section 12.3 we suggest a 
possible way to enhance the quality of national implementing legislation.
12.2 Quality standards pertaining to implementing legislation 
and international legal practice: a comparison
12.2.1 Scope of the regulation of national implementing legislation
A comparison of current international legal practice with regard to the 
regulation of national implementing legislation and the OECD legislative 
policy, reveals two fundamental differences and one similarity with regard 
to their respective scope.
First of all, in the absence of rules under general international law, the 
international regulation of implementing legislation has a rather narrow 
scope; it exclusively applies to national legislation which serves to imple-
ment the legal instrument at hand, very often a treaty. Overall, as we have 
seen in Chapter 10, this has resulted in a highly fragmented regulation of 
national implementing legislation, between regimes and within regimes. Of 
course, this state of affairs is a direct consequence of the absence, under 
general international law, of legislative standards governing national imple-
menting legislation. In contrast, the legislative quality policy developed 
under the guidance of the OECD aspires to govern an unlimited number of 
laws to be adopted by the national legislature in the future.1216 In our view, 
the aforementioned fragmentation is the most problematic aspect of current 
international legal practice from a legislative quality viewpoint, since it 
prevents international policy makers to systematically take into account 
the elements which determine the effectiveness of national implementing 
legislation.
1216 More accurately, the OECD’s policy to enhance regulatory quality applies to ‘policies, 
institutions and tools’ (OECD Guiding principles p. 3). Since our comparison is limited to 
legislative standards, as we have discussed in the introduction to Part II, other aspects of 
the OECD’s legislative policy, such as the recommendation that ‘regulatory policy should 
be carried out at the highest level by the offi ce of the President or Prime Minister’, are left 
out of the equation. 
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Second, contrary to the current international legal practice with regard 
to the regulation of national implementing legislation, the OECD legislative 
quality policy concerns national legislation in general; it does not particu-
larly focus on national implementing legislation.
We can also discern a similarity. Often, legislative standards that are part 
of the regulation of national implementing legislation under international 
legal regimes are not limited to implementing legislation only; instead, they 
apply to the broader category of national implementing measures. Similarly, 
the OECD’s ‘regulatory reform’ policy in principle concerns any form of 
government intervention in society, not only those laid down in legislation.
12.2.2 Character of the regulation of national implementing legislation
With regard to the character of the regulation of national implementing 
legislation, there is one principal difference, which on a more positive note 
may also be considered a partial similarity: whereas the legislative policy 
propagated by the OECD has a non-binding character, the legislative 
standards which we have identified under the international legal regimes 
discussed in Part II have a partially binding and partially non-binding 
nature.
The 2012 Recommendation on regulatory policy and governance has 
been adopted pursuant to article 5, sub b, of the Convention on the OECD, 
which provides the OECD with the power to make recommendations to its 
members with a view of achieving its aims. The chosen wording and legal 
basis thus imply a non-binding character. As we have seen in Part II on 
current international legal practice, some legislative standards have been 
included in binding legal instruments, most notably treaties. As such, those 
legislative standards possess the force of law. Other standards have been 
codified in supplementary documents such as guidelines for implementa-
tion and handbooks. They must be labelled ‘soft law’ instruments which 
lack formal legal power.
However, the distinction between binding and non-binding legislative 
standards may not be as relevant in practice as one might think. Whereas, 
of course, a standard’s legal force is stronger if it is included in a binding 
legal instrument, the precise legal consequences it produces may not be 
clear from the outset. Thus, the formulation of binding legislative standards 
in open terms may still provide a considerable measure of latitude to the 
national legislature in drafting the national implementing law.
12.2.3 Substance of the regulation of national implementing legislation
To what extent do the legislative standards under current international legal 
practice and the OECD legislative policy coincide? Above we have made 
a distinction between three categories of legislative standards: standards 
with regard to legislative procedure, standards with regard to legislative 
substance and standards with regard to legislative form. Although this 
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distinction is not expressly made in the 2012 Recommendation, all three 
categories come to the fore.
With regard to legislative form, the 2012 Recommendation provides 
that regulations should be ‘comprehensible and clear’. To this end, states 
are called upon to use ‘plain language’, which enables legal subjects to 
understand their rights and obligations.1217 In Chapter 10 we have identi-
fied similar requirements under the current international legal practice, in 
particular under the heading of legal certainty. In the context of the ECHR’s 
positive obligations, as we have seen, the ECtHR has treated the observance 
of legal certainty as a crucial condition for the provision of ‘effective protec-
tion’. Formal requirements can also be derived from the conditions under 
which the ECHR’s rights may be restricted. However, the observance of 
formal criteria in the adoption of national implementing legislation may be 
most firmly established under EU law, which demands ‘specificity, preci-
sion and clarity’.
On matters regarding legislative procedure, the 2012 Recommendation 
stipulates that states should:
‘[a]dhere to principles of open government, including transparency and participation in 
the regulatory process […] This includes providing meaningful opportunities (including 
online) for the public to contribute to the process of preparing draft regulatory proposals 
and to the quality of the supporting analysis’.1218
Furthermore, it is recommended that states conduct regulatory impact 
assessments for the development of new legislative proposals. It entails, 
inter alia, the clear formulation of policy objectives and the various options 
to achieve them, including options which do not require the adoption of 
legislation.1219 It also stipulates that states continue to review their existing 
body of legislation to make sure that ‘regulations remain up to date, cost 
justified, cost effective and efficient, and deliver the intended policy objec-
tives’.1220 In short, states should consult relevant organisations and should 
perform ex ante and ex post impact assessments. To what extent do these 
requirements emerge under international legal practice?
As we have seen in section 10.3.3.3, the legislative standard of consulta-
tion can be found under the CDWDW, the FCTC and the ICESCR. Under 
those regimes, consultation serves the purpose of creating support for the 
adopted legislation and to improve the quality of legislation. We have also 
seen that the requirement of ex post evaluation of legislation can be identi-
fied under the ICESCR and the FCTC. Compared to truly autonomous 
national legislation, one legislative standard that is part of the OECD’s regu-
1217 OECD, ‘Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance’ (n 1122) 
section I, sub 2, and section 2.6 of the annex.
1218 Ibid, section I, sub 2.
1219 Ibid, section I, sub 4.
1220 Ibid, section I, sub 5.
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latory quality policy may be less relevant for implementing legislation: the 
clear formulation of policy aims and the consideration of various options 
to achieve those aims, i.e. an ex ante impact assessment. Very often, once an 
international legal regime has been established, that ship will have sailed. 
Whether a state party is at liberty to consider multiple options to obtain the 
policy objectives agreed upon in the international instrument, will depend 
largely on the level of specificity of the applicable international norm. The 
same point could be made with regard to the standard of consultation. Since 
at this stage the state has already contracted an international legal obliga-
tion to adopt implementing legislation, consultation partners can merely 
attempt to improve national implementing legislation; their advice cannot, 
however, lead to the conclusion that the national legislature should refrain 
from the adoption of legislation altogether.
The 2012 Recommendation also provides guidance on matters of legis-
lative substance. A law’s legality and procedural fairness should be subject 
to effective systems of review, which means that citizens should have 
access to remedies against sanctions imposed upon them. As we have seen, 
the provision of ‘effective’ remedies to challenge national implementing 
legislation is firmly established in article 13 the ECHR. Also in the context 
of the CDWDW, MLC and ICESCR the need for domestic remedies has 
been emphasised, which under the latter regime should meet the criteria 
of ‘availability, accessibility and quality’. Without doubt the most elabo-
rate requirements with regard to domestic remedies can be found in EU 
law, which in several respects has circumscribed the national procedural 
autonomy of member states.
Furthermore, the OECD regulatory quality policy demands that legis-
lators consider ‘how regulations will be given effect and should design 
responsive implementation and enforcement strategies’. In sections 10.3.2, 
10.3.3.5 and 10.3.3.6 we have seen that the standards of effectiveness, of 
compliance monitoring and of enforcement could be derived from current 
international legal practice. Together, they can be said to meet the standard 
formulated by the OECD.
The 2012 Recommendation also emphasises the importance of ‘regula-
tory coherence’ between the various levels of government, which means 
that duplication and conflicts between regulations should be avoided.1221
As such, this particular standard cannot be identified in international legal 
practice. However, we have seen that several international regimes stipulate 
that national implementing legislation should be adopted in accordance 
with other domestic legal provisions of higher rank in order to ensure its 
effectiveness.
Also, according to the OECD, national legislatures should observe ‘all 
relevant international standards’ in order to foster ‘global coherence’.1222
The annex to the Recommendation emphasises the need to act in accordance 
1221 Ibid, section I, sub 10. 
1222 Ibid, section I, sub 12, and section 12.2 of the annex.
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with treaty obligations. It particularly stresses the obligation to treat foreign 
products and services no less favorable than domestic products and services, 
which once again reveals the economic perspective engrained in the OECD’s 
regulatory policy.1223 Under the international legal regimes that we have 
discussed in Part II, similar requirements can be found. Examples include, 
inter alia, the CITES, the ICSFT and the CTOC which in brief prescribe that 
states’ national implementing legislation should comply with other relevant, 
existing international legal norms. In doing so, this standard’s codification 
stresses the importance of ‘global coherence’.
In view of the above, there seems to be a discrepancy between current 
international legal practice with regard to the regulation of national imple-
menting legislation and theories and practices which aim at the achieve-
ment of legislative quality. However, this discrepancy is related primarily to 
the scope and, to a lesser extent, character of the legislative standards which 
govern national implementing legislation. With regard to the legislative 
standards’ substance, on the other hand, the similarities are striking; every 
single requirement applicable to legislation under the OECD legislative 
policy, can be found under at least one of the international legal regimes 
discussed in Part II. It does not mean, however, that they are perfectly iden-
tical. It warrants the conclusion that international policy makers seem to 
be aware of the legislative standards that could be included in any special 
international legal regime that requires implementation through legislation 
on the national level. It has, however, not resulted in a consistent entrench-
ment of those standards in international legal practice.
12.3 A gap to bridge?
In the previous section we have identified a discrepancy between current 
international legal practice with regard to the regulation of national imple-
menting legislation and theories and practices which aim at the achieve-
ment of legislative quality. It begs the question: is there a gap to bridge? 
In other words, does the quest for legislative quality demand a change in 
attitudes in international legal practice? If so, what should this change in 
attitudes entail? In the present section we explore the fundamental consid-
erations which determine the answers to these questions.
First of all, the question arises whether there is a problem that needs to 
be solved. Some may argue that the discrepancy between current interna-
tional legal practice with regard to the regulation of national implementing 
legislation and theories and practices which aim at the achievement of legis-
lative quality, to which we have referred above, may justify an affirmative 
answer. Proponents of this standpoint may argue that we are confronted 
with the problem that the regulation of national implementing legislation 
1223 Ibid, section 12.3 of the annex.
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under international law is, from a legislative quality viewpoint, not as good 
as it could be. Therefore, they would add, current international legal practice 
needs improvement. Others may adhere to the view that the regulation 
of legislation in whatever form in order to improve legislative quality is 
a policy aim not worth pursuing. They may submit, for instance, that the 
absence of such regulation is not perceived as a problem in a specific polit-
ical community or they may assert that legislative quality may be achieved 
in other ways than through the formulation of mandatory standards appli-
cable to legislation. In both cases, the identified problem is considered as 
purely theoretical, which may not justify an allocation of public resources. 
In other words, to supporters of this line of reasoning the fact that the 
regulation of national implementing legislation under international law 
demonstrates some flaws may not be problematic at all.
Let us assume that the discrepancy between current international legal 
practice with regard to the regulation of national implementing legislation 
and theories and practices which aim at the achievement of legislative 
quality constitutes a problem that needs to be solved. Should the solution 
be found on the international level?
One may argue that international cooperation between states should 
be reserved for problems which have a transboundary character (such as 
transnational crime, international trade in wildlife and the international 
spread of infectious diseases, to mention only a few examples that we have 
discussed in Part II). Only in those cases the watering down of the demo-
cratic legitimacy of state policy could be justified. Why should a policy to 
remedy an alleged lack of quality of national (implementing) legislation 
possess international dimensions? Even under international law, it could 
be argued, the power to adopt legislation is considered to be inherently 
linked to the notion of state sovereignty. This fact is neither altered by the 
finding that legislative quality is aspired in several or even many countries 
around the globe, nor by the fact that some legislation serves to implement 
international legal obligations of the state. As a corollary, any attempt to 
enhance legislative quality should be undertaken first and foremost at the 
national level. Perhaps even more importantly, legislation must be seen 
in the light of its context, which consists of the national legal culture in 
its broadest sense. Therefore, a policy which aims at the improvement of 
legislation could only be successful if it pays heed to the particular context 
of the national legal order in which it is to be applied. For this, a national 
legislative policy is much more suited. It follows that any legislative policy 
has better odds at obtaining its objectives if it is formulated at the national, 
instead of the international, level. In sum, we may conclude, the statement 
that the improvement of legislation, including national implementing 
legislation, should be pursued primarily at the national level, is not without 
merit.
Others may defend the position that the divergence between interna-
tional legal practice in respect of the regulation of implementing legislation 
and theories and practices which seek to enhance legislative quality, is a 
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problem that should be solved at the international level. They may point to 
the fact that national implementing legislation finds its origin in an inter-
national regime to which the state has committed itself on the international 
level. All the state parties involved have an interest in making the regime 
work in practice, of which high quality national implementing measures 
constitute an indispensable element. In this view, legislative quality is 
closely related to the regime’s effectiveness, a standpoint which, as we have 
seen in Chapter 11, is widely supported. Therefore, they may submit, the 
quality of national implementing legislation is a matter of international 
concern, which justifies the codification of standards for domestic imple-
menting legislation on the international level.
Both viewpoints contain elements of truth and both are part of the 
solution. In our view, it basically consists of a balancing act between the 
protection of state sovereignty on the one hand and the international 
legal regime’s effectiveness on the other hand. In particular, it entails the 
codification of the requirements pertaining to the quality of implementing 
legislation in the meaning we have attributed to this concept in Chapter 
11: the national law’s ability, taking into account its function or functions, 
to achieve the aim or aims embedded in the international legal instrument. 
As we have explained, the notion of quality essentially coincides with the 
regime’s effectiveness, provided that we adhere to a broader notion of 
effectiveness than effectiveness purely in an instrumental sense; a law’s 
quality can only be established in the light of its function or functions. The 
solution that we envisage is based on the assumption that our definition of 
legislative quality is one that should be encouraged by any state seeking 
compliance with the regime, as it makes a truly effective international legal 
regime more likely.
The codification of legislative standards could only be succesful if 
it respects the broad variety in national legal systems and national legal 
practices with regard to the adoption of implementing legislation. In other 
words, it is of paramount importance that the international codification of 
quality requirements for implementing legislation is flexible. This flexibility 
could be strived for in two ways.
First, the quality requirements should be laid down in an authoritative 
and non-binding instrument. Or, more accurately, they should not be laid 
down in a binding instrument. The adoption of a non-binding instrument 
could not only be reconciled more easily with the protection of the national 
legislature’s powers, which derive from the state’s sovereignty. Also, ironi-
cally, the non-binding character of legislative standards pertaining to imple-
menting legislation may increase the document’s potential to significantly 
influence international legal practice. Were it codified in an international 
treaty, for instance, the document runs the risk of becoming subject to fierce 
negotiations, which may result in the codification of a hollow and mean-
ingless collection of legislative standards. Ideally, therefore, the quality of 
national implementing legislation should be discussed and elaborated by 
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the ILC, the authoritative UN body entrusted with the task of ‘encouraging 
the progressive development of international law and its codification’.1224
Second, the quality requirements should be formulated in a way that 
leaves room for the national legislature to consider their correct application 
when preparing a specific legislative proposal that serves to implement 
an international legal regime to which the state is bound. Again, it is a 
safeguard for the protection of a state’s sovereignty. Thus, the legislative 
standards should be formulated in a sufficiently broad manner. For the 
same reason, they should be formulated as recommendations instead of 
mandatory instructions.
What should such a document look like? As we have seen, the discrep-
ancy between current international legal practice with regard to the regula-
tion of national implementing legislation on the one hand, and theories and 
practices which aim at the achievement of legislative quality, as codified 
in the framework of the OECD, on the other hand, largely concerns the 
legislative standards’ scope. Thus, the solution that we envisage should 
primarily address the fact that international policy makers do not system-
atically take into account the elements which determine the effectiveness 
of national implementing legislation, thereby also jeopardising the interna-
tional regime’s effectiveness. This could be achieved by making clear that 
the legislative standards which, albeit irregularly, have already emerged in 
international legal practice, should be applied by the national legislature 
whenever it adopts national implementing legislation.
It raises the question how the international non-binding codification of 
legislative standards relates to the inclusion of legislative standards in the 
various binding international legal regimes, for instance those discussed in 
Part II, which require implemention on the national level. While the former 
should be taken into account by national policy makers involved in the prep-
aration of national implementing legislation, the latter are the product of 
decision making by international policy makers involved in the preparation 
of the international legal regime. In our view, there seems to be no reason 
why the international non-binding codification of legislative standards 
applicable to national implementing legislation should be reserved for 
national policy makers; indeed, it may provide assistance to international 
policy makers as well, who may consider their inclusion in the international 
legal regimes at hand. In short, it may not only increase international policy 
makers’ interest in the quality of national implementing legislation, but may 
also provide them with practical instructions to achieve it.
In theory, our international codification of legislative standards may 
be accepted by decision makers to a varying degree. Each reference to our 
document, whatever its nature, contributes to the spread of knowledge 
on the quality of national implementing legislation. At the one end of the 
spectre, our document may serve as an inspiration for international and 
1224 ChUN art 13, fi rst paragraph, sub a; UNGA res 174(II) (21 November 1947).
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national policy makers. At the other extreme, decision makers may choose 
to codify our solution in a binding legal instrument, thus completely 
harmonising the international legal regulation of national implementing 
legislation. In between, policy makers of specific international legal regimes 
may refer to our document or may prescribe it as mandatory.
If legislative standards applicable to national implementing legislation 
could be internationally codified along the lines described above, this may 
increase the quality of implementing legislation to the advantage of political 
communities across the globe, while at the same time respecting the demo-
cratic underpinnings of national decision making.
12.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have formulated an answer to the question whether the 
features of national implementing legislation, as prescribed under interna-
tional law, live up to the legislative standards which can be considered part 
and parcel of the notion of legislative quality. This analysis has drawn upon 
our findings included in Chapters 10 and 11 and has looked particularly 
into the scope, character and substance of the legislative standards that we 
have identified under international law and as part of theories and practices 
with regard to legislative quality respectively.
In short, there seems to be a discrepancy between between current 
international legal practice with regard to the regulation of national imple-
menting legislation and theories and practices which aim at the achieve-
ment of legislative quality. It mainly concerns the scope and, to a lesser 
extent, character of the legislative standards which govern national imple-
menting legislation. With regard to the legislative standards’ substance, 
we have found a large measure of overlap with the standards codified in 
the framework of the OECD. These findings justify the conclusion that 
current international legal practice, as represented by the regimes that we 
have discussed in Part II, is only partly adequate in ensuring the quality of 
national implementing legislation.
In section 12.3 we have analysed whether the established inadequacy 
or partial adequacy is a problem that should be addressed on the interna-
tional level. We have argued that there is a gap to bridge, for which the 
codification of legislative standards on the international level, preferably in 




13.1 The research questions revisited
In the present study we have analysed the national legislature’s contribu-
tion to the realisation of international law. In particular, we have analysed 
its role in the implementation of international law in the national legal 
system in order to formulate an answer to the following research question:
To what extent is domestic implementing legislation regulated by international law and to 
what extent is this regulation adequate?
In our attempt to formulate an answer to this question we have adopted 
an international and institution-oriented approach which has specifically 
focused on the national legislature’s role as an institution in the implemen-
tation of international law in the domestic legal order. It also means that 
we have looked beyond the particular characteristics of individual national 
legal orders and their legislatures. Neither have we discussed how specific 
international legal instruments have been implemented in one or more 
national legal orders. Instead, we have analysed several international legal 
regimes in order to determine to what extent they provide for standards 
which should be observed by state parties in the adoption of implementing 
legislation in their respective domestic legal orders.
Our findings can be summarised as follows. As a point of departure 
we have formulated an answer to the question why implementing legisla-
tion is an essential precondition for the realisation of international law. As 
we have seen in Part I, even though there are some indications that their 
shared border is becoming increasingly permeable, the international and 
national legal orders can still be largely seen as distinct systems; ‘law’ of 
the international legal order often does not possess the quality of law in 
national legal orders. As a consequence, it is not capable of regulating the 
conduct of legal subjects directly. It means that an act of implementation 
is indispensable if international policy makers intend to realise the formu-
lated policy objectives. Subsequently we have explored the sources of 
international law which may give rise to national implementing legislation, 
as opposed to implementation through the executive or judicial branch of 
government. In quantitative terms, it seems justified to conclude that the 
lion’s share of obligations to adopt implementing legislation derives from 
treaty law. However, those obligations could also be derived from binding 
decisions of international organisations and, in exceptional circumstances, 
from customary international law.
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The obligation to adopt the necessary legislative measures to implement 
a binding international legal instrument is firmly engrained in international 
law. Nevertheless, in Part II we have established that there is no rule of 
general international law which prescribes how such implementation should 
be performed. Our analysis of various special international legal regimes, 
however, has revealed a diverse practice with regard to the regulation of 
implementing legislation: whereas some regimes stipulate in much detail 
the standards that national legislatures should comply with, other regimes 
provide hardly any guidance in this regard. Whenever international policy 
makers have considered it feasible to include legislative standards in the 
regime at hand, they tend to refer to the same standards. In other words: 
although there may not be a uniform practice with regard to the question 
whether legislative standards should be included in the regime, there seems 
to be consensus on which legislative standards should be included in case 
the regulation of implementation is deemed desirable.
Most regimes seem to adhere to the standard of effectiveness, which 
essentially prescribes that national implementing legislation should be able 
to bring about a desired change in behaviour. It is complemented with what 
we have labelled ‘subsidiary elements of effectiveness’. They are separate 
legislative standards, but are often treated as necessary preconditions for 
effectiveness. Under the ECHR, for instance, observance of the requirement 
of legal certainty was considered a sine qua non for ‘effective protection’. 
Therefore, it seems justified to describe the relation between the overarching 
standard of effectiveness and its subsidiary elements as hierarchical.
As we have derived from the international legal regimes we have 
discussed in Part II, the subsidiary elements of effectiveness include the 
following eight standards: consistency with other applicable national and 
international law, including the prohibition of non-discrimination; consulta-
tion with stakeholders; provision of information to the public; monitoring 
of compliance; enforcement; remedies; evaluation; and legal certainty.
The standard of consistency with applicable law demands that national 
implementing legislation is consistent with other norms applicable to the 
same subject matter, of national and international origin. In some cases, 
the international legal regime allows national legislatures to ‘fill in’ parts 
themselves. As we have seen under the CCTMW, for example, national 
legislatures are at liberty to label certain categories of waste as ‘hazardous’, 
thus bringing them under the treaty’s scope of application. In other cases, 
the international legal regime prescribes that national implementing legisla-
tion should not infringe on national laws of higher rank in order to prevent 
a national law to remain without effect. We have found similar references 
to applicable international law. Again, there are regimes which rely on 
other international norms (in a more or less compulsory manner) to fill in 
aspects of national implementing legislation. As we have seen in section 
4.2.3.4, national legislatures which perform their implementing obligations 
under article 12 ICESCR on sexual and reproductive health, should observe 
‘international guidelines and protocols established by UN agencies’. In 
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other cases, international law prescribes that national legislatures have to 
ensure that implementing legislation respects certain established norms of 
international law, such as the principles of territorial integrity of states or 
the principle of non-intervention. We have also found a legislative standard 
to perform consultation with relevant stakeholders. Which stakeholders 
are considered relevant, depends on the substance of the regime at hand. 
On the basis of our examination we may conclude that the purpose of 
consultation is to improve the substance of national implementing legis-
lation and to facilitate support after its entry into force. Furthermore, we 
have identified a legislative standard which demands that governments 
provide information on the newly adopted implementing legislation. This 
information should be aimed at groups which are particularly affected 
by the legislation. The legislative standard to monitor compliance with 
national implementing legislation requires states to establish mechanisms 
for compliance monitoring and ensure that state bodies entrusted with 
compliance monitoring are competent and independent. Once a violation 
of national implementing legislation has been established, another legisla-
tive standards comes into play: enforcement. It requires the appointment 
of national enforcement authorities and the adoption of a legal framework 
for the imposition of effective and proportionate penalties or other enforce-
ment measures in response to violation of domestic implementing legisla-
tion. In addition to these regulatory matters, this legislative standard also 
requires enforcement in practice. Another legislative standard requires states 
to provide for remedies available to individuals or entities affected. Such 
remedies provide them with the tools to challenge national implementing 
legislation and to enforce their rights. Furthermore, after its entry into force, 
states should engage in a periodic ex post evaluation of national imple-
menting legislation. This enables them not only to assess whether national 
implementing legislation is in conformity with the applicable international 
legal regime, but also how it could be improved. Finally, we have discerned 
the legislative standard of legal certainty. It requires national legislatures 
to draft national implementing legislation in sufficiently clear and precise 
terms and to ensure its accessibility and foreseeability.
Our analysis has demonstrated that the regimes explored in Part II do 
not consistently refer to every single one of the aforementioned legislative 
standards; those standards differ in scope of application. Even within a 
specified international legal regime, a legislative standard’s scope of appli-
cation may differ from one provision to the other. Moreover, the standards’ 
substance is not identical under the various regimes of which they are part; 
it would be inaccurate to state that ‘effective protection’ under the ECHR 
has the same substance as the principle of effectiveness under EU law. As 
a consequence, it would go too far to claim that the enumeration of the 
legislative standards mentioned above and the meaning attributed to them 
are in its entirety part of positive law to which the national legislature is 
bound. On the other hand, it would be equally inaccurate to ignore their 
common features. We have seen that the legislative standards do emerge 
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under several regimes, which may indicate that international policy makers 
somehow consider them relevant elements of domestic implementing 
legislation or legislative procedure. If we are aware of their limitations, our 
overview of the legislative standards inferred from international legal prac-
tice provides us with valuable insight in the way international law regulates 
national implementing legislation, as we have seen in Chapter 10.
Subsequently we have asked to what extent observance of the legisla-
tive standards discussed above will lead to ‘good legislation’ as part of an 
assessment of the legislative standards identified under international law. 
What constitutes ‘good legislation’ is highly contested. In Chapter 11 we 
have explored the various perspectives on this controversial subject. To this 
end we have analysed the legislative quality policies of the OECD, the EU, 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in more detail, in particular with 
regard to legislative standards. They represent four approaches to what 
legislative quality entails and how it should be achieved. In some respects 
they differ. Whereas some policies have been codified in documents widely 
used by national policy makers, other policies rely on the specialisation 
of highly trained legislative lawyers. And while some policies apply to 
regulation in general, other policies concern a specific form of regulation: 
legislation. We can also discern similarities, in particular with regard to 
the legislative standards which are considered indispensable elements of 
legislative quality.
We have seen that the notion of ‘effectiveness’, or the extent to which a 
piece of implementing legislation is able to bring about a desired change in 
behaviour, is central not only to many international legal regimes (which 
we have already argued above), but also to policies on legislative quality. 
It can be viewed as the overarching objective, the realisation of which is 
supported by observance of legislative standards of a subsidiary nature. 
However, this state of affairs does not warrant the conclusion that ‘legisla-
tive quality’ and ‘effectiveness’ are synonyms. As we have seen in Chapter 
11, this understanding of legislative quality is too narrow, because it exclu-
sively addresses the instrumental function of legislation, while ignoring 
other functions which could be attributed to legislation. For this reason, we 
have proposed the following definition of ‘quality of implementing legisla-
tion’: the national law’s ability, taking into account its function or functions, 
to achieve the aim or aims embedded in the international legal instrument. 
Subsequently we have established the relevance of legislative standards for 
the assessment of a law’s quality. Three categories of legislative standards 
can be distinguished: standards with regard to legislative substance, stan-
dards with regard to legislative form and standards with regard to legisla-
tive procedure.
As the next step in our assessment of the regulation of domestic imple-
menting legislation under international law, we have relied on the OECD’s 
legislative quality policy. This choice can be justified by the fact that it 
constitutes the only coherent policy on legislative quality with truly global 
aspirations, even though ‘western’ states are over-represented in the OECD 
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membership. In order to operationalise our comparison of the OECD’s 
legislative quality policy on the one hand, and our overview of interna-
tional legal practice with regard to the regulation of national implementing 
legislation on the other hand, we have looked at three aspects in particular: 
the scope, substance and binding character of the legislative standards.
What are the results of our endeavour? With regard to the legislative 
standards’ substance, international legal practice largely coincides with the 
OECD’s legislative quality policy: the legislative standards that we have 
identified under the international legal regimes discussed in Part II also 
emerge in the legislative quality policy of the OECD. They are not identical, 
however. For instance, while we have identified obligations to observe other 
relevant international legal norms in the adoption of national implementing 
legislation, the OECD emphasises the need for ‘global coherence’, i.e. 
consistency between various international regimes, in the regulation of the 
same subject matter. Other legislative standards may be less relevant in the 
adoption of national implementing legislation and, as a result, receive far 
less attention under the international legal regimes discussed in Part II than 
under the OECD’s legislative quality policy. Examples are the standard to 
perform ex ante impact assessments and the standard to perform a consulta-
tion process. Aside from these differences, the picture that emerges is one of 
consensus on the quality criteria that should be observed in the adoption of 
national (implementing) legislation; standards on the law’s clarity, ex post 
evaluation, compliance monitoring, enforcement and remedies, are part of 
both the international legal regimes discussed in Part II and of the OECD’s 
legislative quality policy.
Our comparison of the legislative standards’ character warrants the 
conclusion that legislative standards often possess a non-binding character, 
since they are laid down in soft law documents, such as implementing 
guidelines, legislative guides etc. In this respect, their character resembles 
the OECD’s legislative policy character, which is laid down in a non-
binding recommendation. Nevertheless, other legislative standards are 
firmly established in binding legal instruments, very often the international 
legal instrument that needs to be implemented on the national level.
Finally, with regard to the legislative standards’ scope, we have 
demonstrated that international legal practice is highly fragmented. This 
fragmentation has two dimensions. First, legislative standards which are 
part of international legal regimes, often do not apply to the regime in its 
entirety, but only to specific provisions. For instance, we have seen that the 
Guidelines for Implementation under the FCTC stipulate that domestic 
implementing measures ‘should identify the authority or authorities respon-
sible for enforcement, and should include a system both for monitoring 
compliance and for prosecuting violators’.1225 This requirement, however, is 
limited to articles 9 and 10 FCTC on the regulation of the content of tobacco 
1225 WHO, Guidelines for implementation (n 177) 45. The Guidelines contain an identical state-
ment with regard to article 8 of the Convention. Ibid, 26.
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products, including the publication of information about their content. It 
may lead to a situation in which legislative standards should be observed 
by the national legislature with regard to specific parts of national imple-
menting legislation only. This state of affairs cannot be justified from a legis-
lative quality perspective. Second, no codification of legislative standards 
applicable to implementing legislation exists under general international 
law. As a result, policy makers involved in the formulation and negotiation 
of a new international legal regime should ‘invent’ the legislative standards 
which they consider useful and include them in the regime at hand. This has 
led to the situation, as we have seen clearly in Part II, in which international 
legal regimes differ significantly in the way they prescribe the standards 
that should be met in the adoption of national implementing legislation. 
In contrast, the legislative quality policy adopted in the framework of the 
OECD applies to an unlimited number of regulations or laws in their entirety 
(even though they do not apply to implementing legislation in particular).
In sum, whereas international legal practice with regard to national 
implementing legislation is highly fragmented, the legislative quality 
policy developed under the auspices of the OECD can be said to improve, 
or at least seek to improve, coherence between member states’ legislative 
quality. This discrepancy is a gap to bridge, as we have argued in Chapter 
12, if we accept that state parties not only have an interest in making the 
international regime to which they have committed themselves work in 
practice, but also that the pursuit of legislative quality has an important role 
in ensuring the regime’s effectiveness.
13.2 The gap to bridge
Given this state of affairs, we have proposed to codify legislative standards 
applicable to national legislation which is adopted in order to implement 
international legal obligations. This document should not be applied rigidly, 
however, in the sense that it should prescribe a ‘one size fits all’ path to 
legislative quality. On the contrary, it should respect differences between 
national legal systems and the legislation they produce. In other words, our 
international codification of legislative standards should leave room for the 
national legislature to make the legislative choices which suits it the most 
(provided, of course, that those choices are in conformity with the state’s 
international commitments). This flexibility could be achieved by the adop-
tion of a non-binding document in which the various legislative standards 
are formulated in a sufficiently broad manner, which would make compli-
ance by a large number of states more likely. This ambition could be realised 
in a relatively short period of time, if this task is taken up by a group of 
experts (such as the ILC). In this way, we can contribute to the improvement 
of national implementing legislation, and thus to the effectiveness of inter-
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13.3 The international pursuit of high quality implementing 
legislation
Now we are approaching the end of the present study, it may be useful to 
briefly reflect on the pursuit of legislative quality on a more abstract level. 
As we have seen in Chapter 11, national, regional and international political 
communities have endeavoured to improve the quality of legislation or 
implementing legislation in particular, each of which has specific prioirities 
and features.
The question arises how these various developments relate to each 
other. Can we observe a convergence? Of the regimes discussed in Part II, 
one regime stands out because of its seniority: the EU. Its origins can be 
traced back to the 1950’s, which makes it significantly older than most of 
the other international legal regimes that we have discussed in Part II. Its 
development has been overseen on the basis of compulsory jurisdiction 
of the CJEU. Most importantly, the EU has proved to be able to produce a 
vast body of legislation which affects many aspects of the EU citizens’ lives. 
Arguably, the sheer size of the body of EU legislation and of its interpreta-
tion by the CJEU has made the quality of implementing legislation more 
pressing within the framework of the EU than under the other regimes that 
have been discussed in Part II. It may therefore not be a coincidence that 
the development of EU law is accompanied by a continuous elaboration of 
EU policies on the quality of legislation, as we have seen in Chapter 11. In 
this respect, it could be argued, the EU is ‘ahead’ of other international legal 
orders.
Is this point of view correct? Perhaps. On the one hand, national and 
international actors that are involved in the development of new ideas and 
policies aimed at the improvement of the quality of national implementing 
legislation, may wish to inform themselves about existing ideas and policies 
on the subject. To this end, they may turn to the EU’s or OECD’s legisla-
tive quality policy. In Chapter 12 we have made exactly that assumption, 
when we proposed the formulation of a non-binding policy document on 
the topic, with a view to enabling national and international policy makers 
across the globe to ensure legislative quality in their national or regional 
legal orders. On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that the quest 
for legislative quality does not necessarily point in one single direction. As 
we have seen in Chapter 11, controversy exists with regard to the question 
how the concept of legislative quality must be understood, and which 
legislative standards should play a role in its achievement. Arguably, as 
long as nation states remain the most prominent political entities in the 
international environment, theories and practices with regard to the quality 
of (implementing) legislation will be tailored to their particular needs. This 
also means that a legislative quality policy developed in a national legal 
order may not necessarily serve the needs of another legal order in which 
it is bluntly duplicated. Against this background, we find it difficult to 
imagine that one day, all legal communities will agree on one single binding 
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and highly detailed policy to enhance the quality of national implementing 
legislation. Until that day comes, if ever, national and international policy 
makers may prefer to borrow ideas and policies developed across their legal 
orders’ boundaries and attempt to reconcile them with their legal orders’ 
characteristics. The importance of this has been underlined by Karpen, who 
has stated that:
‘[i]f we understand why and how, in applying common standards, others legislate differ-
ently than we do, we are encouraged to compare and learn, and to improve our methods or 
retain our own legislative style’.1226
To this process, the present study may be a modest contribution.
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Summary in Dutch 
De implementatie van internationaal recht in de 
nationale rechtsorde: een wetgevingsperspectief
Samenvatting
Het vertrekpunt van dit proefschrift, getiteld ‘De implementatie van inter-
nationaal recht in de nationale rechtsorde: een wetgevingsperspectief’, is 
dat internationaal recht voor zijn verwezenlijking in belangrijke mate 
afhankelijk is van de organen van afzonderlijke staten en dat de rol van de 
wetgevende organen, zeker in vergelijking met de rol van rechters, weinig 
aandacht heeft gekregen in de literatuur. Het proefschrift richt zich daarom 
specifiek op de rol van de nationale wetgever bij de implementatie van 
internationaal recht en geeft antwoord op de vraag hoe implementatiewet-
geving onder internationaal recht is gereguleerd en in hoeverre die regu-
lering adequaat is. ‘Implementatie’ wordt in deze studie begrepen als de 
handeling waarmee een internationaalrechtelijke norm wordt geëffectueerd 
in de nationale rechtsorde. Met ‘nationale wetgever’ wordt gedoeld op het 
orgaan van de staat dat krachtens nationaal recht de bevoegdheid heeft om 
wetgeving vast te stellen.
Het antwoord op de hoofdvraag valt uiteen in twee onderdelen: een 
beschrijvende analyse van het bestaande, toepasselijke internationaal recht 
in deel II en een normatieve analyse van dat recht in deel III.
Deel I, getiteld ‘De implementatie van internationaal recht in de nati-
onale rechtsorde’, gaat in op de vraag waarom nationale wetgeving ter 
uitvoering van internationaal recht nodig is en uit welke rechtsbronnen 
verplichtingen voor staten voortvloeien om in de nationale rechtsorde 
dergelijke wetgeving vast te stellen. De eerste vraag, die centraal staat in 
hoofdstuk 2, raakt aan de verhouding tussen de internationale rechtsorde 
en de nationale rechtsorde. Deze verhouding moet naar de huidige stand 
van het recht bovenal als ‘dualistisch’ worden aangemerkt. Dat betekent dat 
de internationale rechtsorde en de nationale rechtsorde(s) als aparte rechts-
sferen moeten worden beschouwd.
Voor dit proefschrift is dat relevant in twee situaties. Ten eerste kan de 
situatie zich voordoen waarin een internationaalrechtelijk regime de staat 
een verplichting oplegt om op nationaal niveau wetgeving vast te stellen 
teneinde de in het regime geformuleerde doelen te verwezenlijken. Een 
voorbeeld hiervan is de verplichting, opgenomen in artikel 12, eerste lid, 
van het Afrikaans Handvest over de Waarden en Beginselen voor Open-
bare Dienst en Openbaar Bestuur, om wetgeving vast te stellen waarmee 
nationale anticorruptieautoriteiten worden opgericht. Dergelijke wetgeving 
wordt in het proefschrift ‘implementatiewetgeving in enge zin’ genoemd. 
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Ten tweede kan de situatie zich voordoen dat een internationale rechtsnorm 
niet doorwerkt in een nationale rechtsorde, ook al is zij zodanig geformu-
leerd dat zij in theorie geschikt zou zijn voor rechtstreekse toepassing in 
die rechtsorde. Een voorbeeld hiervan is het recht op leven, verankerd in 
artikel 2 van het Europees Verdrag tot bescherming van de Rechten van de 
Mens en de Fundamentele Vrijheden (EVRM), dat aan een individu wordt 
toegekend. De mate waarin internationaal recht doorwerkt in de nationale 
rechtsorde, hangt namelijk af van nationaal constitutioneel recht. Dit blijkt 
onder andere uit het feit dat een internationale rechtsnorm niet als ‘recht’ 
in de zin van een nationale rechtsorde kan worden aangemerkt totdat die 
norm op grond van nationaal recht die status verwerft, hetgeen op uiteen-
lopende manieren en onder verschillende voorwaarden gebeurt. Dergelijke 
wetgeving wordt in het proefschrift ‘incorporatiewetgeving’ genoemd.
Deze stand van zaken verklaart waarom implementatiewetgeving in 
ruime zin (hetgeen de hierboven omschreven implementatiewetgeving in 
enge zin en incorporatiewetgeving omvat) nodig is: internationaal recht is 
niet bij machte om eigenstandig, dus zonder dat nationaal constitutioneel 
recht hierin voorziet, rechtsposities binnen nationale rechtsordes te bepalen. 
Overigens is het vervolg van het proefschrift beperkt tot implementatiewet-
geving in enge zin; incorporatiewetgeving blijft verder buiten beschouwing.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt geïnventariseerd uit welke internationale rechts-
bronnen verplichtingen voor staten kunnen voortvloeien om op nationaal 
niveau implementatiewetgeving te kunnen vaststellen. Daarbij is gekeken 
naar drie rechtsbronnen in het bijzonder: verdragsrecht, gewoonterecht en 
bindende besluiten van internationale organisaties. Verplichtingen voor 
staten om implementatiewetgeving vast te stellen, zijn meestal onderdeel 
van verdragen. Dergelijke verdragen kunnen betrekking hebben op zeer 
uiteenlopende onderwerpen. Er zijn ook aanwijzingen dat in zeer uitzon-
derlijke situaties gewoonterecht een verplichting kan bevatten om op 
nationaal niveau wetgeving aan te nemen. Het (enige bekende) voorbeeld 
dat in hoofdstuk 3 is besproken, heeft betrekking op het verbod op foltering 
en het verbod op genocide. Deze verboden omvatten ook, zo lijkt het Joego-
slaviëtribunaal te suggereren, een verplichting voor staten om wetgeving 
aan te nemen ter bestraffing van foltering en genocide. Daarnaast kunnen 
bindende besluiten van internationale organisaties de plicht opleggen 
aan staten om op nationaal niveau wetgeving vast te stellen. Voorbeelden 
zijn enkele resoluties van de VN-Veiligheidsraad over terrorisme en over 
massavernietigingswapens, de Internationale Gezondheidsregeling van de 
Wereldgezondheidsorganisatie (ook al bestaat er een mogelijkheid tot een 
opt out), de ‘technische standaarden’ van de Internationale Organisatie voor 
Burgerluchtvaart en de Wereldmeteorologieorganisatie en de richtlijnen en 
verordeningen die worden vastgesteld in het kader van de Europese Unie 
(EU).
Internationaalrechtelijke normen kunnen als volgt worden ingedeeld. 
Er zijn normen die implementatie in de nationale rechtsorde behoeven 
en normen die niet hoeven te worden geïmplementeerd in de nationale 
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rechtsorde (zoals een verdrag tot vorming van een bondgenootschap tussen 
staten). De eerste categorie kan in drie groepen worden onderverdeeld: 
normen die moeten worden geïmplementeerd door de uitvoerende macht, 
normen die moeten worden geïmplementeerd door de rechtsprekende 
macht en normen die moeten worden geïmplementeerd door de wetge-
vende macht.
In dit proefschrift staat de laatstgenoemde categorie centraal, die op zijn 
beurt kan worden onderverdeeld in normen die een uitdrukkelijke verplich-
ting tot de vaststelling van implementatiewetgeving bevatten en normen 
die dat impliciet doen. Het verschil tussen deze twee (sub)categorieën is 
dat uit de tekst van een norm die onder de laatstgenoemde subcategorie 
valt, niet uitdrukkelijk wordt verwezen naar het vaststellen van wetgeving, 
maar naar aanverwante begrippen, zoals ‘maatregelen’ of ‘strategieën’. 
Indien de redactie van de internationaalrechtelijke norm de mogelijkheid 
openlaat dat ook de uitvoerende macht of de rechtsprekende macht zorg 
draagt voor de implementatie ervan op het nationale niveau, zal nationaal 
recht doorslaggevend zijn. Met andere woorden, dan bepaalt nationaal 
(constitutioneel) recht welke van de staatsorganen uitvoering moet geven 
aan de implementatieverplichting.
In deel II wordt geïnventariseerd hoe implementatiewetgeving onder 
huidig internationaal recht is gereguleerd, in het bijzonder in hoeverre dat 
recht wetgevingsstandaarden bevat. Met ‘wetgevingsstandaard’ wordt 
gedoeld op elk voorgeschreven materiële of formele kenmerk van nationale 
implementatiewetgeving of van de nationale implementatiewetgevings-
procedure. In dit deel wordt betoogd dat er geen wetgevingsstandaarden 
bestaan onder algemeen internationaal recht. Onder algemeen internationaal 
recht geldt als uitgangspunt dat staten verplicht zijn om op nationaal 
niveau de nodige maatregelen te nemen om te voldoen aan hun internatio-
naalrechtelijke verplichtingen; hoe zij echter aan die verplichting voldoen, is 
aan de betreffende staat zelf om te bepalen. Wetgevingsstandaarden kunnen 
daarentegen wel worden waargenomen onder bijzondere internationaal-
rechtelijke regimes. In deel II worden daartoe twee regimes uit elk van de 
volgende rechtsgebieden geanalyseerd: internationale mensenrechten, het 
recht van de EU, internationaal strafrecht, internationaal gezondheidsrecht, 
internationaal milieurecht en internationaal arbeidsrecht (hoofdstukken 4 
tot en met 9).
Op basis van de in deel II opgenomen inventarisatie kan de wetgevings-
standaard ‘doeltreffendheid’ als meest voorkomende wetgevingsstandaard 
worden aangemerkt. Andere wetgevingsstandaarden met een meer speci-
fiek karakter hebben betrekking op de consistentie met ander toepasselijk 
recht (waaronder het verbod op discriminatie), het vereiste om belangheb-
benden te consulteren bij het opstellen van implementatiewetgeving, het 
verstrekken van informatie over de vast te stellen implementatiewetgeving 
aan de doelgroep, het toezicht op de naleving van de implementatiewet-
geving, de handhaving, rechtsbescherming en evaluatie van de implemen-
tatiewetgeving. Daarnaast zijn er wetgevingsstandaarden die betrekking 
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hebben op formele aspecten van nationale implementatiewetgeving ter 
bescherming van de rechtszekerheid.
De in deel II opgenomen analyse laat zien dat de praktijk ten aanzien 
van de opneming van wetgevingsstandaarden in internationaalrechte-
lijke regimes gefragmenteerd is: waar sommige regimes in grote mate de 
kenmerken voorschrijven waaraan nationale implementatiewetgeving moet 
voldoen, laten andere regimes veel ruimte aan de wetgevende organen van 
staten om de nationale implementatiewetgeving en het daarbij horende 
wetgevingsproces vorm te geven. Ook binnen regimes bestaan verschillen 
tussen de toepassing van wetgevingsstandaarden bij de vaststelling van 
implementatiewetgeving ter uitvoering van dat regime; wetgevings-
standaarden worden niet altijd van toepassing geacht op het betreffende 
regime als geheel, maar soms ook slechts op bepaalde delen van dat regime. 
Bovendien bestaat er ook een uiteenlopende praktijk met betrekking tot het 
bindende karakter van de wetgevingsstandaarden: terwijl sommige wetge-
vingsstandaarden een duidelijke basis hebben in het bindende juridische 
instrument, zijn andere opgenomen in niet-bindende documenten zoals 
implementatierichtlijnen, implementatiehandboeken etc.
In deel III worden de inhoud en reikwijdte van deze gemeenschap-
pelijke kenmerken van implementatiewetgeving, oftewel de waargenomen 
wetgevingsstandaarden, verder uitgewerkt. Daarbij blijkt onder meer dat 
de wetgevingsstandaard ‘doeltreffendheid’ zich onder internationaal recht 
in verschillende formuleringen manifesteert. Daarnaast moet niet alleen 
de implementatiewetgeving zelf doeltreffend zijn, maar ook de toepassing 
ervan in de praktijk, althans onder het EVRM en het recht van de EU. Om 
te bepalen hoe de nationale wetgever op ‘doeltreffende’ wijze uitvoering 
kan geven aan een internationale verplichting tot de vaststelling van imple-
mentatiewetgeving, zal de wetgever de onderliggende verplichting moeten 
interpreteren. Ook daarbij speelt het vereiste van ‘doeltreffendheid’ een rol; 
het moet worden beschouwd als integraal onderdeel van de interpretatie 
van verdragsbepalingen ‘in het licht van het voorwerp en het doel’ van 
internationale verplichtingen, zoals is voorgeschreven in het Weens Verdrag 
inzake Verdragenrecht en de relevante jurisprudentie van het Internationaal 
Gerechtshof.
‘Doeltreffendheid’ is niet alleen de meest voorkomende wetgevingsstan-
daard, maar ook de overkoepelende wetgevingsstandaard. Er is met andere 
woorden sprake van een zekere hiërarchie tussen wetgevingsstandaarden. 
Deze hiërarchie kan worden opgemaakt uit de internationaalrechtelijke 
praktijk, waarbij de naleving van de ‘ondergeschikte’ wetgevingsstan-
daarden niet zelden als middel wordt gezien om de doeltreffendheid van 
het regime als geheel te bewerkstelligen.
Eén van die wetgevingsstandaarden is de standaard van rechtszeker-
heid, die van toepassing kan worden geacht op nationale implementa-
tiewetgeving ter uitvoering van het recht van de EU en van de positieve 
verplichtingen onder het EVRM. Deze wetgevingsstandaard houdt in dat 
nationale implementatiewetgeving duidelijk en nauwkeurig moet zijn 
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geformuleerd. Daarnaast moet de betreffende wetgeving toegankelijk 
en voorzienbaar zijn, zodat individuen zich kunnen informeren over de 
regels die op hen van toepassing zijn en over de juridische gevolgen van 
hun handelen. Een andere wetgevingsstandaard die kan worden afgeleid 
uit de in deel II besproken internationaalrechtelijke regimes is het vereiste 
van consistentie met toepasselijk nationaal of internationaal recht. Dit 
vereiste houdt in dat nationale implementatiewetgeving niet strijdig mag 
zijn met reeds bestaande wet- en regelgeving, waaronder ook het verbod 
op discriminatie kan worden begrepen. Hiermee wordt enerzijds de doel-
treffendheid van het regime beschermd, omdat naleving van dit vereiste 
voorkomt dat nationale implementatiewetgeving kan worden vernietigd 
wegens strijd met nationaal recht van een hogere rangorde. Anderzijds kan 
deze wetgevingsstandaard worden beschouwd als een bescherming van 
de soevereiniteit van staten, omdat het tot gevolg heeft dat het internatio-
naalrechtelijke regime geen gevolgen heeft voor reeds bestaande nationale 
wet- en regelgeving. Soms bevatten internationaalrechtelijke regimes ook 
verplichtingen om bij de vaststelling van nationale implementatiewetge-
ving reeds bestaande internationale normen in acht te nemen. Voorts kan 
een wetgevingsstandaard worden waargenomen die de nationale wetgever 
verplicht om belanghebbenden te consulteren bij de opstelling van nationale 
implementatiewetgeving. Dit heeft tot doel het bevorderen van de steun 
voor en de kwaliteit van de betreffende wet. Weer een andere wetgevings-
standaard benadrukt het belang van de verstrekking van informatie over 
de vast te stellen of vastgestelde nationale implementatiewetgeving. De 
informatie moet in het bijzonder worden verstrekt aan de doelgroepen van 
deze wetgeving. De wetgevingsstandaard die verplicht tot het houden van 
toezicht op de naleving van nationale implementatiewetgeving, die onder 
enkele van de in deel II besproken regimes kan worden gevonden, omvat 
de instelling van een toezichtsmechanisme op nationaal niveau. Onder het 
Maritiem Arbeidsverdrag houdt deze wetgevingsstandaard onder meer in 
dat inspectie-organisaties de nodige expertise moeten bezitten en onafhan-
kelijk moeten zijn. Bovendien moeten de inspecteurs bekleed zijn met de 
benodigde bevoegdheden om hun toezichttaak goed te kunnen uitoefenen. 
Wanneer wordt vastgesteld dat de toepasselijke nationale implementa-
tiewetgeving is overtreden, schrijven meerdere internationaalrechtelijke 
regimes voor dat sancties moeten worden opgelegd. Dit omvat de verplich-
ting voor staten om de bevoegde autoriteiten aan te wijzen en te voorzien in 
de nodige wettelijke grondslagen voor de oplegging van handhavingsmaat-
regelen. Vervolgens moeten staten de mogelijke handhavingsmaatregelen 
ook daadwerkelijk gebruiken. Ook kan onder enkele internationaalrechte-
lijke regimes een wetgevingsstandaard worden waargenomen die staten 
verplicht om rechtsmiddelen open te stellen voor individuen, zodat zij hun 
op grond van nationale implementatiewetgeving verkregen rechten ook 
daadwerkelijk kunnen afdwingen. Als laatste wetgevingsstandaard kan 
een verplichting voor staten om nationale implementatiewetgeving ex post 
te evalueren worden genoemd. Hiermee kan niet alleen worden nagegaan 
519024-L-sub01-bw-Beenakker
Processed on: 18-4-2018
326 Summary in Dutch 
of de implementatiewetgeving in de betreffende staat overeenstemt met 
de vereisten van het internationaalrechtelijke regime, maar ook worden 
vastgesteld of de nationale implementatiewetgeving kan worden verbeterd.
Vervolgens wordt beoordeeld in hoeverre die gemeenschappelijke 
kenmerken leiden tot een regulering van implementatiewetgeving die als 
‘adequaat’ kan worden aangemerkt. Om dit begrip te operationaliseren, 
wordt het begrepen als ‘in overeenstemming met de vereisten van goede 
wetgeving’. Daartoe bevat hoofdstuk 11 een bespreking van het wetge-
vingskwaliteitsbeleid in Nederland, het Verenigd Koninkrijk, de EU en de 
Organisatie voor Economische Samenwerking en Ontwikkeling (OESO). 
Hoewel hun wetgevingskwaliteitsbeleid van elkaar verschilt, bestaat 
duidelijke overeenstemming in de wetgevingsstandaarden die ervan deel 
uit maken en die als vereisten voor goede wetgeving worden beschouwd.
Voortbouwend op de vier besproken voorbeelden van wetgevingskwa-
liteitsbeleid wordt in hoofdstuk 11 een definitie voorgesteld van ‘goede 
implementatiewetgeving’, waarbij het vertrekpunt is dat de kwaliteit van 
een specifieke wet uitsluitend kan worden beoordeeld in het licht van de 
functie van die wet: het vermogen van een nationale wet om, met het oog op 
de functie of functies van die wet, de doelstelling of doelstellingen die zijn 
neergelegd in het internationale instrument te behalen. De toepassing en de 
naleving van wetgevingsstandaarden worden gebruikt om vast te stellen 
in hoeverre sprake is van een ‘goede’ implementatiewet. Deze standaarden 
kunnen kunnen betrekking hebben op de gevolgde procedure, of op de 
vorm of inhoud van de betreffende wet.
Ten slotte wordt in hoofdstuk 12 de vraag beantwoord in hoeverre 
de internationaalrechtelijke regulering van implementatiewetgeving 
voldoet aan de in hoofdstuk 11 besproken vereisten van goede wetgeving. 
Daarbij worden in het bijzonder de in het kader van de Organisatie voor 
Economische Samenwerking en Ontwikkeling (OESO) geformuleerde 
wetgevingsstandaarden als maatstaf genomen, omdat zij, anders dan de 
standaarden die deel uit maken van het Nederlandse of Britse wetgevings-
kwaliteitsbeleid of het wetgevingskwaliteitsbeleid van de EU, het enige 
regime is met een internationaal perpectief. Deze vergelijking vindt plaats 
aan de hand van de reikwijdte, de aard en de inhoud van de wetgevings-
standaarden. Ten aanzien van de reikwijdte is een belangrijk verschil dat de 
wetgevingsstandaarden die zijn geformuleerd in het kader van de OESO 
van toepassing zijn op een in beginsel onbeperkt aantal wetten die door 
de nationale wetgever worden voorbereid en vastgesteld. Bij afwezigheid 
van een regulering van nationale implementatiewetgeving onder algemeen 
internationaal recht zijn de wetgevingsstandaarden die zijn verankerd in 
een internationaalrechtelijk regime uitsluitend van toepassing op de natio-
nale implementatiewet die ter uitvoering van dat specifieke regime wordt 
vastgesteld. Een ander belangrijk verschil is dat de onder de auspiciën 
van de OESO ontwikkelde wetgevingsstandaarden van toepassing zijn op 
wetgeving in het algemeen, en niet in het bijzonder op implementatiewet-
geving. Ten aanzien van de aard van de wetgevingsstandaarden is er ook 
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een duidelijk verschil tussen het OESO-regime de internationaalrechtelijke 
praktijk: waar de wetgevingsstandaarden van de OESO zijn neergelegd 
in een niet-bindende ‘aanbeveling’ aan de OESO-staten, zijn de wetge-
vingsstandaarden die we onder de in deel II besproken regimes hebben 
waargenomen deels neergelegd in juridisch bindende documenten en 
deels in juridisch niet-bindende documenten. Ten aanzien van de inhoud 
van de wetgevingsstandaarden valt vooral de grote overeenkomst op: de 
wetgevingsstandaarden die deel uitmaken van de internationaalrechtelijke 
praktijk komen ook terug in de aanbeveling van de OESO. Op basis van 
deze vergelijking kan worden vastgesteld dat internationale beleidsmakers 
zich bewust zijn van de standaarden die kunnen bijdragen aan goede 
implementatiewetgeving; dit bewustzijn heeft echter niet geleid tot een 
coherente verankering of toepassing van die wetgevingsstandaarden onder 
internationaal recht.
Deze stand van zaken zou kunnen en moeten worden verbeterd door te 
voorzien in een codificatie in internationaal verband van wetgevingsstan-
daarden voor nationale implementatiewetgeving. Die codificatie moet wel 
voldoende flexibel zijn om de bestaande verschillen tussen rechtssystemen 
en wetgevingspraktijken van staten te accommoderen. Die flexibiliteit kan 
op twee manieren worden bereikt: door te kiezen voor codificatie in een 
niet-bindend document en door de formulering van de betreffende wetge-
vingsstandaarden in bewoordingen die ze geschikt maken voor gebruik 
door uiteenlopende rechtssystemen en wetgevingspraktijken. Een dergelijk 
document zal behulpzaam zijn voor zowel nationale als internationale 
beleidsmakers en komt de kwaliteit van nationale implementatiewetgeving 
ten goede, zonder op onaanvaardbare wijze afbreuk te doen aan het demo-
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